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EMBEDDINGS OF HEYTING ALGEBRAS

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Embeddings of Heyting Algebras

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ABSTRACT: In this paper we study embeddings of Heyting Algebras. It is pointed out that such embeddings are naturally connected with Derived Rules. We compare the Heyting Algebras embeddable in the Heyting Algebra of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), i.e. the free Heyting Algebra on countably infinitely many generators, and those embeddable in the Heyting Algebra of Heyting’s Arithmetic (HA). A partial result is obtained. We show that every recursively enumerable prime Heyting Algebra is embeddable in the Heyting Algebra of HA*, a ‘natural’ extension of HA.

1 Introduction

This paper sprung from an interest in the Heyting Algebras of Constructive Arithmetical Theories. This interest was in its turn inspired by an interest in the Propositional Derived Rules of constructive Arithmetical Theories. We study and compare four specific Heyting Algebras in some detail:

- The free Heyting Algebra on countably infinitely many generators, in other words: the Heyting Algebra $\mathcal{H}_{IPC}$ of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC).
- The Heyting Algebra $\mathcal{H}_{HA}$ of Heyting’s Arithmetic (HA).
- The Heyting Algebra $\mathcal{H}_{HA*}$ of $B\Sigma_1$-sentences in HA (here $B\Sigma_1$ is the set of Boolean (or perhaps more appropriately: Brouwerian) combinations of $\Sigma_1$-sentences).
- The Heyting Algebra $\mathcal{H}_{HA*}$ of HA*, an arithmetical theory studied in Visser[82].

We ask ourselves which RE Heyting Algebras can be embedded in our target algebras. As we will see the answer to this question also determines what the Propositional Derived Rules for the various theories are. A complete answer has only been obtained for $\mathcal{H}_{HA*}$. All RE algebras of which one could reasonably expect it, i.e. those satisfying the property of primenes (corresponding to satisfying the disjunction property), are embeddable in $\mathcal{H}_{HA*}$, and in consequence, only rules directly derivable in intuitionistic logic are rules under which HA* is closed. This property of HA* is a nice one —and in a surprising manner enables one to prove some properties of HA itself— but it does not seem to hold for more usual theories. Neither in $\mathcal{H}_{HA}$, nor in $\mathcal{H}_{IPC}$ itself can all these algebras be embedded, since both these theories validate many
additional rules not derivable in intuitionistic logic, the best known being:
\[ \neg A \rightarrow (B \lor C) \lor (\neg A \rightarrow B) \lor (\neg A \rightarrow C). \]  
(Independence of Premiss Rule)

It is even an interesting open question whether in $\mathcal{S}_\text{HA}$ and in $\mathcal{S}_\text{IPC}$ the same Heyting algebras can be embedded. This is where $\mathcal{F}_\text{HA}$ comes in: it is possible to show that in $\mathcal{F}_\text{HA}$ and in $\mathcal{F}_\text{IPC}$ at least the same finitely generated Heyting algebras can be embedded. It follows that rules validated by formal arithmetic when one restricts oneself to substitutions of propositional combinations of $\Sigma_1$-sentences, and rules validated by the propositional calculus are the same.

We state some sample results:

- Any RE prime Heyting Algebra $\mathcal{H}$ can be embedded in $\mathcal{S}_\text{HA}$. (5.1)
- There are $\Sigma_1$-sentences A and B such that the subalgebra of $\mathcal{S}_\text{HA}$ generated by A and B is RE, non-recursive. (7)
- Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a Heyting Algebra on finitely many generators, which is embeddable in $\mathcal{F}_\text{IPC}$. Then $\mathcal{H}$ is the Heyting Algebra of a finitely axiomatizable IPC-theory. (2.3)
- Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a Heyting Algebra on finitely many generators. Then $\mathcal{H}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{F}_\text{HA}$ if $\mathcal{H}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{F}_\text{IPC}$. (6.2)

The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we define Heyting algebras in the presentation most useful to our purposes. In section 2 we introduce the notion of embedding and a connected notion of propositional formulas exactly provable for sentences of a theory. Propositional formulas with no iterations of implications on the left (NNIL formulas) turn out to play an important role. In section 3 and 4 necessary facts about HA and IPC, and HA* respectively, are given. In section 5 the above mentioned `RE universality' of HA* is proved. In section 6 $\mathcal{F}_\text{HA}$ is treated. Finally, in section 7 it is shown that, in consequence of the previous results, there is a Heyting algebra on two generators which is RE, but non-recursive, that can be embedded in $\mathcal{S}_\text{HA}$, whereas such an algebra could never be embeddable in $\mathcal{F}_\text{HA}$ or $\mathcal{F}_\text{IPC}$.

1.1 Acknowledgements: Most of the results of this paper were obtained during an exceptionally inspiring visit of both authors to the Katedra Logiky of Prague University and the Institute of Computer and Information Science of the Czech Academy of Sciences. We thank the Prague logicians for their wonderful hospitality.
Some of the main methods employed in this paper were invented by Volodya Shavrukov (see Shavrukov[93]) and further developed and simplified by Domenico Zambella (see Zambella[92]). The work of Shavrukov and Zambella concerns embeddings of RE Diagonalizable Algebras into Diagonalizable Algebras of Classical Arithmetical Theories.

A major tool of the present paper is also Pitts’s Uniform Interpolation Theorem (see Pitts[92]).

1.2 The classical case: Before going on, let’s briefly look at the Boolean Algebras of classical Arithmetical Theories. The Boolean Algebras of all consistent RE arithmetical theories extending Q are isomorphic to the free Boolean Algebra on \( \aleph_0 \) generators, i.e. to the Boolean Algebra of the Classical Propositional Calculus, say: \( \mathfrak{B}_{CPC} \). As far as we can trace this result is folklore. It follows from three observations. First: the Boolean Algebras of all consistent RE arithmetical theories extending Q are countably infinite and (by Rosser’s Theorem, see also 1.4) atomless. Second: \( \mathfrak{B}_{CPC} \) is countably infinite and atomless. Third: all countably infinite atomless Boolean Algebras are isomorphic.

It is not difficult to show that every countable Boolean Algebra can be embedded into \( \mathfrak{B}_{CPC} \).

1.3 Heyting Algebras: A Heyting Algebra \( \mathcal{H} \) is a structure \( \langle H, \land, \lor, \bot, \to \rangle \), where \( \langle H, \land, \lor, \bot \rangle \) is a lattice with bottom \( \bot \). We demand that \( \mathcal{H} \) is non-trivial, i.e. that \( H \) contains at least two elements. Let \( x \leq y \) be defined by \( x \lor y = y \). \( \to \) is a binary operation satisfying: \( x \land y \leq z \iff x \leq (y \to z) \). It is easily seen that if a partial order can be extended to a Heyting Algebra such an extension is unique. Heyting Algebras can be shown to be distributive lattices. Conversely every finite distributive lattice determines a Heyting Algebra.

There are many good sources for Heyting Algebras. We just mention van Troelstra & van Dalen[88b].
We will write:
- \( T := \bot \rightarrow \bot, \)
- \( \neg x := x \rightarrow \bot, \)
- \( x \leftrightarrow y := (x \rightarrow y) \land (y \rightarrow x), \)
- \( \mathcal{H} \models A(x) \iff A(x) = T, \)

where \( A \) is a polynomial in \( \land, \lor, \bot, \rightarrow \) and \( x \) is a sequence of elements of \( \mathcal{H}. \)

Note that \( \mathcal{H} \) can be recovered from \( \models, \) since \( A(x) = B(y) \iff \mathcal{H} \models A(x) \iff B(y). \)

Define:
- \( \hat{f}:\mathcal{H} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{K} :\iff \hat{f} \) is an embedding of \( \mathcal{H} \) into \( \mathcal{K} \)
- \( \mathcal{H} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{K} :\iff \exists \hat{f}:\mathcal{H} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{K} \) for some \( \hat{f} \)
- \( \mathcal{H} \equiv \mathcal{K} :\iff \mathcal{H} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{K} \) and \( \mathcal{K} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{H} \)

Clearly \( \sqsubseteq \) is a preorder on Heyting Algebras with induced equivalence relation \( \equiv. \)

1.3.1 **Example:** Equivalent Heyting Algebras need not be isomorphic.

