1 December 2006, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Maurice Koster
Rationing and cost sharing problems are at the heart of the literature on distributive justice. This talk will be devoted to the most popular solution concepts in both models and highlight existing relations between them. The approach will be axiomatical; desirability of a solution is expressed by its properties and, in particular, combinations of these by which it is characterized. Here the central property is consistency, pertaining to variations of the relevant set of agents dealing with the problem. It envisions the idea of fairness of solutions at all levels of cooperation, for any subgroup of agents, according to which no subgroup should want to re-contract. Here I will present a formulation of the property for the cost sharing context, which relates to that in the rationing context in a natural way. It can be used to make a clear-cut distinction between the most popular cost sharing rules, the proportional, Shapley-Shubik, and serial rule.