Anxiety: A Grammatical Investigation

MSc Thesis (Afstudeerscriptie)

written by

Laura Mojica
(born October 19th, 1990 in Bogotá, Colombia)

under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Martin Stokhof, and submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MSc in Logic

at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Date of the public defense: August 28, 2014

Members of the Thesis Committee:

Prof. Dr. Maria Aloni
Dr. Elsbeth Brower
Dr. Julian Kiverstein
Prof. Dr. Martin Stokhof

INSTITUTE FOR LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND COMPUTATION
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate our experience of anxiety from a Wittgensteinian perspective. I start this investigation by offering a general conception of emotions following Wittgenstein’s conception of language and his remarks in both volumes of his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. I argue that our terms of emotion are syntheses of three elements that converge in our lives: manifestations, circumstances and contents of our consciousness. The way these syntheses are configured is culture-dependent, and they determine how we experience our emotions.

Having this framework in mind, I explore our language-games of ‘anxiety’ and some of the cultural elements of our society that shape them: capitalism, democracy, media, art and science. Finally, I argue that existential anxiety towards one’s own death belongs to a wider family of emotional experiences, a family characterized by the experience of detachment and meaninglessness. I show that existential anxiety towards one’s own death is an emotional experience bodily felt that pervades our world and lives with meaninglessness. As it consists in the experience of a pervasive meaningfulness, it cannot be fully captured by any of our language-games; therefore, it shows the limits of our forms of life.
Acknowledgements

Firs and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Martin Stokhof, for helping me to channel my personal concerns in this thesis, and for being open, honest, tactful and ingenious in our many interesting discussions. Working with him was a deeply enriching experience. I sincerely thank the ILLC and the Beth foundation for the academic and practical support during these two years. I am also grateful to Adriana and Malvin for warmly welcoming me to their home during the most intense periods of writing of this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank Adriana for being always ready to listen, to be critical and to generously share her knowledge with me.

I owe thanks to my parents for their unconditional support, to my sister, Daniela, for her down-to-earth advices and to my brother, Simón, for all the amusing and revealing conversations which are discreetly scattered throughout this thesis. I would like to thank Swantje for her priceless friendship and her visits to Amsterdam that always filled me with joy, and to Nadine, whose invaluable company inspired me to work harder. Finally, I owe special thanks to Mari for reading me carefully, for being sharp and honest with his criticisms and for understanding me extraordinarily well.
Introduction

Anxiety covers a wide range of human emotions: from the ordinary nervousness and unsettlement to a compulsive worrying about a situation to an extreme dread of facing the underdetermination of the manifold possibilities of life in which action, personal identity and life appear to lose their meaning. Anxiety is a confusing emotion. Often it resembles fear, sometimes to the point of being indistinguishable. Often it involves the unsettling impression that one cannot quite grasp what is going on with oneself: the particular circumstances one is anxiously reacting to appear elusive, one is puzzled by one’s own reaction in the prospect of an event, etc.

Accounts of anxiety are frequently focused on only one of these aspects. For instance, Heidegger’s account has focused on the anxiety about one’s non-existence and the world appearing meaningless: a very personal experience that is tremendously difficult to explain to others, if not impossible — that is what he called existential anxiety. In contrast, cognitive approaches in psychology have focused on explaining one’s disproportionate reactions to a possible event. Yet, one can find oneself experiencing something similar to existential anxiety with some features of the cognitive description, but something nonetheless that does not completely fit any of these descriptions. One is still puzzled about one’s emotions because their descriptions do not ‘click’, because the solutions of cognitive psychology do not work and one is still unable to see how one’s experience is connected with other aspects of one’s life.

Then, one would like to have a framework that captures both the paradigmatic and ‘intermediate’ aspects of the experiences of anxiety and the ways in which these experiences are embedded in our lives. But for such a framework to be successful it needs to be based on a suitable and sturdy conception of emotions. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language gives rise to such a conception of emotions and human life: it not only accommodates both paradigmatic and intermediate aspects of our emotional experiences in general, but also allows one to articulate the meaning of one’s emotional experiences in the broader context of one’s life, culture and society. Part I will be entirely
dedicated to explain this Wittgensteinian conception of emotions in general. Part II will deal with anxiety in particular.

Part I is a conceptual analysis of emotions, that is, an investigation into the meaning of our terms of emotion. Meaning, following Wittgenstein, is what we do with language in daily life, how we ordinarily use language. In turn, our human activities are by and large constituted by such uses of language terms: through language (our use of it) we establish relationships with others, we find jobs, we work, we give meaning to objects, to death, to life, etc. Therefore, the investigation into the meaning of our terms of emotions in Part I, and on anxiety in particular in Part II will show how emotions are experienced by us and their place in our lives. The relevance of language for an investigation of emotions will be spelled out in Section 1.1, and it will be framed in the discussion of the relation between bodily manifestations and emotions. There I will explain in some detail my Wittgensteinian conception of language; and that, in turn, will show more clearly why it is pertinent to embark on this particular investigation into the meaning of emotions (a conceptual enterprise).

In order to elucidate the meaning of our terms of emotion, I will address three issues that will structure Part I.

1) What is the role of bodily manifestations and actions in our use of the terms of emotions? Are bodily expressions causally related to these emotions as effects or as the causes behind them? Are they part of our emotional experiences? Are we culturally conditioned to express emotions in certain ways or are our emotional expressions biological facts? Is there any inner at all that corresponds to our real emotions? Through an investigation of our use of language I will answer all these questions in Chapter 1. We will see that emotions do not refer to an inner state or a private entity, and that our bodily reactions are neither caused by nor the causes of an inner state or entity; instead, our bodily manifestations and actions are constitutive parts of what emotions mean for us. That will allow us to see that the meaning of emotions, although constituted in a more or less universal manner for human beings (we are all able to be sad and to be happy), depends on culture-specific manners to express emotions with actions and some gestures.

2) Emotions, however, always appear in particular circumstances, and most of the times are directed to a certain object that appears in these circumstances. Circumstances are what tell us which emotion a particular action or demeanor expresses; and in many cases it is because of certain features of a particular object that one feels a certain emotion towards it. So, circumstances and objects doubtlessly constitute an important part of our use of terms of emotion. The main goal of Chapter 2 is to elucidate this
relation between emotions and objects and circumstances. But is it always necessary to identify a particular attribute in a specific object to be able to experience an emotion towards it? How are we able to see these features we associate with our emotions? To what extent is this ability culture-dependent? If we are, for example, scared, what is the relation between the particular object we are scared of and the attributes that, in general, we find scary? And why can we sometimes experience a certain emotion towards an object that in other circumstances we do not experience towards it? We will see in Chapter 2, more specifically in Section 2.1, that the general attributes we associate with an emotion and the specific objects in their particular circumstances that cause this emotion shape each other in a bidirectional relation. That we are able to see and emotionally relate to these specific and general features depends on the way we are trained to use our terms of emotion. This language training defines how we give meaning to our own emotions, how we understand others’ emotions and why we deem certain objects in circumstances and features appropriate or not for a certain emotional response. This understanding of one’s and other’s emotions towards certain objects in particular circumstances develops from our primitive human reactions in culture-specific ways. That will be shown in detail in Section 2.2. These considerations will finally lead me to show in Section 2.3 that our use of terms of emotion involves our beliefs and knowledge, and that the meaning (use) of ‘believe’ and ‘know’ in this context is one of the many cases that do not conform to the paradigmatic model in science and analytic philosophy which captures only a single kind of their multiple uses.

The investigation of emotional manifestations in chapter 1 and objects and circumstances of emotion in chapter 2 will be centered on the public use of our terms of emotion, i.e. it will be focused on when we say of others that they are experiencing a certain emotion. This investigation as such will not directly answer important questions about our first person experience: what do we feel when we experience a certain emotion? What does this experience have to do with our expressive bodies and our surrounding circumstances? How do the images, sounds and other impressions that appear in our minds when we experience an emotion come about? In Chapter 3, I will directly address these questions. I will show that experiencing an emotion from the first person perspective consists in bodily being in a certain way in particular circumstances. This particular bodily situation synthesizes the circumstances in which one is, one’s bodily reactions, one’s personal history and the artistic and other cultural products that surround one’s life and come to one’s mind in emotional experiences.

Chapters 1 to 3 will provide the building blocks for the main argument
of Part I, emotions are syntheses of bodily manifestations, actions, circumstances, objects and first person experiences.

All the elements discussed in Part I will come into play in Part II, where I will analyze the concept of anxiety and show some of the ways in which it is embedded in our life. As anxiety covers many different psychological experiences, I will offer in Chapter 4 a general picture of the various meanings anxiety has for us. We will see that some experiences of anxiety overlap in various ways with some experiences of fear: their forms of expression, certain attributes in their objects, certain images that come to our mind, etc. We will see that, although one can observe anxiety and fear in languageless creatures, the clear and unmistakable differences between them depend on the complexities that language brings to our life. While examining further these complexities, we will see the specific ways in which culture molds our emotional reactions to certain situations. Culture provides the very circumstances in which we grow anxious, and forges the objects in these circumstances which we can be meaningfully anxious about. More specifically, we will see how science gives to our anxieties a pathological meaning (section 4.2.3), and how democracy and capitalism set standards of life that make us anxious (section 4.2.1). Moreover, we will see that media and arts shape our anxieties in two senses: not only do they provide the images that come to our mind when we are anxious, but they also depict the kinds of life we ought to pursue and are anxious to achieve. Besides this shaping power, art, like philosophy, also allows us to create other meanings of our experiences of anxiety and thereby of our life in a wider sense. Finally, in Chapter 5 I will address existential anxiety in detail. This form of anxiety is particularly interesting, since it reveals the edges of language, of the world of what is meaningful for us and of our own life. In other words, we will see that existential anxiety exposes the limits of my own account of emotions and anxiety.
“I offer you explanations of yourself, theories about yourself, authentic and surprising news of yourself.”

Two English Poems – Jorge Luis Borges (1934)
Part I

Emotions
Chapter 1

Emotional Manifestations

Emotions are often viewed as affections of our inner realm: of our soul, our mind, or of some variation thereof —from the Wittgensteinian perspective this is a misconception. Our utterances and bodily expressions of emotion are seen both as effects and as revelations or reports to others of what is going on inside us: we are privately undergoing a certain inner [emotional] state; and our terms of emotions are names assigned to such inner states for communicative purposes. Some of our expressions seem to support this conception: “No one really knows how I feel inside”, “Smiling in the outside, broken in the inside”, “She cries, because she is sad”. In §§162, 3 in the RPP2, the imaginary and mistaken interlocutor of Wittgenstein captures this position. When Wittgenstein asks in §162 “What do you tell someone else with these sentences?... What use can he make of them?”, she replies in §163 “I give notice that I am afraid”.

In this chapter, I will show why this common sense account is misleading. First, I will expand Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument to show that our terms of emotion do not refer to inner states, that our bodily manifestations do not primarily stand in a causal relation with them, and that our personal experience of emotion and our ability to see other’s emotions do not depend on these inner states. This expansion cannot be done without examining Wittgenstein’s conception of language. Second, based on this discussion, I will present my own position: both bodily manifestations, actions and certain sensations constitute the meaning of our terms of emotion.
1.1 Against the Common Sense Misconception: the Private Language Argument for Emotions

The common sense account of emotions oscillates between two complementary positions: First, emotion terms and bodily reactions are conceived as mere means of communication, either coined in convention or instinctive. Second, bodily reactions are seen as causal effects of inner states. Before rebutting this common sense picture, let us start by considering the first position in some detail, and then we will see exactly how these two are complementary.

Conceiving bodily reactions and verbal expressions of one’s own emotions as communicative devices is not only backed by taking too seriously some of our misguiding common expressions such as ‘the baby is crying to let her dad know she is hungry’, but also by the fact that we can feign emotions. Besides the plain fact that we can lie about our emotions, actors are especially good at using their body language to convey emotions that they are not really feeling. Then, if one extends these uses of bodily expression to all our uses, they seem to be nothing more than dispensable and secondary means to disclose our inner conditions; and our inner conditions, in turn, seem to be independent of what we decide to tell others with our smiling, crying, frowning etc.

Although we sometimes do use both verbal and body language to communicate, it is a mistake to suppose that that is their primary or unique use. This extremely simple picture neglects that bodily expressions are natural manifestations of our emotions, and obscures the relation between them and the way we learn and use terms of particular emotions. Here, the second position of the common sense view attempts an answer: for most of us, most of the times, our bodily expressions of emotion are causal effects of an inner state which is the real emotion. As they are effects of the real inner emotion, with some training, one can be capable of undergoing emotional states without succumbing to their causal effects and vice versa: one can be sad without crying, and one can cry without being sad. Terms of emotion are in this sense the names of the inner states that cause in us such bodily reactions, and our verbal and body language serve in turn to causally communicate our private emotions to others.

One could invent a private language if emotions were private inner experiences, exclusively known to the experiencer in the first place and only later communicated to others via verbal or body language (this is the first posture of the common sense conception). Then, the inner state that is our real emo-
tion could be arbitrarily named in a private ceremony independently of our interaction with our fellow human beings and the public language we share. It would therefore stand for something (an emotion) that only its bearer (the baptizer) can know: her immediate private emotion. Such invented language would capture the immediacy and privacy of emotions that justify the first person authority of statements of emotion, and would clearly display why we can deceive others about our emotions or keep them to ourselves.

Wittgenstein’s famous private-language argument in the [PI] §§242-272 shows that it is misleading to take our words of physical sensations as names of inner and private states, as it is maintained in the common sense conception. Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly address how the details of the argument would be for terms of particular emotions, the argument itself and his remarks on emotions on the RPP suggest that it can be sensibly extended to these cases. In [PI] §243, he opens the discussion by asking “could we (...) imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences –his feelings, moods, and the rest– for his private use?” The kind of language that is meant in the question is not that of our ordinary use: although we do refer to private experiences, i.e. experiences that only oneself is certain to be undergoing, this use is public. We can express with language our own pain and speak about it, we know how to react when someone expresses her pain: we help her, pity her, share our own memories of when we were in pain with her, etc. In other words, we have communal ways to express and understand other’s sensations of pain. Thus, as there is a public common use, the fact that one says “I’m in pain” based on nothing immediately visible to others —as if one was seeing an inner and private image and referring to it— does not show that a purely private language is possible.

Instead, what is being investigated is whether a language that is only intelligible to its creator is possible. In Wittgenstein’s words, “the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language” ([PI] §243). My interest in reproducing the private language argument for emotions here is not to show that a private language as such is impossible; Wittgenstein has already done it using the case of sensations. I rather want to argue against the privacy of what our expressions of emotion mean. We will see that, as with sensations, we cannot have a private language of emotions, and why our emotional experiences are not private in the sense of being in principle hidden from others. It will be clear further in this chapter that we are able to deceive others about our emotions because we have been trained to play such a language-game, and not because we hide them as if they were concrete objects like the private emotion picture.
suggests. Finally, we will see in the next two chapters that the first person authority does not come from an inner justificatory entity; in particular, we will see in Chapter 3 that it is instead a feature of our language-game: only oneself can bodily be in one’s own circumstances.

Wittgenstein discusses in §258 the equivalent for sensations of this fictitious baptism. We are [therapeutically] invited to imagine that he wants to keep track of the recurrence of certain sensation, so he marks an ‘S’ in the calendar whenever he has it. He gives himself some kind of internal ostensive definition of ‘S’, so to impress in himself the connection between the sign and the particular sensation and to remember correctly that connection in the future. One can easily imagine someone undergoing a similar internal baptism of some private emotion, and marking an ‘E’ in her calendar for every time she perceives this inner state that constitutes that private emotion.

But, despite the private baptism ceremony, ‘S’, ‘E’ and whatever word we attempt to define solely by means of pointing to one’s internal occurrences are meaningless. The argument is as follows: suppose one is to define ‘E’ as “this emotion I am feeling now”, and stipulates to oneself that in the future ‘E’ will be used for this: one will remember this and use ‘E’ again (Wittgenstein PI §263). This is private in the sense that it refers to something only its bearer can perceive, hence it lacks any external sign visible to others like verbal or body language. That would make sense because, according to the common sense account, external signs are dispensable for and not part of the real emotion ‘E’ one is labelling. But, however sensible this could sound, whenever we remember, there are in principle ways to verify whether we are right or not. For instance, if one is not sure when the train departs, and checks the timetable in one’s imagination, there is still a way to test the correctness of one’s memory of the timetable (Wittgenstein PI §265); or if one recalls that yesterday one ate pasta at a fancy restaurant, one can always in principle check the leftovers or ask others if one is correct. Clearly, this is not the case with ‘E’. As it is private, i.e. it is not stipulated on the basis of any external sign, there is no practical way to test whether one is recalling this correctly or not, and whatever seems like this emotion to one now, will be this emotion.

Moreover, if one accepts that language is constituted by its use, defining ‘E’ by some sort of ostension as the name of certain emotion presupposes that one already knows how to use the word, and that this use is one that belongs to the family of emotions. The word ‘emotion’ already belongs to our shared language; in other words, its use is constituted by our public rules. We have been trained by others in our community to use it in a certain way, they correct us if we do it wrongly (wrong circumstances, wrong bodily expression: his crying is not of sadness but of anger and so on) and we
have learnt to justify our use of this term. The term appeals to families of bodily expressions, to families of relevant events in one’s or other’s life and related ways in which one characterizes one’s emotional experience. All of them are perfectly public, in the sense that in principle they can be seen by others and constitute our use of the term ‘emotion’, i.e. they constitute its meaning. Thus, if one were to say “This what I am feeling now is a powerful emotion”, one should be able to justify one’s use of ‘emotion’ by appealing to one’s powerful bodily manifestations: trembling hands, colds sweating, to striking events in one’s life: “my girlfriend just dumped me” or to impressive descriptions of one’s experience: “A veil of darkness is falling over my life”. In this sense, if one uses ‘E’ as a term of emotion, it “stands in need of a justification which everybody understands” (Wittgenstein, PI, §261), one that tells why it is an emotion and roughly what that emotion is, that is, the circumstances and bodily expressions, at least, that are synthetized by ‘E’. But if one is to come up with some similar justification for ‘E’, it would not be a word of a private language, since it will become clear to others (and to oneself) what bodily expressions, life events and contents it synthesizes, therefore when and how it is correct to use it.

Both the private baptism and the subsequent recalling lack all the practical consequences that our public ostensive definitions and our ordinary recalling have. They are as idle as moving the clock’s hands until they strike one as right in order to know what the time is (PI, §266), or as doing imaginary loading tests on the material for building a bridge (PI, §267), or as one’s left hand giving money to one’s right hand (PI, §268). In this sense, giving birth to a language by private ostension and the further recalling only achieves the impressions of rules (PI, §259), and not rules of use because they are detached from all the practical ramifications that constitute our social uses of ostension and recalling.

If one were to insist, however, that ‘E’ stands for something one has, not an emotion, but something that cannot be said (PI, §261), the refutation will be the same, but it will quickly lead to uncover how language is constituted. In Wittgenstein’s words:

“Has” and “something” also belong to our common language.—So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described. (Wittgenstein, PI, §261)

Answering (i) why and how a sound (or a bunch of strokes on a paper) is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, and (ii) why it
should be described will allow me to explain briefly the lucid conception of meaning of Wittgenstein and its relation with use and rule following. This discussion will clarify why a conceptual, rather than a causal, analysis is essential for understanding emotions, and to avoid further misunderstandings in what is meant here by criteria of correctness and rules of use.

In the PI, Wittgenstein addresses what constitutes the meaning of language. Pretty soon in the Investigations he explicitly asserts: “For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” (...) this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI, §43). This opposes the conception, vastly widespread in philosophy, of meaning as some mental or physical entity, i.e., the conception that all our words function as a name for something.

Postulating entities external to our use of language as the source of its meaning is supposed to reveal two things. First, that a sound or a stroke is meaningful because it has a connection with one of these independent entities and its meaning is, of course, such an entity. Locke, for example, maintained that our words are meaningful because they are connected with our ideas (Locke, 1975); Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1973) argued that proper names and natural kind terms (e.g. water, tree, whale) mean the actual objects in the world we are referring to, which is very much in line with Augustine’s conception of words as names of objects that are combined in sentences (Augustine, 978). Second, as such an entity discloses exactly what the meaning of a word is, there is a clear answer to exactly when it is correct to use a word: when there is a well-defined entity that corresponds to its meaning; and how to interpret expressions we do not know what to make out of: as relations between the entities that are named.

Such conceptions of language as a collection of names run into various difficulties, but here I will mention only three which will be useful to explain Wittgenstein’s conception of language. To start with, there are problematic words like ‘help!’; ‘hello’ and ‘no!’ for which is hard to see how they can name anything, but which are still perfectly meaningful (PI, §27). Moreover, assuming from the outset that meaningful words must name something creates metaphysical problems: what kinds of entities are numbers, love, justice, etc.? And it consequently creates epistemological problems: it becomes enigmatic how we are able to learn these words when the entities that constitute their meaning are so elusive and abstract. Even more striking, how can we use them so often without knowing their real meaning?

Realizing that meaning is the use of language rather than a [most of the time hidden] entity behind our use —a pragmatic turn, if you will— prevents such metaphysical and epistemological problems to arise, and gives a more
accurate conception of how meaning and correctness occur in language.

On the one hand, it emphasizes that sounds or strokes are meaningful in so far we do something with them. For example, we are trained to respond to ‘apple’ by taking an apple from the table and handing it to someone so she can eat it, by drawing and recognizing drawings of apples, by climbing up the apple tree, and so on. The resemblance of these activities with games—a child follows the rules of the game when her caregiver says ‘apple’—reveals an essential characteristic of language, namely, that it is constituted by language-games of each of our expressions in which we do something with them and follow rules. Such rules, most of the time, are not explicitly stated and are not fully deterministic: as a pianist can play the same piece differently, the child could reach the apple in the table in many different ways and still be playing the ‘apple’ game. Shortly, I will explain in some detail this concept of language-game and how rules are constitutive of it. For now, it suffices to emphasize that learning English, in this case learning the term ‘apple’, is taking part in these activities (games) or in these forms of life (PI §23). In this sense, Wittgenstein writes, “[t]o understand a language means to be master of a technique” (PI §199). The meaning of our expressions is therefore a family of doings in a family of similar contexts, and it does not necessarily involve naming.

Our terms for sensations and emotions are fine examples of words that do not mean or refer to an entity. We learn them primarily as means of expression that replace our instinctive crying of pain, growl of anger, etc. Then, language allows us to speak about them, to create more sophisticated distinctions and to capture wider contexts; and this also goes mutatis mutandis for all the other uses of language. Getting back to the example, as we keep on acquiring language tools we are able to engage in more elaborated activities around apples, and our life becomes more sophisticated —e.g. we are able to manifest our desire to eat an apple when there is none around, we can order someone to gather apples to cook, we can share apple recipes—. As language is inseparable from activities, and our life is vastly constituted by our doings with language, it is worth embarking on a conceptual analysis of emotions (specifically anxiety in this work) that lays bare our activities and therefore the form of life we live in.

On the other hand, the use is what establishes both what is correct to say and how to understand language. We learn its rules by being trained in our doings with language and in how to react to others’ use. Rules are constituted by this very course of actions and reactions and are publicly available both in the sense that others can also be trained to follow them and in the sense that others, since they can or have been trained like us, can tell (react) whether we are using language correctly or not, i.e. if we are making sense or not.
Those rules constitute language just as the game of chess is constituted by the way we use the pieces, hence the concept of language-game and we can see the taking an apple from the table and handing it to someone when she says ‘apple’ as a language-game. Imagine that this was our only use for the word ‘apple’: without this doing with the apple on the table, ‘apple’ would not have a meaning. This is why a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game ((i) on page 14).

As our doings and reactions are not exhaustively defined from the outset for every possible case nor fully determined at every instance, rules are not all-encompassing normativities. Instead, they leave room for under-determined cases in which we follow a pattern that feels natural to us given our human abilities of pattern recognition or we decide on the spot to go on like this and not like that. In this sense Wittgenstein writes, “[o]ne might say that the concept ‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges” (PI §71), and so it is for our language which is constituted by families of language-games. Such under-determination leaves room to have different ways of playing the same language-game.

This already suggests that there is no abstract set of underlying rules that supports and universally defines how to use and interpret language, not as a constitutive feature of language nor as a representation in our minds. Wittgenstein explicitly addresses this conception in [PI] §§185-243 and shows that postulating an abstract set of rules that governs language does not explain our use and therefore the meaning of words. The reason is that it makes language use to be the result of an interpretation according with such rules; however, in Wittgenstein words, “every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning” (PI §198). Abstract rules that determine language are not only irrelevant to our [linguistic] course of action, but also insufficient to explain that we do this rather than that in our use of language. Meaning, instead, is determined by the use, therefore, abstract and sharply defined rules cannot be the criteria to tell what is meaningful.

Language is meaningful because it has a shared use, and this use is our human activities, our everyday life. Activities (games) involve not only what we say, but also what we do with our bodies, how we interact with others or the circumstances in which we are, etc. In other words, the use that makes our expressions meaningful is constituted in a language-game. Moreover, learning language-games comes to us as naturally as learning other basic activities that sustain human life: “[c]ommanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing” (PI §25). Emotions are also in this sense part of our natural
Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry. Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of the science of medicine are to those of old women who spend their time nursing the sick. (RPP2 §62)

Now, we can close our discussion of the private emotion ‘E’, and see why it is senseless to insist that it stands for something one has, but cannot be said. If ‘E’ were meaningful, i.e. if it had a use constituted by rules, it would be possible for others to see what we are doing with that mark, that we are in certain circumstances, that our emotion is manifested in certain bodily expressions and they could learn to do the same. Therefore, if one claims that ‘E’ is meaningful, ((ii) in page 14) one should describe its use in a language-game one can be trained to use. But as it refers to something inexpressible and not available to others, one cannot explain how and when to use the expression. That means that there are no rules available neither for others nor for us to check if we are right or wrong in calling ‘E’ whatever we are feeling. In short, since ‘E’ is not an expression of a language-game, it is meaningless. Imagine how a child learns to play emotional introspection.

1 Conceptual analyses of emotions and empirical investigations on the physiognomic or psychic mechanisms that sustain them are interdependent. On the one hand, a conceptual analysis precedes empirical investigations by clearing out the concepts (activities, phenomena, events etc.) that will be investigated. To this extent, I agree with Hacker in [Bennett and Hacker, 2003]. On the other hand, results of empirical investigation can change our language-games over time, and therefore, the concepts we use in ordinary language-games. One can see that our concepts of certain emotions and moods studied by psychology have been slowly incorporated as bodily manifestations what before was not part of the emotion, e.g. loss of interest in school and in other children as part of depression. In Rewriting the Soul [Hacking, 1995], and Mad Travelers [Hacking, 1998], Ian Hacking offers a detailed and compelling investigation on how cultural and historical contexts determine the existence of certain psychiatric disorders. In Subsection 4.2.3 I will examine this interplay between psychology and our anxieties.
First, she learns to manifest very basic emotions with language instead of primitive gestures or sounds, then she learns to use this language to report those emotions. Others can see the circumstances and the bodily expression that constitute her emotion; they can empathize, tell her that she is lying, correct her because that what she is feeling is not this but that, etc.

1.2 Sensations and Manifestations

Imagining both how children learn to use a word and general facts of nature that could belong to the activities involved in our concepts, call it fictitious natural history, serves to reveal how language is constituted, that is, the way we use words and the activities in which sounds and strokes on a paper become meaningful expressions. Examining fictitious natural histories will be an important methodological tool in the rest of this thesis, as it will uncover certain essential characteristics of emotions in general (part I) and of anxiety in particular (part II). Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind that they are tools in conceptual investigation rather than empirical hypothesis.

I agree with the reading proposed by K. Dromm (2003) of the role that Wittgenstein’s remarks on language acquisition and natural history have in his philosophy. Opposing the standard interpretation, Dromm does not take them as empirical hypotheses; instead they are intended to show the basic forms of our current complex language-games and “to identify important features of those language-games”. Dromm offers two compelling reasons for this reading. First, Wittgenstein gives no empirical proof of his remarks on natural science or language acquisition. Second, he is very explicit about his commitment with a conceptual, not empirical, investigation, and consequently he makes clear that such remarks are imaginary or just important possibilities. Wittgenstein himself writes:

Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history —since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. ([P] xii).

However, this does not mean that fictitious natural histories could not or should not be taken as hypotheses in empirical sciences. The point is that within a conceptual investigation, such as the one embarked on this thesis,
they serve to clarify our actual use of language and not its actual causal or historical origin or development. Therefore, that our fictitious natural histories are proven right or wrong in empirical sciences is irrelevant for what they are meant to reveal of our current use of language.