It is easily seen that any linear order with endpoints determines a Heyting Algebra. E.g. we find: \( x \rightarrow y := T \) if \( x \leq y, \) \( x \rightarrow y := y \) if \( y < x. \) Moreover an embedding of linear orderings determines an embedding of Heyting Algebras. Consider the algebras given by the real interval \([0,1]\) and by \([0,1/2] \cup \{1\}. \) On the one hand these algebras are equivalent, on the other they are not isomorphic.

Let \( T \) be any consistent theory in constructive propositional logic or in constructive predicate logic. We take \( \mathcal{H}_T \) to be the obvious Heyting Algebra given by the T-provable equivalence classes. Sometimes we will consider only equivalence classes of a subset \( X \) of the language of \( T, \) which is closed under the propositional connectives. In this case we write: \( \mathcal{H}_T(X). \)

We can go from theory to algebra. Obviously it is sometimes natural to go back and recover theories from algebras. We introduce some notions relevant to this motion, which is executed by choosing a set of generators.
- A **numbered** Heyting Algebra \( H \) is a pair \( (\hat{f}, \mathcal{H}), \) where
  1. \( \hat{f} \) is a function (not necessarily injective) from either \( n = \{0, \ldots, n-1\} \) or \( \omega \) to \( H \);
(ii) $\mathcal{S}$ is generated by the range of $\bar{f}$.

- A numbered Heyting Algebra is \textit{finitely based} if $\text{dom}(\bar{f})$ is finite.
- $\ll\mathcal{S}\ll := \{\langle f, \mathcal{S} \rangle | \langle f, \mathcal{S} \rangle \text{ is finitely based and } \mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{S} \}$
- $\mathcal{L}_v$ is the language of IPC if $v = \omega$, and the language of IPC restricted to $p_0, \ldots, p_{n-1}$ if $v = n$. We often write $\mathcal{L}$ for $\mathcal{L}_\omega$.
- For $A \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{dom}(\bar{f})}$: $H \models A \iff H \models A[\bar{f}]$, where $A[\bar{f}]$ is the result of substituting $f_i$ for $p_i$ in $A$ (for each relevant $i$). It is pleasant to use $\models$ also when $A$ contains $p_j$ for $j \notin \text{dom}(\bar{f})$. In this case we substitute $T$ for $p_j$.
- $\text{Th}(H) := \{A \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{dom}(\bar{f})} | H \models A\}$.

1.3.2 \textbf{Fact:} Let $H = (\bar{f}, \mathcal{S})$ be a numbered Heyting Algebra. Then $\mathcal{S}$ is isomorphic to $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Th}(H)}$.

\textbf{Proof:} Trivial. \hfill $\Box$

Define:

- A numbered Heyting Algebra $H$ is RE if $\text{Th}(H)$ is RE.
- A Heyting Algebra is RE if it can be extended to an RE numbered Heyting Algebra.

Note that the Heyting Algebra of an RE theory is RE.

Let $T$ be any theory and let $\bar{f}$ be a function from the propositional variables to the language of $T$. We write $A[\bar{f}]$ for the result of substituting the $f(p_i)$ for $p_i$ in $A$. Define:

- $A \vdash_T B \iff \forall \bar{f} T \vdash A[\bar{f}] \Rightarrow T \vdash B[\bar{f}]$.

We say that the inference form $A$ to $B$ is an \textit{IPC-derived rule for $T$}. Since all derived rules we will consider in this paper are IPC-derived we will suppress the ‘IPC’.

IPC-derived rules are studied in detail by V.V. Rybakov. A good reference is Rybakov[92], where it is shown that the IPC-derived rules for IPC are decidable.

1.3.3 \textbf{Fact}

i) $A \vdash_T B \iff \forall H \in \ll\mathcal{S}|| (H \models A \Rightarrow H \models B)$

ii) $\ll\mathcal{T}|| \ll\mathcal{S}||$ and $A \vdash B \Rightarrow A \vdash_T B$.

iii) $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{S} \Rightarrow \ll\mathcal{S}|| \ll\mathcal{S}||$. 

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Proof: Obvious.

1.4 The density of Heyting Algebras of Arithmetical Theories

Evidently many properties of Heyting Algebras are not captured by embeddability results (see example 1.3.1). Such properties are not the main subject of this paper, yet they at least merit a brief comment here. Moreover many properties of the Boolean Algebra of Classical Arithmetical Theories can be generalized to the constructive case. We briefly illustrate this for the property of density.

Let i-Q be the constructive version of Robinson’s Arithmetic.

1.4.1 Fact: The Heyting Algebra of a consistent RE extension of i-Q is dense, i.e. between every two points there is a third one.

Proof: Fix a consistent RE extension of i-Q, say T. Let □ stand for (the formalization of) provability in T. Consider any two sentences A and B such that □(A→B) and not □(B→A).

Interpolated Remark: The usual proof of this theorem for the classical case would be as follows. Take the Rosser sentence R of T+B+A. I.e. something like:

\[ T\vdash R \iff □((B\land\neg A)\rightarrow R) \leq □((B\land\neg A)\rightarrow R), \]

holds. Here ≤ is the witness comparison relation, which is defined between formulas having an outer existential quantifier. There are two witness comparison relations, which are defined as follows:

- \((\exists x \, Dx \leq \exists y \, Ey) := \exists x (Dx \land \forall y < x \neg Ey),\)
- \((\exists x \, Dx < \exists y \, Ey) := \exists x (Dx \land \forall y \leq x \neg Ey).\)

The element between A and B will be: C := (A\lor(B\land R)). In constructive logic one cannot even conclude from the data that T+B+A is consistent. The correct constructive proof is just a slight variation on the classical argument. End of Remark

Define by the fixed point theorem a sentence R such that (verifiably in T):

\[ R \iff □((B\land R)\rightarrow A) \leq □(B\rightarrow(A\lor R)). \]

Let S := □(B→(A∨R)) < □((B∧R)→A) and C := (A∨(B∧R)). Clearly □(A→C) and
\(\Box(C \rightarrow B).\)

We have:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box(C \rightarrow A) & \quad \rightarrow \Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \\
& \quad \rightarrow R \lor S.
\end{align*}
\]

On the other hand:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \land R & \quad \rightarrow \Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \land \Box R \\
& \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).
\end{align*}
\]

And:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \land S & \quad \rightarrow \Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \land \Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \\
& \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).
\end{align*}
\]

Combining we find: \(\Box(C \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).\) Ergo not \(\Box(C \rightarrow A).\)

Also we have:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box(B \rightarrow C) & \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \\
& \quad \rightarrow R \lor S.
\end{align*}
\]

On the other hand:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \land S & \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \land \Box S \\
& \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \land \Box \neg R \\
& \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).
\end{align*}
\]

And:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \land R & \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow (A \lor R)) \land \Box((B \land R) \rightarrow A) \\
& \quad \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).
\end{align*}
\]

Combining we find: \(\Box(B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow \Box(B \rightarrow A).\) Ergo not \(\Box(C \rightarrow A).\) \(\Box\)

2 Embeddings of Heyting Algebras in Free Heyting Algebras

Every Heyting Algebra on countably many generators is the homomorphic image of \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC}.\) In other words: it is the Heyting Algebra of some theory in IPC. On the other hand not every Heyting Algebra on countably many generators can be embedded into \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC}.\) First of all \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC}\) is prime, i.e.: \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC} \models (x \lor y) \Rightarrow (\mathfrak{H}_{IPC} \models x \lor \mathfrak{H}_{IPC} \models y),\) or, in other words: IPC has the disjunction property. Clearly subalgebras inherit primeness. In this section we illustrate that many countable prime Heyting Algebras are not embeddable in \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC}.\) We provide some information about the Heyting Algebras on finitely many generators that are embeddable in \(\mathfrak{H}_{IPC}.\) The problem of giving a neat characteri-
zation of the algebras embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$ is still open.

Whenever ‘$\vdash$’ is used without exhibiting a theory we intend provability in IPC.

