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Institute for Logic, Language and Computation


11 June 2010, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Daniele Porello

Speaker: Daniele Porello
Title: Modelling Multilateral Negotiation in Linear Logic
Date: Friday 11 June 2010
Time: 15:00
Location: Room A1.04, Science Park 904, Amsterdam

Abstract

We show how to embed a framework for multilateral negotiation, in which a group of agents implement a sequence of deals concerning the exchange of a number of resources, into linear logic. In this model, multisets of goods, allocations of resources, preferences of agents, and deals are all modelled as formulas of linear logic. Whether or not a proposed deal is rational, given the preferences of the agents concerned, reduces to a question of provability, as does the question of whether there exists a sequence of deals leading to an allocation with certain desirable properties, such as maximising social welfare. Thus, linear logic provides a formal basis for modelling convergence properties in distributed resource allocation. This is joint work with Ulle Endriss.

For more information, see http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/ or contact Ulle Endriss ().


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