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Institute for Logic, Language and Computation


5 October 2012, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Mees de Vries and Ruben Brokkelkamp

Speaker: Mees de Vries and Ruben Brokkelkamp
Date: Friday 5 October 2012
Time: 16:30
Location: Room B0.203, Science Park 904, Amsterdam

Abstract

We consider generalized congestion games, a class of games in which players share a set of strategies and the payoff functions depend only on the chosen strategy and the number of players playing the same strategy, in such a way that fewer such players results in greater payoff. In these games we consider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich, such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, and prove that ordered best response improvement paths are finite, while ordered better response improvement paths may still be infinite.

For more information, see http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/ or contact Ulle Endriss ().


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