This methodology already allowed us to see in the previous section that terms of emotion do not refer to private states, and that their meaning is instead primarily the same as the meaning of a growl of anger or a cry of sadness. Terms of emotion are primarily expressions of emotion. However, one can still argue that they actually refer to inner states that are causally connected to bodily expressions. Against such picture, a more detailed fictitious natural history of our terms of emotion is needed. It will show a detailed impression of the difference between emotions and sensations, which in turn will allow me to show two things. First, James’ account confuses emotions with sensations, and therefore it cannot explain the relevance of circumstances and the subtle diversity of emotions that language permits us. Second, and more important, the relation between what we feel, i.e. how we speak of emotions, and our bodily expression is not that of causality as James argued and the common sense view maintained. Instead of causes of emotion, bodily expressions are one of the constitutive parts of emotions: they make our terms of emotion meaningful in the first place before embarking on any consideration of their causes. I will partially articulate the discussion around a critical reading of Schulte’s eighth chapter of Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology, in which he offers an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s criticism of James.

Whereas the common sense conception incites us to see bodily reactions as causal effects of emotional states, James considers that the causal relation holds the other way around: we are sad (we are in an emotional state) because we cry (bodily react) (James, 1905, p. 1065-6). An emotion is for him “the resultant of a sum of elements, (...) [t]he elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the reflex effect of the exciting object” (James, 1905, p. 453). If we take seriously the common sense perspective, we are compelled to accept that there is something inner which causes the bodily reactions and which is what we are really talking about with our terms of emotion. That there is such an inner state is exactly what James is denying. In The Principles of Psychology, he offers a compelling thought experiment:

*If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted.* (James, 1905, p. 451)
As there is nothing to emotions besides their bodily symptoms, a good attempt to feign an emotion can lead one to actually feel that very emotion. According to James, the difference between feigned and real emotions is that real emotions contain physiological reactions that we cannot voluntarily control, whereas a feigned emotion can only reproduce some but not all of the elements that form the sum of physiological reactions that are the real emotion: the ones that are voluntarily and malleable. For example, one can feign anger by frowning, tightening one’s lips, crossing one’s arms etc.; but one cannot fake the temperature changes, the sweat, the flushes, etc. that also belong to the set of bodily reactions that is anger. However, a very good performance could provoke these involuntary physiological changes, making one actually angry.

James’ theory, by focusing on the bodily aspects of emotion, brings into prominence two elements that are crucial for how emotions stand in our lives, and that are captured by Wittgenstein’s conception. Both elements appear clearly stated already in the Brown Book from 1934-5, and will still be central for Wittgenstein’s latter conception of emotion, although in a different way:

You will find that the justifications for calling something an expression of doubt, conviction, etc., largely, though of course not wholly, consist in descriptions of gestures, the play of facial expressions, and even the tone of voice. Remember at this point that the personal experiences of an emotion must in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular tension of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the sensations around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part of what I feel. This is, I think, what William James meant when he said that a man doesn’t cry because he is sad but that he is sad because he cries. (1965, p. 103)

The two elements I want to highlight in the quote are sensations and bodily expressions. First, the experience of emotions from the first person perspective includes in some way sensations of the bodily changes associated with an emotion. And second, we frequently ascribe beliefs and doubts to others based on their gestures, tone of voice and facial expressions, which is often more reliable than what people say (Schulte 1993, p. 122). As these gestures, tone of voice and facial expressions comprise our justifications, they are constitutive parts of the language-game in which our expressions of conviction and doubt become meaningful; in other words, they belong to their meaning. That the same goes for emotions is indicated in the following passage:

“We see emotion.”–As opposed to what?–We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing
a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features.—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.

This belongs to the concept of emotion. (Wittgenstein RPP2 §570)

The fact that we see emotions in other’s facial and other bodily expressions, rather than infer them reinforces that bodily expressions constitute the concept of emotion and not merely accompany it. However, such constitutive relation changes in the RPP and therefore differs from James’ conception.

In RPP1 §§450-7, Wittgenstein explicitly addresses this difference. He opens the discussion by asking in §451 how it happens, as James holds, that we feel an emotion because we feign its physical manifestation. If the muscular sensations are part of our concept of sadness, then it would appear to us like a truism that we feel sadness when we feign sadness; if not, it would be an empirical statement. That is why after asking how James’ experiment is possible, Wittgenstein immediately asks whether or not the muscular sensations of a sad face are part of sadness (RPP1 §451). As we will see, it is important to keep in mind that these paragraphs are about whether there is a conceptual or an empirical relation between sensations and emotions, and not about bodily expressions and emotions as Schulte, in what seems like a lapsus linguae, holds (Schulte 1993 p. 124). In RPP1 §452 Wittgenstein raises two parallel questions that make the discussion more concrete. First, are ‘raise your arm and you will feel that you are raising your arm’ and ‘make a sad face and you will feel sad’ empirical propositions or pleonasms? Second, does ‘make a sad face and you will feel sad’ mean ‘feel that you are doing a sorrowful face and you will feel sorrow’?

As for the first question, Schulte does not explain why Wittgenstein compares sadness with raising an arm, but concludes that they are not pleonasms: Since they can be false in some circumstances, we would not call them analytic statements; therefore the sentences are not pleonasm and do not show a conceptual link. One could raise one’s arm and not feel it because one has taken a drug that renders one’s limbs numb (Schulte 1993 p. 124). Then, Schulte implicitly concludes that the feeling is not ‘purely’ part of our

Besides this unfortunate paragraph in which Schulte confuses sensations with bodily manifestations, it is clear through the rest of his chapter that he does not confuse these two concepts. For example, when he argues against the role of bodily manifestations for James, he writes “This, however, has nothing to do with physical feelings...[but] it is connected with what we regard as our natural ways of expressing our emotions” (Schulte 1993 p. 130).
concept, as it is shown in the following passage:

The possible falsity of the statement seems to speak in favour of thinking that it is an empirical one. On the other hand, it will be false only under very special circumstances, whereas in normal situations it will be true. And we do feel sure that somehow it cannot normally help but be true that the feeling that one is raising one’s arm is simply part of raising one’s arm. Yet it surely is not a purely, that is, it is not what we may wish to call an analytic statement. (Schulte, 1993, p. 124)

As for being sad, Schulte’s answer is the same: it is clear that one can fake the facial expression of sadness without feeling sad whatsoever; therefore, since ‘make a sad face and you will feel sad’ is false, it is not a conceptual truth. Schulte’s answer to the second question in [RPP1] §452 supports his point: he takes ‘feel that you are doing a sorrowful face and you will feel sorrow’ to mean the same as but to sound more pleonastic than ‘make a sad face and you will feel sad’. But again, one can deliberately make a sad face, savour ‘the various aspects of the sensation’ and still not feel sad. He takes Wittgenstein’s §454 in the [RPP1] to support this reading. Saying something like “Now I feel much better: the feeling in my facial muscles and round about the corners of my mouth is good” (RPP1, §454) sounds funny not only because one does not normally say things like that, but also because when speaking of one’s own emotions, one does not intend to speak about what it looks like to feel well or better from the outside (Schulte, 1993, p. 125).

It is worth extending the details of Schulte’s reading of these passages ([RPP1] §§450-7) to elucidate how emotions are related to the body, and to avoid confusing sensations with bodily expressions. I will conclude, with Wittgenstein and Schulte, that the bodily expressions of emotions are constitutive of the concept; just as with sensations, they are, so to speak, the behavioural side of the coin of the psychological experience. The other side is the phenomenal part, i.e. the content of the emotion from the first person perspective which, I will argue against Wittgenstein and Schulte, includes but is not exhausted by some sensations that arise from one’s bodily expression.

To begin with, it is important to examine the distinction between bodily expressions of emotions and sensations. Schulte reads Wittgenstein’s question in §451 (referring to James’ thought experiment) “[d]oes that show that muscular sensations are sadness, or part of sadness?” (italics mine), as “the problem of whether there is a conceptual or merely an empirical connection between statements about emotions and statements about expressions of emotions” (italics mine) (Schulte, 1993, p. 124). However, Wittgenstein is
clearly referring not to expressions of emotions but to muscular sensations. This suggests that Schulte confuses sensations with bodily expressions, but a closer reading of the chapter (Schulte, 1993, p. 122) shows that he is rather taking the sensations under discussion to be roughly the bodily feelings that correspond to the physiological changes that our bodily expression would bring about. The questions are, first, in what sense are expressions of emotion constitutive of our concepts? and second, are sensations, in particular, sensations that could be provoked by the bodily manifestations of emotions, belong to our concept of emotion i.e. to what we ascribe to others, what we say about ourselves or what we express when we use terms of emotion? I will answer each of these questions in the following two sections.

1.2.1 Expression

Having a joyful face and having the muscular sensation of my grinning face are different things. The latter requires attention, a particular disposition to observe and feel one’s own body, and the former does not. One’s joyful face (an expression of emotion) coincides here with one’s cry of pain: one is not (insistently) aware of the muscular sensations in the face and the tears around the eyes that occur when crying of pain. The bodily changes that the cry of pain brings about are not precisely what one is feeling when one is feeling pain. Nevertheless, the cry, being an expression of emotion, is constitutive of our concept for two reasons. First, without such bodily manifestation it would be impossible for us to have a concept of pain whatsoever; and second, it makes little sense to assume that alive creatures can regularly undergo pain without manifesting it in their behaviour in any way (without crying): the first person experience of the sensation of pain and the behaviour that manifests pain are the two sides of the same psychological experience of pain (our concept of pain). And the same goes for basic emotions. To see in more detail how these concepts are constituted, I will follow Wittgenstein and consider a relevant fragment of our possible natural history.

Imagine how a child could be trained to use the word ‘pain’. She cries after falling down, her caregivers tell her that she is feeling pain, they speak of her pain among each other and she eventually learns to say ‘I’m in pain’ instead of crying every time she falls down. We teach children new pain-

---

3 In the preamble of his discussion of Wittgenstein’s §§450-7, Schulte writes “in the case of joy, at any rate, there normally are other (besides crying) typical feelings in certain parts of our face which tend to correspond to natural and thus reliable outer expressions of this emotion”.

behaviours by training them to replace many of their characteristic cries of pain with exclamations and later with sentences (PI § 244). The grammar of ‘pain’, i.e. the way we use it, is as a manifestation of pain; it makes our sensation present in the world, so to speak, and it is neither a label from something inner, nor a means of communication. Therefore, if human beings did not have characteristic manifestations of pain, it would be impossible to train a child to use the word ‘pain’ (PI § 257).

Expressions of mild pain are substituted with language and learned gestures; in this way the language-games in which we have been trained condition our bodily expressions (more on this further on page 26). This does not mean, however, that language completely overtakes our bodily expression. Although its grammar is the same as the strident crying of babies, our language-games assimilate the nuances of expression that our most primitive expressions have, and become part of its meaning. Clearly the most accusing sensations normally keep their primitive expression, but even in cases of mild pain, in which language is our primary means of expression, many of the bodily manifestations that accompany the cry are incorporated in the language-game. Thus, if one says ‘she is in a horrendous and unbearable pain’ and is asked to justify it, one would not usually appeal to what she says, but to her piercing cries of pain, the expression of her face etc. Likewise, if one says ‘I’m in pain’ with a beaming smile, others would not think one is really in pain: as one’s bodily expression is blatantly not that of pain, the meaning of ‘I’m in pain’ in this case is not an expression of pain but rather a joke, a sarcastic comment or something along these lines.

Crying is also one of the behaviours on which sadness hangs. As it is clearly put by Wittgenstein, we can learn the different meanings of crying because of the circumstances:

Pain-behaviour and behaviour of sorrow. —These can only be described along with their external occasions. (If a child’s mother leaves it alone it may cry because it is sad; if it falls down, from pain.) (RPP2 § 148).

I will treat in detail the role of circumstances in our concepts of emotion in the next chapter, but for now it suffices to say that they are wider and their limits blurrier than the circumstances that belong to our concepts of sensations, which in the case of pain are more or less limited to what could provoke damage in the body.

It is important to notice here that ‘pain’ and ‘sadness’ do not acquire their meaning as names of any inner state as it is commonly misconceived (page 11). Crying is not a label that babies and languageless animals attach to an inner state that works as a communicative device, but a manifestation
that belongs to what it means to be in a certain psychological state; in Wittgenstein’s example, it is a manifestation of the baby’s sadness for being left alone. As we just saw, the expression ‘I am sad’ acquires its primary meaning by replacing such instinctive crying; therefore, sadness does not refer to an inner state, but it manifests the emotion instead, which makes it present in the world. Although one can speak about one’s and others’ emotions with language, not even then does one refer to inner states: one reports such a psychological experience that is constituted by the bodily manifestations, the circumstances and the content of one’s first person experience. Thus, the private inner state—the ‘mind-stuff’ in James’ terms—does not play a role in how we use emotional terms, therefore it is neither part of how our psychological experience is constituted nor of how we experience it.

However, it is not only the external occasions that make a crying of sadness different from one of pain, we also know that the different nuances of the cry manifest different experiences. Roughly: a sad baby cries with the corners of the mouth drooping and the eyebrows coming together, whereas a sudden, shrill and piercing cry manifests pain. Sometimes, experienced caregivers can recognize that these cryings are manifestations of different emotions when the circumstances are still unknown. Language incorporates such nuances, allows us to refine these different expressions of pain and sadness, and make further distinctions between the circumstances that elicit them.

Besides caregivers’ ability to differentiate cryings of pain and of sadness, people in general can already feel and see differences in degree on languageless creatures’ experiences: their expression and its nuances tell us how bad a pain is or how sad they are. A screaming restless baby is in greater pain than if she was just moaning, likewise crying displays more intense sadness than downturned lips and raised eyebrows. Replacing some primitive expressions of pain or sadness with language and maintaining others not only captures those differences in degree; it also allows us both to speak about and to engage in more fine-grained circumstances, qualitative differences and the places in the body where sensations are felt and some emotions are associated with. One, therefore, can speak about and express more subtly differentiated sensations and emotions. One can differentiate one’s burning pain in the stomach from a stabbing pain, or, to use a simple example, the sadness that not being with mommy produces from the sadness of making a drawing that turns out ugly, etc. Such distinctions come together with new non-verbal behaviours to express emotions and sensations. One eventually learns, for example, to express pain in the stomach not only with a facial expression but also by making a cup of tea, and to express sadness by crying and calling mommy on the phone or by weeping quietly and staring repeatedly to one’s and other
kids’ drawings.

As life grows more complicated, i.e. as we learn more language-games, our non-verbal expressions of sadness become more sophisticated; for example, one watches a sad film and weeps or listens to Beethoven’s Moonlight besides having a sad face, etc. In Wittgenstein’s words, “Language — I want to say — is a refinement, ‘im Anfang war die Tat’.” (C E, 21.10.(37)). Families of thoughts and families of colorings of thoughts also become part of the characteristic manifestations of emotions. This is very clear in pathological cases like obsessive-compulsive disorder, in which repetitive and intrusive thoughts are clear manifestations of it and could, more specifically for example, express overwhelming fears of being dirty, about the own sexual orientation or about someone close dying. Families of expressive thoughts with certain coloring are also very characteristic in non-pathological emotions. Take nostalgia for example; one thinks of the past and makes personal, somehow happy, associations with what used to be, with “the good old days”. It is important to notice here that a characteristic expression of an emotion is not a particular thought, but a particular type of thoughts that may vary greatly from person to person depending on their own history. They share characteristic family resemblances — the family of nostalgic thoughts: the neighbourhood where one grew up, one’s primary school, the dirty, enormous, charming and overwhelming city one comes from, etc.

Hacker (2004, p. 48-9) offers a taxonomy of the expressive behaviors in which emotions are manifested: non-actions, actions and manners of acting. Non-actions are, for example, the sobbing of sadness, and the waning, the tremble or the cryings of fear. These non-actions are closely related to some actions that are very spontaneous reactions; they differ however in that the latter are most of the time learnt. A heartfelt curse of fear or a Rear

5 Examining what is a thought from a Wittgensteinian point of view would require an in depth investigation that exceeds the purposes of this thesis. Here, it suffices to point out that thinking is not an internal human process or entity that is expressed by language. Thoughts arise in many different language-games; sometimes mean specific doings in a language-games, sometimes the content, i.e. what populates one’s space of impressions (expressing a thought as “I said to myself...”), etc. Given that thinking is not a single easily definable language-game, and that it comprises a complex family of doings, contents, circumstances and objects, it would be mistaken to locate thoughts exclusively as part of one of the particular aspects that our language-games of emotion comprise. Instead, particular emotions and thoughts mesh in various ways, and some of them will be pointed out throughout this thesis.

6 Of course, having certain thoughts can also lead one to experience certain emotions. We will see in the next chapter (page 54) that, just as with one’s beliefs, emotions and thoughts can enter in a loop dynamics which, when harmful, cognitive-behavioral therapy aims to break.
Leg Roundhouse kick of rage are examples of that. There are two prominent differences between actions and non-actions in this context: except by accomplished actors, actions can be imitated but non-actions cannot, and actions can be repressed but non-actions cannot. Of course, very complex actions can be manifestations of emotion that we cannot help like, again, the heartfelt curse of fear; and there are expressive non-actions that people are raised to suppress, like the sobbing of sadness that is strongly discouraged in males in Latin-American (Macho) and other cultures. Both because complex actions become natural to us and arise as developments of primitive bodily expressions, actions and non-actions form a continuum. At the other end of this continuum, the action end, one finds emotional manifestations such as writing a letter of love or hate, buying and giving flowers out of gratitude or building an underground bunker out of fear. This distinction, we will see in Section 2.3, is tied together with different ways of intertwinement, sometimes grounded on belief, of our manifestations and content of emotions and the way we see the object of our emotions.

Bodily manifestations, mainly non-actions, are one of the aspects of the concept of emotion on which further causal language-games hang. They are one of our most reliable ways of seeing what others feel. For example, in appropriate circumstances, we can see that someone is angry, because his face turns red, he sweats and raises his voice, etc. Some of these bodily manifestations can enter into a different language-game, that of experimental psychology, in which they are seen and tested as measurable and objective somatic accompaniments or manifestations. They become clear-cut criteria of someone experiencing an emotion, or they are measured as physiological reactions to approximately quantify the intensity of an emotion. Take for example Zelin’s test of Anger, the ASR. Among the 64 items on the questionnaire, there is a section exclusively dedicated to the expression of anger which includes “subscales for general, physical and verbal expression” (Zelin and G. Adler, 1972). However, our layperson concepts of emotion do not only provide science with elements and a framework of investigation, scientific findings in turn can influence how our concepts are constituted. In the particular case of bodily manifestations, science can test whether or not a certain physiological reaction indeed belongs or co-occurs with a certain emotion, and discover other concomitant bodily reactions that could enter our non-scientific language-game and alter our concepts. It has been found, for example, that excessive anger causes high blood-pressure (James et al., 1986). The widespread media coverage of this finding could lead to high blood-pressure being incorporated in our concept of anger as a bodily mani-
It is worth observing that there are of course cases in between the causal practices of psychology and the ordinary purely conceptual language-game of emotions. People that are not trained in experimental psychology attempt both to partially observe their own bodily manifestations and to find the causes of their physiological reactions when undergoing an emotion. For example, patients in cognitive-behavioural treatment are trained both to observe their own reactions, and to find the circumstantial and physiological possible causes. In this kind of cases, it is not clear whether the person is engaging in a new language-game or is expanding and playing the same language-game they had before for their emotion. Such obscurity is characteristic of how our language-games connect with each other, so giving an answer to such a question will result in a misleading picture. However, one can think of a metaphor to capture the interplay: people interpret differently the same language-game just as musicians interpret differently the same piece. Besides the cognitive behavioral therapy case, one can find, for example, differences in how the language-game of grief is played by atheists and Catholic Christians: Catholics might be certain the death they are grieving was product of God’s will, and that it is the best for everyone in the long term, despite how painful it is right now; they might soothe themselves by hoping one day they will see who died in the afterlife, they will go to church, pray and light candles seeking the Lord and the Saints will give a happy afterlife to who passed away, etc. Clearly, none of these elements would play a role in the experience of grief of a convinced atheist.

But one does not only learn new complex expressive behaviours and language-games to speak about emotions; having language also allows us to feign and lie about our emotions: “[t]he child that is learning to speak learns the use of the words “having pain”, and also learns that one can simulate pain. This belongs to the language-game that it learns” (RPPI, §142), in general, “[l]ying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one” (PI, §249). Therefore, that one is able to feign an expression of pain without being in pain does not imply that those expressions are not constitutive of our concept of pain. However, the game of lying, a game that is learnt, does not depend exclusively on our [human] natural languages. Both humans and other living creatures (e.g. dogs) can learn to feign bodily manifestations of sensations and emotions. One can be trained to behave as if one was in pain when one is not, and to pull a sad face when one is not sad.

\[\text{footnote}^{7}\]

I am aware of the debate on the stance of philosophy with respect to science. As it already transpired in the text, I disagree with Hacker’s position. See the footnote on page 18. Going in depth into this discussion, however, would lead me astray of presenting an accurate picture of our concept of emotion.
Likewise, the fact that we can make a sad face without feeling sad is not
enough reason to conclude, as Schulte does (page 23), that bodily expressions
of sadness are not constitutive of our concept of sadness (or that feeling one’s
arm raising is not constitutive of the concept of raising an arm, because one
might not feel it if under the effects of some drug). Moreover, it is wrong
to hold, as Schulte does, that conceptual truths, i.e. statements that lay
down the certainties that articulate our language-games, must be tautologies
or sound [to philosophers] like analytic statements. Certainties can be and
are in many cases contingent statements that can turn out to be false. For
example, one’s certainty that one has not been to the moon might turn out
to be false, or, as it happened, the certainty of the earth being flat turned
out to be false, but it nevertheless articulated the world view of, for example,
Greek people before the classical period.

1.2.2 Sensations

I disagree with Schulte’s supporting reasons, namely, that one can pull a sad
face without being sad (as one can rise an arm without feeling it), but I
agree with his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s point: emotions, despite the
fact that they are partially constituted by bodily expressions, are not usually
constituted by localized bodily sensations. So, let us examine more accurate
reasons for this conclusion. In Wittgenstein’s words,

[Sensations and emotions] have characteristic expression-behaviour.
(Facial expression.) And this itself implies characteristic sensa-
tion too. Thus sorrow often goes with weeping, and characteristic
sensations with the latter. (The voice heavy with tears.) But the
sensations are not the emotions. (In the sense in which the nu-
meral 2 is not the number 2.) (RPP2 §148)

What is constitutive of emotions is usually the bodily expression, but not
its sensation. Bodily expressions are constitutive in the sense that they are

\footnote{It is worth noticing that conceptual connections that can turn out to be false without
substantially modifying our language-games are quite extraordinary. Despite the fact that
our certainties reveal conceptual connections that constitute our language-games, I believe
that not all the conceptual connections that constitute a language-game can or should
be formulated as certainties or analytic sounding statements. As it will be extensively
argued in this part I, our language-games of emotion are constituted by a confluence of
factors (bodily manifestations, sensations, objects, circumstances and content) that may
be individually absent in a particular emotional experience without making us doubt that
someone, maybe oneself, is undergoing a psychological experience. But not only emotions,
but our psychological experiences in general provide good examples of these conceptual
but defeasible connections.}
the grounds that allow others to surmise one’s emotions, and one is able to learn terms of emotions because one behaves in a certain way in certain circumstances that constitute a certain emotion. Most of the times, one’s physical sensations of one’s own emotional expression are neither what we capture when we speak of someone else being sad, nor what we capture when expressing our own sadness: we speak of her sad face, not of her facial muscular contractions, although she might feel them; we speak of our own uncontainable crying, not of our sensation of wetness around the eyes and the muscular contractions in our forehead, although we could feel them. Whereas when we speak of our own pain (a sensation), we do refer to the sensation of heaviness in one’s head or the piercing sensation on the right side of one’s head, etc.

In this sense Wittgenstein writes:

Now granted —although it is extremely doubtful— that the muscular feeling of a smile is a constituent part of feeling glad; — where are the other components? Well, in the breast and belly etc.!—But do you really feel them, or do you merely conclude that they must be there? Are you really conscious of these localized feelings?—And if not— why are they supposed to be there at all? Why are you supposed to mean them, when you say you feel happy? \[RPP1\ §456\]

Clearly, one neither means nor consciously feels a muscular contraction in the face (a localized sensation) when one says one is happy or sad or in grief. Hence, one would conclude that the sensations that could be provoked by the physiological changes of bodily expressing an emotion do not belong to our concept of emotion: they are not part of what we ascribe to others, what we say about ourselves or what we express when we use terms of emotion.

Wittgenstein aims exactly at the same point in \[RPP2\ §§452, 4\]. As I said before (page 22), he poses two questions in RPPI, §452: first, whether ‘raise your arm and you will feel that you are raising your arm’ and ‘make a sad face and you will feel sad’ are empirical propositions or pleonasm. Schulte answers that they are not really pleonasm despite how obvious they could sound, because they can both be false; therefore, he concludes, sensations do not belong to our concept of sadness, but they are closely related. Now, I am in a position to show what I consider a more enlightening reading which nevertheless brings me to the same conclusion as Schulte’s. When one raises one’s arm, one is usually not aware of any particular feeling. Unless one is under the effect of a drug or has an injury that makes the muscles on the arm sore when raising one’s arm, one is not aware of any localized feeling. The comparison of raising an arm and making a sad face shows that,
when doing philosophy or psychology, one is inclined to conclude that the localized sensations have to be there. But when we use the concepts of raising one’s arm (as pupils participating in class) and of sadness in our ordinary language-games, we neither mean nor experience a localized sensation in the face accompanying the sad face and the arm raising.

Moreover, “Now I feel much better: the feeling in my facial muscles and round about the corners of my mouth is good” [RPP1] §454, is not funny because it confuses one’s feelings with how one could look from the outside, as Schulte regarded. Instead, such an odd statement is funny, because it confuses the emotion of sadness with the physical sensation that its bodily manifestation could produce. This reading is supported by two facts. First, the paragraph appears within the discussion of whether or not the physical sensations are constitutive of our concept of sadness, and second, Wittgenstein speaks of the good feeling in one’s facial muscles, not of how one’s facial expression looks like. Therefore, how one could look from the outside is not the point of such an odd remark.

At this point there is the discrepancy between Wittgenstein’s posture in the Brown Book (1965) as quoted on page 21 and his posture at the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980). It is important to bear in mind that the Brown Book is from the academic year 1934-5, while the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology are from 1946-9. In the Brown Book, Wittgenstein writes that sensations “are obviously part, and an important part of what I feel” (Wittgenstein, 1965, §48, p.103). However, he changes his position in RPP2 §148 and maintains that sensations are no longer constituent of emotions, are not identical to them, but still are closely related. Sensations become meaningful as symptoms of emotions once we have learnt the terms of emotion, i.e. once we are able to synthesize in language certain arrays of circumstances, bodily manifestations and first person experiences. Then, one can understand one’s tension in the forehead as anger, only after having the concept of emotion, i.e. a language in which one can synthesize one’s irritation and one’s upsetting circumstances. In this sense, for Wittgenstein in the Remarks, sensations do not belong to our concepts of emotion.

However, I think it is misleading to see sensations as mere symbols of emotions as Wittgenstein does. Both Wittgenstein in the RPP and Schulte argue under the assumption that if sensations are constitutive of an emotion, they are the sensations produced by the bodily manifestation of said emotion. It is clear that most of the times we do not feel any localized sensation when we pull an angry face. However, there is no reason to exclude from our concepts of particular emotions other sensations that are not directly linked to the bodily manifestations that allow others to see our emotions. Therefore, the fact that we do not feel our muscles working to pull together...
a facial expression is not enough to conclude that sensations do not belong to our concepts of emotion at all. One can conceive, for example, that the sensation of tiredness might be part of how sadness is experienced by a person. His expression ‘I’m sad’ synthesizes a family of sensations, like tiredness, together with circumstances and bodily expressions that he is most likely not aware of. It is true that the absence of tiredness in a specific case might not lead him to conclude he is not sad; however the absence of any [physical] sensation whatsoever will prompt him to admit that he is not really sad even when adequate circumstances are present. Furthermore, it is not difficult to imagine people for whom sadness was constituted by a characteristic sensation of tiredness, just as we have the characteristic sensation in the stomach that partially constitutes our concept of nervousness. We can imagine it, because our use of emotion terms captures first person experiences that include in many cases sensations; however, they need not to share a specific and well-defined feature with every other one’s own or someone else’s experience. They are family related, just as the circumstances comprised in emotions, the bodily manifestations and other various ways of characterizing their content also are. Sensations of emotion are usually not the muscular contractions involved in one’s facial expressions, they are rather particular sensations as the chest pain of panic or the fast heart beating of fear. Moreover, the first person experiences, although they include sensations, are neither inner nor private, because we can share and characterize them by using, for example, the terms of sensation that we already share with others.

