Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

13 September 2007, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Krzysztof Apt

Speaker: Krzysztof Apt
Title: Sequential Groves Mechanisms for Public Project Problems
Date: Thursday 13 September 2007
Time: 16:00
Location: Room P.327, Euclides Building, Plantage Muidergracht 24, Amsterdam


This talk will deal with the problem of mechanism design for public project problems.

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This motivated recent research in designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit.

We first show that, in contrast to the case of the auction mechanisms considered in [Cavallo '06] and [Guo and Conitzer '07], for the public project problems no feasible Groves mechanism can reduce the deficit inherently present in VCG mechanism.

This brings us to a study of sequential Groves mechanisms. We show that then other dominant strategies than truth-telling may exist and that in the case public project problems they can be used to reduce deficit.

The talk will be self-contained and all the relevant notions will be introduced and motivated. Based on a joint work with Arantza Estévez-Fernández.

For more information, see or contact Ulle Endriss ().

The websites of the UvA make use of cookiesThis site uses cookies More informationMore info Hide this message XHide X