Universiteit van Amsterdam


Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

11 January 2018, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Zoi Terzopoulou

Speaker: Zoi Terzopoulou
Title: Modelling Iterative Judgment Aggregation
Date: Thursday 11 January 2018
Time: 15:00
Location: Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam


We introduce a formal model of iterative judgment aggregation, enabling the analysis of scenarios in which agents repeatedly update their individual positions on a set of issues, before a final decision is made by applying an aggregation rule to these individual positions. Focusing on two popular aggregation rules, the premise-based rule and the plurality rule, we study under what circumstances convergence to an equilibrium can be guaranteed. We also analyse the quality, in social terms, of the final decisions obtained. Our results not only shed light on the parameters that determine whether iteration converges and is socially beneficial, but they also clarify important differences between iterative judgment aggregation and the related framework of iterative voting. (This is joint work with Ulle Endriss.)