Wittgenstein moves from his agreement with James in the Brown Book on seeing the physical sensations that the changes in the body could produce as part of what an emotion is to the completely opposite position of rejecting that sensations are part of emotions in RPP2 §148 as quoted in page 30. Yet, I consider that our use of concepts of emotions lies somewhere in between these two opposites: the distinctive sensation of the stomach is constitutive of our nervousness and the sensation of nausea is constitutive of some kinds of anxiety. We are very conscious of these particular localized feelings, and we would not call ours or other’s psychological experience nervousness without that particular sensation in the stomach. Denying that sensations belong to any of our concepts of emotion obscures an important part of how we use emotion terms, because it neglects particularities of some of our concepts of emotions. It obscures, for example, our use of ‘excitement’ or ‘fear’ in which we say things like ‘my heart is pumping fast!’ or even make a gesture with a hand in the chest.

My intermediate position is also consonant with the close relation between sensations and emotions that we experience and draw in language. Wittgen-
stein acknowledges this closeness in various passages, for example in RPP2, §158: “Why does one use the word ‘suffering’ for pain as well as for fear? Well, there are plenty of tie-ups”. We will see in part II that both the close relation that Wittgenstein acknowledges and the fact that sensations can be in some cases constitutive of emotions are crucial for understanding certain forms of anxiety.

Despite the fact that sensations are constitutive of certain emotions, there are various differences worth explaining. Both our concepts of emotions and sensations are characterized by the particular way in which they are embedded in our life (RPPii, §150), but the contexts that make emotions meaningful, i.e. in which certain techniques for the use of emotional terms can take place, grow in different manners and directions than the contexts of sensations. Unlike sensations, the expressions and circumstances captured in terms of emotion are not primarily tied to the sensations the human body is capable of feeling, and, in Wittgenstein’s words, “they do not give us any information about the external world. (A grammatical remark)” (RPPii, §148). Because of these two characteristics, emotions (the circumstances, expressions and contents they synthesize) can develop in even more sophisticated ways than sensations can, and are more culture-relative. In this sense, Wittgenstein writes:

Only surrounded by certain normal manifestations of life, is there such a thing as an expression of pain. Only surrounded by even more far-reaching particular manifestations of life, such as the expression of sorrow or affection. And so on. (RPPii, §151)

Take, for example, catholic guilt around pre-marital sex. It is an emotion that captures both a wide array of bodily expressions of guilt and particular circumstances in which the person currently is and has been raised. In the example, the bodily expressions go from the more or less characteristic facial expression of guilt (looking down, mouth dropping in sorrow) to compulsive showering, to a strict discipline of praying and fasting; and the particular circumstances that constitute the guilt comprise not only the sexual event but also her history of being raised with catholic values and the institution

---

[RPP2] §148 as quoted in page 30 and explicitly at §322:

Yet still I mustn’t forget that joy goes along with physical well-being, and sadness, or at least depression, often with being physically out of sorts.—If I go for a walk and take pleasure in everything, then it is surely true that this would not happen if I were feeling unwell.
of marriage, perhaps her decision to live accordingly or her ignorance of any other moral framework to see sexuality, etc. Learning ever more complex language-games allows us to live in ever more complex circumstances, to express our psychological experiences in more complex ways and capture both of them with language.

Certainly, ‘guilt’ in the example does not comprise only her behaviour and her particular circumstances, but also her first person experience, what I called before the phenomenal side of the experience. She might feel violent hot blushes in her face when she thinks of the wrong she has done. She might also describe her guilt using poetry, she could quote César Vallejo’s *The Black Heralds* and say mournfully “everything lived wells up, like a pool of guilt, in [my] look” ([Vallejo and Eshleman](#) 2005).

As we situate ourselves in a rich confluence of complex circumstances and expressive behaviours, we also experience from the first person perspective emotions that otherwise we would not have been able to feel. In this sense, by learning to replace certain primitive expressions of pain and sadness with linguistic expressions, not only the behavioural side of sensations and emotions is enriched, but also new and more refined first person experiences arise. Language enriches ‘the space of impressions’ allowing us to describe what we are feeling in ways that are impossible to differentiate from any of the primitive expressions of pain or sadness ([RPP1](#) §733).

An important difference between emotions and sensations lies precisely here: although there are some emotions that comprise particular sensations, their content, unlike sensations’, is not mainly nor usually localized sensations in the body. Instead, it tends to capture what one could call how life is going for one, or even an atmosphere with a particular aesthetics that lies over the events and circumstances that constitute the object of the emotion; as we all have experienced, when an emotion is particularly persistent such atmosphere can bathe many other unrelated events of one’s life, and it can turn into a mood when such atmosphere stretches beyond the objects of the emotion.

Despite the differences I have identified so far, emotions and sensations form a continuum of psychological experiences: at one end there are sensations as the pain of leg cramps or the sensation of itching. Those have a clear

---

10Here Wittgenstein refers to the content of emotions as what populates the space of impressions. But one can speak of the content of (some) sensations as it is clear from [RPP1].

§732 And what sort of description is this: “Ewiges Dustere steigt herunter” (“Perpetual cloud descends”. Spoken by Care in Goethe’s Faust, Part II, Act v.)
One might describe a pain like that; even paint it.

§733 Isn’t the ‘content’ what one peoples the space of impressions with?
location in the body, a clear duration, their content is just the sensation we are all familiar with and the circumstances around them do not grow much more complex than too much exercise, a mosquito bite, etc. Pain circumstances can even be nothing at all once we have learnt to express them with language. As we have seen, we learn to use the word ‘pain’ [roughly] as a verbal replacement of our instinctive crying of pain. The same goes for ‘my leg is cramping!’, which replaces the sudden cry that goes with a rapidly bending of one’s leg and one’s face grimacing in pain. Learning these words is possible because they have very characteristic bodily expressions. But not all sensations have a characteristic expression: seeing and hearing are not instinctively tied to a particular behaviour, and we learn to use these words in different ways. This makes certain sensations to be particularly related to emotions, in Wittgenstein words, “[p]ain differentiated from other sensations by a characteristic expression. This makes it akin to joy (which is not a sense-experience)” (RPP2, §63). Very basic emotions have characteristic expressions as well: the crying of sadness that gradually grows, the loud and abrupt cry of fear, the beaming smile of joy, etc. However, as the circumstances and the content that they capture grow more complex by relying more heavily on language, their bodily manifestations grow more complex, more language-dependent and less characteristic, i.e. emotions have a wider array of manifestations than the very basic emotions from which they developed. Moreover, many emotions also have a clear duration; for example, one can roughly indicate when one started to feel fear and when it stopped. One could even say: the less certainty one has of their duration, the more one is inclined to call them moods rather than emotions. The same goes for expressive behaviours: the blurrier, wider and less characteristic the array of expressive behaviours is, the more one is inclined to call them moods.

Now we have a more accurate notion of how the bodily manifestations of emotions constitute our concepts of emotions. Emotions, we saw, are not the feeling of the physical changes that our reaction to the environment brings about as James thought. Instead, our terms of emotion primarily acquire their meaning as verbal manifestations that replace certain instinctive manifestations that occur in particular circumstances. Such manifestations, both instinctive and verbal, are a constitutive part of how we use the terms of emotions. In other words, they belong to its meaning, and are the worldly manifestation of emotions. In this sense James was right in denying any ‘mind-stuff’ underlying our emotions, however, the cause of one’s sadness is not one’s crying and crying is not a causal effect of adverse circumstances. They are part of what is comprised in our concept of sadness: when we say someone is sad, we justify it by appealing to her bodily expressions and her
circumstances; likewise, when we express our sadness by saying ‘I’m sad’ we are expressing a synthesis of circumstances and content (phenomenal experience) that characterize how our life is going. Such uses are what constitute our concept of sadness and of emotions in general. In this sense, any causal investigation of emotions comes after our concept is constituted, after we have an established use of terms of emotion. That is why it is not accurate to identify our emotions or our ordinary concepts of particular emotions with their causes, which is exactly what James attempts to do by identifying emotions with their bodily manifestations. Although it could be true that emotions are caused by some physiological state like a neuronal state, as it is presumably the case with chronic depression, such a state is not what we mean with our terms of emotion; therefore, they are not what our emotions are.

Moreover, in a common sense attempt to explain emotions, as I said at the beginning of the chapter (page 11), one could say that inner states are missing in James’ account, something inside that explains the phenomenal side of emotions that seems so personal. And one could even add that such inner states are caused by the exterior circumstances. Circumstances are therefore seen as conditions for emotions, but not really part of what an emotion is. But here again, it is not inner, hidden or private states what we mean with our terms of emotion. Why don’t we say she is sad only on the basis of her crying? What is missing in James’ picture of emotion? What is missing is how she characterizes her emotion and her particular circumstances; but not any inner state we are naming when we speak of her crying nor even of our own crying. Such a common sense attempt captures, in a way, that identifying emotions with their physical causes has the obvious problem of ignoring the circumstances and the way people experience their own emotions. That identification makes it very difficult to explain why there are emotions and gestures specific to particular cultures and how they can be directed to external entities as many emotions in fact are; furthermore, by ignoring the way in which we use our terms of particular emotions, it ignores the role emotions have in our lives and societies. I will show in the next chapter how my proposed Wittgensteinian account successfully captures all these three aspects.

I have shown so far that gestures, bodily manifestations and some sensations associated with them constitute our concept of emotion; they are neither causes nor effects of emotions. The discussion already suggested that

---

11It does not imply that conceptual analyses are foundational of our empirical sciences, since empirical sciences also shape our concepts in everyday language-games. See footnote at page [18]
both circumstances and the content (our descriptions of emotional experiences) are also constitutive of our concepts of emotions, since I have been defending that our terms of emotion are used as ‘devices’ that synthesize bodily manifestations, circumstances and content. It is a good moment to consider in detail how circumstances are constitutive of how terms of emotion are used and present in our life, which is one of the topics of the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Towards Objects and Circumstances: A Moving Picture

In ‘The Conceptual Framework of the Investigation of Emotions’ (2004), Hacker makes a useful distinction for the conception of emotions I am elaborating in this thesis. He distinguishes emotional attitudes from emotional perturbations as different aspects of our emotional experiences. The perturbational side is very prominent in emotional outbursts. It involves both what I called the content of emotions, i.e. the sensations and other impressions that populate the consciousness of someone who is vividly experiencing an emotion, and the [bodily] expressions of emotions. Thus, what we saw in the previous chapter belongs to this perturbational side. The attitudinal side is more prominent in long-standing emotions such as parental love. It involves the way in which a specific object matters to one, i.e. how we characterize it, and the blurry family of traits that make a thing the object of a specific emotion. This aspect of the concept of emotion is deeply related to our beliefs, and is expressed mainly by families of actions, thoughts and what Wittgenstein calls the coloring of thoughts. In these two senses the concept of emotion is two-sided. The attitudinal side of emotions will be the central topic of this chapter. It is important to keep in mind that distinguishing the attitudinal and the perturbational aspects is only an analytical tool to compose an accurate painting of our concepts of emotion, and not an ontological claim of two separate kinds of experience. Such a painting is necessarily a moving composed whole, since in each of our particular concepts of emotion and our emotional experiences the attitudinal and perturbational aspects always appear intertwined as two sides that fuse into each other.

I will start by showing that objects are the core of the cognitive element
of emotions, and that they have two important aspects: First, they have an attributive aspect which comprises the family of characteristic properties of objects of a particular emotion; and second, objects of emotions have a specific aspect, which is, roughly speaking, a particular object in specific circumstances towards which our emotions are directed. These two aspects are constitutive of our concepts of emotion, and are deeply connected to each other in our language-games. Then, I will show that circumstances have two roles in our concepts of emotions. On the one hand, circumstances both allow us to see specific objects as the objects of our emotions, and on the other hand, the way circumstances are perceived (described, felt etc.) is influenced by our emotions. In this sense, emotions and circumstances could be seen as being in a bidirectional relation. These considerations will lead me to show how an object can be appropriate or inappropriate for an emotional reaction, and how we can understand other’s emotions: we will see that these two aspects are instituted in our language-games of emotions. Finally, I will examine the role that belief and knowledge have in our emotions, a distinctive role (a particular use) that diverges from their paradigmatic conceptions, and therefore have different, yet related meanings. We will see that they are not only linked to how we see the object of an emotion, but also to how we manifest that emotion.

2.1 Attributes and Specific Objects in Circumstances

We saw in the previous chapter that certain families of thoughts can be manifestations of an emotion. In many cases these expressive thoughts are directly connected with the object of emotion. For example, Nathaniel loves Sofia. He thinks of her as “a Poem. Of what sort, (...) A sonnet? No; for that is too labored and artificial.” She is for him “a sort of sweet, simple, gay, pathetic ballad, which nature is singing, sometimes with tears, sometimes with smiles, and sometimes with intermingled smiles and tears.” (Hawthorne, 1839). Such thoughts are clearly directed to a specific object, Sofia, but she is also imbued by a family of attributes that is not rigidly defined.

Just as with our previous example of love, emotions, in many cases, have a specific object. In Wittgenstein’s words, “the language-game “I am afraid” already contains the object” (RPP2 §146), and that goes for, at least, all our basic language-games of terms of emotion. It is part of each concept of emotion to be concerned in a certain way with a specific object (that might very well be non-existent); and the particular way of being concerned
is characteristic of each emotion. I call this aspect of our concepts of emotion ‘emotional attitudes’ because it is directed to objects and is directed in a way that is influenced, as we will see, by one’s knowledge and beliefs characterized by words.

The distinction between the specific object of one’s emotion and the attributes one sees in it roughly corresponds to the widespread distinction between formal and specific objects of emotion in cognitivist and intentional approaches to emotion. In a very strong and logical formulation such as Anthony Kenny’s 1963, Chap. 9, emotions are seen as intentional states, and the formal object as the set of characteristics that something must have “if it is to be possible for the state to relate to it” (de Sousa, 2014). This excessively strong account is motivated, as we will see, by the clarity with which it captures two interconnected elements of emotions: one can talk of appropriate and inappropriate objects of a specific emotion, and emotions are intelligible and, to some extent, can be explained to others.

Let us take fear, for example. In this sort of account, the formal object of fear is the attribute of being frightening. Then, if one is afraid of a dog, one ascribes this property to the dog’s features: its big fangs, its loud bark are constructed as frightening features (de Sousa, 2014). That ascription is, according to Kenny and de Sousa, what makes one’s emotion fear and not some other emotion. Therefore, every emotion, if it has an object, has to have a formal object. The accordance of the object’s features with the formal object of the emotion is what makes it appropriate or not. In the example, a cute little puppy would not fit the formal object, so it would not be appropriate to be afraid of it. Finally, emotions are made intelligible by making explicit to others and to oneself the features of the specific object to which the formal property is implicitly ascribed. Such ascriptions are beliefs, and relate to one’s knowledge and other beliefs. This formulation might not be completely fair, but it captures the cognitivist-intentional flavour, the gist of which is that ascribing certain properties to specific objects constitutes, presumably partially, an emotion. Along these lines, one could explain the development of one’s emotions as changes in the collections of features of things that one takes to be frightening, lovely, saddening, etc.

There are various aspects of this position that I agree with, and they deserve to be further investigated. First, formal objects are constitutive of our concepts of emotion. Second, our language-games with terms of emotion do involve both speaking of [in-]appropriate objects of emotion and explaining

---

1Kenny’s *Action, Emotion and Will* from 1963 was one of the biggest influences on the revival of emotion as a philosophical topic. His account moreover, is one of the foundations of the cognitive approach in which emotions are seen as appraisals, conscious or not, of objects and situations.
one’s and understanding other’s emotions. And third, our knowledge and beliefs do play a role in how our concepts of emotion are constituted and how we experience emotions. I agree, to some extent, with the distinction between formal and specific objects of emotion; however, they should not be seen rigidly or as well-defined entities, and the relation between a formal and a specific object should be neither only nor primarily seen as the relation of an entity to a definable set.

To start with, speaking of formal objects suggests the possibility of well-defined limits of the set of properties that we see in the object of an emotion. However, the attributes that characterize the object of our fear, surprise or any emotion form a blurry family. Let us go further with the example of fear. There is no well-defined set of definitory characteristics that tells us what makes an object frightening nor how we would characterize it if asked. Every attempt to define the contours of such experiences is doomed to fail:

— The experience of fear comes when we perceive an object threatening our life or our integrity.

— I know this tiny spider is harmless, but I’m so scared!

— Then, what is frightening is an object that is perceived as threatening or repulsive.

— This big black mountain in the horizon has always scared me.

— The sound of the door closing was so loud and so sudden that it scared me a lot.

   etc.

Think yourself of all the things that scare you or that you love. You will quickly find yourself recalling your own concrete experiences, thinking of your expressions of emotion (actions, thoughts, sensations, etc.) towards objects in certain circumstances. You will find that there is no set of properties that you could find to be common to all, or you will find yourself squeezing them into arbitrary and rigid categories.

Trying to offer a rigid set of properties that qualifies something as the object of certain emotion is a self-defeating enterprise, not only because we can always come up with an example that does not quite fit the picture, but also because the notion of emotion that underlies it is a misconception. It approaches emotion as an inner, mental event in which certain beliefs are formed about an object: the crucial belief is that such object has some or all the properties of a certain definitory set. On such a view, the ascribed
property, or a set of them, is seen as the gist of the emotion. Thus, under this conception, an accurate account of emotion should give a set of properties which boils down to a collection of words (adjectives). In that sense, these accounts are not primarily concerned with our actual use of terms, but refer to a collection of other abstract semantic features somehow and indirectly operative in people’s minds.

This concern with semantic features neglects that emotions only happen in particular circumstances —life and its complexities— and that the meaning of our terms is precisely their particular use in circumstances, not words detached from use. More concretely, the specific objects of our emotions do not play the prominent role they actually play in our language-games. Since emotions [partially] are ascriptions of particular properties, the specific object of an occurring emotion matters only as long as the properties characteristic of the emotion are ascribed to it. Therefore, it does not particularly matter for the specific psychological experiences whether one’s emotion is directed to this or that object —my fear of my neighbour’s dog is the same experience at core as my fear of big-fanged aliens that could invade the earth: both consist of me ascribing the property of being threatening to a particular feature of these objects, namely, their fangs. Such a picture misrepresents the complexity and the important and subtle differences between our use of ‘fear’ in different occasions. In particular, it obscures that our use of emotion terms, which is always embedded in particular circumstances, also synthesizes the object towards which it is directed: an emotion towards a different object or no object at all is a different emotion. Our use of the same term in different occasions hints to family resemblances in the language-game, not to a core set of common definitory characteristics. These resemblances might lie not only in the specific or formal object of the emotion, but also in its manifestations, its contents and the circumstances in which the emotion is experienced.

As the formal object of an emotion consists of a blurry family and not so much of a definable set of characteristics, and given the kind of language-games that involve ‘formal’, it is misleading to call this aspect the ‘formal’ object of emotions. I will call it therefore the attributive aspect which alludes to the family of resemblances between the different roles that objects have in our language-games of specific emotions.

To see more clearly that the characteristics of the objects of our emotions are shaped like a family in our use, it is worth considering a fragment of fictitious natural history: a baby cries when her mom suddenly and loudly plays her favourite death metal song. Mommy teaches her to incorporate

\footnote{If in doubt, remember our definition of fictitious natural history on page 19}
to her crying the expression ‘I’m scared’ when asked what she is feeling. After some time, she will learn to replace the noisy crying by this and other civilized expressions of fear, and to use them in other contexts: she does not cry uncontrollably any more when meeting the neighbour’s dog, but timidly hides and says again ‘I’m scared’; she is trained to be afraid of running close to the wheels of a moving car, etc. Her fear of dogs might or might not make her be afraid of cats or wolfs or creatures with big fangs. She might or might not see a resemblance between the neighbour’s big-fanged dog and the little puppy of her aunt, and grow scared.

Our little excursion above to a fragment of fictitious natural history shows that the use of our terms of emotion does not involve having a clear collection of properties that make an object qualify as, in the example, frightening. The small family of scary objects-in-circumstances (mom’s loud song, the unfriendly neighbour and his threatening dog) is expanded with further experiences and new language-games (applying for an important position, learning the horrors of a totalitarian government, etc.). One feels analogies, patterns, similarities with other objects and with other circumstances. In this sense, specific objects of emotion in particular experiences shape the family of attributes that constitute the attributive aspect of the objects of emotion.

There are at least two ways in which attributive objects are shaped by the specific objects of our experience. One is culture-relative: we are taught that we can or should play the language-game of fear towards certain families of objects —e.g. learning that one should be scared of Islam and terrorism or to fear eclipses in certain circumstances as bad omens—. The other one is person-relative: one is ‘prompted’ to see or to be caught by particular resemblances of something to the specific object of a particular emotional experience one has had; a resemblance that others might not see, but that conforms to each person’s use of terms of emotion. Of course, it is sometimes the case that we grow emotional once we learn that a thing has a certain property —‘I got scared when I learnt I was pregnant’. And one can find similarities between this experience and the activity of classifying an object, as if one was examining the properties of an object and classifying it in the collection of, say, scary things in virtue of the found properties. The analogy is tempting: reducing emotional experiences to this analogy brings an enticing picture of clear and systematic parameters (a picture with clear contours), an apparently wholesome account in which knowledge and belief have a clear place. However, it is a misleading analogy, since, besides overlooking the complexity of the circumstances of life that the use of terms of emotion involves, it appeals to a singular case of emotional experience [towards something] that is neither the only one nor necessarily the most im-
portant: as we just discussed, finding an object, for example, scary is usually not a consequence of fitting it into our prefixed characterization of the formal object of that particular emotion.

Circumstances play a crucial role here: a grimace is a smile of joy only in particular circumstances. Babies imitate adults' smile and slowly get immersed into patterns of life (events, circumstances, further bodily manifestations) where being joyful makes sense and a smile is a manifestation of joy. Circumstances provide the objects of emotion: a clown is scary in the middle of a misty forest late at night, but it is funny at an innocent party. The specific object always appears in particular circumstances; these circumstances condition one to see it as scary or entertaining and subsequently to describe it as threatening, macabre, etc. or ridiculous, cute, etc. Not only families of objects, but also families of circumstances make it sometimes possible or not, sometimes appropriate or not for an emotion to emerge, to play a particular language-game of emotions so to speak. In this sense, circumstances both evoke the attributive aspect of the object of an emotion and constitute its specific object.

The relation between circumstances and emotions depicted above is, however, not the only way in which they are synthesized in our particular concepts of emotion. Emotions, in many cases, make us perceive further circumstances in particular ways. This is manifested not only in how we think about them, but also in our actions. Think of someone, on a rainy afternoon of spring, being angry because his boyfriend dumped him. The object of his anger is clearly that event. Then he bikes back home and hears a love song on the radio, which he normally would had ignored and reacts with rage: he switches off the radio, he rants about how overrated love is, etc. He despises the rain in his face and the darkness of the city, dimly thinks of how clumsy drivers and other bikers are when it is raining and how odious it is to have to bike back home. He bikes fast with an angry expression on his face, bikes fast and no one is able to outpace him. Clearly, the particular song, the rain, the darkness and the other bikers and drivers are not the object of his anger, but his reactions (thoughts, actions) to these further circumstances manifest his anger towards his new ex-boyfriend.

It would be misleading to attribute to the circumstances primarily a causal role with respect to our emotions in the same sense that we see gravity as the cause of the falling of an object. As it is clear in the example, circumstances primitively appear as constituents of our language-game: on the one hand they set the objects of emotion, and on the other hand they integrate the various constituents of our concepts of emotion, meaningfully placing them together. We will see in the sections below that circumstances allow us
to see actions, thoughts and demeanors as manifestations, and to link them to other events in our lives. This does not mean, however, that circumstances and objects could not be further considered, in our ordinary language-games or in a scientific practice, as causal agents. Just as we saw before with bodily manifestations (page 28), there are many grey area cases and interesting interplays between our ordinary and non-causal language-games and their causal scientific counterparts.

It is worth noticing here that objects and causes of our emotions are often the same in our primitive language-games. For the girl that is learning to use ‘I’m scared’, the cause and the object of her fear is the loud death metal song her mom loves. However, as we enter into more sophisticated language-games and learn to draw more fine-grained distinctions, we are able to distinguish more subtleties both in the circumstances and the objects; thus, we can feel towards more peculiar aspects and tell them apart from the causes of our emotions. The angry man who has just been dumped could in an exercise of reflection say that his disproportionate reactions towards the rain, the song, etc. are caused by his being angry at his now ex-boyfriend. He could also say that he is not really annoyed by/towards all these circumstances, but that he is ‘taking out’ his anger on them (other people, the song, the rain), that is, in our philosophical jargon, his reactions are manifestations of his anger towards his ex-boyfriend.

I said before (page 41) that there are three aspects brought out in the cognitivist perspective with which I agree. But, as it can be expected from what was illustrated above, I think that they belong to our concepts of emotion in a different manner. The second and the third aspects, namely, the appropriateness of an object of an emotion and the role of beliefs and knowledge in our emotions, each deserve a separate section. So, let us close this section by discussing the first aspect.

The first aspect is that both attributive (formal) and specific objects normally belong to our particular concepts of emotion. Tautological-sounding sentences like “I’m scared, because it is scary” indicate that there is a attribute we see in the object of our emotion; that is, as we saw above, a certain resemblance to the other objects that scare us. We find all these objects scary, i.e. we see in them a scary attribute, because they all scare us; and that the attributive aspect belongs to our concept of emotions consists in this plain fact. One can imagine that in primitive language-games “I’m scared” and “that’s scary” are synonyms, i.e. they are both used as an expression of fear and in circumstances in which something specific is the object of such fear. Thus, that there is a specific object of fear and that, as we saw above, it both belongs to and shapes the family of what is scary (the attributive object of
fear) are already part of the concept of fear. That specific objects normally belong to our concepts of emotion is also visible in our reaction when others say something like “I’m scared and I don’t know what of”. We know he is scared because of his bodily manifestations (including the verbal ones), and because he is experiencing fear, i.e. his space of impressions is filled with the images of fear, including its characteristic sensations. We take that the other is scared of something and he is not [fully] aware of the circumstances. He might be, besides manifesting his fear, asking for help to figure out what’s the object, the circumstances, even the causes of his emotion. Thus, we ask what has happened in his life lately, what elements of his personal history or current environment could be the object or the cause of his emotion. Therefore, the object and certain circumstances that we regard as causes normally constitute our concepts of particular emotions.

But here, again, intermediate cases pervade. There are emotional experiences in which the object and the circumstances that are being synthesized remain elusive. One might call these experiences objectless emotions, yet one has characteristic emotional expressions. For example, in Wittgenstein’s words, “Anxiety” is what undirected fear might be called, in so far as its manifestations resemble or are the same as those of fear” (Z, §489). Trying to find the object towards which these kind of emotions are directed seems unfruitful and pointless. As with moods, they are not directed to something, but unlike moods, they have characteristic expressions and the perturbational aspect of emotions is still very prominent. Those experiences, that range from an anxiety attack to a mild sad feeling and not knowing why, are a conceptual step towards emotional experiences that we would doubtlessly call moods. In general, and to continue with our discussion on the continuous relation between moods and emotions (see page 36), moods are not directed towards a particular object and can be constituted with or without a cause. Unlike some emotions, one is fine without having an answer for ‘Why am I so joyful this week?’; whereas, if one ever were to ask, there is always an answer for ‘Why am I surprised now?’.

2.2 Appropriateness and Understanding

The second aspect of the cognitivist perspective which I agree with (page 41) is that our language-games with terms of emotion do involve both speaking of [in-]appropriate objects of emotion and explaining one’s and understanding other’s emotions. To see how such doings belong to our concepts of emotions, it is crucial to examine our use; our use, in turn, is displayed in considering
what being trained in language-games involves. For that, I will partially rely on Schatzki’s distinctions contained in his concepts of dispersed and integrative practices (Schatzki, 1996, Chap. 4).

As we saw in the last chapter, becoming competent in the use of particular terms of emotion involves a simultaneous training in replacing some of our instinctive manifestations (crying is the more prominent example) by language and in manifesting or carrying out new and more subtle bodily expressions and actions. It also involves being trained to identify one’s and other’s particular emotions and to react to others’ manifestations of them. For example, children learn to hug and kiss, to recognize when others do so and to respond appropriately to it — a child would learn to kiss and hug her parents when asked, to respond back with kisses and hugs and to tell that others are hugging when, for example, asked what two people are doing in a family picture. In general, humans (including children) enter these specific practices and understand certain doings as meaningful gestures when they can perform, identify and react to gestures and actions. This is roughly Schatzki’s concept of dispersed practices.

From his concept of integrative practices, there are two elements that are crucial here, explicit rules and teleoaffective structures. Teleoaffective structures specify in a non-always explicit, not fully formulable manner correctness and acceptability of “which ends should be pursued, which projects, tasks, and actions carried out for that end, and which emotions possessed when (...) one is engaged in the practice” (Schatzki, 1996, p. 100). Explicit rules are those which participants take into account and adhere to, and they sometimes specify actions, ends to be pursued, emotions to be possessed, etc. In this sense, entering our language-games of emotion (practices), that is, being trained to understand these gestures and actions is already linked both with one’s life conditions and emotions, and with certain rules of when and how it is appropriate to manifest an emotion.

As a quick and primitive example in which life conditions are not so complex yet, we are trained simultaneously to give a hug (perform the action), when and to whom (to parents) and in understanding hugs as manifestations of our love for someone. These primitive practices of hugging and kissing are clearly dispersed practices in the sense that children learn to perform
hugs and kisses in certain circumstances, recognize them and react to them, but it is simultaneously already an integrative practice, since what they are being taught is that such actions are manifestations of love, or in Schatzkian terms, signify love. Language-games of emotions can become central to more complex integrative practices, as in the case of the practice of Valentine’s day for which love (mostly romantic love) is central, and, of course, includes other elements like capitalism or religion for some.

Having this Schatzkian framework in mind, we can directly examine how explanations, understandings and the appropriateness of objects of emotion develop and integrate our concept. To do so and to avoid being trapped in a picture detached from use, let us consider some fictitious natural history. In a family trip to the zoo, some days after watching The Wizard of Oz at home, a young boy trembles and cries in fear when he sees a monkey. His mother, surprised by the boy’s strong reaction, asks him “what is going on? Are you in pain?” He apprehensively stutters “no” and points to the monkeys. His mom starts speculating together with her wife in front of their boy about his fear. They realize it might have something to do with the flying monkeys of the film. They explain to him that there is nothing to fear since those flying monkeys were not real, that these monkeys he sees now cannot fly and are not evil, that they have not been evilly trained and that there is no witch to whom they could take him. He feels relieved. A few days later, watching the film again, he repeats mildly fearful that those monkeys and their master witch are not real, that they are not going to take him, that there is nothing to be scared of, etc.

In this process the boy is trained to recognize both that ‘fear’ has connections with other life conditions (the film he watched before) and that his fear can be inappropriate and dismissed (as evil monkeys are not real). Such particular situations become part of his concept of ‘fear’; in other words, they become part of how he plays the language-game of fear, and give rise to the child recognizing some patterns: he links his not-so-complex-yet feelings with further life conditions, expands the family of attributive objects of emotions to things of the past, goes on explaining his own emotions to others and to himself and soothes himself with explanations or bodily gestures when caught by emotional perturbations. Here again, both the culture and the particular individual ways of recognizing patterns and of ‘going on doing the same thing’ shape one’s own way of playing the language-games of particular emotions. On the one hand, the communal side, by being trained to explain our emotions and to point out their objects, we are also trained to follow and allude to these and not those patterns; that is, we are being trained to feel towards certain families of features and not others, to find certain families of attributes accurate for an emotional perturbation and not
others —imagine a community in which people are taught to be scared of human and animal bones, in which they are associated with powerful and unknown superhuman forces. On the other hand, as these patterns and the rules to recognize and react to them are not strict (the nature of language-games of emotion), there is ample room for finding patterns, and therefore, shaping one’s family of attributive objects of a particular emotion in personalized ways. Neither a ‘fully’ determined configuration like mathematics, nor a random configuration.

Our language-games of emotion are intertwined with many other aspects of our life: our beliefs, knowledge, the political institutions of the community in which we live, etc. (more on this in section 2.3). The ties between beliefs and emotions are clear in our example of the community that is scared of bones: their fear is sensible for them because it is tied with superhuman forces. Those intertwined language-games serve to determine what is normal, sensible or pathological. What is a normal manifestation of emotion and a normal emotion in a circumstance largely depends on our training in certain language-games. As we saw above, our training involves performing, recognizing and reacting to certain activities with language. Hence, our capacity to recognize and react to such manifestations in particular circumstances is a good criterion for regarding something as a normal emotion. In other words, what is emotionally normal is the fuzzy family of bodily expressions, actions and sayings that we recognize as emotional manifestations or explanations and to which we can react. This fuzzy family is what we consider to be sensible. Of course, there are emotions conditioned by culture and individual ways of seeing patterns that lie outside this fuzzy family; those we cannot understand: we do not know what to answer or how to react, we do not understand what someone’s demeanor and actions are to express, we cannot empathise, etc. Yet, there is a basis of human emotions given by our bodily constitution and vital events that go through all human cultures: death, reproduction, birth, disease, natural threats to life etc. That is why others’ emotional lives do not usually come across as completely alien, and why the language-games of emotions that result incomprehensible are not as extended as other practices without a clear “universal” human basis.

Often, emotions that appear incomprehensible at first are (re)conceptualized as pathological. However, what is considered pathological (not only mentally but also physiologically) belongs to very complex practices in which, at least, biological, political, economical and cultural elements meet. There is an extended debate on the matter. Georges Canguilhem argued in The Normal and the Pathological (1989) that the emergence of our categories of the pathological and the healthy (normal) did not strictly correspond to the objective epistemological foundations that modern biology and science traced.
He argues that political and economic elements were also intertwined on the appearance of these concepts. Kutchins and Kirk, in their *Making Us Crazy* (1997), show how political, ethical and economic factors determine the DSM classification of mental conditions, and subtly argue that the rhetorics involved in the voting process among the thousands of authors of the DSM impedes a rigorous psychopathological diagnosis and makes the DSM a political, not scientific, product (Lewandowski and Raskin, 2000, p. 22). There is a copious amount of cases in human history that display this complexity, among others: homosexuality, which only relatively recently stopped being considered a psychological pathology in the official discourse of western societies and in various sub-communities of these societies, or the rising cases of diagnosed Attention Deficit Disorder in recent times (Hacking, 1998), which, according to J. Laurence and D. McCallum (2006), are the result “of particular administrative needs and particular technologies of inscription” rather than an internal condition in children’s brain or psyche.

Finally, that we can give explanations and dismiss emotions is a prominent difference with sensations and an important similarity with moods. In Wittgenstein’s words, “To the utterance: “I can’t think of it without fear” one replies: “There’s no reason for fear, for....” That is at any rate one way of dismissing fear” (Z, §501). In contrast, there is no way to dismiss pain or any other sensation: “there’s no reason for feel pain, for....” does not make sense as a way of dismissing it from one’s mind. If meaningful, it would not mean that there is a way of seeing one’s life conditions that would lead one to not feeling pain any more as it is sensible to do with respect to emotions. It would mean rather something like “He should not be feeling pain as he is under morphine”.

### 2.3 Belief and Knowledge

Explaining and giving grounds for one’s and other’s emotions are very closely related to the third element indicated by the cognitivist perspective, namely, that our knowledge and beliefs do play a role in how our concepts of emotion are constituted and how we experience emotions. A surprised woman could say “I can’t believe what you’re saying” as a manifestation and an explanation of her emotion; or a man, frozen by fear as he sees a dog passing by closely, could fearfully say “I know it will bite me”. It is easy to be misled by the occurrence of the words ‘believe’ and ‘know’ in these contexts. As if

---

4Only in 1987 homosexuality was completely removed from the DSM classification (Lewandowski and Raskin, 2000, p. 22) obeying, as Kutchins and Kirk argue, political and moral changes more than scientific reasons (1997, chap. 3)
the woman, had she believed what the other said, would have felt nothing, conviction or sympathy; or as if the man, had he not known that the dog was going to bite him, would not have felt fear. The picture that results from taking these uses too literally portrays human emotions as a sort of derivation from believed or known propositions, the cognitivist picture. In order to break the spell it is convenient to go over the use of these expressions.

Let us start with the case of knowledge. In 1933-34, Wittgenstein wrote in *On Certainty*:

One says “I know that he is in pain” although one can produce no convincing grounds for this.—Is this the same as “I am sure that he...”? —No. “I am sure” tells you my subjective certainty. “I know” means that I who know it, and the person who doesn’t are separated by a difference in understanding. (Perhaps based on a difference in degree of experience.)

If I say “I know” in mathematics, then the justification for this is a proof. *(OC, §563)*

Clearly, the process of ‘knowing’ as used in the example above, “I know he is in pain”, is not what we would call a paradigmatic case of gaining, showing or applying propositional knowledge. There is no gathering of information, drawing conclusions according to rules, testing of hypotheses or anything of this sort. In other words, it is not precisely an instance of playing one of the paradigmatic language-games of knowledge: it is not as if one was assessing the properties of an object, as it is done in chemistry. The difference does not lie in the fact that one assessment is universal (chemistry’s) and the other only subjective (emotions’ and sensations’). Instead, following the Schatzkian framework I offered above, “I know he is in pain” refers to our ability to recognize his manifestations of pain, to react to them appropriately and our ability to manifest pain when we feel it ourselves; in short, it refers to the very constitution of our language-games.

In my example, “I know the dog will bite me”, the use of ‘know’ appeals to the attributes of the specific object of his emotion and to how strong his emotion is —by this I mean the plain fact that the man is very scared of this specific dog biting him. It is both a manifestation and an explanation of his emotion in which he makes explicit the elements that constitute his use of ‘pain’ in specific circumstances. In Wittgenstein’s example it appeals to our ability to understand his pain: the circumstances surrounding the specific use of ‘pain’ regarding other, and the manifestations of pain. Hence, the language-games of emotions and sensations resemble each other. The paradigmatic use of ‘to know’, i.e. as it is used in science or mathematics, is not central to the constitution of our language-games of emotions.
and sensations. Instead, when ‘know’ is used in emotional contexts, it embodies manifestations, explanations, reactions, actions, etc. in particular circumstances towards some object. In many cases, they are not meant to be empirically tested, but they make explicit certain elements that shape the particular emotion one is feeling.

The case of belief is similar. In philosophy and science, the language-game of belief that serves as the model is the same as that of knowledge: believing is taking some proposition [propositional content] as true, and such belief is knowledge if the proposition is true and one has a justification for one’s belief. However, our ordinary language-games of belief in the context of emotions comprise uses that are not included in this model. We will see now that there are at least three ways in which ‘belief’ is used not paradigmatically in our language-games of emotion: beliefs can be grounds of manifestative actions, they can be manifestations of emotions and emotions can be manifestations of beliefs. But before examining these tie-ups it is good to have in mind that there are uses of belief that do not need an emotional component and vice versa: —Is Simon in his office? —I believe so. Or: —I’m so happy today! Finally my migraine is gone.

Beliefs and knowledge sometimes work as grounds of actions that manifest a certain emotion. Take for example a person who fears burglars breaking into his house. He might hire a sorcerer to throw a spell and protect his house, he could buy a gun, replace his door by a sturdy security door or have a burglar-alarm installed. These actions are manifestations of an emotion (fear) and a way to express belief and knowledge. As the examples already suggest, such beliefs and what we consider knowledge are heavily influenced by culture, they depend on the confluence of other language-games within which they are meaningful and hang together with other activities. Knowing, for example, that the alarm will automatically call the police if someone breaks in is linked with aspects of one’s form of life such as living in a community with reliable institutions like the police, with public access to electricity, in which the fact that electric systems work according to laws of physics is common knowledge, etc. In general, these intertwined language-games in which the person stands make the throwing of a spell, the buying of a gun or the replacement of the door intelligible actions: they are meaningful for him and others as manifestations of fear and belief. Others understand his actions if they share his activities and forms of life. That is why I, and probably the reader, cannot understand how throwing a spell could keep burglars away, or in a lesser extent how having a gun would increase one’s security we do not belong to forms of life in which spells are meaningful and interwoven in one’s daily activities, in other words, they do not constitute
our form of life.

Beliefs do not only serve as grounds of manifestations of emotions; beliefs themselves can appear as manifestations of an emotion: — “My anxiety leads me to believe I can’t cope with my new job; and I know I wouldn’t be thinking that if I wasn’t so anxious”. This interplay is very clear in emotions that lack a specific object. Take a slightly modified version of Greenspan’s example (1988, p. 22): someone drinks too much coffee and it causes him to be in an objectless state of edginess, which is initially manifested in his shaky hands, his feeling of nausea, his uneasy demeanor, etc. After a while, it starts creeping in his mind, and the edginess is manifested in passing thoughts and particular beliefs: harmless things become threatening, and he says to himself “this dodgy person in the street wants to rob my cellphone”. Such beliefs and thoughts in turn are manifested in further actions; an extreme case in the example could be running away from the harmless person, and that reaction may very well trigger a further emotional reaction based on such specific belief: the person grows scared of falling down, of being chased by the potential thief, etc. In these cases, we often say that our emotions caused our beliefs.

The relation can also hold the other way around. Often in our ordinary language-games of emotion, we identify not the object of our experience, but a belief as its cause. Take for example a remark like: — “She is scared of the dog, because she thinks it will bite her”.

Hence, beliefs might both prompt one to feel in a particular way or might arise as complex manifestations of emotion. Cognitive-behavioural therapy in psychology aims to break down these loop dynamics between emotions and thoughts and beliefs. The patient is trained to track the beliefs and thoughts that underlie a certain form of behaviour as a manifestation of an emotion, and to track the circumstances that trigger a cascade of beliefs and emotions which in turn are manifested in behaviours that are harmful to others or oneself. However, despite the fact that in our language-games beliefs sometimes cause (trigger, influence, etc.) our emotions, they do not always cause them: believing that someone is lovely is different from loving him. Since not all emotions enter in these loop dynamics with thoughts and beliefs, the scope of cognitive-behavioural therapy, although wide and useful, is limited.

Beliefs have a very prominent role in emotions like love, admiration and gratitude, which remain for a longer time than emotional outbreaks. These

5In *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification* (1988, p. 22), Patricia Greenspan discusses emotions that are not directed to a specific object, and uses as example the anxious edginess that comes after drinking too much coffee.
long-standing emotions are more distinctly characterized by how its object matters to one than by sudden emotional manifestations or sudden contents coming to one’s mind. In this sense, its attitudinal aspect is more prominent than its perturbational aspect. One is concerned with and cares about a specific object in some particular way, and that concern can go unexpressed at times, —“I also love my children when I’m not with them or thinking about them”. Thus, as long-standing emotions are not mainly manifested by instantaneous emotional responses, they rely more heavily on one’s personal history than on manifestative reactions to present objects and current circumstances: one’s attitude towards the object is multifariously embedded with one’s personal history, memories, beliefs, knowledge, other emotions, etc.

Although long-standing emotions are not continuously expressed, they are still manifested in various ways, a family of manifestations: elaborate actions grounded on one’s beliefs, cultural background, personal history, etc., thoughts, knowledge and beliefs that cause one’s emotion —“I know she’s the right person for me”, “I know she have always done the best for me, so I’m very grateful”—, and thoughts and beliefs that arise as manifestations of one’s long-standing emotions. Although such expressive thoughts are sometimes about the object and the features that make it the object of a specific emotion, they are not necessarily limited to this kind. One also has thoughts about other things coloured by one’s emotion. Take for example the happy thoughts about life in general when one is in love or the sad thoughts about daily life when one is grieving.

Long-standing emotions can be put to the test, just as beliefs can. In Wittgenstein’s words, “emotional attitudes (e.g. love) can be put to the test, but not emotions.” (RPP2 §152). This is clear in the grammar of our long-standing emotional attitudes: “Love is not a feeling. Love is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: “That was not true pain, or it would not have gone off so quickly”.” (Z §504). These two passages seem to draw a sharp distinction between emotional attitudes, what I called long-standing emotions, and sensations. Some emotional perturbations and sensations resemble each other in that they are sometimes immediate reactions that are bodily manifested and that come with images that suddenly fill our minds. In that sense, the distinction Wittgenstein draws can be extended to emotional perturbations in contrast to emotional attitudes. Expanding the distinction is useful to highlight that whereas one cannot put one’s emotional perturbations (feelings) to the test —one does not test one’s own sudden emotions, one just feels them— one can doubt and test one’s emotional attitudes —“after all, I think I really didn’t love him as much”.

How emotions are tested depends heavily on the cultural practices around
emotions we have been raised in, in other words, it depends on how the concepts of particular emotions are shaped in the culture we live in: the duration a certain emotion has, the actions that manifest it, a family of ways in which the object is embedded in one’s life and matters to one, etc. For example, for some people, a manifestation of parental love could be the willingness to spend a big amount of money on her beloved daughter, whereas for other (e.g. an indigenous mother) parental love could be manifested in a careful search for a respectable husband for her teenager daughter. Long-standing emotions are predominantly expressed in complex actions which are grounded in one’s beliefs; therefore, our main way of putting our emotions to the test is by our actions.

Emotional attitudes can be tested because we can be wrong about them, and because, unlike sensations like pain, it makes sense to say things like “I don’t know what I’m feeling” or “I don’t know if I love him or I’m just used to being around him”. Whereas one cannot be mistaken about one’s bodily sensations or about what is going through one’s mind, one might fail to grasp the circumstances, objects and antecedents in one’s personal history that constitute one’s particular emotion. In that sense, whereas one cannot put, say, one’s nausea or sensation of butterflies in the stomach to the test, one can very well doubt that they are manifestations of one’s anxiety or infatuation, and guess they simply are sensations without much emotional meaning. One would then consider one’s current circumstances, test if one would actually do any of the family of actions that are part of one’s normal manifestations of emotion, etc. This is why, in some cases, it is possible for others to understand better one’s own feelings than oneself.

This is closely tied to emotions one is not aware of; think of expressions like “I didn’t know I was so angry at her, until I had to meet her again” or “If you hadn’t asked, I would have never found out I was still so grateful to him”. We use this kind of expressions to articulate certain emotional states that are being meaningfully connected to one’s past, and we often call them ‘unconscious feelings’. These expressions and our talk of unconscious feelings articulate various elements in a sensible whole: complex emotions, one’s personal history, circumstances, objects, bodily reactions etc. One starts to relate differently to one’s memories (maybe even make up memories), to feel differently towards them, certain events and objects become embedded in one’s life in a new manner, etc. In this sense Wittgenstein writes:

It might be found practical to call a certain state of decay in a tooth, not accompanied by what we commonly call toothache, “unconscious toothache” and to use in such a case the expression that we have toothache, but don’t know it. It is in just this
sense that psychoanalysis talks of unconscious thoughts, acts of volition, etc. Now is it wrong in this sense to say that I have toothache but don’t know it? There is nothing wrong about it. (Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 22-3)

Just as with realizing that one has “unconscious toothache”, one can perfectly say “I was so sad and I didn’t notice before” to articulate a particular emotional state in one’s life.

To close the discussion on long-standing emotions, it is good to keep in mind Wittgenstein’s own advice and not to focus too much on one aspect. Let us not forget that we use ‘love’ and other terms for long-standing emotions and not only for attitudes; but our uses, doubtlessly, also involve feelings. Besides the long-standing care about or concern with a specific object, the other perturbational elements discussed above are still present: long-standing emotions are also manifested from time to time by simple actions and bodily manifestations characteristic of emotional perturbations, by occasional emotional thoughts that shape a characteristic family or by occasional emotional images that suddenly fill one’s mind. Think of the sporadic genuine hug or kiss parents give to their children. Moreover, there are of course many intermediate cases, for example, infatuation which is equally constituted by a family of attitudes towards a person, and a family of emotional perturbations like the well-known butterflies in the stomach.
Chapter 3

The Content of Emotions

So far, I have been focusing on the public elements of emotions: bodily manifestations, objects, causes and circumstances. However, it is undeniable that emotions are, in a sense, felt in a private manner—I am the only one who can feel my happiness—and that one is sometimes under the impression that there is ‘something inside’ oneself that makes the difference between, say, being happy, sad or indifferent under the same circumstances. So, it is time to account for this personal aspect of emotions in the same spirit of the previous chapters: breaking the spell of emotions as entities or states that are named by our specific terms. The first person experience of emotions, i.e. that what one feels when affected by an emotion, will be treated in detail in this chapter.

We do say things like ‘stay honest and never hide what you’re feeling inside’ or ‘I’ve got a feeling, a feeling deep inside of me’, but taking their superficial grammar too far and ignoring their use in specific circumstances would mislead us to think there is something which is named by our terms of emotion. It is good to re-asses why this common sense inner picture is misleading; not in the context of bodily manifestations as we did in the first chapter, but now in the context of the first person experience of emotions. We saw in Chapter 1 that the use of our terms of emotions is not like the use of names. Instead they are used primarily as emotional manifestations (sometimes reports) that capture a family of circumstances, objects, sensations and other forms of manifestations. Even when our language-games grow more complex, terms of emotions are not used as proper names of inner things: when we speak of emotions, there is not a thing to be named with properties to be discovered, a place to go, someone to meet, an object to put a label on.

Wittgenstein’s famous passage of the beetle in the box appeals to this point. If our terms of emotions were names of the private first person expe-
rience, it would be as if

everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. (PI, §293)

If the essential thing to which we are referring with our terms of emotion was an inner state or an inherently private inner experience, our language-games of emotion would work exactly like this model of the beetle in the box. The emotion itself will be “the beetle” and the constitutive circumstances and objects of emotions would be seen as causes or effects of the existence of said beetle. However, terms of emotion do have a use in our language which is public, we have rules for their correct use, and we understand each other, i.e. we can react appropriately to others emotions. Such use, however, is not the name of a private experience (a “beetle”), since:

if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI §293)

And the same goes for emotions. Therefore, “[t]he thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.” (PI §293). Rejecting that our terms of emotion name a first person experience is not denying that we experience our emotions, or that there is a difference between feeling an emotion and enacting it (its characteristic manifestations, objects and circumstances). Certainly, we personally experience emotions, and there are differences between real and fake emotions. What is being denied here is that such difference depends on the presence of an entity or a particular state (a configuration of neurons, an affectation of the soul), and that language functions only as the naming of such things or as the means for conveying thoughts about these things (PI §304). Such a picture hinders us from seeing how we do use the terms of particular emotions, i.e. how they are embedded in our life and the confluence of factors that constitute our language-games and are synthesized by our words. In this sense, joy, as all our terms of emotions, is not a thing; in Wittgenstein’s words, “‘Joy’ designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward thing” (Z §487).

So, if our personal experience of emotions is not named by our terms, how does it belong to our concepts? Let us go over our use of terms of emotion and
how we characterize their content. Although we almost never speak of ‘the content’ of emotions outside an academic setting, we do articulate our first person experiences of emotions in various forms in our ordinary language-games, which are precisely what ‘content’ aims to capture. We talk about the sensations that are manifestations of our emotions, about the emotional images in our heads, we say things like “when I received her lovely email, everything became bright and colourful”, some of us paint, dance or write literature as to express our emotional feelings, etc.

Having an emotional experience is nothing more than being in a particular confluence of circumstances and objects, having certain bodily manifestations and being under certain bodily states, and being aware of certain patterns (particular attributes in an object) and seeing things (circumstances) with a certain atmosphere. Try to pinpoint something else, something inside you, and you will see how elusive it is; you will find yourself coming back to that which you feel in specific circumstances or to certain artistic expressions that capture certain family-related images, expressive demeanors, circumstances, objects and atmospheres with certain colors and shapes. Otherwise, you will get caught up in an obscure enterprise: the more clear and specific the phenomenon of emotion becomes, the more detached from our use it gets. You might end up playing a different language-game, for example, by trying to elucidate the physiological conditions co-occurrent with such confluences (the practice of science). Having an emotion is not being in a specific internal state; it is not as if our minds, souls or brains were circuits, and emotions certain configurations of them of open and closed switches. Having an emotion is a state of synthesized confluence (specific circumstances and bodily manifestations) that is filled with impressions, thoughts, sensations, etc. expressed both in language and art, I call this filling the content of emotions. Take, for example, the content of happiness: the brightness and colorfulness of everything, the optimistic thoughts and reactions to everything, the happy descriptions with words, the delight of happy music, the artistic expressions of emotion and the ability to understand other’s artistic expressions of emotion. In short, having an emotion is being in a particular way in the world.

Yet, having an emotion is to have a private experience, an experience that only oneself can have; one would even want to say that others cannot really know how one feels a particular emotion in a particular circumstance. As if when someone says “I’m so scared, I want to run away. All this is so daunting!” , he should mean that he has a revolting beetle in his box (the emotion itself) that was caused by some particular object (an external circumstance) and now is causing his actions and bodily reactions. In this respect, one can say similar things of emotions and sensations: just as one cannot know how others experience sounds or see colours, one cannot know
how others experience fear, happiness or sadness; but still we all know others do. Thus, as it “would (...) be possible —though unverifiable— that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another” (PI, §272), it would be possible that one section of mankind had one experience of sadness and another section another.

One can imagine the same for all psychological experiences. This possibility, I would like to argue, follows from the grammar of our psychological concepts; more concretely, it stems from their being bodily experiences. In contrast, mathematics or natural sciences are perfect public practices without this aura of the inner, since one does not characteristically express or does mathematics or science with one’s body. Clearly, the body is crucial for our concepts of sensation. It involves both what is felt with and within one’s body and expressive faces and demeanors.

If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another [in my body]. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body [as if his body was part of mine]. (Which would also be possible.)

Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place —but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression. (PI, §302)

The same goes roughly for emotions. As we saw in the first chapter, demeanors and the very eloquent expressiveness of human faces are constitutive of our concepts of emotions. We also saw that certain bodily sensations constitute particular concepts of emotion, like the nausea of nervousness, or the overall tiredness of acute sadness. Those sensations clearly belong to how emotions are experienced [from the first person perspective]. It is good to be careful at this point and avoid to get caught in the body-mind distinction that might be lurking. It is not as if emotions and sensations were only experienced in one’s mind as causal effects of something happening in a dispensable body where the expressive manifestations were in turn only causal effects of the state of the mind. Our language-games, the practices around and the experience of emotion come as a whole, an integrated confluence of elements that philosophers and psychologists dissect into inner, mental elements and exterior, material elements. The expressive face and the particular demeanor are also part of the phenomena of emotions: they
constitute psychological experiences as a whole bodily way of being in the world to which a certain awareness (e.g., poignant sensations) also belongs.

The body-mind distinction is graciously captured by the beetle metaphor we discussed above (PI §293). This, together with Wittgenstein’s considerations in PI §§281-4, will allow me to show more clearly both how the body is constitutive of emotions and psychological experiences in general, and why it is pertinent to abandon the body-mind dichotomy. Imagine that our use of terms of emotions and sensations were projections of what we internally feel onto other living things; as if one projected one’s own beetle(s) onto others and named everybody else’s beetles on the basis of what one sees in one’s own box. Yet, we do not project these onto plants, walls, stones, numbers, etc. Why not? Wittgenstein invites us in PI §283 to imagine how it would be. Imagine you turn into a stone while you are having frightful pains; the stone will have pains then. How? In what sense would such a stone have pains? Only in so far as there is a human being, you, ‘behind’ it. One imagines then the stone having a soul which feels pain. But then this soul has nothing to do with the stone, but with you (you are not a stone, your body is not a stone). “For one has to say it [that it is in pain] of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some body has. And how can a body have a soul?” (Wittgenstein, PI §283).

Self-moving, sentient and expressive bodies are what can have souls. In this sense, Wittgenstein writes, “only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (PI §281); and one can add here, it is happy, sad, scared, etc.

Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different. —If anyone says: “That cannot simply come from the fact that a living thing moves about in such-and-such a way and a dead one not”, then I want to intimate to him that this is a case of the transition ‘from quantity to quality’.

Emotions, sensations and psychological experiences are what make the difference in this transition from quantity to quality. We react with pity, empathy etc. only to bodies which behave and look similar to living human beings: bodies with something like an expressive face (an expressive mouth, expressive eyes), with the capacity to move and adopt different demeanors (having arms or legs), etc. We say of them, and not of the dead or unexpressive, that they are in pain, happy or scared. Therefore, sentient and expressive bodies are the only possible participants of our language-games of emotions and sensations, and in this sense, they are at the base of these language-games.
Maintaining the body-mind distinction conceals the dynamics of our language-games of psychological experiences and misrepresents the human forms of life language-games bring about. It imposes the picture of an inner mind detached in principle from the outer body, which is problematic for two reasons. First, the states of the inner mind are considered to be what really constitute psychological experiences (focus on “the beetle”); and second, it completely neglects the grounding place of the sentient body in our language-games of psychological terms, and therefore, also neglects its grounding place in our experience.

Moreover, the fact that the sentient body is the subject in our language-games of psychological experiences, i.e. it is the one who feels and the one who experiences an emotion (any psychological experience), explains that we can conceive the possibility that others experience emotions in a different way than us. A sentient body is that which is in the confluence of elements that constitute and are synthesized in a particular emotion (circumstances, objects, obviously bodily manifestations, etc.), and it is also the only place in which one can have pain or what makes us capable of seeing, etc. But, one has one and only one body: one’s own, therefore, one can only be in one’s own particular confluence with one’s own body, one can only feel pain in one’s body — these are remarks on how our psychological language-games are played. Hence, one does not and cannot know how and what others feel, and the inquietude about others feeling different than us arises.

This possibility, however, does not pose a threat to the intelligibility of each other’s emotions. For, on the one hand, we all have similar bodies with similar capacities to feel and to react. And on the other hand, as we saw in the previous two chapters, we all understand each other in a community, because we all play the same language-game despite our different performances of it. One would like to ask then how this possibility happens to arise in the first place, i.e., under what circumstances of use one would consider that others do not feel emotions like oneself. There are various ways in which the use of within-language-games of emotions could make this possibility visible, and such uses already reveal that the uniqueness of one’s experience of emotions resides within the particularity of one’s body being in specific circumstances and reacting in an individual, yet culturally influenced manner. One realizes, for example, that others have a familiar but different array of characteristic physical sensations when experiencing an emotion. As when I’m nervous and say things like “ay!” I’m so nervous, my hands just started aching”, I touch

\(^1\)“Ay!” is roughly the Spanish equivalent of “Oh!”
and squeeze my hands; but clearly others do not manifest their nervousness in such manner, their hands do not hurt when they are nervous. One would like to say then that I experience nervousness in a different way than others who turn red and whose hands do not hurt. Or one can think of people who seek to have others around being affectionate to them when they are sad, whereas others completely withdraw from all their social circles and need to be alone. Also for anger: some blush and remain quiet, others need to kick and smash things or people.

In these examples of use, it is clear that what feels so personal and unique about one’s own first person experience of emotions is manifested in the way in which one engages with the possible patterns of manifestative actions and how one bodily stands and reacts to a confluence of circumstances. There are, however, other instances in which the uniqueness of one’s first person experience of emotion is manifested, e.g. when I am heartbroken I sink into painful Rancheras by Chavela Vargas\textsuperscript{2}, others might compulsively listen to sad Brazilian pop music from the 70s. That brings me to a different element that arises in the confluence that constitutes emotions that I have not addressed yet: the content.

Being in a particular emotional state comes with a family of impressions.

Isn’t the ‘content’ what one peoples the space of impressions with? What changes, what goes on, in space and time. If, e.g., one talks to oneself, then it would be the imagined sounds (and perhaps the feeling in the larynx or something like that). (Wittgenstein, \textit{RPPI}, §733).

And more specifically, Wittgenstein writes “the content of an emotion —here one imagines something like a picture, or something of which a picture can be made. (The darkness of depression which descends on a man, the flames of anger.)” (\textit{Z}, §489). Therefore, the content of our psychological experiences is not restricted to localized \textit{[constitutive]} sensations, but also includes a family of impressions. Besides sinking on one’s bodily sensations, one can also imagine sounds, spaces with certain architectural features, moving pictures that can develop into more complicated \textit{[imaginary]} stories. That is why

\textsuperscript{2}Ranchera is one of the most widespread popular genres in both in Spanish-speaking countries and other countries like Greece and Brazil. It is part of the traditional music of Mexico, and is characterized by the prominence of guitars and strings, and the powerful voice of a singer. Chavela Vargas is known for her dark and beautiful voice, and the disquieting emotional power of her singing.
works of art\textsuperscript{3} can become natural expressions of the contents of our emotions, sensations and moods.

One can see the content of sensations, emotions and moods as a continuum: from the absolutely localized sensation to a particular atmosphere surrounding an event with more or less characteristic sensations (emotions) to the pervasive atmosphere in one’s life with hardly any localized sensation (moods). Certainly, there are many cases in between. Pain is a good example. The descriptions of the content of being in continuous pain range from the localized sensation to the impressions of sadness to a moody atmosphere. Wittgenstein’s words can be read having this experience in mind: “And what sort of description is this: “Ewiges Duster steigt herunter”\textsuperscript{4} One might describe a pain like that; even paint it.” (RPP1, §732).

Some works of art capture characteristic aspects of emotions and the fuzzy family of characteristic impressions that we associate with these aspects. This can be make apparent by discussing particular works of art. Certain paintings can capture different aspects of our impressions of happiness, for example, the lightness and colourfulness captured in paintings like Rothko’s No.5/No.22 (figure 5.2) or Pollock’s The Water Bull (figure 5.3), or the characteristic demeanors that manifest happiness hinted at in Chardin’s A Lady Taking Tea (a subtle smile) (figure 5.4) or its very explicit depiction as in Reynolds’ Miss Bowles with her Dog (figure 3.1), or the typical circumstances that we associate with happiness delicately captured by the lush and quiet landscape of La Corniche near Monaco by Monet (figure 5.5), or by the substantial portrayal of a joyful dancing party in Matisse’s The Dance (figure 5.6), etc. And one can come up with examples of the sort for other forms of art as literature and music. These works of art embody aspects of the content of our experience of emotion, because they grasp the non-rigid associations that we are taught to see when learning to use terms of emotion and that shape our emotional impressions.

Let us discuss how these non-rigid associations are captured in Reynolds’ Miss Bowles with her Dog.

\textsuperscript{3}Fine Arts (with the capital A) are not the only cultural forms of expressions that both capture and, as we will see later, influence our emotional experiences. A broader range of ‘artistic’ products, which includes soap operas, popular music, comics and films of ‘dubious’ quality etc., also has these capacities. By art (with small ‘a’) I refer to this wider conception.

\textsuperscript{4}“Perpetual cloud descends”. Spoken by Care in Goethe’s Faust, Part II, Act v.
The portrayal of Miss Bowles demeanor captures various aspects of what we consider characteristic bodily manifestations of joy: her charming delightful smile, her cheeks delicately rose-colored, her timidly joyful posture slightly inclined towards the dog and her graciously raised shoulder. But not only her demeanor evokes happiness. One can recognize other associations: the joy of being around lush nature, the expression of care in her soft hug to the small fluffy puppy. Her light and dainty clothes also suggest that she is being taken care of, that she lives with a happy loving family whose wealth secures Miss Bowles a comfortable and innocent happy childhood. All these elements, together with the light and easy atmosphere that bathes the girl gives us an impression of happiness.

How the impressions that populate the content of emotional experiences are synthesized in our own particular experience depends on the confluence of the various constituent elements of emotion we saw before in the previous two chapters (bodily manifestations, actions, objects, circumstances); and since all these elements, in turn, depend on both the family resemblances we individually see and the family resemblances we are trained to see, the contents of emotion are also both personal and culture-relative. Moreover, the associations that are made within the language-games of emotion in a community are arbitrary. This is spelled out clearly by Wittgenstein as follows:

Joy is represented by a countenance bathed in light, by rays streaming from it. Naturally that does not mean that joy and light resemble one another; but joy it does not matter why —is

---

Footnote: One might hypothesize that these associations may have had adaptive reasons. For example, we came to associate fear with darkness, because we are not able to see in the dark. Whilst some of these evolutionary hypotheses might actually be true, they do not belong to the constitution of our concepts of emotion within our language-games.
associated with light. To be sure, it might be that this association is taught the child when it learns to talk, that it is no more natural than the sound of the words themselves — enough that it exists. (RPPi, §853)

Moreover, the particular ways in which art is produced in a community at a specific time and place in turn shape the associations that are made in our language-games of emotion. The atmosphere that surrounds the circumstances and the objects of our emotions is shaped by the pervasive and often subtle presence of art in our lives. Take for example the widespread association of the colour blue with sadness. One can imagine Picasso’s very famous blue period influencing how people experience sadness, or people letting specific pieces of music like Chopin’s Prelude op.28, No 4 shape their experience of sadness. However, the influence of art on our language-games of emotions is not limited to the specific impressions that fill us when undergoing an emotion. It can also shape the circumstances, objects, bodily manifestations and manifestative actions that are synthesized in our terms of emotion and their atmosphere. For example, the dramatic and troublesome circumstances that are intertwined in every love story portrayed in Latin-American soap operas have heavily influenced how love is understood there, and have reinforced the atmosphere of passion and overflowing that surrounds romantic love in Latin American societies (Barrera Tyszka, 2013). Thus, the family of actions that manifest love, i.e. that are understood as loving actions, is partially grounded on these fictitious portrayals of love in which love can do anything, in which certainly you will have to fight against all odds (family problems, socio-economic barriers, evil and envious people etc.) in order to finally marry the one and true love of your life, and in which jealousy is a manifestation of love. This also holds for other forms of artistic expression like popular music (bolero, tango, ranchera), and even for advertising. For an interesting overview of these phenomena in Latin-America see (Arcadia, 2013).

The content of emotions is not limited to sensations and specific visual or auditory impressions. It is also constituted by a certain atmosphere, a family of related atmospheres, in the context of which other parts of our life (other language-games) are seen. As we saw in Section 2.3, the particular kind of connection between having a certain emotion and other language-games shapes how emotions are embedded in our life. In other words, the way in which one bodily stands in the confluence of constituent elements of a particular emotion also comprises how other elements converge in one’s particular moment of life. This is palpable, for example, in the atmosphere

---

*Rearcall the conception of art (with small ‘a’) that I am using. See footnote at page 65.
of threat one perceives around a stranger approaching oneself when one is scared as compared to the friendly atmosphere one would perceive if one is happy. Here again, art is particularly felicitous as a way to capture those connections. Alexandre O’Neill’s poem *An Unoriginal Poem About Fear* is an excellent example of these connections being captured by art. It starts by bringing out elements that are common objects of fear or are commonly seen with a frightening atmosphere like what one cannot see and certain noises with an unknown explanation:

```
Fear will have everything
(...)It will have eyes no one sees
(...) ears not only in the walls
but also in the floor
in the ceiling
in the gurgling drainpipes
and perhaps even (warning!)
ears in your ears
```

Then it develops further connections with other aspects of life which one ordinarily does not see within this particular atmosphere when the fear is not too pervasive. He spreads the atmosphere that already populates one’s experience of fear to these distant elements:

```
Fear will have everything
phantoms in the opera
weekly seances
miracles
common courtesies
courageous phrases
model children
secure pawnshops
secret weekend apartments
assorted conferences
frequent symposiums
excellent jobs
original poems
and poems like this one
supremely sordid projects
heroes
(fear will have heroes!)
real and unreal dressmakers
factory workers
```
(more or less)
bookkeepers
(lots)
intellectuals
(without a doubt)
perhaps your voice
perhaps mine
and certainly theirs

Yes fear will have everything
everything
(I think about what fear will have
and I am afraid
it will be exactly
what fear wants) [O’Neill and Zenith, 1987]

The way in which emotions are embedded in our life, expressed in this kind of descriptions, is not permanent. They again depend on the patterns we are trained to see and we can individually see, and it changes through life as one moves from one small community (with its particular language-games) to another. In this sense, one can see the different ways in which emotions are embedded in our life as different paraphrasings. Thus, Wittgenstein writes:

It is important, however, that there are all these paraphrases! That one can describe care with the words “Perpetual cloud descends”. I have perhaps never sufficiently stressed the importance of this paraphrasing. (RPPi, §853)

The ability of certain works of art to capture these connections has two aspects. On the one hand, works of art can detach the interplay of emotions and other parts of our life from the particularities of each individual’s personal history. On the other hand, these relations are portrayed in a universal manner in the sense that they can capture both the pervasion of emotions that arises from events central to any form of human life (death, birth, sex, natural threats), as Brâncusi’s portrayal of romantic love in his sculpture, The Kiss (figure 5.7), and the connections with other practices (language-games) in which we all participate from the moment we were born in a particular time and place, as in Harper’s portrayal of annoyance in The Agony in the Kitchen (figure 5.8). In addition, art can unveil or create further connections between our language-games of emotion and other practices with which one does not normally associate a particular emotion. Besides the example in the poem we just saw above, one can also think of the so called Werther
Effect. The series of suicides emulating Werther’s suicide in Goethe’s *The Sorrows of Young Werther* was certainly preceded by a new form of shaping the emotional experience of each of those young men.

One’s personal experience of emotions, how one feels in a specific circumstance is therefore changed by being immersed in art (with small ‘a’, cf. footnote in page 65). Because of this capacity of art one can see it as a form of therapy. As art can show and create further connections of one’s emotional experience with other aspects of life, it is and could be a way to channel one’s emotions into less daunting or painful experiences. Alain de Botton’s *Art as Therapy* (2013) captures this capacity of art, and argues superficially on how experiencing art can function as a tool to enrich people’s emotional experiences or better cope with various even aspects of human life. He focuses on seven aspects of life: remembering, hope, sorrow, rebalancing, self-understanding, growth and appreciation, and further shows how the influence of art on these aspects can also help to cope with other emotions like anxiety. Given our framework for understanding emotions, one can see that such an enrichment or better coping comes not only from the ability of art to capture in a more or less a universal manner the impressions that come with human emotions (certain facial expressions, certain events occurring in any form of human life —birth, death, love, etc.); but as we saw above, it also comes from its capacity to prompt one to draw new connections between particular emotional experiences with other aspects of one’s life and even its capacity to evoke further emotions.
Part II

Anxiety
Chapter 4

The Big Picture Of Anxiety: The Pervasive And The Pathological

Anxiety covers a multifarious range of human experiences: the fearful expectation before an exam, the restless and uncertain feeling towards one’s future, a full blown anxiety attack, etc. In this chapter I will offer a general framework of the multiple ways in which anxiety is embedded in one’s life, that is, the families of bodily manifestations, circumstances and contents that converge in our experiences of anxiety. I will articulate this general picture in two steps. First, I will start by delving into relevant fragments of fictitious natural history. It will show both the links between fear and anxiety, and the bodily manifestations on which anxiety hangs. Such an investigation will serve as a basis for the second point, a general explanation of the current pervasiveness of anxiety in western democratic societies and of what is currently considered pathological anxiety. The transition from the first to the second point will show how our language-games of fear and anxiety allow us to grasp certain patterns rather than others in circumstances, conceive further objects of our emotions and develop new bodily manifestations and manifestative actions. This two-step general picture will serve as a particularized framework to understand existential anxiety in Wittgensteinian terms, which will be treated in detail in the fifth and final chapter.

As I said, the concept of anxiety is an umbrella term. It covers a big family of emotions and moods (language-games) with many sub-families; and it has strong links with other specific emotions (confluence of language-games), most prominently, fear — in a sense “anxiety is what undirected fear might be called” (RPP2, §148)—, but it is also linked to sadness, nervousness,
depression, frustration, impotence, etc. We will see later that our western practices of psychology both remove themselves from our ordinary talk of anxiety and influence it in a dialectical interaction. They include other physiological concomitants and shape them into causal or statistical terms as comorbid conditions. In particular, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) and in *Anxiety* by S. Rachman (2004) anxiety is understood to cover various more or less well defined pathological conditions (social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety, etc.). This psychological conception, in turn, influences the popular conceptual understanding of anxiety, thereby making the particular way in which anxiety is experienced by people localized within the specific time and place of our culture. So I will start by depicting the broad family of language-games of anxiety, which includes the pathological cases considered in psychology, and both the non-pathological cases in daily life and the cases explored in philosophy and literature.

### 4.1 The Family of Anxiety: An Impression

Anxiety is very closely related to fear. Imagine a frightened baby. Particular circumstances with very specific objects would come to one’s mind: a loud noise, a stranger trying to carry her, together with her particular bodily manifestations: a sudden cry, eyes wide open (in terror), her body shaking, etc. Now imagine an anxious baby. One could imagine a restless baby with a sad expression, a baby that is easily scared so he cries in fear because of slightly loud noises, whenever he is left alone, whenever a stranger is around, etc. One would like to think that the baby is generally anxious, and his anxiety is clearly manifested by his excessive outbursts of fear and by his generally unsettled demeanor. Then, one does not think of a clear specific object towards which his anxiety is directed, but of particular instances in which it is manifested towards a particular but “disposable” object. One can imagine the causes of his anxiety: a violent family, lack of attention from his parents, etc. —this already hints to cultural ties with our western scientific practices.

Saying that a baby is anxious because he was left alone might sound contrived to some and considered an instance of the pervasive talk of anxiety of our times that seeps into our conception of babies’ emotions. It might seem that saying that the baby is anxious is just to say that he is mildly scared because he has been left alone. Such an impression is backed by an ontological and an epistemological factor. On the one hand, the bodily manifestations associated with anxiety largely overlap with the bodily manifestations of
fear. On the other hand, babies (and languageless creatures in general) lack the tools to capture and express the subtle differences as to what in the circumstances constitutes a manifestation of anxiety in contrast with a manifestation of fear. Therefore, we, speakers of a language, often cannot know if a specific manifestation is a manifestation of fear or of anxiety. Thus, whatever could be called an outburst of anxiety of a baby could also be a manifestation of fear. Yet, one can already see differences in duration, recurrence and general demeanor between anxiety and fear, as if anxiety was fear extended to a mood.

Settling whether or not it can be properly said of babies that they are anxious as opposed to frightened is a futile matter of how one demarcates the concept of anxiety, but there are two elements worth noticing here: First, the bodily manifestations of both anxiety and fear overlap. Second, it seems appropriate to speak of anxiety when (i) it is a ‘fearful’ mood or (ii) when the object towards which an emotion manifested by unsettledness or by full blown manifestations of fear is elusive or seems to be “disposable”. Third, anxiety arises as an emotion with clear contrasts with fear as long as we have more complex forms of life, i.e. more families of complex language-games in which there is the ability to speak, for example, of things or aspects of life other than what is present (e.g. the uncertain, what we cannot do, what we don’t know, what we yearn for).

In order to see how the three elements I highlighted above converge in the concept of anxiety, let us imagine how a child can be taught to use the term ‘anxiety’ in a family that is very mindful of emotions. Before we start, it is good to remember that this and all the following are just fictitious natural histories, and by no means they intend to hint at an exhaustive taxonomy of children fears and anxieties, nor to suggest hypotheses that have to be empirically proven (see page 19). What appears meaningful to us in these instances of fictitious natural history is a sketch of the particular structures, so to speak, that constitute our concept of anxiety.

Imagine a girl that, during her first visit to her uncle, grew very scared of the vast collection of dissected insects that decorates his house. So, on the next family trip, on the way to her uncle’s house, she starts biting her nails, she withdraws and uneasily moves around and has a worried expression on her face. Then, as they approach and she sees his uncle’s house, she breaks into tears and her body shakes in sheer terror. Her parents ask her what is going on, but she is not able to tell —she does not know, her reactions are too overwhelming for her to speak, etc. The exact reason does not matter,

---

1This transition is beautifully captured by O’Neill’s poem quoted at the end of the last chapter (page 68).
there might not even be an exact reason that we can discern within our (hers, her parents' and our) language-game. So, they comment on how anxious she is, they might worry about her strong reaction and say things like “It must be the insects that scared her so much last time what have been making her so anxious all day long”. So they explain to her that such dissected insects are inoffensive and that mom and dad will be there with her when she grows scared. She stops crying, and when dad asks “Are you still anxious?”, she says “Just a little bit”.

In this interaction with her parents and by being in these particular life conditions, the girl is being trained to use the term ‘anxiety’. As we saw extensively in part I, specially in the second chapter (page 49), such training involves various factors. She is being taught to use language to explain to others and to herself her emotional responses —that what she’s feeling very acutely in her body—, by linking them to things that are not present yet —the dissected insects she is about to encounter—, and to other aspects of her life —her personal history—. Thus, she learns to grasp aspects of specific objects towards which her emotion is directed. She is being trained to use the term “anxiety” when she is again in a similar situation: similar unpleasant feelings that remain for some time —a fearful mood—, similar outbursts of fearful crying, similar horrible past experiences that are to be encountered again —an object that is similar in certain relevant aspects: it is disgusting—. Here again the similarities depend both on cultural and individual factors —e.g. a child who sees the resemblance in encountering the frightening insects and going to school for the first time and meeting all these unknown people, and a child who does not. She is being trained to respond to the anxiety of others and to cope with or to soothe her own. Even in this very basic example, one can already see how culture relative these responses are. Imagine the girl was a boy, and the family was part of a macho culture. His parents might not appeal to the harmlessness of the dissected insects, but to the fact that he is a boy and that he is therefore not supposed to cry, because, since he is strong, he should not be afraid of anything.

One can see the resemblance between fear and anxiety, and more specifically between the fragment of fictitious natural history of fear of the monkeys in the Wizard of Oz (page 49) and our fictitious consideration on the natural history of anxiety. Both compress similar bodily manifestations (the trembling, the crying, one can imagine similar facial expressions), similar responses (parents pointing out what is that makes children scared or anxious) and similar ways of soothing and dismissing fear and anxiety. Yet one can see small but significant differences both in the circumstances and the bodily manifestations.
In our fictitious considerations on natural history, bodily manifestations of anxiety may be spread over longer periods of time than fear, and they overlap with bodily manifestations of other emotions such as being happily nervous about going to play for the first time at a friend’s house (the shaking hands, the unsettledness, maybe the withdrawal). The overlapping of the bodily manifestations of these language-games arises both from their conceptual closeness, and from the very nature of our concepts of emotions. In general, our terms of emotion capture a fluid confluence of various aspects that constitute our life. As we saw before (page 60), our terms of emotion capture the way in which we bodily stand in this confluence of life, in other words, we are bodily in a circumstance and we grasp with our terms of emotion certain patterns of our situation with language. Such patterns are fuzzy and the circumstances that can constitute different emotions are the same in many cases. Therefore emotions overlap, and there are no clear limits from one to the other. In particular, anxiety, fear and nervousness do not only resemble each other in their agitated bodily manifestations, but also in certain traits of their objects in specific circumstances (soon we will see in some detail how the objects of anxiety are constituted) that bind them together as related families: the threatening, the unknown, the uncertain, the overwhelming, etc.

As we learn more complex language-games, in which the circumstances that constitute our life acquire very subtle nuances, we simultaneously acquire new bodily manifestations of anxiety that depart from its prevalent similarity to fear. We saw in the first chapter (pages 26 and 28) that grasping our ways of bodily being in specific circumstances with terms of emotion allows us to acquire further expressive doings and more refined feelings. In particular, our concept of anxiety can be embedded in our life as we are able to remember scary experiences from the past and foresee them in our future. We learn to express this new way of synthesizing our bodily experiences in the world by saying things like “I’m anxious”, by responding adequately when others ask us and by doing and telling to ourselves what others have taught us in order to soothe ourselves and cope with this particular manner of bodily standing in the confluence of one’s life. In our limited example of the dissected insects, one learns to express one’s anxiety by telling to oneself that this intimidating future is actually not really threatening, or that one is a boy, therefore one is strong and there is no reason to be anxious. One can also imagine parents explaining their daughter what these insects are used for in science, so she can see them not as threatening but as a fascinating way of knowing in detail what insects look like and she might even see some pleasant aspects about them (the iridescent colour on their wings, the delicate little antennae etc.). After some time, she might be trained to actively
look for information in order to soothe her uncertainties. One can see the links that anxiety has with other practices: soothing one’s anxiety as a motivation behind research or a compulsive obsession with acquiring knowledge as a way to deal with a threatening world, etc.

But the family of ways to synthesize and express how one bodily stands in one’s life that constitutes the family of anxiety is bigger than the cases we have seen so far, since both the relevant attributes of their objects and their bodily manifestations vary. Let us start by considering some other common ways in our western societies of grasping certain attributes in the family of objects of anxiety.

Anxiety is sometimes understood as an excessive fear: an emotional reaction that lasts longer or is much more violent than is proportionate with respect to a specific object, and that leads to a lingering unsettled mood. It is also conceived as a fear (overlapping bodily manifestations) that is directed towards non-present things: future threats, one’s inability to cope, imaginary events, one’s thoughts, etc. This particular way in which the language-games of thinking, imagining, etc. mesh with this specific conception of anxiety resembles another member of the blurry family of anxiety: a fearful and excessive worry, as if the anxious person was always expecting the worst; one is nervous (the mild nausea) and mildly scared (the shaking hands) about an uncertain future or about nothing definite at all. Often anxiety is distinguished from fear in that one knows what one is scared of, but one does not know what one is anxious about.

Each of these subfamilies is also constituted by arrays of bodily manifestations and expressive actions that heavily depend on one’s culture, the particular ways in which people around us play language-games of emotion and one’s personal tendencies to react in specific ways. Here, once again, in being trained to play these specific language-games of anxiety, one is simultaneously trained to see patterns in certain attributes of objects and to express in particular ways one’s bodily experience of being in certain circumstances. One can imagine primitive versions of each of these language-games of anxiety, one could even imagine using different words for each of them. One can go on listing the family that constitutes anxiety and its distinctions from our concept of fear. Since these distinctions are shaped by each one’s particular circumstances, culture and personal ways of seeing patterns in one’s life, it is impossible to give a detailed account that is not very personal. Let us now consider in detail one member of this family of anxiety that will be important for the second part of this chapter and the next chapter.

Take for example anxiety understood as a fear directed towards non-present things, and imagine how one can train a child to use ‘anxiety’ in such a way. Imagine a girl being introduced to the academic dynamics of
exams, she might be in her first year of primary school. She is told on the first day that in two months time she will be tested and graded on how well she knows the material that is presented to her. After an unfortunate episode in which she could not give an answer when her grandfather asked her to tell all she had learnt in school so far, she starts behaving very apprehensively every time she is asked about school, she withdraws and stops participating in class, she trembles and adopts a facial expression of fear every time the teacher mentions the approaching exam, etc. She happens to have a very mindful teacher and family around that notice her change of behavior. They notice a pattern in her bodily manifestations and a correlation between them and the prominent surrounding circumstances in her life. They ask her and encourage her to articulate her emotions around the exams, they tell her that the thing she is feeling is called anxiety, they reassure her by telling her that she is intelligent enough, that she will be fine if she studies at home and that whenever she is feeling anxious she can calm down by remembering she is intelligent enough and by breathing deeply. With reinforcement, accompaniment and care she finally learns to express her unsettling feelings, not only by trembling and crying, but also by saying she is anxious, breathing deeply, telling kind things to herself, repeating what the adults have told her, getting herself to study whenever she grows anxious of failing the exam and disappointing her family and teacher, etc. As she expands her social circles and gets into contact with new forms of grasping and expressing one’s bodily being in circumstances, she learns more and new ways of manifesting her own anxiety, for example, she might learn at some point to smoke as a way to manifest her mild anxiety of writing a difficult essay, or to practice kickboxing as to ease her anxiety when her academic life seems too uncertain for her.

The objects and the circumstances that constitute anxiety are assembled together by all the different specific circumstances in one’s life in which one experiences anxiety: the girl might see the resemblance between the demands

\[\text{It is quite likely that this fragment of fictitious natural history is true, mutatis mutandis, for many children in our times. As Rollo May points out in The Meaning of Anxiety}, \\]

While it long has been recognized that apprehensions and fears, particularly those related to approval or punishment from parents and teachers, exerted much power over the child in school, not until recently have there been scientific recognitions of the innumerable subtle expressions and influences of anxiety permeating the child’s educational and classroom experience. \[1950\].

Currently, there is extensive research on anxieties arising from the school learning process, in which, for example, mathematics, foreign languages and being part of a disadvantaged minority play a role. For an overview, see The Causes, Consequences, and Solutions for Academic Anxiety \[2010\].
of future exam and her parents’ expectations about her behavior towards others (e.g. her parents expecting her to be affectionate and friendly towards this aunt she does not like), or between the possibility of failing the exam and the possibility of not being able to make new friends in the park or the possibility of not being able to do this hip trick in the bike that many of her friends can do and brag about, etc. She, therefore, might be able to articulate her unsettling bodily experiences in the prospect of these circumstances by saying she is anxious. One learns to call anxiety that what one feels and is bodily expressed sometimes as fear, sometimes as this bodily unsettledness and that which sometimes lingers around as a mood coloured by fear, but which is directed towards objects that seem ‘far away’, i.e. a family composed by future events, what one thinks one won’t be able to cope with, etc.

Clearly, anxiety has links not only with fear, but also with expectation. Both expectation and anxiety can only appear in a life that is complex enough to conceive and feel towards what is not present, in particular, future events. Thinking about and feeling towards what is not present —the future for example— is expressed and experienced as part of our life, thereby it also constitutes the circumstances we live in, and it is language what allows us to be in such future oriented states. Consider expectation. In Wittgenstein’s words, “It isn’t a later experience that decides what we are expecting”, but “it is in language that expectation and its fulfilment make contact” (PG, §92 and PI, §445). Expectation is not decided by the later experience, which is evident from the fact that we can expect things that never happen. But what does it mean to expect? There are three elements that may converge together and constitute expectation: thoughts, feelings and preparatory behaviours, for which Wittgenstein’s example is “a player in a ball game holding his hands in the right position to catch the ball” (PG, Part VII, §93). It is worth quoting Wittgenstein at length to see how thoughts and feelings are threaded together in expectation:

When I expect someone,—what happens? I perhaps look at my calendar and see his name against today’s date and the note “5 p.m.” I say to someone else “I can’t come to see you today, because I’m expecting N”. I make preparations to receive a guest. I wonder “Does N smoke?”, I remember having seen him smoke and put out cigarettes. Towards 5 p.m. I say to myself “Now he’ll come soon”, and as I do so I imagine a man looking like N; then I imagine him coming into the room and my greeting him and calling him by his name. This and many other more or less similar trains of events are called “expecting N to come”.

But perhaps I’m also prepared to say “I have been expecting N” in
a case where the only thing that connects him with my expectant activity is for instance that on a particular day I prepare a meal for myself and one other person, and that N. has announced his intention of taking that meal with me. (PG, §94)

There are various features of expectations we can see from the quote and that are worth being compared with anxiety. First, one can expect something without feeling anything in particular, but one cannot be anxious and not feel anything at all. This is one of the reasons why expectation is not an emotion, but anxiety is. That brings me to the second difference: the array of preparatory behaviours that constitute expectation is not characteristic and it varies widely depending on what one is expecting. This is not the case for anxiety; as we saw, there is a more or less characteristic array of bodily manifestations of the different concepts that constitute anxiety, a collection of arrays that keep a family resemblance—an unsettled manner of bodily being in the world that overlaps with the characteristic bodily manifestations of fear. Thirdly, both for expectations and anxiety our thoughts, doings, feelings and personal history are tied together by language—that one is expecting N. is connected with making a big meal and with N.’s announcement of visiting by the fact that one might say “I’m expecting N.”. In Wittgenstein’s words, “it is in language that it’s all done” (PG §95), it is language that makes our life complex enough to synthesize all these present and non-present circumstances. In other words, it is through language that anxiety is embedded in one’s life, and this embedding usually converges with one’s cognitive abilities: as we are able to play the language-game of remembering, speculating, reading, writing, etc., we are able to capture in our emotions more subtle aspects of objects in circumstances and to express them in more sophisticated manners.

There is a fourth important similarity between anxiety and expectation: one can expect and still be unable to tell exactly what, for example, when one wakes up with the idea that “something might happen” (maybe because it is one’s birthday). Likewise for anxiety. One feels anxiety and expresses it by certain actions and bodily manifestations, but it can be that there is nothing concrete that causes the anxiety or is able to take it away by disappearing. In this particular experience, there is no specific object, be it a future event, a threatening possibility, etc., that ‘clicks’ as that towards which our emotion is directed—nothing ‘clicks’ like in the case where one finds a yellow flower after having been looking for one (PG, §108), or when N. finally arrives after having expected him for hours. —One can see that expectation without a clear object is closely related to emotions, and the limits between both language-games become blurry.
This objectless experience of anxiety is very interesting for two reasons. First, its lack of a specific object suggests it is a mood, however the strength of its manifestations closely relates it to an emotion. Second, existential anxiety belongs to this subfamily of the concept of anxiety. Since existential anxiety will be treated in detail in the next chapter, I will address the overlap between anxiety and objectless expectation there.

A cautionary note is called for here. I have been arguing so far that our concept of anxiety is clearly differentiated from fear (and any other similar emotions), because language allows us (i) to make subtle distinctions in the circumstances we live in, (ii) to expand both the circumstances and the objects we can conceive and feel towards—for example, particular future events—, and (iii) to expand and modify the bodily manifestations and actions that express our emotions. It might seem then that we are not in a position to feel anxiety without knowing how to use the word ‘anxiety’, that is, without participating in the language-game of anxiety. But clearly this is not the case: both languageless creatures and people that, despite having language, do not use the term ‘anxiety’ can experience it.

To start with the former, early in this chapter (page 73) we saw that there are certain moods and emotions in babies and animals for which it seems appropriate to use the term ‘anxiety’—one could even imagine certain subfamilies of our language-games of anxiety depending on these primitive experiences. There I also presented a possible concern, namely that some could find it contrived to say that languageless creatures experience anxiety, since their manifestations of fear overlap with the manifestations of anxiety and they lack the tools to differentiate aspects that would make one anxious in specific circumstances. Now I can answer to this concern, that despite the fact that bodily manifestations of fear and anxiety overlap, they differ sufficiently for us to be able to speak of anxious babies, dogs, cats, etc.: they grow easily scared, they have an unsettled demeanor, etc. People even say of goldfishes who jump out of their bowls that they are anxious. In this sense, there is indeed an ontological difference in the life of babies and sufficiently complex non-human animals on which the ascription of anxiety depends: the patterns of their behavior in specific circumstances. That their behavior is different enough to reveal a difference between anxiety and fear is a sufficient reason to deem that the circumstances in which anxiety and fear arise for languageless creatures make an ‘epistemological’ difference to them. It is worth noticing that by epistemological difference I do not mean a sort of cold rational calculus in which circumstances are evaluated, but rather particular ways of bodily being in and reacting to the world and its changes. Hence, anxiety depends on a language-independent emotion that is
closely related but not identical with fear, and it is only through language that it develops as the vast family of concepts with their characteristic bodily expressions, complex circumstances, and [sometimes elusive] objects.

Moreover, one can easily imagine someone not alien to us (similar culture, raised in roughly the same community) whose emotional education is not similar to the fictitious natural histories we have considered in this chapter; someone who only late in his life learnt the word ‘anxiety’. Yet, one can still imagine him feeling anxiety even before he started using the word, that is for example, before he read an existential book, or went to a cognitive-behavioral psychologist because of his disproportionately growing reactions of fear, nervousness, unsettledness that he could not understand. That person could be oneself. One might want to explore into one’s personal history to find whether one has had experienced anxiety before, when, why, etc. One reconsiders one’s own history in retrospective, and gives new meanings to it and to one’s current circumstances articulated by a new concept. However, one is able to do so with one’s and other’s personal histories, because we share a cultural background and a specific historical moment that allow us to project into the past our particular and pervasive conception of anxiety of nowadays.

As we saw before, the way we conceptualize and therefore experience anxiety arises in practices that are highly dependent on culture. The attributes we see in objects, the resemblances between our experiences of fear and anxiety and our manifestative actions and many of our bodily expressions arise in our training in using terms such as ‘anxiety’, ‘fear’, ‘expectation’, etc. However, language-games do not come in isolation; we are simultaneously trained in a complex aggregate of language-games (practices) that constitute the form of life in our culturally and historically situated communities. In this sense, the ways in which one experiences anxiety also relates to other practices and the values of the community one is living in.

Thus, in order to understand how the family of concepts of anxiety is constituted in our current times, it is necessary to deviate from the detailed investigation of language-games I have been undertaking so far, and engage in a general diagnostic picture of our current forms of life in which our concept of anxiety is embedded. This methodological change will offer a glimpse of various cultural elements that shape how anxiety is understood and experienced nowadays. Therefore, the following section will sketch a particular instance of the cultural relativity of our concepts of emotions that I discussed throughout Part [1]. However, it will be merely a sketch, since, first, it includes aspects that shape but are not internal to our language-game of anxiety, and, second, it will require an extensive and in depth investigation that exceeds
the purposes of this thesis.

4.2 Cultural Diagnosis

I believe that there are three interrelated elements that shape our concept of anxiety, and that contribute to its prevalence in our times: (i) our democratic and capitalist conditions of life, (ii) art and media and (iii) the scientific outlook of our mental life that seeps into the popular understanding of psychological experiences.

4.2.1 Democracy and Capitalism

Rollo May identifies competitive individual success as one of the main values of our culture that bring us anxiety. In his own words,

The goal of individual competitive success is accorded such crucial weight because it is identified with self-esteem and self-worth. It is to the modern man what salvation was to the citizen of the Middle Ages (...). Competitive success in our culture is not essentially a matter of achieving material security, nor is it in the realms of sex and love a matter of achieving an abundance of libidinal satisfactions. Rather, it is a means of gaining security, because it is accepted as a proof of one’s power in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others. (May, 1950, p.217)

The way in which such values come to shape one’s life is deeply connected with our training in the use of terms of emotion. As I said before, this training does not happen in isolation. We are taught to fear not only cars and terrorists (to see these patterns, bodily manifest our fear in certain ways, say we are afraid, etc.), but also to fear failing in school, being unable to have a nice house, car, bike, clothes, etc.—there are language-games one cannot

---

3 Alain de Botton’s *Status Anxiety* (2004a), which is also presented as a documentary *Status Anxiety* (2004b) addresses in some detail and in an engaging manner the cultural elements that makes us so anxious today. As it is a book written for the general public and not an academic source, it sometimes lacks some argumentative rigour. There are also academic sources exploring this topic in a detailed manner and with a more narrow focus, for example *National Belonging and Everyday Life* by Michael Skey (2011) which addresses the relation between the anxiety towards the uncertainties of living in a globalized world and the nationalist thinking encountered in everyday speech.

4 These three elements are not by any means exhaustive. One can think of other factors such as the powerful weapons we currently have that can destroy all human life or the possibility of one’s life being entirely exposed given the pervasive surveillance of nowadays.
join and that are glamorously depicted as desirable if one is not wealthy enough. One fears the loneliness that comes with not being part of such practices pictured as desirable—a fear of loneliness that is related to the childhood fear of not having one’s parents attention, and a fear we often call anxiety since it is closer to expectation than to the fear of a barking dog (the bodily manifestations, the elusiveness of the object towards which the emotion is directed). Clearly, our cultural products, what I called art with small ‘a’ in the previous chapter (Cf. footnote in page 65), have a tremendous influence on how our fears, desires and anxieties are shaped. I will address this influence in our times in the next section.

May identifies the Renaissance as one of the origins of individual competence as a value, more concretely, the switch from the medieval confidence in authorities and institutions to the confidence in the power of autonomous reason over the established opinion. It led us to value strong personalities highly, in his words, “the accepted ideal was the powerful, free, creative individual, whose power was implemented by his knowledge and reason (as well as cunning)” (May, 1950, p.218). This change of mentality, he argues, together with the subsequent economic developments of the laissez-faire and the emergence of capitalism, are visible in two aspects of our contemporary social dynamics. On the one hand, unlike the multidimensional individual of the Renaissance, we understand self-realization and self-worth predominantly in terms of economic wealth (a one-dimensional individual). Although May does not consider it, the work ethics of protestantism also influenced greatly the development of capitalism as Max Weber famously argued in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2001). The Protestant Reformation introduced a new dignified view of the value of labour: hard work and perseverance were seen then as a sign of one’s salvation. On the other hand, the individual ambition for success (one seeks to conform to the ideal and be recognized by others) favors an environment of aggression and hostility between members of the same society (May, 1950, p. 218-9). Such aggression, hostility and prevalence of the value of wealth transpires in the way we judge others (a language-game). It is an internalized discourse: one learns to judge oneself and others because one sees harsh judgements perpetuated in our success-oriented practices. Aggression and hostility is visible in (i) the one-dimensional judgement of the other (her economic wealth, her number of publications, grades, credits taken, etc.) (ii) the disregard of other factors in her life that are not under her control and that result on her current [economic, academic, etc.] status.

Certainly, equating economic wealth with self-worth, although prevalent, is not the only form that our value of individual competitive success takes on. Marx’s concept of alienation brilliantly captures how this equation of
self-worth with specialized skills pervades capitalism. In his *Comments on James Mill* (1844), he argues that the products of capitalism, as produced by human beings, affirm oneself and others: (i) One’s individuality is objectified in a product, in other words, one’s product is a lasting display of one’s skills, personality, etc. that is objective and visible to others. (ii) When another person enjoys using what one has produced, one is pleased with having created an object that satisfies other’s human needs. (iii) One, therefore, is recognized and felt by the other as her completion: one is recognized in one’s thought and affection. (iv) Hence, in one’s production, one is confirmed and realized as a human being, with respect both to one’s particular skills, personality, etc. and to one’s being a member of society. In this sense, self-worth is equated to one’s products. This equation transforms, for example, the structure of our current (western) academic practices. In this setting, self-worth is easily understood in terms of results: grades — our practices of examining and quantifying students’ knowledge —, publications, participation in classes and conferences, etc. Such results operate as products in the dynamics of academia. Moreover, the uniformity of assessment, i.e. the fact that everyone’s results are evaluated in the same way, establishes a particular standard of what constitutes a good and valuable product. This uniformity, together with our understanding of products as objectifications of one’s skills and personality, makes our academic practices favor, just as economic wealth does, a specific one-dimensional individual. As we saw in our fictitious natural history of the girl scared of failing her exam in school (page 77), these practices of assessment can easily lead to anxiety. When they are further equated with self-worth, one can easily imagine that the anxiety they provoke can be much more poignant: one is not only scared of failing an exam, but also of not being a valuable person.

Moreover, the structure of our academic practices ignores aspects of individuals’ lives that influence how specific results are achieved (traits of one’s personality that do not favor participating and publicly engaging in debates, struggles with one’s social and economic conditions, etc.). On its positive side, ignoring these conditions in principle allows democratic participation in academia regardless of people’s socio-economical background, race, gender, etc. Just as in politics and economics, we are all seen as equals, and, in principle, we can all be as successful as we want, provided that we work hard enough. As Alain de Botton explains in his documentary *Status Anxiety* (2004b), such equality, not only in academia but on the job market in general, brings one to compare oneself more bitterly to every other person. Whereas before our democratic societies existed, people (servants in particular) accepted their fate, work and limited capacities in good faith, nowadays one feels bad since in principle one could be someone more grandiose. Besides
equality, the fact that our jobs, our capacities and fortune are secularized creates a climate where there is little room for a happy resignation based on one’s faith. As a result, we demand more of ourselves, and we grow anxious of achieving a successful position in society which we see as depending, not on God or fortune, but almost exclusively on our capacities. However, this theoretical democratic equality is far from being the case in our actual social structures. Then, when one happens to be unable to succeed, the anxiety grows more stringent not only towards what we desire, but also towards the possibility of never achieving it and therefore being seen by others and by oneself as an incapable and less valuable human being.

4.2.2 Media and art

A second source of our current anxieties, I believe, is our cultural products; more concretely, what I called art with small ‘a’ in the previous chapter and media have a tremendous influence on how our fears, desires and anxieties are shaped. Depictions of people’s lives in paintings, films, advertisements, popular music (most explicitly in its lyrics) and news, besides whatever aesthetic experience they might provoke, also convey the message of the kinds of life that are worth showing and therefore worth living. Thus, the value of competitive individual success is incarnated and perpetuated by the recurrent image of the rich and famous. We have a constant barrage in the news and advertisements of the life of superstars: film stars, writers, musicians, politicians, businesspeople, etc. whose wealth is made glamorously visible for us in their looks (clothes and jewellery) and their exuberant social events. And unlike non-democratic societies, we are also told that we can be like them; we can become rich if we work hard enough and if we are good enough. F. S. Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby is a fine depiction of our wealth-centered society. Despite the sorrow of the story, Gatsby manages to be part of the wealthy and successful (the valuable people) by his fierce discipline, talent and cunning. The excessively lavish parties he throws and his extravagant and wealthy lifestyle represent his being accepted and recognized by others. The fact that we can conceive this dazzling economic success and understand it as a materialization of his worthy character and intelligence bespeaks the prevalence of competitive individual success as a value in our society. Its contemporary validity, after almost a century of having been written, was

5 Besides Marx, authors like Bourdieu (1991), from a sociological perspective, and Althusser (2014), from a more political and economical perspective, have brilliantly uncovered the structural inequalities that operate in our societies and that make, in practice, certain social groups more powerful and likely than others to achieve recognition and what we consider success.
cogently visible in the opulent film of 2013 based on the novel, which was very popular worldwide. Examples abound in contemporary forms of [popular] art: skyscrapers in architecture, fictional characters like Ironman and Batman, the particular lyrics of rap and reggaeton that are often ‘odes’ to money and opulence, etc.

Recognition (all the friends and happiness around the famous) comes with wealth, and wealth is not a matter of luck or fate, but a direct consequence of one’s ambition, intelligence, acumen, discipline, etc. It is not that we all have to yearn to become businessmen or super actors. Neither is the case that if we genuinely did not aspire to conform to these specific models, we would therefore be free from the anxiety induced by the structural value of individual success: the model of individual success is reproduced, mutatis mutandis, in many of our different practices. So we have for example, the model of the accomplished professor of a famous university happily and smartly depicted on the university website. With enough discipline and investment (time, money and effort), we are all able, in principle, to be like them.

However, there is a tension in the message that is sent out by the media: the valuable world of the wealthy and the successful is both depicted as reachable for everybody, but as unachievable for the non-talented at the same time. Superstars in every field are recognized by their particular skills that appear to be innate or a gift from nature: intelligence, beauty, talent for acting, singing, etc. Since they depend on luck and nature, their recognition is therefore based on particular characteristics that are impossible to attain for the big majority of us. This contradictory message, i.e. a democratically accessible world of wealth, recognition and fulfilment that is nevertheless reserved only for the talented, generates yet another source of anxiety. Then, peculiar practices and compulsive behaviors arise which are meant to ease the threat of not having “what it takes”, be it to artificially attain it or to find one’s hidden talents, etc. This is particularly clear in the boom of reality shows all over the world in which ordinary people struggle to become recognized singers in American Idol, models in Germany Next Top Model, fashion designers in Project Runway, etc. Not only reality shows, but advertisements in general often exploit these anxieties. Then one sees, for example, the particular talents of famous football players being equated with a pair of football boots. The possibility of never belonging to the world of the wealthy, talented, recognized and successful appears to recede with the acquisition of

\[\text{It is worth pointing out explicitly that such an embodiment and perpetuation of economic success in art varies from culture to culture, and it is deeply tied to other sets of values and specific circumstances of a time and a place. One can compare, for example, the Colombian soap operas that, presumably unintentionally, glamorize the life of big drug lords of the 80’s and 90’s with the aforementioned depiction of the great Gatsby.}\]
a product (the pair of football boots); but of course, the product, most of the
times, will not be enough to stop one’s anxieties towards that possibility and
to ease one’s guilt about not living one’s dream which, one has been told, is
accessible to everyone.

Not only wealth, but also beauty is equated with worthiness; it is a sign of
ambition, discipline and a strong character. Beauty is therefore understood
as a value, and the tension between what is given by nature and democratic-
ically achievable takes on a visibly painful form. On the one hand, beauty,
in particular the equation of female beauty with thinness, is portrayed both
as a duty and as a commodity democratically accessible to everyone. All
one has to do is to watch carefully what to eat, and be disciplined enough
to have an exercise routine. Thinness is then understood as an indica-
tion of discipline, care and health, and therefore non-thinness is seen as a sign of
poor health, laziness, carelessness and lack of discipline. Furthermore, the
depiction in media and art of all the friends and happiness around the beau-
tiful (narrowly conceived) and of the interesting lives that happen to be the
lives of the beautiful embodies and perpetuates the idea that to be a worthy
valuable person (in particular for women) is to be beautiful.

On the other hand, it is clear that the ideal of beauty is not attain-
able for everybody, and that it is explicitly depicted in the unreachability
of the images of fashion models, actresses, singers, etc. Hence, the tension
explained above induces a general anxiety that is sometimes manifested by
violent practices in which people seeking to attain such beauty model: eating
disorders, compulsive exercising (thinness and fitness emerge as values), plas-
tic surgery, etc. The self-depreciation and violence towards oneself involved
in these manifestations of anxiety are tied to the particular ways of assessing
[famous] people’s appearance in the media (particularly but not exclusively
in news and popular magazines). The excessive focus on women’s bodies in
many cases accompanied by hostile remarks and judgements that are based
on a narrow conception of beauty is a practice (a hostile language-game) that
is learnt and directed not only to others but also to oneself; they are, in other
words, language-games that are incorporated to one’s “inner speech”.

---

7Not only beauty and wealth, but many other ruling values in our societies pose anxiety-
inducing models of desirable life, for example, heteronormativity. In Gender Trouble
(1999) Judith Butler brilliantly captures how this pervasive value is embodied in our
politics and language.

8Currently, there are extensive studies on the subject. See for example Media Exposure,
Body Dissatisfaction, and Disordered Eating in Middle-aged Women: A Test of the
Sociocultural Model of Disordered Eating (Viren Swami and Wyrozumska 2010) and
Oppressive Beliefs at Play: Associations among Beauty Ideals and Practices and Individual
Differences in Sexism, Objectification of Others, and Media Exposure (Julie Slevec 2011).
4.2.3 Science

Our secularized outlook has not only transformed how we see our own capacities and fortune—it depends not on God’s will, but on our individual capacities—but has also transformed how we understand anxiety itself. This introduces a third element that shapes our concept of anxiety and makes it so prevalent in our times (see page 83): the scientific outlook of our psychological experiences. According to George Makari, during the second half of the nineteenth century, religious beliefs about the ‘I’, which was essentially an impenetrable immaterial soul, were displaced by a view of mental life as composed of natural phenomena that deserve to be studied scientifically (Makari 2008, p.9). As a consequence, not only “both the miraculous and the demonic would be exposed as simply hysterical” (Makari 2008, p.17), but also people’s ordinary psychological lives would be detached from God and religion, and seen as causal effects of a variety of factors in their lives. He sees in August Comte, more concretely his idea of scientific and positive knowledge as the most perfect knowledge, the predecessor of this switch. This change of conception had visible consequences for language use: while “in pre-modern, Western Christendom, the Latin anxietas signified unease that often took its shape within a framework of sin, redemption and eternal judgment” (Makari 2012); later, in the early nineteenth century, when anxiety came to be considered a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, different descriptive medical terms for it emerged within different cultures—the French “angoisse”, the German “angst”, the Spanish “angustia” took this meaning.

Freud was doubtlessly one of the biggest exponents of this shift, and he greatly influenced the popular conceptions of mental life during the twentieth century. He incorporated not only the physiological perspective in line with the influence of Comte, but also other factors coming from modern philosophy and biology: heredity, emotions and associationalism of ideas. Anxiety was completely detached from religious guilt and explained in causal terms: its origin was the birth trauma—the separation from the mother—and the fear of castration—the genital deprivation that makes a re-encounter with the mother impossible—which were, in his view, two traumatic experiences which are tremendously powerful due to the painful feelings, bodily sensations and overwhelming excitations they involve. Further anxieties that appear in life such as the fear of loss of approval and fear of death are understood by him in terms of the primordial fear of separation from the mother (May 1950, p. 120-1).

Freud took the popular concept of anxiety, and transformed it by framing it into the practice of clinical psychology. In this framework, normal and healthy anxiety (objective anxiety) was differentiated from pathological
anxiety (neurotic anxiety), it was possible to ask what their relation is and anxiety was located at the core of personal development (May, 1950, p. 115). In turn, the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis seeped into the popular understanding of psychology and anxiety during the first half of the twentieth century. Terms like ‘subconscious’, ‘Freudian slip’, ‘trauma’, ‘complexes’, ‘oral fixation’, etc. were either introduced to ordinary language use or their use changed into concepts that explain one’s and others’ behavior. In particular, sexual explanations of ‘anxiety’ were incorporated in the everyday use of the term. One can still see traces of such an influence in our current use of language. For example, in Bogotá when a woman seems very anxious, people would jokingly conjecture that she must be lacking sex. Despite the derogatory sexist component of the comment, the sexual explanation of her psychological state comes from a pop understanding of an underlying sexual conflict in the manner of Freudian theories.

Although pathological cases were widely studied in Freudian psychoanalysis, anxiety was not pervasively seen as a pathological affection during the twentieth century. It was rather a condition of human life that could grow into a neurotic (pathological) condition and which certainly could be causally explained and influenced. It was seen as a pervasive problem, not as an epidemic as it is seen now. This can be seen in philosophical works of the time such as Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1962) and the many existentialist works of literature that capture the experience of anxiety (Auden, Kafka, Sartre, Hesse, Camus). Nowadays, anxiety, rather than having receded during the years, is still a very present and popular problem: it is said that one every thirteen people has an anxiety disorder (A. J. Baxter and Whiteford, 2013), popular newspapers and magazines constantly address the problem and offer strategies to cope with it (good examples of this are Psychology Today and the New York Times), there are many personal blogs where people share their experiences with anxiety and ask for or offer help to cope with them, etc. However, anxiety is currently commonly seen as a pathological condition with a definitory set of symptoms, and this change, I believe, is due to the predominant cognitive-behavioral approach in psychology together with the information explosion that came with the popularization of the internet.

The American psychologist Aaron Beck, who is considered by some the father of cognitive therapy (University of Louisville, 2003), was one of the more visible exponents of the new approach in psychology that emphasizes the role of cognitive processes in emotional and behavioral responses, includ-

---

ing affective states. This cognitive approach does not neglect the causal role of genetic, biological, environmental and developmental factors in psychological experiences, a role already acknowledged in the psychoanalytic tradition. The difference with the psychoanalytic tradition is rather that psychological experiences and conditions are decomposed in various distinct elements which are all articulated by cognitive elements: cognitive processes are seen as necessary for the production of all emotional and affective responses, and are crucial for maintaining psychological states (Beck and Clark, 1988, p. 23). Cognitive processes, in turn, are understood in terms of cognitive schemas that “guide the screening, encoding, organizing, storing and retrieving of information” (Beck and Clark, 1988, p. 24).

In this framework, in which ordinary psychological experiences are reconstructed as cognitive assessments with attached symptoms, the concept of anxiety acquires a new meaning. It is understood in terms of a maladaptive cognitive schema that “involve[s] perceived physical or psychological threat to one’s personal domain as well as an exaggerated sense of vulnerability” (Beck and Clark, 1988, p. 26). Anxiety disorders are differentiated by “different schematic themes”, thus:

With generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) a variety of life situations are viewed as threatening to one’s self-concept; in panic disorder (PD) bodily or mental experiences are interpreted as catastrophic: with simple phobias danger is attributed to specific avoidable situations; and in agoraphobia panic attacks are associated with external situations and so reinforce avoidance behaviour. (Beck and Clark, 1988, p. 26-7)

The bodily manifestations and manifestative actions of anxiety are understood in cognitive psychology as concomitant behavior that is reinforced by the cognitive definitory core of anxiety. Manifestations are then seen not as constitutive elements, but as symptoms of a defective processing of information of the external world.

Such a cognitive-behavioral conception of psychological experiences is widely popular nowadays. For example, the daunting popularity among psychiatrists and general practitioners all over the world of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) bespeaks and perpetuates the ample acceptance of seeing behaviors as symptoms of psychological experiences. The DSM is a standard classification of all the mental disorders that is meant to be used by clinicians in the United States, however, given the current economic and cultural power of the U.S. over the world, its influence is international (Frances, 2013). It is composed by three main elements that embody the cognitive-behavioral conception of psychological experiences I sketched above: first, a diagnostic
classification of presumably all the existing mental disorders, second, a set of symptoms and an indication of the amount of time that they should be present for an individual to qualify as having any of the disorders listed in the classification and, third, a description of the disorder that includes, among others, its development and course, its functional consequences and its risk and prognostic factors.

The sharp classification of the DSM has been motivated by various factors external to the scientific practices of psychology and which also explain its popularity. Among them: 1. In order to cover the treatment of a mental illness, private health insurances in the U.S. and universal health insurance in some parts of Canada require people to be diagnosed according to the guidelines of the DSM. They require a code given in such classification (Hacking, 2013). 2. The standardized classification of the DSM makes it possible to do statistic research on the prevalence of mental illnesses: official census and assessing army recruits. Hence, the ‘Statistical’ in its name (Hacking, 2013). 3. The DSM allows pharmaceutical companies to identify both their target market and the people they need to study in order to develop new medicines for specific mental disorders (Hacking, 2013). 4. Finally, it gives clear guidelines for determining the legal responsibility of a practitioner when accused of malpractice.

The DSM classification of mental disorders with their corresponding symptoms is analogous to a medical classification of diseases, or as Ian Hacking pointed out, to the classification of plants and animals (Hacking, 2013). The popularity of the DSM and in general of cognitive-behavioral psychology have reshaped our conception of certain psychological experiences, in particular our conception of anxiety as an illness of the mind (the flawed cognitive process of assessing of a future dread) of the mind with attached bodily symptoms (muscle tension, excessive bodily reactions) and associated behaviors (avoidance and excessive associated actions like in OCD) (Craske et al., 2009). It is not the condition of a sinner soul or a natural human experience, but an objective natural phenomenon that can be classified. In short, anxiety is seen as a pathological condition with specific causal antecedents, and therefore, with the possibility of being treated. In this sense, as one can get cancer, one can get an anxiety disorder; and one can undergo the appropriate form of therapy to get rid of either of them. In Rachman’s words, the DSM “encourages the unfortunate idea that all anxiety problems are pathological: are indeed mental disorders” (Rachman, 2004, p. 1).

Although current psychology is not blind to the fact that anxiety is also present in ‘healthy’ people, what has reached the popular culture is its conception of it as a cognitive malfunction accompanied by physical and behavioral symptoms. Thus, one can find on the internet, on the one hand, copious
lists of symptoms that indicate, as in a check-list, whether or not one might be unknowingly suffering an anxiety disorder, accessible explanations of the different anxiety disorders one might suffer from and countless tips for coping with anxiety; and on the other hand, one finds an overwhelming amount of self-help books and websites that teach people how to change the way the perceive the world and consequently become less anxious.

The DMS and, in general, the cognitive-behavioral approach in psychology are part of how anxiety is currently understood and experienced. The new conditions and the new language-games of our pathological conditions are widespread enough to ‘create new people’ à la Hacking. In ‘Making up People’ (2006), Hacking explores the influence of two specific classifications of mental disorder —multiple personality disorder and autism— on people being classified. He asks two key questions of each of them, first, whether or not there were people suffering the mental disorder before it was recognized as such, and second, whether or not having the specific disorder was a way of being a person, i.e. whether people could experience themselves, interact with others and find their place in society as mentally ill.

As for the first question, people doubtlessly experienced anxiety before we had our current highly specialized and scientific-like concepts of anxiety. This is clearly visible in, for example, Kierkegaard’s *The Concept of Dread* (1957) in which anxiety is tied to sin and religious guilt. The second question is far more interesting for our purposes. One could say that some forms of anxiety indeed existed as a way of people to understand themselves: hysteria and some experiences described in the Bible sound fairly similar to some of our specific concepts under the umbrella term of anxiety.

However, as we have seen throughout this thesis, anxiety and all our concepts of emotion are highly dependent on the culture of a society in a time and a place; so, one could suspect that before the cognitive-behavioral understanding of anxiety people did not experience themselves, interact with others or find their place in society as having an anxiety disorder —any anxiety disorder or a specific one. There are two main reasons that support this initial suspicion. On the one hand, as we saw in the first chapter, whichever conceptual construction of a human inner realm is currently accepted (like the soul, the brain, etc.), it is not constitutive of our use of our concepts of emotion. So, although whatever happens in the inner realm could be the

---

93

---


11Hysteria is understood also to include both dissociative disorders, like dissociative amnesia and dissociative identity disorder, and Somatoform disorders, including hypochondriasis, and body dysmorphic disorder (Owens and Dein 2006).
cause or the condition of possibility of our experience of anxiety, it does not constitute its meaning, i.e., its public use. In this sense, even if equivalent inner processes or states occur in people then and now, they cannot be said to understand, and therefore experience their psychological experiences in the same sense.

On the other hand, as we saw in the second chapter, circumstances, objects, manifestative actions, bodily manifestations and content are constitutive of emotional experiences. However, they all differ throughout different times and cultures. The life of the anxious nowadays involves practices as going to therapy, taking specific medication, telling one’s friends and family that one suffers from anxiety, explaining one’s reactions because one has a condition called anxiety (social fobia, generalized anxiety, OCD). One’s personal experience of anxiety would include a particular awareness of some bodily sensations in which anxiety is manifested, e.g. as one knows increased heart rate is a common symptom of anxiety, one might even think something like “I must be really anxious now, I have all the symptoms, even the heart rate!”. Moreover, as we do not see anxiety (speak of it) as a normal reaction towards certain aspects of life, when anxiety strikes one, one is likely to feel that one has contracted an illness, and, if it is coupled with a strong sense of the duty of success, one feels weak for having contracted it. Consequently one might also embark on ruminations about what is causing one’s anxiety or struggle fiercely against certain aspects of one’s life, e.g. by taking pills or other medication. This experience of anxiety is constituted as a self-deprecatory struggle: one ends up fighting one’s circumstances, thoughts and bodily manifestations, just as one fights a cold or a cancer. Hence, other emotions might arise: frustration, guilt, shame and a feeling of utter loneliness as if one were the only member of society who is unable to cope with his anxiety problems. Such a struggle is nowadays one of the most pervasive forms of anxiety and it belongs to our concept of anxiety.

It is worth pointing out that the fact that certain forms of current anxiety are struggles does not imply that there is a more genuine experience of anxiety that is being concealed by our scientific approach to it. Rather, it is related to other forms of anxiety, like existential anxiety which will be treated in the next section, that do not involve a ferocious battle against such a ‘mental disease’. It is as genuinely experienced as the other forms, and the fact that people from other cultures and other times cannot experience anxiety in this particular manner shows that indeed the ways in which we feel depend on our culture situated at a time and a place, and not that our current understanding of it is a futile façade that hides away our real human emotions. Therefore, to clearly answer the question I raised above (page 93), given that the way one conceives oneself and experiences an emotion
depends on the specific language-games (practices) of the culture one lives in, people did not experience anxiety as suffering from an anxiety disorder before the cognitive-behavioral approach and its classifications existed and became popular.

To conclude this chapter, I will answer Hacking’s question in further detail having in mind now the elements we saw in Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. We will see that people outside our democratic and capitalistic societies whose life is not pervaded by our art and media cannot experience anxiety as we do. As we saw in chapter 3 (page 60), having an emotion is being in a state that is a synthesized confluence of specific circumstances, manifestative actions and bodily manifestations, which is filled with impressions, thoughts, sensations, etc.; this filling is what I have called the content of emotions. Not only do the circumstances in which we live depend on the particular time and place we happen to be in, but also the manifestative actions, the bodily manifestations to some extent and the content that constitute an emotion. This, of course, also holds for anxiety. As we saw throughout our excursus, the circumstances towards which our anxieties are directed depend on a variety of particular features of our current culture: its capitalist democratic organization and the standards of success embodied and perpetuated by arts and media. So, for example, one could not have experienced the particular anxiety towards the possibility of never being successful enough before our society was structured by the value of competitive individual success. Being in such particular circumstances is a constitutive aspect of how anxiety is experienced nowadays, and in this sense, it is impossible to feel this particular emotion if one has never lived in a capitalist democratic culture —yet one can see the resemblance with the anxiety about being a sinner as conceived in Christianity. This constitutive difference goes together with differences in the forms of manifestation of anxiety. So, for example, undergoing plastic surgery as a manifestation of one’s anxiety about not being beautiful enough is highly dependent both on the means available in the society one lives in, but also on the way the concept of anxiety is constituted within one’s society.

That suggests that the manifestative actions of anxiety in different times and places vary widely. But they do not depend completely on the circumstances that cause anxiety or towards which it is directed, they also depend on how the family of manifestations of anxiety is constituted in a particular community. For example, one does not manifest one’s anxiety by smoking cigarettes if smoking is not a practice within the community one grew up or lives in. First, the material means to carry out the manifestative action most likely are not available there —there are no cigarettes—, and second and more importantly, growing up and living in such a community makes
one’s concept of anxiety not to be constituted by smoking as one of its ex-
pressions. Hence, one neither smokes nor feels the urge to smoke when one
is experiencing anxiety, in other words, smoking does not belong to one’s
particular way of bodily being in the world when experiencing anxiety. And
the same goes for taking prescribed anxiolytics.

Finally the content of our emotions is also culture-dependent. This is
clearly visible in the artistic depictions of emotion that, although one can see
family resemblances among them, vary from place to place and time to time.
One can think of the wide difference between depictions of anxiety in Ex-
pressionist paintings like Munch’s popular *The Scream* (figure 5.9) and the
sculpture of the Roman emperor Trajan Decius (figure 5.10), or depictions
in works of literature like the gloomy anxiety of Kafka’s works and Oedipus’
profound dread when he finds out that he has killed his father, the king of
Thebes. The difference is also visible in the ways in which people portray
the content of their experiences nowadays through photography, films and
electronic music. This again is not a mere matter of having or missing the
means to capture and express one’s emotions, in our case, anxiety. The im-
pressions that fill one’s consciousness when experiencing anxiety come not
only from one’s particular experiences (memories from the weather, places,
smells, colours, circumstances, dialogues, etc. that were so prominent this
other time one was very anxious), but also from the cultural products one
is exposed to. In that sense, one can imagine various different experiences
depending on people’s particular interests. Notice for instance the difference
between a comic book fan who is anxious about his social status and who
evokes the gloomy aesthetics and the lonesomeness of Batman comic books
and a woman that evokes Lars von Trier’s *Antichrist* (2009), its soundtrack, a
particular scene, its dark and morbid atmosphere when experiencing anxiety
about the correctness of her sexual behavior. Since such cultural relative im-
pressions constitute one’s experience of emotion, cultural products do shape
the emotions one can have, not only by inducing them, but also by consti-
tuting them.

Art and our cultural products have a tremendous significance not only
by constituting the content of one’s psychological experiences, but also by
drawing links with other aspects of one’s life or features of the practices one
lives in. Thus, art can have a redeeming character: whereas only the life of the
holy, the rich, the powerful or the heroic was depicted in art before modern
art, Jean-François Millet painted the life of peasants in a dignified manner
in his *Gleaners* (figure 5.11). This painting, together with works from others
like Gustave Courbet’s, van Gogh and the later impressionist movement,
was a revolution in art that emnobled the ordinary lives of peasants and
common people. This, on the one hand, portrays as desirable and glamorizes
the ordinary life one is living, which in turn eases the anxieties one might have about not living a life that is good enough. On the other hand, these paintings present a critical stance towards the dominant values and certain practices of a society in a particular time and place; the superiority of the rich and the heroic is questioned and other forms of life are made as visible as them. These are at least two senses in which art can have a redeeming role in one’s life. And not only art, but one can also conceive philosophy as having this redeeming power: in the manner of Nietzsche, philosophy can be practised as a critical and creative enterprise to both diagnose culture (our practices and language-games), and to question and create new values and practices that enhance one’s life.
Chapter 5

Existential Anxiety, A Wittgensteinian Perspective

There is a further form of anxiety that deserves to be considered in some detail: existential anxiety. Unlike the forms of anxiety we considered in the previous chapter, existential anxiety is neither constituted by the particular values that a society has, nor directed to a specific event one might experience in the future. Existential anxiety, we will see, arises from what makes it possible for human beings to be part of the world, to be with others and to understand things, language and doings as meaningful. Despite the fact that this form of anxiety is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s conception of anxiety, it is worth pointing out that what follows will be neither about his concept of anxiety nor about the connections between the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Such an enterprise amply surpasses the purpose of this thesis. Thus, I will consider in this section a family of experiences of anxiety that resemble each other in that they involve the experience of the meaningless. I will consider them within the framework of emotions I offered above and its implicit conception of world and human life. Naming this family of experiences ‘existential anxiety’ corresponds to their undeniable similarities with Heidegger’s conception, some of which I will point out throughout the section, and to the fact that his work served as an inspiration.

Before directly addressing existential anxiety, it is necessary to recapitulate certain aspects of the framework I presented in part I. The purpose of

---

1 Lee Braver in *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger* (2012) offers a judicious study of the links between these two authors’ philosophies. Although anxiety is considered in the book, it is neither the central topic of his study, nor thematized in detail. His book, however, could serve as a fine ground for an in depth investigation of how the Heideggerian concept of anxiety can be understood in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
this is to clarify the implicit conception of world that was on the background of the concept of emotion I defended there. In what follows, I will argue that the concept of world is two-sided. On the one hand, it is constituted by that which appears meaningful to us; on the other hand, it is where our life occurs. Let us start by considering what appears meaningful to us.

I introduced above the Schatzkian notion of practice (page 48) and it will now provide conceptual tools to capture what it is to have a human form of life in which the world is meaningful. We saw that doings, things and language appear meaningful to us when (i) we can perform activities with them (hammering with a hammer, using language to express one’s fear, hugging someone to manifest one’s affection), (ii) we can identify such doings, things and language as such (instead of empty or unfamiliar movements, sounds and things) and (iii) we can react to these doings, things and language in a manner that is meaningful to others. These three conditions are what being part of a dispersed practice is. They are involved in a language-game, although language-games are not exhausted by them. Being part of a language-game is also having a form of life, and that comprises acting [non-]accordingly with one’s emotions, beliefs, purposes, etc., and with certain social explicit rules of the practices which one lives in. Thus, the way in which we carry out these dispersed practices (in language-games) meshes with our life conditions and with how they are structured in the society we live in —this is Schatzki’s notion of integrative practice. In that sense, it is only within practices that things, doings, language and other people make sense to us. Therefore, both what is constituted in our practices and what happens within them are what is meaningful to us. But, as I said, this is only one side of the world in which we live. In order to elucidate how the world where our life occurs is constituted, let us start by expanding on what life conditions are within this Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian conception.

Life conditions are how things stand and are going for someone; naturally, emotional experiences are part of our life conditions. They involve two aspects, namely, patterns in the circumstances in which one lives and what is going on in one’s “inner”. As for the first aspect, we saw throughout the second chapter that our concepts of emotion coordinate relevant patterns of life in one’s circumstances that we are [socially] trained to capture, but that also depend on what appears particularly relevant to an individual. This also holds mutatis mutandis for other terms that capture life conditions, such as beliefs, moods, thoughts, personality, bodily conditions (e.g. being tired, energetic or sick), etc. For example, saying that someone believes in God involves a complex pattern of his behavior in certain circumstances: appealing to God’s power to explain certain events, voicing his gratefulness to God about certain events or life conditions, etc. Patterns of life condi-
tions are interwoven with each other, and they are irregular and indefinite (Schatzki, 1996, p. 32): they are generally looser than the patterns we see in the physical world that give rise to our inductive reasoning.

As for the second aspect, we saw in the first chapter that both bodily manifestations and actions make our inner emotional experiences present in the world: the manifestations of the “inner” are publicly available. In this sense, inner emotional experiences neither causally determine nor are determined by our bodily manifestations or actions. In turn, these manifestations are expressions of one’s life as long as there are social practices (language-games) that make them intelligible in that sense.\(^2\) As we saw in the first and second chapters, language-games (practices) are what institute that certain expressions (some bodily manifestations that are not biologically given reactions and actions) are characteristic of a certain emotion. This is also partially the case for life conditions other than emotions: on the one hand, there are other life conditions that also have characteristic manifestations (sensations, and moods to some extent), and those characteristic manifestations are instituted in our social practices. Just as in the case of emotions, they incorporate our biological reactions to certain situations and institute new manifestations that partially replace our biological ones. On the other hand, there are life conditions, such as beliefs, hopes, attitudes, etc., which lack characteristic manifestations, yet they are expressed by our actions and bodily reactions. In this case there is no biological base as in the case of crying being a manifestation of fear or pain. Instead, such manifestations depend entirely on the social practices in which the manifestations are instituted.

So, for example, writing an elaborate letter of motivation and filling out a form are expressions of one’s life condition of applying for a PhD, which in turn could be the expression of one’s belief that pursuing an academic career is the most rewarding professional choice.

To have a clear idea of how the meaning of our bodily manifestations and manifestative actions is instituted for life conditions in general, it is worthwhile to recapitulate briefly how it is for emotions. We saw that practices dictate the relevant patterns that constitute an emotion, because in being trained to use terms of emotion we learn to capture and fully experience: (i) the past and future events that constitute that emotion, (ii) the relevant aspects of the immediate and wider circumstances and (iii) the links with

\(^2\)Schatzki actually identifies four conditions for doings, i.e. actions and bodily reactions, to be expressions of our life conditions. Besides social practices, he identifies 1. the past and future behavior of the person, 2. the web of life conditions that already holds for her, and 3. the immediate and wider situation in which the person [bodily] acts or reacts. I left them out however, because these three aspects acquire, in turn, their status as such by being established in a social practice (Schatzki, 1996, p. 35-6).
other aspects of our life conditions that make a bodily reaction or an action a manifestation of that specific emotion. This also holds for the rest of our life conditions. Take the example of catholic religious belief: crossing oneself is a manifestation of belief when (i) one has been part of Christian practices, (ii) when one is in the church, passing by a church, about to travel, about to take a difficult exam or in another situation that might call for crossing oneself, and (iii) when one’s Christian beliefs are configured in a way that crossing oneself is a manifestation of respect towards God or is somewhat connected with God’s power over one’s salvation, fortune, abilities, etc. The meaning of our personal experiences is therefore instituted in social practices, which also dictate the patterns of our life that are captured by our concepts of life conditions.

However, one’s experiences of life conditions also involve inner impressions of what is going on with one’s life. So, for example, being in pain is not only crying in pain (its manifestation), but it is also having a sensation of pain that only oneself can feel. Likewise, as we saw in the third chapter, one’s emotional experiences are not only constituted by their publicly available circumstances, objects, bodily manifestations and manifestative actions, but they also involve certain images, sounds, sensations, etc. that are only available to oneself. These inner appearances are what I called the ‘content’ of emotions. Many, if not all, of our life conditions are constituted by some content: our space of impressions is filled in some way. It should be noticed that the content of our life conditions does not refer to something private for two reasons. First, as we saw in Chapter 3, the inner phenomenal experiences of our life conditions are an aspect of bodily being in a particular confluence of circumstances. The private nature of our experiences of life conditions, which includes the content of the experience, stems from the fact that each of us has only one body which is situated in only one particular confluence of life conditions. In short, the private nature of the content of our emotions consist in our inability to bodily experience someone else’s life conditions. The second reason is the nature of language-games. In Wittgenstein’s words:

[A sensation itself] is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. \(\text{Wittgenstein, } \text{PL}, \text{§}304\)

As we saw in the third chapter (page 60), the meaning we give to our emotional experiences, i.e. the way in which we articulate our emotions as synthesized confluences filled with content, and therefore the way in which we experience them, does not depend on any private entity or state that might
be ‘behind’ our emotions as their causal condition of possibility. Given the public nature of language and therefore the way meaning is constituted for us, the same reasoning holds for all the other private correlates of our life conditions one is tempted to conjecture.

The importance of bodily experience for life conditions such as sensations, emotions and moods is evident by the fact that they all have, to various degrees, families of characteristic bodily manifestations (reactions, demeanor, etc.). However, the role of the body is not as prominent in the conceptual constitution of other more cognitive life conditions, such as belief and knowledge. That is clear from the fact that they do not have characteristic expressions as emotional and sensational life conditions do. Yet one is sometimes under the impression that one’s beliefs and knowledge are something inside oneself. The impression of the private and inner in these cases comes from the fact that they depend on certainties and specific complex combinations of forms of life: from the meaning of certain doings and sayings to the purposes and projects in one’s life. These complex combinations are one’s personal history. As no other person has the same personal history as oneself, no other person shares the same complex combination of forms of life; and that gives us the occasional impression of the privacy of cognitive life conditions such as belief and knowledge.

Thus, we have the two constitutive sides of the concept of world of my Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian conception: the world is formed by the confluence of social practices in which we live that (i) makes things, language, doings and others meaningful to us, and constitutes the particular life conditions in which we live —the patterns we capture with language—, and (ii) it is the place where we can make them present in the world —where the inner life is instituted and becomes meaningful—. Hence, one is in the world as long as one participates in practices and understands certain doings (including language) as meaningful gestures and things as ‘equipment’.

This conception of world has various links with Heidegger’s own conception in *Being and Time* (1962). To start with, a person is fundamentally understood as being with-others: what is meaningful is the world as it refers to (is revealed to) us as being for the sake of the life and projects of others. The world, in turn, is constituted as a holistic network without a uniform structure in which things, doings, language and others appear meaningful to us; in Heideggerian terminology, it is a totality of involvements. Moreover, they both converge in rejecting the conception of the world as func-

---

3Schatzki offers an account of life (mind/action) in which Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies are combined. He relies on Wittgenstein for the constitution of states of life and on Heidegger for the flow-structure of the stream of life. Schatzki (1993).
damentally being a spatio-temporal material entity that can be objectively measured. However, there are two differences that are worth mentioning. First, unlike my Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian account, Heidegger’s *Being and Time* can give rise to some metaphysical interpretations: in the framework of an ontological investigation, Dasein can be understood as an ontological structure that is the condition of possibility of the everyday ontic involvements with the world. However, the subject that is being studied in this thesis is a human being who is involved in the world, and not the more fundamental condition of possibility of this involvement; in fact, there is no deeper structure assumed behind. Such a metaphysical reading of Heidegger’s early philosophy yields to the second difference: that the ontological is more fundamental than (a condition of possibility of) the ontic opens the possibility of neglecting the bodily realm because it is ontic. Thus, according to this kind of reading, it is pertinent to investigate Dasein, as defined above, as a disembodied entity: its ontological conditions of being involved in the world are studied from a metaphysical point of view. In contrast, in my Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian framework, the person in the world is seen as a human body in a rich confluence of practices (language-games). For on the one hand —somewhat instrumental— one enters practices by learning to perform actions with one’s body (speak, write, hug, dance), and on the other hand, one’s bodily experiences are constitutive of certain language-games such as our language-games of emotions, moods and sensations. It should be noted nonetheless that these two differences do not arise in less metaphysical and more anthropological interpretations of Heidegger’s earlier philosophy, such as Dreyfus’ in, for example, *What Computers Still Can’t Do* (1992).

Having this theoretical framework in mind, we are now able to address how existential anxiety enters the general picture of anxiety. A family trait of existential anxiety is the fact or the possibility of not belonging with others, not being part of the world, and therefore of the world appearing (at least partially) meaningless to one. This family trait comes from Heidegger’s conception of anxiety, which is a mood that renders the world meaningless. Here, however, its sole meaning is not that of being a mood arising from the inevitable possibility of one’s own death. Instead, existential anxiety comprises a larger family of cases in which part of one’s world loses its meaning.

The family of existential anxiety has various members, for example: the anxiety of not being understood and recognized by others, in the sense that

---

4See for example *Martin Heidegger: Theorist of Space* [Schatzki 2007] and *Spatial Ontology and Explanation* [Schatzki 2007].

5Heidegger himself regarded *Being and Time* as ‘too metaphysical’ in his later philosophy. See [Heidegger et al. 2012].
one’s doings or language do not or might not appear meaningful to them—e.g. the anxiety that might occur when one is learning a new language, or partially, Nietzsche’s anxiety about his own times. Conversely, there exists the anxiety about others appearing meaningless to oneself, i.e. of not being able to understand their doings or their language. An obvious example of the latter is being alone in a foreign country for the first time. A similar member of the family of existential anxiety is being in an alien world of things that one cannot recognize: they do not refer to a practice or do not refer (in the Heideggerian sense) to others. Various works of art, of science fiction in particular, capture this poignant experience. For example, the fourth section of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). Moreover, existential anxiety can also be directed towards oneself. Aspects of one’s life appear meaningless when the practices that one was involved in are no longer understood as purposeful. In other words, the purposes of these practices are not seen as such any longer. Thus certain doings and aspects of one’s ordinary life become detached: the uncanny feeling of something familiar, yet unfathomable; the disturbing and growing conviction that one’s job is senseless, etc. One cannot identify oneself as being part of a community, and one’s identity as being someone—e.g. a student, a Colombian, a woman, a heterosexual—crumbles. As a [bodily] manifestation one withdraws in one’s “monadic”

---

6In the introduction of Daybreak Nietzsche writes referring to his own enterprise and himself:

> For his path is his alone -as is, of course, the bitterness and the occasional ill-humour he feels at this ‘his alone’: among which is included, for instance, the knowledge that even his friends are unable to divine where he is or whither he is going, that they will sometimes ask themselves: ‘what? is he going at all? does he still have — a path?’ —At that time I undertook something not everyone may undertake: I descended into the depths, I tunnelled into the foundations, I commenced an investigation and digging out of an ancient faith, one upon which philosophers have for a couple of millennia been accustomed to build as if upon the firmest of all foundations —and have continued to do so even though every building hitherto erected on them has fallen down: I commenced to undermine our faith in morality. But do you understand me? (Nietzsche et al., 1997, p.1-2)

7David Bowman lands on Jupiter. After encountering from his ship an unintelligible succession of landscapes with some familiar shapes (a tunnel, mountains, lakes) yet disconcerting colors, he appears in a Louis XVI-style room without windows and an unsettling predominance of green in its decoration. He stands in his spacesuit and sees different and progressively older versions of himself in the room, the last one of which being is his elderly self lying in bed and trying to reach a black shiny monolith that appears at the foot of the bed. He tries to reach it, and when he does, he turns into a big-eyed baby encapsulated in a transparent and bright membrane, floating in space and staring at the earth.
body that does not smoothly belong to anything, as if one was a Leibnizian monad without windows: curved shoulders, crossed arms [subtly] embracing oneself, fetal position accompanied by the urge of disappearing in one’s body (a similar urge as when one is utterly embarrassed), etc. Such a “monadic” body can in turn be the object of existential anxiety: the uncanny feeling of having a body that does not belong to oneself, that is different to what one is, that is not part of one’s identity. We can read about the content of this form of existential anxiety in Kafka’s *The Metamorphosis* (2007). This particular experience might be understood as an extreme case in the continuum of cases of anxiety about having a body that one hates (which in turn relates to the form of anxiety about beauty we saw in the previous chapter), about actual or possible sickness, about having a biological sex that does not match one’s gender identity or about lacking or desiring to lack a part of one’s body (an arm, a leg), because its presence or lack of it does not match the body one identifies with.

Anxiety about one’s own death, as defined by Heidegger, is very closely connected with the existential anxiety that is directed towards one’s life or body. They all involve, to some extent, a loss of meaning, i.e., a detachment from the practices one has been living in. However, the objects and circumstances of the former are not as clear as the ones of the latter. I mentioned before that existential anxiety resembles objectless expectation in that there is nothing one can identify as its cause or maintainer (page 80). Treating the constitution (objects, circumstances, bodily manifestations and content) of this particular experience in detail is interesting for various reasons: besides it being a grey case between an emotion and a mood, it appeals to the edges of our language-games, the constitution of our world and to the publicity of one’s life. So let us start by considering its circumstances and lack of object.

Heidegger defined existential anxiety about one’s death as a mood directed towards the inevitable possibility of one’s nonexistence, the inevitable possibility of the irreversible loss of my being with others. In his own words, death is the “possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all” (1962 53: 307). This possibility, which constitutes the object of this specific kind of existential anxiety, remains tremendously elusive to characterize both in Heidegger’s and my account, since it is about one not being in any way in any world. In order to show this elusiveness and show how it arises in my

---

8The Metamorphosis narrates the story of Gregor Samsa who wakes up one day to find himself transformed into a monstrous insect. It poignantly relates Samsa’s struggles to accept and to adjust to his new repulsive condition capturing both Samsa’s broken relation with his body and the transformation of his identity and relationship with others.
Wittgensteinian-Schatzskian account, let us start by considering a couple of emotions with fairly clear objects that can be easily confused with existential anxiety about one’s death.

The object that constitutes this experience is not the death of one’s beloved others (or a fictional or famous character one is fond of). As Heidegger discussed in *Being and Time* (1962, 47), existential anxiety is not grief: one is not mourning others’ death, one is rather facing the possibility of one’s own nonexistence — although grieving or fearing the death of others can trigger existential anxiety. Neither it is directed towards the possibility of a world without oneself. One can indeed imagine seeing others’ life going on without one, but even then one would still exist as a solitary observer: one would still be in a world, although not in one’s current world. The problem with these characterizations is not that they are the constitutive objects of other emotions. The problem is rather that these objects are conceived as circumstances in which one is in a particular way in the world, and this problem pervades whichever elaboration one could attempt of one’s own death. The other forms of anxiety we saw were directed at possibilities one could encounter: failing an exam, not being recognized by others, being unworthy, etc. One can easily conceive all these situations and imagine how one would feel, what one would do, etc. In general, whatever circumstance might constitute the object of one’s anxiety is a circumstance in which one is or could be involved. We also saw that one’s life conditions and events in general are instituted in our practices (language-games), and that such practices are fundamentally social in the sense of one being involved with others. Thus, whatever in one’s circumstances is the object of one’s anxiety, the experience of anxiety implies that one belongs to a practice with others in which a particular event or life condition one is anxious about makes sense. Therefore, all the forms of anxiety we saw are directed towards one’s being in a particular way with others in the world.

However, following Heidegger, what is constitutive of existential anxiety is the inevitable possibility of one’s not-being (a world without one) — one’s inevitable death is the ceasing of all possibilities, it is a *reductio ad absurdum* of one’s existence in which one has to be (is one’s possibility), but, in principle, one cannot be. We should keep in mind that this is a metaphorical characterization that hints to a possibility that cannot be described in our language-games: since it is fundamentally one not being, then one cannot

---

9This does no apply in general: not all objects of each emotion are constituted by one’s possibility of being in some way in some world (although all emotions are bodily being in some way in one’s world). However, as existential anxiety towards one’s death is by definition directed to one’s own possibilities, it is fruitless to compare this kind of anxiety with emotions that are not directed towards one’s possibilities.

106
be involved with others in any sense; therefore one cannot belong to any social practice. But as language is essentially public and constituted in our social practices, it is impossible to describe with language the object of this specific form of anxiety, i.e. an object that by definition is detached from any language-game. In this sense, existential anxiety about one's death lacks a specific object, be it a future event one can conceive of or a threatening possibility, just as objectless expectation does (page 80): nothing 'clicks' as that something towards which our anxiety is directed —nothing ‘clicks’ as when one finds a yellow flower after having been looking for one. There is no possible “yellow flower” for existential anxiety. And this impossibility is one of the reasons for seeing existential anxiety towards death as a mood, rather than as an emotion.

Existential anxiety thereby defies the public nature of our language-games: one’s non-existence is not “visible”, determined by public criteria, and it does not capture patterns of one’s life conditions since, by definition, one is experiencing towards their nonexistence. Yet one is able to experience it, one’s bodily being in one’s current circumstances is shaped by this experience with an ineffable object: a disquieting asymmetry between one’s present existence and one’s inevitable possibility of dying. One’s own existence is seen through one’s own death, and what is seen is inexorably ineffable. Then, the language-games one plays and the practices in which one is are pervaded by an atmosphere of transience and meaninglessness —an uncanny feeling. One feels confined to an absolute and ineffable loneliness. In this sense, just like Heidegger’s conception of anxiety, existential anxiety towards death is the 'ownmost' experience.

Moreover, existential anxiety about one’s own death is constituted by a peculiar family of manifestations. Given the pervasive aura of meaninglessness that existential anxiety brings to the social practices to which one belongs, no action is constituted as a characteristic expression of one's existential anxiety and one’s and other’s actions lose their [customary] meaning. Action in general might be numbed, and any action, now under the aura of meaninglessness, can become a manifestation of this existential anxiety. Thus, one encounters depictions like Camus’ The Stranger (1989) in which Meursault’s actions such as killing the Arab or having sexual intercourse with Marie are no longer manifestations of rage, fear or love. Instead, they can be seen as meaningless actions that manifest his existential anxiety: the meaninglessness of his existence and his seeing the absurdity of the human condition (eventually, we are all going to die). These are “disposable” actions in the sense that they manifest this kind of existential anxiety only incidentally, not constitutively, and in this sense, this particular form of existential anxiety towards one’s death is closer to moods like gloominess, than
to emotions like fear.

However, the disquieting asymmetry between one’s present existence and one’s inevitable possibility of dying is not only constitutive of the object of existential anxiety, but it is also bodily manifested with a blurry family of reactions, in some cases as an emotion, in others as a mood. Thus, one may have extreme bodily manifestations such as a poignant facial expression of fear, sharp nausea or a particular sensation in one’s stomach, chest or throat; a family of manifestations that resembles that of fear (an emotion). One can also have fuzzier bodily manifestations like a subtle nausea that lasts for days and slowly pervades whatever one finds meaningful, just like Roquentin in Satre’s *Nausea* (2013). These fuzzy bodily manifestations, together with the ‘disposable’ manifestative actions we considered above and its fundamental lack of object, make existential anxiety towards one’s death an experience closer to moods than to emotions.

The constitutive prominence that bodily manifestations and manifestative actions have in my account is an important difference with Heidegger’s account, when interpreted from a metaphysical perspective (page 103). Despite the fact that both here and in Heidegger’s account anxiety is considered a mood, the underlying conception of mood differs. For Heidegger, moods are inherent aspects of being in the world: disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) is a condition of possibility of Dasein (‘one’ in our terminology), i.e. it is part of Dasein’s ontological structure that allows it to be with others and in the world. This condition allows Dasein to be receptive to the world, and it opens the world to him in one way or another. Disposedness is reflected in one’s everyday moods, so for example, if one is joyful, the world opens up to one as a beautiful place. But as it is a pre-ontological condition, according to Heidegger, one is always in some mood.

In my Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian account moods are not pre-ontological conditions, but emotional experiences that form a continuum with emotions, and that synthesize certain circumstances, manifestations and families of contents: moods are aspects of one’s confluence of life conditions. Therefore, unlike Heidegger’s, one is not always necessarily in some mood; but, in accordance with Heidegger’s conception, moods constitute distinctive ways of being involved in the world: in this case, it is a particular way of bodily being in the world that is constituted by the aforementioned synthesized three elements. Since one is *bodily* in the world, one is seen here as a biological reactive creature, largely trained to manifest in certain forms her emotions and moods. In a metaphysical reading of Heidegger’s account, however, with his focus on the [pre-]ontological structure of Dasein, the bodily expression of moods (and emotions) is completely neglected. This difference has profound consequences for how the existential anxiety about one’s own death
is conceived. But it should be noticed here again that Heidegger’s account does permit interpretations that acknowledge that being in the world is fundamentally a bodily being, for example Dreyfus’ famous interpretation in *Being-in-the-world* (1991).

For Heidegger, existential anxiety about one’s own death is an inherent mood of Dasein, in the sense that he is finite and has the ability to reflect on his own possibilities, among them, his inevitable death. A similar reasoning also exists in my account: one learns that one is finite as everybody else, and through this finitude, we saw above, the practices in which one lives and that constitute one’s world might lose their meaning. In these senses, existential anxiety towards one’s own death is part of the ontological structure of human beings both in Heidegger’s and my Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian account. In other words, it comes with one’s possibility of being in the world and having a human form of life. However, unlike in metaphysical readings of Heidegger, here one’s belonging to the world is, among other things, fundamentally embodied. Therefore, existential anxiety towards one’s own death is also experienced bodily. It is important to notice that despite the abstract character of the discussion, the subject for whom this existential detachment is possible is a subject that conceives himself as finite. Therefore, this experience is impossible for subjects who fundamentally conceive themselves within practices that regard human life as eternal. For example, the Christian conception of human being in which one’s life continues eternally in heaven or hell (or in the purgatory, for the Catholic variety).

Finally, the content of this form of anxiety resembles in some aspects that of fear. In Wittgenstein’s words, “Anxiety borrows the pictures of fear. “I have the fear of impending doom.”” (Wittgenstein [RPP1], §724). A content, nevertheless, that is not that of fear, but which is captured by certain Expressionist paintings (figure 5.9), and by painters like Edward Hopper, Francis Bacon or Goya. Let us briefly analyse one of Goya’s paintings from his Black Paintings, *The Dog* (figure 5.1), and see how it can capture the experience of existential anxiety towards one’s death.
The dread of a shapeless impeding doom is reflected by the blurry and amorphously obscure figure on the right side of the painting. A figure without meaning, whose closeness, nevertheless, subtly suggests a threat to one’s life: one can relate to the dog’s clearly defined facial expression, a face that manifests a calm fear of something undefined yet threatening, and its being hidden accentuates the fear one can see in its face. Moreover, the dog seems paralysed, it is neither ready to escape nor to fight; that is the numbness of action depicted as a manifestation of existential anxiety. The colours and the composition as a whole evoke a dark and disquietingly calm atmosphere of an impending world that has lost its meaning.

However, existential anxiety can seep into any of our language-games or practices, and thus its content can be constituted by pretty much anything when one is under such an experience. In short, everything can be seen as meaningless and can appeal to the meaninglessness of one’s existence. So for example, one can find existential interpretations of The Wizard of Oz (Meyers, 2011) where the film prompts the author to existential questions about choice, personal identity, and other issues revolving around the dichotomy of one’s identity, the world and action.
Conclusions

In Part I, I showed that emotions are syntheses of three elements that converge in one’s life: manifestations —i.e. bodily reactions and manifestative actions—, circumstances —including the objects in these circumstances towards which our emotions are directed—, and the contents of our consciousness —i.e. sensations, images, etc.—. An emotional experience, we saw, is a particular way of being in and reacting to the world that is largely dependent on the language-games of the culture in which we live.

In Chapter 1, we saw that bodily manifestations are constitutive elements of our emotions. The argument had two steps. First, in Section 1.1, I showed that our terms of emotion do not refer to private inner entities or states. The argument I offered there was an expansion of Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument which originally shows only that our terms of sensation do not refer to a private affection. This discussion led me to explain the Wittgensteinian conception of language, that is, that the meaning of language is our use of terms, which in turn justified the conceptual enterprise of analyzing emotions and anxiety that I embarked on in this thesis. The use is always an activity in which we do something with language, it is entirely public in the sense that it follows certain rules; rules are in turn constituted by our shared doings and not by abstract entities outside our activities to which we externally appeal. In short, we use language meaningfully as long as we can show others in a shared activity what we are doing with language. The activities of our language use are what we ordinarily do in daily life, therefore speaking a language is having a form of life; and language use is what make things, our doings and our life meaningful. In that sense, we saw, investigating our use of terms of emotion reveals how we live (experience) our emotions. In the second step, which was presented in Section 1.2, I argued that our bodily manifestations of emotion do not stand in a causal relation with inner states that correspond to our real emotions as James maintained or a common sense conception might suggest. Given the conception of language I explained in Section 1.1, an inner state that is not publicly available to the speakers is irrelevant to the meaning of our emotions. Hence, the way in
which expressions of emotion belong to our concepts of emotions can neither be a cause nor an effect of a real inner emotion that is by definition hidden from others.

In order to elucidate the relation between bodily manifestations and emotions, I appealed to fictitious natural histories, that is, imagining how children are trained to use certain terms and the general facts of [human] nature involved in this training. This methodology reveals the gist of the use of terms in our language-games, in other words, it reveals how our concepts are constituted. Because of that, I used fictitious natural history not only in Section 1.2, but throughout the whole thesis. Then, we saw that our terms of emotions primarily mean the same as the manifestations (e.g. a sobbing of sadness) that make our emotions present in the world. That showed that bodily manifestations and certain actions constitute what experiencing an emotion means: they are part of what allows us to tell meaningfully and [in]correctly whether we or others are experiencing a certain emotion, and in this sense they belong to the meaning of our terms of emotion. In short, bodily manifestations and manifestative actions stand in a conceptual relation with our terms of emotion.

However, we saw that this conceptual connection is quite extraordinary, because it is still possible to, say, pull a sad face without feeling sad. I argued that this possibility arises from learning the practice of lying, thus it does not really speak against the conceptual connection I argued for. Whilst that was enough for my main argument, it is worth investigating in further work whether these defeasible conceptual connections appear in other language-games, and their relation with our certainties. We also saw that the different ways in which bodily manifestations constitute our language-games of emotion depend on the particular ways in which language is used in a particular culture. Thus, I concluded, since bodily manifestations are constitutive elements of the meaning of emotions and inner and private states do not belong to their meaning, inner states that may cause our emotional expressions are irrelevant for how we speak and personally experience (give meaning to) our emotions.

Finally, I closed Chapter 1 showing that certain sensations are also constitutive of our language-games of emotion. We saw that Wittgenstein’s rejection in the RPP of this conceptual connection was accurate in pointing out that the sensations that may arise from the muscular contractions of our facial expressions of emotion do not play a role in our language-games. However, there are other sensations, such as the upset stomach of nervousness, that manifest our emotions and serve as criteria of use of our terms.

Chapter 2 was dedicated to the second constitutive element of emotions: that to which they are directed, i.e. their objects, and the circumstances.
in which they occur. We saw that being concerned with a particular object in a specific way is part of our language-games of emotion. By discussing the gist of the cognitivist account of emotions, I identified two aspects of this constitutive object: the attributive and the specific. I argued that the general attributes we see in the objects of our emotions are families shaped by our concrete experiences towards specific objects, and that both attributive and specific objects belong to our concepts of emotion. This argument was articulated against the cognitivist conception of emotions.

In the cognitivist perspective, the attributive object is understood as a set of properties that are ascribed to a specific object. This set is definitory of each particular emotion. When enough properties of this set are ascribed to an object, we relate emotionally to it. I offered three arguments against this conception, that, in turn, supported my own account. First, any attempt to sharply define such a set is doomed to fail, since we can always come up with examples from our emotional experiences as they occur in our lives that do not belong to the attributes of this set. Second, and more important, I argued that there is an underlying misconception in this cognitivist account. Emotions are seen as inner processes or states that are captured by an abstract representation: a set of semantic features to which we decide whether or not a given object belongs. But, as we saw in Chapter 1, the meaning of our terms of emotions is constituted by their public use, and not by states, entities or processes that are not publicly available or that are not part of our use. Such a use occurs in particular circumstances, and the cognitivist account, by appealing to an abstract set of semantic features, misrepresents that the emotions we experience are different when they are directed towards different objects, even when we capture these various experiences with the same term: our fear of this dog is different from our fear of the apocalypse. Third, considering fictitious natural histories allowed me to show that the attributive object of our emotions is constituted by our ability to see patterns and resemblances between the specific objects of our experiences and other objects. These patterns and resemblances form the family of objects, attributes and events towards which our emotions are directed. How this family is shaped, in turn, depends both on our culture —how we are trained to relate emotionally towards certain things— and our personal ways of seeing things.

Moreover, we saw that the specific objects of our emotion always occur in particular circumstances, which allows us to see them in a particular emotional way, to see them, for example, as ridiculous or scary. Reversely, we also saw that how circumstances are experienced also depends on the emotions we are feeling. In these two senses, circumstances are part of our language-games of emotion.
We also saw that the explanations, our understanding and the appropriateness of emotions are already integrated in how we are trained to play language-games of emotion. Fictitious natural histories and Schatzki’s account of practices allowed me to show that we usually explain our emotions by making explicit the particular objects or circumstances that constitute them. That comprises, for example, pointing out an object or making explicit some links with our past, present and future life conditions. Others understand such explanations and our emotions in general, because they share with us a cultural background in which we were trained: we express emotions similarly, both others and we recognize them and react to them as emotional manifestations that are connected in appropriate or inappropriate ways with certain objects and circumstances, and we link them in similar ways to other language-games we share. We also saw that this training is not all-encompassing in the sense that sometimes others’ explanations and emotional manifestations do not make sense to us, that is, we do not know how to react to their emotions or we do not recognize them. The concept of pathological emotions captures some of these cases of not understanding; however, our use of ‘pathological’ is a complex language-game that also involves at least political, cultural, biological and economical factors.

One of the uses of ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ in language-games of emotion is precisely to make explicit certain attributes of the object that constitutes a particular emotion and its links with other language-games. Another use is to explain the grounds, i.e. the links with other language-games in our culture or aspects of our language-games of particular emotions, that make our actions or expressions sensible emotional manifestations. We also saw that sometimes beliefs are manifestations of emotions and, reversely, that emotions can be manifestations of beliefs. I called this relation a loop dynamics, and I identified it as the target of cognitive-behavioral treatments in psychology.

Chapter 2 ended with three considerations on long-standing emotions. First we saw that they rely heavily on the way we care about the object, thus the links and attributes that belief and knowledge make explicit appear very prominently in our language-games of this kind of emotions. Second, we saw that unlike emotional perturbations and emotional reactions, long-standing emotions can be put to the test. Our ways of testing them is through our actions, and since the meaning of our actions is culture-dependent, our tests of long-standing emotions are culture-dependent too. Third, we saw that long-standing emotions, despite their heavy reliance on beliefs and their links to our personal history, are still manifested just as our emotional reactions (perturbations) are. In this sense, they form a continuum: one end relies heavily on bodily manifestations and the other end on manifestative actions.
and beliefs that embody the complex and language-dependent links to our personal history, beliefs and knowledge that make a specific object matter to us in a particular way.

Chapter 3 was an investigation into our first person experience of emotions. We saw in chapter 1 that an inner element that is not publicly available cannot play a role in the meaning of our emotions; thus, a felt private inner cannot play a role in how we meaningfully experience emotions from the first person perspective. So, I argued that having an emotional experience is bodily being in a confluence of objects and circumstances, in which one reacts with bodily manifestations and expressive actions, one is aware of certain patterns (particular attributes in an object that may occur over time) and sees things (circumstances and objects) with a certain atmosphere —they are all public activities in which we have been trained. In other words, all the constitutive elements of our emotions converge in our bodies, and this convergence, together with our bodily sensations, reactions and actions, is what having an emotional experience is. As one only has one’s own body, one can only feel one’s own bodily sensations and one can only be in one’s own confluence of circumstances, objects and the language-games one has been trained in. That is why we cannot experience others’ sensations and emotions, and psychological experiences are felt as private experiences.

My position was backed by a feature of our language-games of emotion and psychological experiences in general: only of what is alive and is sufficiently similar to us, i.e. only of self-moving, expressive and sentient bodies do we say that they have psychological experiences. In this sense, we saw, the body has a fundamental place in our language-games of psychological experiences. Having this in mind, a further criticism of the conception of emotions as inner and private entities in one’s mind or states of it arose: as in this conception the body is detached from the real emotional experience, it neglects the fundamental place it has in our language-games, i.e. in the way we articulate their meaning.

Then, I explained that our impression of the privacy of emotions arises in our language-games when we see that others experience emotions in a different way than us: they have different ways of engaging in patterns of emotional manifestations, they have different bodily reactions, they speak about different images and appeal to different atmospheres or works of art than what we appeal to when experiencing an emotion. These last three elements, images, atmospheres and works of art, brought me to the second aspect of emotions I addressed in Chapter 3: their content. The content is what goes on in our minds when we feel an emotion. It is not restricted to localized sensations, but also includes families of impressions and atmospheres. The latter two are captured by works of art: the colors, shapes,
sounds and the general atmosphere that come to our minds are depicted by art, and, in these depictions, they are intermingled with the confluence of objects, circumstances, bodily expressions and manifestative actions.

I closed Chapter 3 addressing how these associations of emotions with certain images are made. I started showing that they are arbitrary for every culture, and that art and media play an important role in how these associations are made. Since art not only captures them, but also the other constitutive elements of our emotions (objects, circumstances, emotional manifestations), art also greatly influences the way in which the other aspects of emotions are part of our lives. Then, I argued that the power of art to capture and shape our emotions results from both its capacity to detach from individual particularities the interplay of emotions with other language-games, and its capacity to portray emotions that arise in events that are central to every human form of life. The influence of art comes from its capacity to unveil and create connections between our emotions and other practices in our culture. In this sense, we saw, one’s emotional experience can be changed by art, and art has a redeeming power.

Chapter 3 concluded the general investigation of emotions that was the purpose of Part I. In Part II, I used this framework to investigate in detail a family of emotions: anxiety. Chapter 4 was dedicated to sketch a general account of this family of emotions, and Chapter 5 was an investigation into a subfamily of this family: existential anxiety.

As anxiety is closely related to fear, I started Section 4.1 by comparing them. We saw that expressions of anxiety and fear overlap greatly, yet expressions of anxiety may be spread over longer periods of time and may resemble expressions of other emotions like nervousness. Likewise, the objects and circumstances of anxiety, fear, nervousness, etc. overlap, that is, the patterns we see in circumstances and the resemblances of particular objects —e.g. the uncertain— are often the same for anxiety, fear and nervousness.

However, there are characteristic features of certain experiences of anxiety that differentiate it from other emotions. Through a fictitious natural history, we saw that there is a kind of anxiety characterized by being directed towards an event in the future. It depends on our ability to remember a scary past event and foresee it in the future. It comes with bodily manifestations that resemble those of fear but that last longer and are not as disturbing. In being trained to use the term ‘anxiety’ in these cases, we learn both to grasp these subtle patterns in our circumstances and to explain one’s emotions to others and to oneself.

We saw that this anxiety towards a specific event in the future could be seen as a member of a bigger family: anxiety as a fear towards things that are not present. We saw that this is not the only kind of experience that
we call anxiety. So, we considered three other members of the family: a disproportionate fear towards a specific object whose manifestations linger and become an unsettled mood, an excessive worry, as if one was always expecting the worst, and a fear that does not have an object. Each of these members has a characteristic family of manifestations.

Then I continued with the detailed investigation into the anxiety towards non-present things. Considerations on fictitious natural histories allowed me to show two things. First, the circumstances and objects of this kind of experience are constituted both by the resemblances we individually see and the resemblances we are socially trained to see in our particular experiences. Second, that our manifestations of this kind of anxiety are shaped by the particular way we are trained to use the term ‘anxiety’, and are expanded as we start living in new social circles. By comparing this kind of anxiety with our language-game of expectation in various forms, we were able to see that it is only through language that these non-present things can belong to our current circumstances and constitute our emotional experiences. Therefore, we can be anxious, just as we can expect something, because we have language. Language allows us to make subtle distinctions in our circumstances that constitute this particular experience of anxiety: we can remember, imagine and project into the future things that scare us. These distinctions, we saw, can be made even if one has never been trained to use the word ‘anxiety’.

As the constitution of emotions in general and anxiety in particular is culture-dependent, I dedicated Section 4.2 to give a cultural diagnosis that unveils some of the elements that make up our anxieties nowadays. In Subsection 4.2.1, we saw that in capitalism, self-worth is equated with one’s wealth and production. This equation, together with the democratic idea that we all have the same opportunities to succeed make us anxious about not being rich or successful enough, and therefore, about not being worthy enough. In Subsection 4.2.2, we saw that art and media depict the lives that are worth showing and living. There is a recurrent glamorized image of the talented hard-worker which is reproduced virtually in all our practices. I considered two instances of this reproduction: academic success and beauty. And we saw that this image comes with a tension: these glamorized lives are presented as accessible in principle to all of us, yet we recognize these people because of their special talents. That tension generates anxiety in us, and these anxieties are exploited by advertisements.

Finally, in Subsection 4.2.3, I explored the role of science in our current experiences of anxiety. I traced the historical origins of our view that anxiety is a psychological phenomenon that deserves to be causally studied back to Freud. We saw that the cognitive-behavioral approach takes this scientific stance, but, unlike Freudian accounts, anxiety is conceived as a maladapta-
tive cognitive schema of assessment with attached bodily symptoms. The international popularity of the DSM perpetuates and attests that we see manifestations of anxiety as bodily symptoms. I argued that this widespread outlook leads people to experience anxiety as a mental illness that has to be battled against—a form of experience that is impossible in times and cultures that do not share this particular conception of anxiety. Thus, an anxious person studies himself and observes his symptoms of anxiety, he manifests his anxiety by taking pills, etc. I concluded Chapter 4 by explaining more concretely how all the elements we saw in Subsections 4.2.1-3 form the circumstances, objects, manifestations and content of our anxieties, and I considered two practices that allow us to transform these cultural constitution of emotions: art not only gives us some of the images of the content of our anxieties, but it also has a transformative power over the circumstances and values that makes us anxious, for example, by depicting as glamorous our ordinary lives and thereby criticizing the current dominant values; and philosophy allows us to diagnose and question these values, and, with this basis, it allows us to create other values that make us less anxious.

To conclude Part II, I investigated existential anxiety in Chapter 5. I started by making explicit the account of world and life that underlay the conception of emotions I presented in Part I. I showed that, since meaning is constituted in social practices, our life and our world, i.e. the things, people and circumstances that make sense to us, are also constituted by social practices. Our world and our life arise in living with others. Then, I showed that existential anxiety is a family of experiences that resemble each other in the experience of detachment, and therefore meaninglessness. I briefly considered some examples: non-being understood and recognized by others, not understanding others, not understanding things—an alien world—, seeing certain practices one is in as meaningless and seeing one’s body as not belonging to one’s identity.

I treated in detail one of the members of this family: anxiety towards one’s own non-existence, that is, the bodily experience of the asymmetry between one’s current existence and the inevitable possibility of one’s non-existence, that is, one’s death. We saw that it is impossible to characterise the object of this kind of existential anxiety: since one’s own non-existence is a complete detachment from one’s practices, one’s life with others and one’s world, then one’s non-existence is the utter meaninglessness. This meaninglessness pervades the practices in which one currently lives: the world appears transient and insignificant. Therefore, actions also lose their sense. And, since actions are meaningless, there is no characteristic family of manifestations of this kind of existential anxiety beyond certain bodily reactions that overlap with fear and nervousness. Moreover, I argued that, as one cannot elucidate a
specific object of this kind of anxiety and there is no characteristic family of manifestative actions, existential anxiety towards one’s non-existence resembles a mood. But since it is manifested by bodily reactions, it resembles an emotion. Finally, we saw that the content of anxiety sometimes resembles the content of fear. In particular, we saw that Goya’s *The Dog* can be seen as a depiction of existential anxiety as a calm fear towards a shapeless impending doom in which action is paralysed. But since existential anxiety pervades all the language-games and practices to which one belongs with an atmosphere of transience and meaninglessness, the content of anxiety does not form a family but can be constituted by anything.

The account of emotions and anxiety I offered in this thesis gives rise to interesting questions that can be investigated in further work, for example:

1. Throughout Wittgenstein’s work, one can find various remarks on Freud. Despite his clearly critical stance towards the status of psychoanalysis as a science proper, it is clear that he deems it as a meaningful way of articulating human concerns (Cosman et al. [2013]). It would be worth exploring, first, if and how my account of emotions could be incorporated in a Wittgensteinian-Freudian account of human psychology, second, how to conceive emotions that defy our understanding within such an account and third, when and how to treat emotions in a therapeutic way.

2. Although Wittgenstein’s writings do not offer a clear or systematic view on aesthetics, his multiple remarks on the topic reveal that aesthetic issues are connected with all the philosophical questions he explicitly addressed. In *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief* (1966), Wittgenstein highlights the importance of making connections in our perception and understanding of art works. We saw in Chapter 2 of this thesis that making connections with other aspects of our life is crucial for the constitution of our emotional attitudes towards an object. Moreover, we saw in chapter 3 that art has a powerful and sometimes redeeming role in showing us connections that we have not seen before. This suggests profound connections between our aesthetic experiences and our emotional attitudes that would be worth addressing in further work.

3. In Chapter 5 I offered an account of world, life and existential anxiety whose resemblances with Heidegger’s philosophy I briefly pointed out. It would be interesting to explore these resemblances in depth, that is, to explore to what extent the concept of world as a confluence of language-games and practices overlaps with Heidegger’s notion of *Weltheit* as a totality of involvements. That there are profound similarities is suggested by the importance of our activities and of being with others in the concept of world in both Heidgger’s and my own Wittgensteinian-Schatzkian account. Within
this investigation, it would be necessary to answer whether or not my ac-
count leaves room for a conceptual correlate of the Heideggerian notion of
care. I believe that the the second constitutive element of emotions we saw
in this thesis, i.e. being concerned in a particular way with an object in
circumstances, could be a good starting point for this investigation.
Appendix
Figure 5.2: Mark Rothko No. 5/No. 22, 1950 (dated on reverse 1949).
Figure 5.3: Jackson Pollock *The Water Bull* (from the Accabonac Creek series), 1946.

Figure 5.4: Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin *Woman Taking Tea*, 1735.
Figure 5.5: Claude Monet *La Corniche near Monaco*, 1884.
Figure 5.6: Henri Matisse *La Danse (I)*, 1909.
Figure 5.7: Constantin Brâncuși *The Kiss*, 1907-8.
Figure 5.8: Jessica Todd Harper *The Agony in the Kitchen*, 2012.
Figure 5.9: Edvard Munch *The Scream*, 1983.
Figure 5.10: marble bust of the Roman Emperor Decius, (r. A.D. 249 to 251).
Figure 5.11: Jean-François Millet *Gleaners*, 1857.
Bibliography


Augustine (397-8). *Confessions*, chapter VIII, Book I.


de Botton, A. (2004b). Status anxiety. Online. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1MqJPHxy6g](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1MqJPHxy6g)


