Nash Social Welfare in Multiagent Resource Allocation Sara Ramezani Khorshid Doost Abstract: Multiagent resource allocation studies the distribution of resources among agents in different ways depending on the criteria that are to be satisfied. The allocation of resources can be carried out in a centralized or distributed manner. The resources may be discrete or continuous, sharable or not, and the criteria may range over a wide array of different requirements, for instance optimizing various social welfare functions or fairness criteria. Many such problems have been studied extensively in the literature. The Nash social welfare function (also referred to as the Nash collective utility function) is the product of the utilities of individual agents. Because of its mathematical structure, increasing NSW gives a balance between increasing the utilitarian welfare of the society, which is the sum of the utilities of agents, and fairness among agents. This dissertation aims at studying multiagent resource allocation with indivisible unsharable goods with regard to Nash social welfare. We study various properties of the Nash collective utility function in this context such as convergence of agent negotiation, communication and computational complexity. We also devise and implement a new heuristic algorithm for solving the problem of optimizing Nash social welfare, carry out some experiments in this regard and analyze their results.