2.1 **Example:** There are many non-trivial derived rules for IPC. For example:

- $\vdash (\neg A \to A) \to (A \lor \neg A)$ \Rightarrow $\vdash \neg A \lor \neg A$ (De Jongh[82])
- $\vdash \neg A \to (B \lor C) \Rightarrow \vdash (\neg A \to B) \lor (\neg A \to C)$ (Independence of Premiss Rule)

This means that every embeddable algebra $\mathcal{I}$ will satisfy:

- $\mathcal{I} \models (\neg A \to A) \lor (A \lor \neg A) \Rightarrow \mathcal{I} \models \neg A \lor \neg A$
- $\mathcal{I} \models \neg A \to (B \lor C) \Rightarrow \mathcal{I} \models (\neg A \to B) \lor (\neg A \to C)$.

2.2 **Example:** We give an infinitary derived rule. Let $F_n(p)$ be an enumeration of the formulas presenting the non-top elements of the Rieger Nishimura Lattice. (For information about this lattice, see e.g.: Troelstra & van Dalen[88a], p49.) We have:

- (For all $n \vdash F_n(A) \to B$ ) \Rightarrow $\vdash B$.

It follows that in an embedded Heyting Algebra for any x there can be no element between the $F_n(x)$ and the top.

**Proof:** Suppose for all $n \vdash F_n(A) \to B$. Let $p$ be a propositional variable not in $A$ and $B$. It follows that for all $n: \vdash F_n(p) \to ((p \leftrightarrow A) \to B)$. By Pitts[92] there is a uniform pre-interpolant of $(p \leftrightarrow A) \to B$ w.r.t. to the variables in this formula unequal to $p$. This means that there is a formula $C$ with just $p$ free such that for any formula $D$ containing no variables of $A$ or $B$ we have:

- $\vdash D \to ((p \leftrightarrow A) \to B) \leftrightarrow \vdash D \to C$.

(Following Pitts we could write the formula $C$ as: $\forall q((p \leftrightarrow A) \to B)$, where $q$ represents the propositional variables in $A,B$.) It follows that for every $n: \vdash F_n(p) \to C$. Ergo (since $C$ only contains $p$) $\vdash C$ and hence $\vdash ((p \leftrightarrow A) \to B)$. Substituting $A$ for $p$ we find:

- $\vdash B$.  

2.3 **Theorem:** Every Heyting Algebra on finitely many generators that is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$ is the Heyting Algebra of a finitely axiomatizable IPC theory.

**Proof:** Suppose the generators of the algebra go to $A_1, \ldots, A_n$. We have:

- $\vdash B(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \leftrightarrow \vdash ((p_1 \leftrightarrow A_1) \land \ldots \land (p_n \leftrightarrow A_n)) \to B(p_1, \ldots, p_n)$. 

8
We suppose that \( \{p_1,\ldots,p_n\} \cap \text{VAR}(A) = \emptyset \) and \( \text{VAR}(B) \subseteq \{p_1,\ldots,p_n\} \). Now let C be the Pittslean post-interpolant of \((p_1 \leftrightarrow A_1) \land \ldots \land (p_n \leftrightarrow A_n))\) w.r.t. the variables in the \( A_i \). So, if these variables are \( q \), we could write C as: \( \exists q((p_1 \leftrightarrow A_1) \land \ldots \land (p_n \leftrightarrow A_n)) \). The only variables of C are the \( p_i \) and we have: \( \vdash B(A_1,\ldots,A_n) \iff \vdash C \rightarrow B \). □

Which formulas \( C \) are axioms of Heyting Algebras on finitely many generators that are embeddable in \( \mathcal{S} \). We call such \( C \) IPC-exactly provable. In this paper we will abbreviate IPC-exactly provable by exact. So \( C(p_1,\ldots,p_n) \) is exact if there are \( A_1,\ldots,A_n \) such that for all \( B(p_1,\ldots,p_n) \): \( \vdash B(A_1,\ldots,A_n) \iff \vdash C \rightarrow B \). The notion of exactly provable formula was introduced in De Jongh[82].

Clearly by the above the exactly provable formulas are precisely those which are provably equivalent to Pitts' formulas of the form \( \exists q((p_1 \leftrightarrow A_1) \land \ldots \land (p_n \leftrightarrow A_n)) \), where \( q \) contains precisely the variables occurring in the \( A_i \) and where none of the \( p_j \) is in \( q \).

We say that \( A \) is prime if \( \mathcal{S}_{\text{IPC}+A} \) is prime, i.e. \( \text{IPC}+A \) is consistent and \( \text{IPC}+A \) has the disjunction property:

- for all \( B,C \in \mathcal{L} \): \( \vdash A \rightarrow (B \lor C) \Rightarrow \vdash A \rightarrow B \) or \( \vdash A \rightarrow C \).

In an alternative formulation, adhering to the convention that the empty disjunction is \( \bot \), IPC is prime if for every finite set of formulas \( X \):

\[ \vdash A \rightarrow \bigvee X \Rightarrow \exists B \in X \vdash A \rightarrow B. \]

We give some properties of exact formulas and provide some special classes of such formulas. Our primary aim is to show that the prime NNIL-formulas are all exact. NNIL-formulas are formulas with No Nestings of Implications to the Left. Let's define NNIL more precisely. Let \( \text{Sub}(A) \) be the set of subformulas of \( A \). We have:

- \( A \) is in NNIL iff for all \( (B \rightarrow C) \in \text{Sub}(A) \): \( B \) does not contain \( \rightarrow \).

NNIL-formulas were studied in Visser[85] and Renardel[86]. The lemmas we give, can, however, also be used to establish exactness for more formulas than our target class. The result on NNIL will be used in the proof of 6.2.

2.4 **Observation:** If \( A \) is exact, then \( A \) is prime.
2.5 Observation: Suppose \( p \) does not occur in \( A \). Then \( (p\rightarrow A)\land B \) is exact if \( B[p:=p\land A] \) is.

Proof: Let \( \bar{\tau} \) be the embedding for \( B[p:=p\land A] \). We show that \( \bar{\varphi} := [p:=p\land A] \circ \bar{\tau} \) is the embedding for \((p\rightarrow A)\land B \). We have for \( C \) with variables from \( p,A,B \):

\[
\vdash C[\bar{\varphi}] \iff \vdash C[p:=p\land A] \bar{\tau}
\]

\[
\iff \vdash B[p:=p\land A] \rightarrow C[p:=p\land A]
\]

\[
\iff \vdash ((p\rightarrow A)\land B) \rightarrow C.
\]

(The last equivalence from left to right is because \( \vdash (p\rightarrow A) \iff (p\leftrightarrow(p\land A)) \). From right to left is by substituting \( p\land A \) for \( p \).

We say that a formula is confined if it is a conjunction of formulas of the form \( p\rightarrow B \). A formula is strictly confined if it is confined and if for any two distinct conjuncts the antecedent variables are different. (We consider \( \top \) as the empty conjunction, so \( \top \) is strictly confined.)

2.6 Corollary: Any confined formula is exact.

Proof: Suppose \( A \) is confined. First rewrite \( A \) to a strictly confined formula \( A' \) by merging different conjuncts \( p\rightarrow B \) and \( p\rightarrow C \) to \( p\rightarrow (B\land C) \). Suppose \( A' \) is of the form \((p\rightarrow D)\land E \). This formula is equivalent to \( A^* := ((p\rightarrow D[p:=\top])\land E) \). According to observation 3 \( A^* \) is exact if \( A^* := E[p:=(p\land D[p:=\top])] \). Clearly \( A^* \) is again a strictly confined formula with less conjuncts than \( A' \). Repeat the procedure till all conjuncts are eliminated and we end up with \( \top \). \( \top \) is exact by the identity substitution.

Note that it follows that confined formulas are prime.

2.7 Observation Suppose \( p \) does not occur in \( A \). Then \( (p\land A) \) is exact if \( A \) is.

Proof: Suppose \( \bar{\tau} \) is the embedding for \( A \). Take \( \bar{\varphi} := [p:=\top] \circ \bar{\tau} \). Then \( \bar{\varphi} \) is the embedding for \((p\land A) \). Let the variables of \( B \) be among the variables of \((p\land A) \), we have:

\[
\vdash B[\bar{\varphi}] \iff \vdash B[p:=\top]\bar{\tau}
\]

\[
\iff \vdash A\rightarrow B[p:=\top]
\]

\[
\iff \vdash (p\land A) \rightarrow B.
\]
2.8 **Theorem:** Every prime NNIL-formula is exact.

2.8.1 **Lemma:** Suppose $p$ does not occur in $A$. Then $A$ is prime if $(p \wedge A)$ is.

**Proof:** Suppose $(p \wedge A)$ is prime. Let $X$ be a finite set of formulas and suppose $\vdash A \rightarrow \forall X$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $p$ does not occur in $X$. It follows that $\vdash (p \wedge A) \rightarrow \forall X$ and hence $\vdash (p \wedge A) \rightarrow B$ for some $B \in X$. By substituting $\top$ for $p$ we find: $\vdash A \rightarrow B$.

**Proof of 2.8:** Let $A$ be a NNIL-formula. We will reduce $A$ to a formula $A_0$. The formula $A_0$ satisfies one of the following properties: (i) $A_0$ is confined or (ii) $A_0$ is a prime NNIL-formula and has strictly less propositional variables than $A$. Moreover we have: if $A_0$ is exact, then $A$ is exact. In the first case we are done, in the second case we repeat the procedure.

**Step 1:** We first remove $\top$ and $\bot$ from $A$ by the obvious procedure. This only fails when we end up with either $\top$ or $\bot$. We cannot end up with $\bot$, since $A$ was supposed to be prime and hence non-refutable. If we end up with $\top$, then $A$ is exact by the identity substitution. If we do not end up with $\top$ go on to step 2.

**Step 2:** Write $A$ in disjunctive normal form (treating the implications as atoms). Since $A$ is prime, it is equivalent with one of its disjuncts, say $A'$. $A'$ is a conjunction of atoms and implications. If the number of atoms is zero go on to step 3. Otherwise write $A'$ in the form $p \wedge C$. Clearly $p \wedge C$ is equivalent to $p \wedge (C[p := \top])$. Put $A_0 := C[p := \top]$.

**Step 3:** $A'$ is a conjunction of implications. Reduce subformulas of the form $(B \wedge C) \rightarrow D$ to $(B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$ and subformulas of the form $(B \vee C) \rightarrow D$ to $(B \rightarrow D) \wedge (C \rightarrow D)$. Repeat the procedure till no such subformulas are left. Let $A_0$ be the result. Since $A'$ was in NNIL, clearly $A_0$ is confined.
3 Some useful facts about IPC and HA

In this section we provide some technical preliminaries to the result of section 5.

We suppose the reader is familiar with Kripke models for IPC (see Troelstra & van Dalen[88a], or Smorynski[73]). To fix notations: a Kripke model is a structure \( \mathcal{K} = (K, \leq, \models) \), where \( K \) is a non-empty set of nodes, \( \leq \) is a partial ordering, \( \models \) is the atomic forcing relation: it is a relation between nodes and propositional atoms, satisfying: \( k \leq k' \) and \( k \models p \Rightarrow k' \models p \). The relation \( \models \) can be extended to the full language of IPC in the standard way. We write \( \mathcal{K} \models A \) for: \( \forall k \in K \ k \models A \). A rooted Kripke model \( \mathcal{K} \) is a structure \( (K, k_0, \leq, \models) \), where \( (K, \leq, \models) \) is a Kripke model and where \( k_0 \in K \) is the bottom element w.r.t. \( \leq \). For any \( k \in K \) \( \mathcal{K}[k] \) is the model \( (K', k, \leq', \models') \), where \( K' := \{ k' | k \leq k' \} \) and where \( \leq' \) and \( \models' \) are the restrictions of \( \leq \) respectively \( \models \) to \( K' \). (We will often simply write \( \leq \) and \( \models \) for \( \leq' \) and \( \models' \).)

3.1 The Henkin construction: A set \( X \) is adequate if it is finite, closed under subformulas and contains \( \bot \). A set \( \Gamma \) is \( X \)-saturated if:

(i) \( \Gamma \subseteq X \),

(ii) \( \Gamma \not\models \bot \),

(iii) \( \Gamma \vdash A, A \in X \Rightarrow A \in \Gamma \),

(iv) \( \Gamma \vdash (B \lor C), (B \lor C) \in X \Rightarrow B \in \Gamma \) or \( C \in \Gamma \).

The Henkin model \( \mathcal{H}_X \) has as nodes the \( X \)-saturated sets and as accessibility relation \( \subseteq \).

The atomic forcing in the nodes is given by: \( \Gamma \models p \iff p \in \Gamma \). We have by a standard argument: for \( A \in X \): \( \Gamma \models A \iff A \in \Gamma \).

3.2 Definitions

i) Let \( K \) be a set of Kripke models. \( M(K) \) is the model with nodes \( \langle k, \mathcal{K} \rangle \) for \( k \in \mathcal{K} \in K \) and ordering: \( \langle k, \mathcal{K} \rangle \leq \langle m, \mathcal{M} \rangle \iff \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{M} \) and \( k \leq_M m \). As atomic forcing we take:

- \( \langle k, \mathcal{K} \rangle \models p \iff k \models p \).

(In practice we will forget the second components of the new nodes, pretending the domains to be disjoint already.)

ii) Let \( \mathcal{K} \) be a Kripke model. \( B(\mathcal{K}) \) is the rooted model obtained by adding a new bottom \( b \) to \( \mathcal{K} \) and by taking: \( b \models p \iff \mathcal{K} \models p \). We write \( \text{Glue}(K) := BM(K) \).

3.3 Push Down Lemma: Let \( X \) be adequate. Suppose \( \Delta \) is \( X \)-saturated and \( \mathcal{K} \models \Delta \). Then \( \text{Glue}(\mathcal{H}_X[\Delta], \mathcal{K}) \models \Delta \).
**Proof:** We show by induction on $A \in X$ that $b \vdash A \iff A \in \Delta$. The cases of atoms, conjunction and disjunction are trivial. If $(B \rightarrow C) \in X$ and $b \vdash (B \rightarrow C)$, then $\Delta \vdash (B \rightarrow C)$ and hence $(B \rightarrow C) \in \Delta$. Conversely suppose $(B \rightarrow C) \in \Delta$. If $b \not\vdash B$, we are easily done. If $b \vdash B$, then $B \in \Delta$, hence $C \in \Delta$ and by the Induction Hypothesis: $b \vdash C$. □

We say that $\Delta$ is prime if it is consistent and:

for every $(C \lor D) \in \mathcal{U}$: $\Delta \vdash (C \lor D) \Rightarrow \Delta \vdash C$ or $\Delta \vdash D$.

**3.4 Theorem:** Suppose $X$ is adequate and $\Delta$ is $X$-saturated. then $\Delta$ is prime.

**Proof:** $\Delta$ is consistent by definition. Suppose $\Delta \vdash C \lor D$ and $\Delta \not\vdash C$ and $\Delta \not\vdash D$. Suppose $\mathcal{K} \vdash \Delta$, $\mathcal{K} \not\vdash C$, $\mathcal{M} \vdash \Delta$ and $\mathcal{M} \not\vdash D$. Consider Glue($\mathcal{H}_X(\Delta), \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}$). By 3.3 we have: $b \vdash \Delta$. On the other hand by persistence: $b \not\vdash C$ and $b \not\vdash D$. Contradiction. □

**3.5 A big model:** Construct a Henkin model by taking as nodes $\langle \Gamma, X \rangle$, where $X$ is adequate and $\Gamma$ is $X$-saturated. Take $\langle \Gamma, X \rangle \leq \langle \Delta, Y \rangle : \Leftrightarrow \Gamma \subseteq \Delta$ and $X \subseteq Y$. Also: $\langle \Gamma, X \rangle \vdash p : \Leftrightarrow p \in \Gamma$. Then for all $A \in \mathcal{U}$: $\langle \Gamma, X \rangle \models A \iff \Gamma \vdash A$. The proof, which uses 3.4, is left to the industrious reader. □

**3.6 Formalization in HA:** We first formalize Kripke completeness for finite models in Peano Arithmetic (PA). Noting that the model existence theorem yields a multi-exponential bound $E$ on the size of the Henkin model we formulate the result as follows: $PA \vdash \forall A((\forall \mathcal{K} \leq E(\mathcal{A}) \mathcal{K} \models A) \rightarrow IPC \vdash A)$. Noting that the formula proved is $\Pi_2$, we see that by a theorem due to Kreisel: $HA \vdash \forall A((\forall \mathcal{K} \leq E(\mathcal{A}) \mathcal{K} \models A) \rightarrow IPC \vdash A)$. Since the converse is readily verifiable in HA we find:

$HA \vdash \forall A((\forall \mathcal{K} \leq E(\mathcal{A}) \mathcal{K} \models A) \leftrightarrow IPC \vdash A)$.

