Universiteit van Amsterdam

Events

Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.

26 November 2019, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Zoi Terzopoulou

Speaker: Zoi Terzopoulou (ILLC)
Title: Strategic Manipulation with Incomplete Preferences
Date: Tuesday 26 November 2019
Time: 15:30
Location: Room F3.20, Science Park 107, Amsterdam

Abstract

Many websites that recommend various services use crowdsourcing to collect reviews and rankings. These rankings, usually concerning a subset of all the offered alternatives, are then aggregated. Motivated by and generalising upon such scenarios, we axiomatise a family of positional scoring rules for profiles of possibly incomplete individual preferences. But many opportunities arise for the agents to manipulate the outcome in this setting. They may lie in order to obtain a better result by: (i) switching the order of a ranked pair of alternatives, (ii) omitting some of their truthful preferences, or (iii) reporting more preferences than the ones they truthfully hold. After formalising these new concepts, we characterise all positional scoring rules that are immune to manipulation. This talk is based on is joint work with Justin Kruger.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.

Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.