2 - 3 March 2017, Consequence and Paradox between Truth and Proof, Tuebingen, Germany
The notion of logical consequence has been traditionally analysed as necessary truth-preservation, and such an analysis is at the core of contemporary model-theoretic approaches to semantics. An alternative approach to semantics is inferentialism, according to which the notions of inference and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of reference, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory.
Inferentialism has mostly been developed in opposition to the more traditional semantic approach. However, the tight relationships between the basic concepts involved in the two approaches suggest a more complex interplay than mere opposition. Many of the central notions (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g. interpolation) in logic usually have both a model-theoretic and a proof-theoretic dimension. Moreover, the notions of truth and proof, when conceived as the central notions of a theory of meaning, share many of their core features.
This complex interplay between truth and proof can be found in current debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to paradoxes are motivated sometimes by traditional semantic considerations, sometimes by considerations about the structural features of our inferential practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires resources coming from both model-theoretic and inferential conceptions of language and meaning.
The aim of the workshop is to bring together researchers working on different aspects of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange ideas and methods and discuss recent results.
If you would like to contribute a talk (30-45 minutes), then please send a one-page abstract to Luca Tranchini at cptp-cfp at informatik.uni-tuebingen.de. The deadline for submission is 15 December 2016.