BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3540/20- September-2010-Public-communication-in-games-of-im perfect-information-Sunil-Simon DTSTAMP:20100912T000000 SUMMARY:Public communication in games of imperfect information, Sunil Simon ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Sunil Simon DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100920T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100920T000000 LOCATION:CWI, Science Park 123, Room L017 DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The standard way of modellin g imperfect information in games is in terms of in formation partitions for players. In this view, ea ch player is associated with an equivalence relati on over the set of game positions. For multi-playe r games of imperfect information defined in this m anner it turns out that most of the interesting al gorithmic questions like determining the winning s trategy and synthesis of an equilibrium profile ar e undecidable. The crucial element which yields un decidability is the ability of the game model to i mplicitly encode arbitrary private communication b etween players. In this light, we propose a model where the players' information partitions are gene rated explicitly by means of communication. We def ine a notion of locally consistent equilibrium and suggest that this better captures the intuition o f stable behaviour of players. We show that when c ommunication is by means of public announcements, it is decidable to check whether locally consisten t equilibrium profile exists. This work is join t with R. Ramanujam (IMSc., Chennai). For more in formation, contact Krzysztof Apt at apt at cwi.nl. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
Abstract : The standard way of modelling imperfect informat ion in games\n is in terms of information p artitions for players. In this view, each\n player is associated with an equivalence relation over the set of game\n positions. For mult i-player games of imperfect information defined in \n this manner it turns out that most of th e interesting algorithmic\n questions like determining the winning strategy and synthesis of an\n equilibrium profile are undecidable. T he crucial element which yields\n undecidab ility is the ability of the game model to implicit ly encode\n arbitrary private communication between players. In this light, we\n propo se a model where the players' information partitio ns are\n generated explicitly by means of c ommunication. We define a notion of\n local ly consistent equilibrium and suggest that this be tter captures\n the intuition of stable beh aviour of players. We show that when\n comm unication is by means of public announcements, it is decidable to\n check whether locally con sistent equilibrium profile exists.\n
\ n\n This work is joint with R. R amanujam (IMSc., Chennai).
\n \nF or more information, contact Krzysztof Apt at apt at cwi.nl .
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3540/20- September-2010-Public-communication-in-games-of-im perfect-information-Sunil-Simon END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR