BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2019/newsitem/10906/28 ---29-November-2019-Mental-Representations-in-a-Me chanical-World-Bochum-Germany DTSTAMP:20190523T183329 SUMMARY:Mental Representations in a Mechanical Wor ld, Bochum, Germany DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20191128 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20191129 LOCATION:Bochum, Germany DESCRIPTION:The concept of representation is ubiqu itous in cognitive science and in the philosophy o f mind. Neural representations are postulated by n euroscientists to explain sub-personal phenomena s uch as the processing of visual information in the brain, while mental representations are taken to explain person-level phenomena, such as imaginatio n, or consciousness. But non-representationalists contend that postulating representations of any so rt is unnecessary or problematic. This workshop in vestigates the status of representations in a mech anical account of the mind and cognition. One core question will be whether the status of neural and mental representation is equally problematic. A s econd core question concerns the relationship betw een neural and mental representations. Speakers: Joe Dewhurst (LMU), Carrie Figdor (Iowa), Jolien F rancken (Amsterdam), Matej Kohar (RUB), Beate Kric kel (RUB), Marcin Milkowski (Polish Academy of Sci ences) and Karina Vold (Cambridge). A number of f urther presentation slots have been reserved for i nterested scholars selected by double-blind peer r eview process. The contributions should be suitabl e for a 30 minute presentation. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
The conce pt of representation is ubiquitous in cognitive sc ience and in the philosophy of mind. Neural repres entations are postulated by neuroscientists to exp lain sub-personal phenomena such as the processing of visual information in the brain, while mental representations are taken to explain person-level phenomena, such as imagination, or consciousness. But non-representationalists contend that postulat ing representations of any sort is unnecessary or problematic. This workshop investigates the status of representations in a mechanical account of the mind and cognition. One core question w ill be whether the status of neural and mental rep resentation is equally problematic. A second core question concerns the relationship between neural and mental representations.
\n\nSpeakers: Joe Dewhurst (LMU), Carrie Figdor (Iowa), Jolien F rancken (Amsterdam), Matej Kohar (RUB), Beate Kric kel (RUB), Marcin Milkowski (Polish Academy of Sci ences) and Karina Vold (Cambridge).
A number of further presentation slots have been reserved for interested scholars selected by double-blind peer review process. The contributio ns should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation .