Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

11 February 2011, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Vincent Conitzer

Speaker: Vincent Conitzer (Duke)
Title: Solving Complete-Information Voting Games by Backward Induction
Date: Friday 11 February 2011
Time: 16:00
Location: Room A1.10, Science Park 904, Amsterdam

Game-theoretic analyses of strategic voting are generally troubled by equilibrium selection problems. In this talk, I will discuss our work on two complete-information models (where the preferences are common knowledge among the voters) that lead to a unique outcome. In one, the voters vote in sequence; in the other, there are multiple binary issues that are sequentially voted on by the voters. We consider a number of related questions, including how to compute the solution (involving a relation to compilation complexity), paradoxes, comparisons to truthful voting, and communication complexity.

This is joint work with Lirong Xia and Jérôme Lang.

For more information, see, or contact Ulle Endriss ().

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