So IPC-provability is decidable in HA.

In intuitionistic theories even subsets of the singleton set are not decidable. We, however, assume that the finite sets that we are using, e.g. in the construction of the Henkin model, are coded as numbers and hence provably finite and decidable. Under this convention whether a finite set is $X$-saturated or not becomes decidable, given the decidability of IPC-provability.
We leave it to the reader to verify 3.3 and 3.4 in HA (assuming $K$ to be a finite set of finite models, etc.). Note that the reductio reasoning in 3.4 is harmless because of decidability.

### 3.7 Theorem:
Let $X$ be a prime, RE set of IPC-formulas, closed under IPC-consequence. Without loss of generality we may assume that $X$ is given by a recursive increasing sequence of finite approximations $X_i$. We assume that $X_0 = \emptyset$. Say, this sequence is presented by the $\Delta_1$-formula $\xi(i,x)$. Then we can represent $X$ by a sequence $\langle Y_i, Z_i \rangle$, where:

i) $X = \bigcup Y_i$,

ii) $i < j \Rightarrow (Y_i \subseteq Y_j$ and $Z_i \subseteq Z_j)$

iii) $Z_i$ is adequate

iv) $Y_i$ is $Z_i$-saturated

Our sequence can be represented by a $\Delta_1$-formula $\sigma(i,y,z)$ such that HA verifies the functionality of the sequence, plus (ii), (iii), (iv). Let $Y$ be given as: $\{ B \exists i, y, z (\sigma(i,y,z) \land B \in y) \}$. It follows by 3.4-3.6 that HA verifies that:

$Y$ is prime, that $Y \subseteq X$ and that $(X$ is prime $) \rightarrow Y = X$.

### Proof:
We reason informally, but constructively, and leave verifiability in HA to the industrious reader. Remember that our sets are really finite, decidable sets represented by numbers. Fix an increasing sequence $U_i$ of adequate sets such that for every $A$ we can effectively find an $i$ such that $\text{Sub}(A) \subseteq U_i$. We define weakly monotonic functions $f, g : \omega \rightarrow \omega$ and take $Z_i := U_i$ and $Y_i := \{ B \in Z_i | X_{gi} \vdash B \}$.

- $f_0 := 0$, $g_0 := 0$

- Consider $U_{fn+1}$. In case $\{ B \in U_{fn+1} | X_{n+1} \vdash B \}$ is $U_{fn+1}$-saturated, put $f(n+1) := fn+1$, $g(n+1) := n+1$. Otherwise $f(n+1) := fn$, $g(n+1) := gn$.

$f$ and $g$ are recursive, since, by 3.6, IPC-provability is (verifiably) decidable. By the formalization of 3.4, every $Y_i$ is prime (in case $i = 0$, this uses the fact that IPC is prime).

Suppose $X$ is prime, then both $f$ and $g$ tend to infinity (and hence $Y = X$). Evidently it is sufficient to show that after every stage the first clause of the definition of $f$ and $g$ will become active. Consider stage $n$. If at stage $n+1$ $\{ B \in U_{fn+1} | X_{n+1} \vdash B \}$ is $U_{fn+1}$-
saturated, we are done. Suppose not. Since \( U_{fn+1} \) is finite we can exhaustively enumerate the \( U_{fn+1} \)-disjunctions \( \forall \lor \) proved by \( X_{n+1} \). Since \( X \) is prime we can find for any such \( \forall \lor \) an \( i \) such that \( X_i \vdash E \lor X_i \vdash F \). Let \( n_1 \) be the maximum of these \( i \)'s. By assumption \( \{ B \in U_{fn+1} \mid X_{n_1} \vdash B \} \) properly extends \( \{ B \in U_{fn+1} \mid X_{n_1+1} \vdash B \} \). If \( \{ B \in U_{fn+1} \mid X_{n_1} \vdash B \} \) is \( U_{fn+1} \)-saturated then either \( f \) and \( g \) have moved between \( n+1 \) and \( n_1 \) or will move at \( n_1 \). If not we repeat the procedure. Thus we obtain a sequence \( n+1 := n_0 < n_1 < ... < n_N < ... \). Note that \( \{ B \in U_{fn+1} \mid X_{n_i+1} \vdash B \} \) properly extends \( \{ B \in U_{fn+1} \mid X_{n_i} \vdash B \} \) so \( N < U_{fn+1} \). So eventually we reach a \( U_{fn+1} \)-saturated stage and our functions did move or move now.

4 What is HA*?

In this section we introduce the theory HA*. This theory was introduced in Visser[82]. HA* is to Beeson's fp-realizability (Beeson[75]) as Troelstra's HA+ECT₀ is to Kleene's r-realizability. This means that for a suitable variant of fp-realizability HA* is the set of sentences such that their fp-translations are provable in HA. The natural way to define HA* is by a fixed point construction as: HA plus the Completeness Principle for HA*. (Here it is essential that the construction is verifiable in HA, see below.) The Completeness Principle can be viewed as an arithmetically interpreted modal principle. The Completeness Principle viewed modally is:

\[
\forall \vdash A \rightarrow \Box A
\]

The Completeness Principle for a specific theory T is:

\[
\forall T \vdash A \rightarrow \Box_T A.
\]

Here \( \Box_T \) stands for the formalization of provability in T. So we have:

\[
\text{HA}^* = \text{HA} + \forall \text{HA}^*.
\]

We briefly review some of the results of Visser[82].

- Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be the smallest class closed under atoms and all connectives except implication, satisfying: \( A \in \Sigma_1 \) and \( B \in \mathcal{A} \Rightarrow (A \rightarrow B) \in \mathcal{A} \). Note that modulo provable equivalence in HA all formulas of the classical arithmetical hierarchy in their standard form are in \( \mathcal{A} \). HA* is conservative w.r.t. \( \mathcal{A} \) over HA.

- There are infinitely many incomparable T with T=HA+C_T. However if T=HA+C_T verifiably in HA, then T=HA*.

- Let KLS:=Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield's Theorem on the continuity of the effective
operations. We have: $HA^* \vdash KLS \rightarrow \square_{HA^*} \bot$. This immediately gives Beeson’s result that $HA^\# KLS$ (see Beeson[75]).

Consider the Löb conditions.

L1  $\vdash A \Rightarrow \vdash \Box A$
L2  $\vdash \Box (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$
L3  $\vdash \Box A \rightarrow \Box \Box A$
L4  $\vdash \Box (\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Box A$

$i$-$K$ is given by $IPC+L1,L2$. $i$-$L$ is $i$-$K+L3,L4$. We write $i$-$K\{P\}$ for the extension of $i$-$K$ with some principle $P$. Note that $i$-$L\{C\}$ is valid for provability interpretations in $HA^*$.

A principle closely connected to $C$ is the Strong Löb Principle:

SL  $\vdash (\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$

As a special case of SL we have: $\vdash \rightarrow \square \bot$.

4.2 **Fact:** $i$-$L\{C\}$ is interderivable with $i$-$K\{SL\}$.

**Proof:** $L4$ is immediate from SL. “$i$-$K\{SL\} \vdash C$”:

$\vdash A \rightarrow (\Box (A \land \Box A) \rightarrow (A \land \Box A))$

$\rightarrow A \land \Box A$

$\rightarrow \Box A$.

“$i$-$L\{C\} \vdash SL$”:

$\vdash (\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow A) \land \Box (\Box A \rightarrow A)$

$\rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow A) \land \Box A$

$\rightarrow A$.

$i$-$L\{C\}$ is a kind of Kindergarten Theory in which all the well-known syntactical results of Provability Logic have extremely simple versions. We add the proofs for completeness. 4.3-4.6 are not essential for the rest of the paper.
4.3 **Substitution Lemma:** In \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \) we have a very powerful substitution principle:

\[
S^{++} \vdash (A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow (CA \leftrightarrow CB)
\]

**Proof:** By a simple induction on \( C \).

We say that \( p \) occurs only modalized in \( A \) if all occurrences of \( p \) are in the scope of \( \Box \).

4.4 **Uniqueness of Fixed Points in \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \):** Suppose \( p \) occurs only modalized in \( Ap \) and \( q \) does not occur in \( Ap \). We have in \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \):

\[
\vdash (p \leftrightarrow Ap) \land (q \leftrightarrow Aq) \rightarrow (\Box(p \leftrightarrow q) \rightarrow (Ap \leftrightarrow Aq) \\
\quad \rightarrow (p \leftrightarrow q))
\]

\[
\rightarrow (p \leftrightarrow q).
\]

4.5 **Explicit Fixed Points in \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \):** Suppose \( p \) occurs only modalized in \( Ap \). We show that \( Ap \) has fixed point \( A\top \). We have:

\[
\vdash A\top \rightarrow (A\top \leftrightarrow \top)
\]

\[
\rightarrow AA\top.
\]

\[
\vdash AA\top \rightarrow (\Box A\top \rightarrow \Box(A\top \leftrightarrow \top))
\]

\[
\rightarrow A\top.
\]

A formula of the modal language is closed if it contains no propositional variables. We define:

\[
\Box^0 \bot := \bot, \quad \Box^{n+1} \bot := \Box \Box^n \bot, \quad \Box^\omega \bot := \top.
\]

4.6 **The Closed Fragment of \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \):** Every closed formula \( A \) is \( i\text{-L}\{C\} \)-provably equivalent to a formula of the form \( \Box^\alpha \bot \) for \( \alpha \leq \omega \).

**Proof:** The proof is by induction on \( A \). We have:

\[
\vdash \top \leftrightarrow \Box^\omega \bot, \quad \vdash \bot \leftrightarrow \Box^0 \bot
\]

\[
\vdash \Box^\alpha \bot \land \Box^\beta \bot \leftrightarrow \Box^{\min(\alpha, \beta)} \bot
\]

\[
\vdash \Box^\alpha \bot \lor \Box^\beta \bot \leftrightarrow \Box^{\max(\alpha, \beta)} \bot
\]

\[
\vdash \Box^\alpha \bot \rightarrow \Box^\beta \bot \leftrightarrow \Box^\alpha \rightarrow \Box^\beta \bot, \text{ where } (\alpha \rightarrow \beta):= \top \text{ if } \alpha \leq \beta \text{ and } (\alpha \rightarrow \beta):= \beta \text{ if } \beta < \alpha.
\]

Note that \( \min(\alpha, \gamma) \leq \beta \iff \gamma \leq (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \).
4.7 Open Problems

i) Is i-L(C) the provability logic of HA*?

ii) Prove or refute: HA ⊢ ¬KLS.

5 A Shavrukov Style Embedding Theorem for HA*

Shavrukov proved that every RE Diagonalizable Algebra satisfying an appropriate Disjunction Property is embeddable in the Diagonalizable Algebra of Peano Arithmetic. It is clear from section 3 that there is no analogous result for Heyting Algebras and Heyting Arithmetic. In this section we show that an analogue can be obtained for the theory HA*.

5.1 Theorem: Any RE prime Heyting Algebra 𝒟 can be embedded in 𝒟_{HA*}. Moreover the equivalence classes in the range of the embedding all contain a Σ₁-sentence.

Before proving the theorem we briefly look at an illustrative example to give the reader some feeling of how it is possible that an embedded algebra can completely consist of equivalence classes of Σ₁-sentences.

5.1.1 Example: Consider the algebra 𝒟, IPC-axiomatized by ¬¬p→p. To be precise: 𝒟=𝒟_{IPC+(¬¬p→p)(Ω1)}. We have:

𝒟 can be embedded into 𝒟_{IPC} by e.g. [p := ¬p];

𝒟 can be embedded into 𝒟_{HA} by e.g. [p := ¬¬HA ⊥].

On the other hand 𝒟 cannot be embedded into 𝒟_{HA} by sending p to a Σ₁-sentence, since for any Σ₁-sentence B, we have:

HA ⊢ ¬¬B→B ⇒ HA ⊢ B ∨ ¬B

⇒ HA ⊢ B or HA ⊢ ¬B.

(The first implication is proved by applying the Friedman translation for ¬B to (¬¬B→B). See e.g. Visser[85].)

We turn to HA*. Let R be the ordinary Σ₁ Rosser sentence for HA*. I.e.:

R ⇔ ¬HA* ⊢ R ≤ ¬HA* ⊢ R.
Let $S := \square_{HA^*}R < \square_{HA^*}\neg R$. We have by the ordinary Rosser property:

$HA^* \not\vdash R$ and $HA^* \not\vdash S$.

On the other hand we have:

$HA^* \vdash \neg R \leftrightarrow S$ and and $HA^* \vdash \neg S \leftrightarrow R$.

We prove the first equivalence. \textquotedblleft$\Leftarrow$\textquotedblright Trivially $HA^* \vdash S \to \neg R$. \textquotedblright$\Rightarrow$\textquotedblright Reason in $HA^*$.

Suppose $\neg R$ and $\square_{HA^*}S$. It follows from the second assumption that $\square_{HA^*}\neg R$ and hence that $R \lor S$. Combining $R \lor S$ with our first assumption, we get: $S$. By SL we may drop the assumption $\square_{HA^*}S$.

Using the above facts it is easy to see that the subalgebra of $\mathfrak{S}_{HA^*}$ generated by $R$ is given by the non-equivalent $\Sigma_1$-sentences: $\bot, R, S, \square_{HA^*} \bot, T$. This algebra is clearly isomorphic to $\mathfrak{S}$.

In 5.6.1 we show that it is definitely not the case in $HA^*$, that the $\Sigma_1$-sentences are closed under the Boolean operations (modulo provable equivalence).

\textbf{Proof of 5.1:} Let $\square$ stand for $\square_{HA^*}$ and Proof for $Proof_{HA^*}$.

Consider the following Kripke model $\mathfrak{H}$, which is a variant of the Big Model of 3.5. Its nodes are of the form $\langle i, U, V \rangle$, where:

$\bullet$ $i \in \{0, 1\}$

$\bullet$ $V$ is an adequate set of formulas,

$\bullet$ $U \subseteq V$, $U$ is $V$-saturated.

Define $\preceq$ and $\vdash$ as follows:

$\langle i, U, V \rangle \preceq \langle j, W, T \rangle : \iff i \leq j$ and $U \subseteq W$ and $V \subseteq T$ and $(i = 1 \Rightarrow V = T)$

$\langle i, U, V \rangle \vdash p : \iff p \in U$.

Using 3.3 and 3.6 it is easy to see (in HA) that:

for any formula $A$: $\langle 0, U, V \rangle \vdash A \iff U \vdash A$,

for $A \in V$: $\langle 1, U, V \rangle \vdash A \iff U \vdash A$.

Note that it follows that the relation $k \vdash A$ is decidable.

Let $\langle Y_i, Z_i \rangle$ be an enumeration of a propositional theory presenting $\mathfrak{S}$, satisfying the properties promised in 3.7. We define a Solovay function $\mathfrak{H}$ from $\omega$ to the nodes of $\mathfrak{H}$.
\(\delta x\), the *state* of \(\delta\) at \(x\), is defined as \((\delta x)_0\). \(\delta 0\) will be set at 0. Till a certain catastrophic Event happens, the state will remain 0 and \(\delta\) will run upward through nodes \((0,Y_0,Z_0)\). As soon as (and if) the Event happens, the state will definitively move to 1 and our function runs upwards through nodes of the form \((1,U,V)\). Define by the Recursion Theorem \(\delta\) as follows:

- \([A] :\leftrightarrow \exists x \ \delta x = A\)
- \(\delta 0 := (0,Y_0,Z_0)\)
- \(\delta(n+1) := k\) if \((*)\) Proof\((n,[A])\), \(\delta n \neq A\),
  \(k\) is a 1-node, \(\delta n \leq k\), \(k\) maximal such that \(k \neq A\)
- \(\delta(n+1) := (0,Y_{n+1},Z_{n+1})\) if case \((*)\) does not obtain and \(\delta n = 0\)
- \(\delta(n+1) := \delta n\) if case \((*)\) does not obtain and \(\delta n = 1\).

