BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2009/newsitem/3058/29- October-2009-Logic-and-Cognition-Seminar-Alistair- Isaac DTSTAMP:20091028T000000 SUMMARY:Logic and Cognition Seminar, Alistair Isaa c ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Alistair Isaac DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20091029T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20091029T180000 LOCATION:Room A.106, Science Park 904, Amsterdam DESCRIPTION:Peirce first identified abduction as a type of inference distinct from induction and ded uction. He claimed that abduction permeates every aspect of human thought, from low-level perception to scientific theory choice. In contemporary phil osophy, abduction is frequently considered only in the latter capacity, as a form of high-level scie ntific reasoning. In A.I., abduction is closely as sociated with the frame problem, the problem of ho w to determine relevance. Again, however, philosop hers tend to identify this as a problem only for h igh-level reasoning. Fodor, for example, argues th at low-level perceptual processes are encapsulated , and thus immune to the challenges of holistic re asoning, like abduction. In this talk I provide an overview of several different perspectives on abd uction. I argue that the fundamental stumbling blo ck for formal models of abduction is its inherentl y creative character. I conclude with a defence of Peirce’s original insight, arguing that empirical research on perception is a field from which mode ls of abduction in other domains (such as scientif ic reasoning) can and should draw inspiration. Fo r more information contact Nina Gierasimczuk at N. Gierasimczuk at uva.nl. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
\n Peirce first identified abduction as a type of inf erence\n distinct from induction and deduct ion. He claimed that\n abduction permeates every aspect of human thought, from\n low- level perception to scientific theory choice. In\ n contemporary philosophy, abduction is fre quently considered\n only in the latter cap acity, as a form of high-level\n scientific reasoning. In A.I., abduction is closely\n associated with the frame problem, the problem o f how to\n determine relevance. Again, how ever, philosophers tend to\n identify this as a problem only for high-level\n reasonin g. Fodor, for example, argues that low-level\n perceptual processes are encapsulated, and thu s immune to the\n challenges of holistic re asoning, like abduction. In this talk\n I p rovide an overview of several different perspectiv es on\n abduction. I argue that the fundam ental stumbling block for\n formal models o f abduction is its inherently creative\n ch aracter. I conclude with a defence of Peirce&rsqu o;s\n original insight, arguing that empiri cal research on\n perception is a field fro m which models of abduction in other\n doma ins (such as scientific reasoning) can and should draw\n inspiration.
\n \nF or more information contact Nina Gierasimczuk\nat N.Gierasimczuk a t uva.nl.
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2009/newsitem/3058/29- October-2009-Logic-and-Cognition-Seminar-Alistair- Isaac END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR