Universiteit van Amsterdam

Events

Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.

10 December 2010, Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and their Social Inefficiency, Orestis Telelis (U Liverpool, UK)

Speaker: Orestis Telelis (U Liverpool, UK)
Date: Friday 10 December 2010
Time: 11:00
Location: room L016, CWI, Science Park 123, Amsterdam

We study formally discrete bidding strategies for the game induced by the Generalized Second Price (GSP) keyword auction mechanism. Such strategies have seen experimental evaluation in the recent literature within iterative best response procedures, which have been shown not to converge.

We give a detailed definition of iterative best response under these strategies and, under appropriate discretization of the players' strategy spaces we find that the discretized configurations space contains socially optimal pure Nash equilibria. We cast discrete strategies under a new light, by studying their performance for bidders that act based on local information; we prove bounds for the worst-case ratio of the social welfare of locally stable configurations, relative to the socially optimum welfare. Finally we discuss open problems regarding convergence of discrete strategies and the social welfare of stable configurations for Keyword Auctions under the GSP mechanism.

For more information, contact

Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.