Since \(\models\) is (provably in HA) decidable, it follows that \(\delta\) is a well defined recursive function.

Note that the catastrophic Event is the first time that \((*)\) obtains. Before the Event the function enumerates nodes representing better and better approximations of \(\delta_\epsilon\). After the event it behaves like an ordinary Solovay function traveling upwards through a converse wellfounded (w.r.t. \(<\) part of the model.

### 5.2 Lemma

\[
\text{HA} \vdash x \leq y \rightarrow \delta x \leq \delta y
\]
\[
\text{HA} \vdash (x \leq y \land \delta x = A) \rightarrow \delta y = A
\]

**Proof:** Obvious. \(\Box\)

### 5.3 Lemma: \(\text{HA} \vdash \delta x \neq 0 \rightarrow \Box \exists y \ \delta x < \delta y\).

**Proof:** Reason in HA. Suppose \(\delta x \neq 0\). \(\delta\) must have arrived at \(\delta x\) by case \((*)\). So for some \(A\) and for some \(p<x\): Proof\((\text{HA}^*, (p,[A]))\), \(\delta(p+1) = \delta x \neq A\). By \(\Sigma\)-completeness we have: \(\Box \delta x \neq A\). Combining this with \(\Box \exists y \ \delta y = A\), we obtain, using 5.2, the desired result. \(\Box\)

### 5.4 Lemma: \(\delta n = 0\) for any \(n\).
**Proof:** Suppose $\_n \neq 0$. By 5.3: $\square \exists y \; \downarrow y < \downarrow y$. Remember that $\text{HA}^*$ is $\Pi_2$-conservative over $\text{HA}$. Thus $\text{HA}^*$ will certainly satisfy $\Sigma$-reflection. It follows that for some $m$: $\downarrow m < \downarrow m$. Repeating the argument we can construct an infinite strictly ascending chain above $\downarrow m$. This contradicts $\_n \neq 0$.  

5.5 **Lemma:** [.] commutes modulo $\text{HA}^*$-provability with the propositional connectives.

**Proof:** Reason in $\text{HA}^*$. Clearly $[\bot] \leftrightarrow \bot$ and $[\top] \leftrightarrow \top$.

Suppose $[A \land B]$, then for some $x$: $\downarrow x = A \land B$. It follows that $\downarrow x = A$ and $\downarrow x = B$ and hence $[A] \land [B]$. Conversely suppose $[A] \land [B]$. Say $\downarrow y = A$ and $\downarrow z = B$. Let $u := \max(y, z)$, then by 5.2: $\downarrow u = A$ and $\downarrow u = B$ and thus $\downarrow u = A \lor B$. We may conclude: $[A \land B]$.

Suppose $[A \lor B]$, then for some $x$: $\downarrow x = A \lor B$. It follows that $\downarrow x = A$ or $\downarrow x = B$ and hence $[A] \lor [B]$. Conversely suppose $[A] \lor [B]$. Suppose e.g. $\downarrow y = A$. It is immediate that also $\downarrow y = A \lor B$ and so $[A \lor B]$. Similarly in case $\downarrow z = B$.

Suppose $[A \rightarrow B]$ and $[A]$. Then for some $x$ and $y$: $\downarrow x = A \rightarrow B$ and $\downarrow y = A$. Take $u := \max(x, y)$. Clearly $\downarrow u = A \rightarrow B$ and $\downarrow u = A$. Ergo: $\downarrow u = B$ and thus $[B]$. Conversely suppose $[A] \rightarrow [B]$. We show $[A \rightarrow B]$ using the SL. So we may also assume $\square [A \rightarrow B]$. Suppose Proof($p, [A \rightarrow B]$). In case $\downarrow (p) = (A \rightarrow B)$ we have $[A \rightarrow B]$. Suppose $\downarrow (p) \neq (A \rightarrow B)$. In this case $\downarrow (p+1)$ is a maximal $k \geq p$ such that $k \neq (A \rightarrow B)$. It follows that $k = A$ and $k \neq B$. From $\downarrow (p+1) = k \neq A$, we have: $[A]$, and hence by assumption: $[B]$. But $[B]$ immediately implies: $[A \rightarrow B]$. So in both cases we find $[A \rightarrow B]$. By the SL we may drop the assumption that $\square [A \rightarrow B]$.  

We finish our proof of 5.1, by showing that: $A \in X \iff \text{HA}^* \vdash [A]$.

Suppose $A \in X$. Then for some $n$: $A \in Y_n$. By 5.4: $\_n = 0$ and hence $\downarrow n = \langle 0, Y_n, Z_n \rangle$. Ergo $\downarrow n = A$ and so $\text{HA}^* \vdash \downarrow n = A$ and thus $\text{HA}^* \vdash [A]$. Conversely suppose $\text{HA}^* \vdash [A]$. Say $m$ codes a proof of $[A]$. Suppose $Y_m \not= A$. Since $\downarrow m = \langle 0, Y_m, Z_m \rangle$ it follows that $\downarrow m \neq A$. So clause (*) would become active and the catastrophic Event would take place. But 5.4
tells us this cannot happen at a standard stage.

5.6 **Remarks on the proof:** (i) The present proof combines the proof strategy from Zambella[92] with an idea from Visser[85] (on how to handle implication using the SL). In fact our proof follows Zambella’s quite closely modulo some inessential stylistic differences (like our use of a kind of Henkin model).

ii) The proof cannot be extended in any obvious way to give a completeness theorem for the provability logic of HA*, since nodes of our Henkin model where we have $\Box \bot$ also satisfy Excluded Third. But of course HA* does not prove Excluded Third from $\Box \bot$.

iii) An attractive alternative formulation of the proof is to take, on the one hand, as nodes of the Henkin model the more traditional pairs $(U,V)$, but to work, on the other hand, with two accessibility relations:
- $(U,V) \models_0 (W,T) :\iff U \subseteq W$ and $V \subseteq T$
- $(U,V) \models_1 (W,T) :\iff U \subseteq W$ and $V = T$

Corresponding to these different accessibility relations we have forcing relations $\models_0$ and $\models_1$. We define a suitably adapted Solovay function simultaneously with an auxiliary state function. Which accessibly relation and which forcing relation is relevant, will depend on the state. We leave it to the reader to work out more details.

iv) The $[A]$’s are $\Sigma_1$. So our embedding is into the $\Sigma_1$-formulas modulo HA*-provable equivalence. The surprising property of the $[A]$’s is that they are closed under implication (modulo HA*-provable equivalence). It is not true in general that the $\Sigma$-sentences of HA* are closed under implication. This is immediate from the following well-known fact (which is a simple adaptation of Kripke’s result on flexible sentences to the constructive case).

5.6.1 **Fact:** Let $T$ be any consistent extension of HA. Then there is a $\Sigma_1$-sentence $\Omega$, such that for no $\Sigma_1$-sentence $S$: $T \vdash \neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S$.

**Proof:** Let $T$ be a consistent extension of HA. Take $\Omega$ such that:

$HA \vdash \Omega \leftrightarrow \text{True}_\Sigma(\varepsilon S. \Box (\neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S)).$
Here True$_\Sigma$ is the usual truth-predicate for $\Sigma_1$-sentences and $\epsilon S. \square_T (\neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S)$ is the first $S$ such that $\square_T (\neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S)$ that we find if we run through the $T$-proofs. Clearly $\Omega \in \Sigma_1$. Suppose for some $S' \in \Sigma_1$: $\mathcal{T} \vdash \neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S'$. Let $S$ be the first such $S'$ that we encounter, when running through the $T$-proofs. We have: $\mathsf{HA} \vdash S = \epsilon S'. \square_T (\neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S')$ and hence: $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \Omega \leftrightarrow \mathsf{True}_\Sigma (S)$. We may conclude that $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \Omega \leftrightarrow S$. On the other hand $\mathcal{T} \vdash \neg \Omega \leftrightarrow S$. Ergo $\mathcal{T} \vdash \bot$. Quod non.

