BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/1104/12- December-2005-Logic-and-Game-Reading-Group-Special -Event-Martin-van-Hees-University-of-Groningen-Dep artment-of-Philosophy- DTSTAMP:20051201T000000 SUMMARY:Logic and Game Reading Group, Special Even t, Martin van Hees (University of Groningen, Depar tment of Philosophy) ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Martin van Hees (University of Groningen, Department of Philosophy) DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20051212T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20051212T163000 LOCATION:P3.27, Euclides Building, Plantage Muider gracht, Amsterdam DESCRIPTION:My object here is twofold. In the firs t part I will try to explain why it is important f or rational choice theory to incorporate intention s in its framework. In doing so I shall not yet go into the question whether intentions can be defin ed in terms of strategies, preferences, or beliefs or in any other ingredient of the existing models ; I simply introduce intentions as an extra variab le and then introduce some conditions that one mig ht impose on them. I argue that the conditions tha t I use reveal new information about the behaviour of rational individuals and that intentions thus do indeed add something to rational choice theory. Whereas the first part is somewhat formal, the second part is of a more informal nature. Here I w ill address the question of how certain intentions are to be defined in terms of specific rational c hoice models. It is argued that a particular class of intentions, viz. intentions that have autonomo us effects, cannot be modelled by standard rationa l choice theory in a satisfactory way. For more information: oroy at science.uva.nl X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
\n My object here is twofold. In the first part I wil l try to explain why it is important for rational choice theory to incorporate intentions in its fra mework. In doing so I shall not yet go into the qu estion whether intentions can be defined in terms of strategies, preferences, or beliefs or in any o ther ingredient of the existing models; I simply i ntroduce intentions as an extra variable and then introduce some conditions that one might impose on them. I argue that the conditions that I use reve al new information about\n the behaviour of rational individuals and that intentions thus do indeed add something to rational choice theory.\n
\nWhereas the first part is some what formal, the second part is of a more informal nature. Here I will address the question of how c ertain intentions are to be defined in terms of sp ecific rational choice models. It is argued that a particular class of intentions, viz. intentions t hat have autonomous effects, cannot be modelled by standard rational choice theory in a satisfactory way.\n
\n \n\n For mo re information: oroy at science.uva.nl\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/1104/12- December-2005-Logic-and-Game-Reading-Group-Special -Event-Martin-van-Hees-University-of-Groningen-Dep artment-of-Philosophy- END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR