Designing Incentives for Boolean Games
Ulle Endriss, Sarit Kraus, Jérôme Lang, Michael Wooldridge

Abstract:
Boolean games are a natural, compact, and expressive class of
logic-based games, in which each player exercises unique control over
some set of Boolean variables, and has some logical goal formula that
it desires to be achieved. A player’s strategy set is the set of all
possible valuations that may be made to its variables. A player's goal
formula may contain variables controlled by other agents, and in this
case, it must reason strategically about how best to assign values to
its variables. In the present paper, we consider the possibility of
overlaying Boolean games with taxation schemes. A taxation scheme
imposes a cost on every possible assignment an agent can make. By
designing a taxation scheme appropriately, it is possible to perturb
the preferences of the agents within a society, so that agents are
rationally incentivised to choose some socially desirable equilibrium
that would not otherwise be chosen, or incentivised to rule out some
socially undesirable equilibria. After formally presenting the model,
we explore some issues surrounding it (e.g., the complexity of finding
a taxation scheme that implements some socially desirable outcome),
and then discuss possible desirable properties of taxation schemes.