5.7 Corollary: $A \models_{\mathsf{HA}^*} B \iff \mathsf{IPC} \vdash (A \rightarrow B)$.

Proof: '=$\iff$' is trivial. '$\Rightarrow$' Suppose $\mathsf{IPC} \not\vdash (A \rightarrow B)$. Then there is a finite Kripke model $K$ such that $K \models A$ and $K \not\models B$. Let $\mathfrak{S}$ be the Heyting Algebra of upwards closed sets of $K$. Obviously $\mathfrak{S}$ is finite and hence RE. Embedding $\mathfrak{S}$ into $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}^*}$ gives us an interpretation $\hat{f}$ such that $\mathsf{HA}^* \vdash A[\hat{f}]$ and $\mathsf{HA}^* \not\vdash B[\hat{f}]$.

6 On HA

Are the same Heyting Algebras embeddable in $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}}$ and in $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{IPC}}$? The answer to this question is unknown. We conjecture: yes. In this section we show that if we restrict ourselves to Heyting Algebras on finitely many generators embeddable in $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}} := \mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}}(B\Sigma_1)$, then is the answer is yes.

We first prove the uniform version of De Jongh's Completeness Theorem for IPC w.r.t. interpretations in HA using the result of 5.

6.1 Theorem: $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{IPC}}$ is embeddable in $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}}$.

Proof: Let $[\cdot]$ give the embedding of 5.1 of $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{IPC}}$ into $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathsf{HA}}$. Let $\hat{f}$ be given by: $\hat{f} := [p]$. We have:

$\mathsf{IPC} \vdash A \Rightarrow \mathsf{HA} \vdash A[\hat{f}]$

$\Rightarrow \mathsf{HA}^* \vdash A[\hat{f}]$

$\Rightarrow \mathsf{HA}^* \vdash [A]$

$\Rightarrow \mathsf{IPC} \vdash A$. 

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6.2 **Theorem:** Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a Heyting Algebra on finitely many generators. Then $\mathcal{S}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{HA}$ iff $\mathcal{S}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$. It follows immediately that the IPC-derived rules for IPC are equal to the IPC-derived rules for HA w.r.t. substitutions involving only $B\Sigma_1$-sentences.

To prove 6.2 we borrow three facts from Visser[85].

6.2.1 **Fact:** For each IPC-formula $A$, there is a formula $A^*$ in NNIL such that:

i) All propositional variables of $A^*$ occur in $A$,

ii) For all $B \in$ NNIL: $IPC\vdash B \rightarrow A \Leftrightarrow IPC\vdash B \rightarrow A^*$.

Note that 6.2.1(ii) tells us in terms of $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$ that $\{B \in$ NNIL $\mid B \leq A\}$ both has and contains a supremum $A^*$. Thus $A^*$ is the greatest lower NNIL-approximant of $A$.

6.2.2 **Fact:** Let $\tilde{f}$ assign $\Sigma_1$-sentences to the propositional variables. Then for any propositional $A$: $HA\vdash A[\tilde{f}] \Rightarrow HA\vdash A^*[\tilde{f}]$.

6.2.3 **Fact:** The number of NNIL-formulas in $p_1,\ldots,p_m$ modulo IPC-provable equivalence is finite.

**Proof of 6.2:** Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a Heyting Algebra on finitely many generators.

Suppose $\mathcal{S}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$. By 6.1 $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{HA}$ and hence $\mathcal{S}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{HA}$.

Suppose $\mathcal{S}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{HA}$. Let the generators of $\mathcal{S}$ be $A_1,\ldots,A_n$. These generators are in their turn Boolean combinations of $\Sigma_1$-sentences, say, $S_1,\ldots,S_m$. So $A_i = B_i(S_1,\ldots,S_m)$ for some propositional $B_i$. Let $\mathcal{S}\tilde{f}$ be the subalgebra of $\mathcal{S}_{HA}$ generated by $S_1,\ldots,S_m$. Since $\mathcal{S}$ is embedded in $\mathcal{S}\tilde{f}$ by assigning $B_i$ to $p_i$, it is sufficient to show that $\mathcal{S}\tilde{f}$ is embeddable in $\mathcal{S}_{IPC}$. Let $C^*$ be the greatest lower NNIL-approximant of $C$ promised by 6.2.1. We find by 6.2.2:

$HA\vdash C(S_1,\ldots,S_m) \Rightarrow HA\vdash C^*(S_1,\ldots,S_m)$.

So $\mathcal{S}\tilde{f}\vdash C \Rightarrow \mathcal{S}\tilde{f}\vdash C^*$. Since the set of NNIL-formulas in $p_1,\ldots,p_m$ is finite (modulo IPC-provable equivalence) by 6.2.3, there are only finitely many possible $C^*$. Let $C^+$
be the conjunction of the C*.

Clearly C+ is a prime NNIL-formula. By 2.8 C+ is exact. Ergo \( \mathcal{S} \) is embeddable in \( \mathcal{S}_{IPC} \).

6.3 Open question: Is \( \mathcal{S}_{HA} \) isomorphic to \( \mathcal{S}_{IPC} \)? We conjecture: no.

7 An RE, non-recursive Heyting Algebra on two generators

We show that there is an RE, non-recursive Heyting Algebra in two generators. It follows by 5.1 that there are \( \Sigma_1 \)-sentences A and B such that the subalgebra of \( \mathcal{S}_{HA}^* \) generated by A and B is RE, non-recursive. In contrast we know by 2.3 that every finitely generated Heyting Algebra embeddable in \( \mathcal{S}_{IPC} \) is decidable and similarly, by 6.2, for \( \mathcal{S}_{HA} \). It is still consistent with everything we know that there are arithmetical sentences A and B such that the subalgebra of \( \mathcal{S}_{HA} \) generated by A and B is RE, non-recursive.

It is sufficient to produce an infinite decidable set X of IPC-formulas in p,q such that:

- for every finite \( X_0 \subseteq X \) and every \( A \in X/X_0 \cdot X_0 \not\vdash A \)
- every finite \( X_0 \subseteq X \) has the disjunction property

The desired algebra is obtained by taking an RE and non-recursive subset of X as axiomatization.

In de Jongh[80] infinite sequences are produced of finite rooted Kripke models \( \mathcal{L}_i \) of formulas \( A_i \) (\( \psi_i^* \) in de Jongh[80], p107) and of formulas \( B_i \) (\( \psi_i \) in de Jongh[80], p107) such that:

- \( \mathcal{L}_j \models A_j \iff i \neq j \)
- \( \mathcal{L}_i \models B_j \iff i = j \)
- \( A_i \) is of the form \( B_i \rightarrow C \) for some C
- It is decidable whether a formula is of the form \( A_i \)

(This result is originally due to Jankov, see Jankov[68])

We take X to be the set of \( A_i \). Consider a finite \( X_0 \subseteq X \) and \( A \in X/X_0 \cdot \) Suppose \( A = A_i \), Then clearly \( \mathcal{L}_i \models X_0 \) and \( \mathcal{L}_i \not\vdash A_i \). Hence \( X_0 \not\vdash A_i \).

To prove the Disjunction Property, consider any finite \( X_0 \subseteq X \). Suppose \( X_0 \vdash E \lor F \), but
$X_0 \not\models E$ and $X_0 \models F$. Let $\mathcal{K} \models X_0$ and $\mathcal{M} \models X_0$ and $\mathcal{M} \models F$. Let $j$ be such that $A_j$ is not in $X_0$. We have: $\mathcal{L}_j \models A_0$ and $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models B_i$ for $A_i$ in $X_0$. Consider $\text{Glue}(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{L}_j)$. Clearly $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models E$ and $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models F$. Consider any $A_i \in X_0$. $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models B_i$, since $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models B_i$. Since $A_i$ is of the form $B_i \rightarrow C$ and $\mathcal{K}$, $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{L}_j$ all force $A_i$, it follows that $\mathcal{L}_j \models A_i$. We may conclude that $\mathcal{L}_j \models X_0$, but $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models E$ and $\mathcal{L}_j \not\models F$. A contradiction.

References


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