BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Events/Upcoming-Events/newsitem
/1771/15-March-2007-Logics-for-Dynamics-of-Informa
tion-and-Preferences---Special-Working-sessions-Fr
ançois-Lepage-Universite-de-Montreal-
DTSTAMP:20070308T000000
SUMMARY:Logics for Dynamics of Information and Pre
ferences - Special Working sessions, François Lepa
ge (Universite de Montreal)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:François Lepage (Universite
de Montreal)
DTSTART:20070315T140000
DTEND:20070315T000000
LOCATION:P3.27, Euclides Building, Plantage Muider
gracht 24, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:There are two very different ways to r
epresent the dynamics of belief. One is the well k
nown conditionalization: An agent whose belief fun
ction is represented by a probability function Pr(
X) shifts to Pr(X ∧ A)/Pr(A) after discovering tha
t A is the case. An other kind of dynamics is asso
ciated with the evaluation of a counterfactual: Pr
(A > B) = Pr_A(B) where Pr_A is obtained from Pr b
y some minimal change to obtain Pr _A(A) = 1. This
is Imaging as introduced by David Lewis. After
a characterization of Lewis imaging, we ask the q
uestion of the possibility of extending imaging to
the general framework of conditional probability
functions, i.e. of the possibility of defining - g
iven that conditional probability function Pr(X, Γ
) is the primitive notion - Pr(A > B,Γ) using imag
ing. We show that there is no simple and intuitive
way to do so. For more information, see http:/
/staff.science.uva.nl/~oroy/Working_sessions/
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n There are
two very different ways to represent the dynamics
of belief. One is the well known conditionalizatio
n: An agent whose belief function is represented b
y a probability\n function Pr(X) shifts to
Pr(X ∧ A)/Pr(A)\n after discovering t
hat A is the case. An other kind of\n dynam
ics is associated with the evaluation of a counter
factual: Pr(A > B) = Pr_A(B) where Pr_A is obta
ined from Pr by some minimal change to obtain Pr _
A(A) = 1. This is Imaging as introduced by David L
ewis.\n

\n \n After a characte
rization of Lewis imaging, we ask the question of
the possibility of extending imaging to the genera
l framework of conditional probability functions,
i.e. of the possibility of defining - given that c
onditional probability function Pr(X, Γ) is t
he primitive notion - Pr(A > B,Γ) using im
aging. We show that there is no simple and intuiti
ve way to do so.\n

\n \n \n
For more information, see http://staff.science.uva.nl/~oroy/Working
_sessions/\n

\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Events/Upcoming-Events/newsitem
/1771/15-March-2007-Logics-for-Dynamics-of-Informa
tion-and-Preferences---Special-Working-sessions-Fr
ançois-Lepage-Universite-de-Montreal-
END:VEVENT
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