BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2016/newsitem/8320/18- --19-November-2016-Workshop-The-relevance-of-logic -for-human-reasoning-Munich-Germany DTSTAMP:20161031T142002 SUMMARY:Workshop 'The relevance of logic for human reasoning', Munich, Germany DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20161118 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20161119 LOCATION:Munich, Germany DESCRIPTION:Much has been discussed lately about t he relevance of formal logic (including probabilit y theory) to the normativity of reasoning, as well as to the psychology of reasoning. Is it correct to diagnose human ratiocinative/argumentative perf ormance as rational or irrational on the basis of claims about logical validity or consistency? Does the fact that we sometimes fail to comply to cert ain logical standards in an apparently rational wa y show that logic is irrelevant to the norms of th ought? Following Harman (1986), one might reach th e conclusion that logic is not specially relevant to reasoning after all. Or, maybe, logic is specia lly relevant to human reasoning -- but not in the way we initially thought. Relatedly, logic and pro bability theory are extensively used by psychologi sts to model and make predictions about inferentia l performances. The workshop is intended to foster investigation about these and related topics. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
Much has been discussed lately about the relevance of forma l logic (including probability theory) to the normativity of reasoning, as well as&nbs p;to the psychology of reasoning. Is it c orrect to diagnose human ratiocinative/argumentati ve performance as rational or irrational on the ba sis of claims about logical validity or consistenc y? Does the fact that we sometimes fail to comply to certain logical standards in an apparently rati onal way show that logic is irrelevant to the norm s of thought? Following Harman (1986), one might r each the conclusion that logic is not specially re levant to reasoning after all. Or, maybe, logic is specially relevant to human reasoning -- but not in the way we initially thought. Relatedly, logic and probability theory are extensively used by psy chologists to model and make predictions about inf erential performances. The workshop is intend ed to foster investigation about these and related topics.
URL:http://www.mcmp.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/ev ents/workshops/container/relevance_of_logic/index. html CONTACT:andreas.kapsner at lrz.uni-muenchen.de END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR