Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference - Truth, Meaning, and Normativity
María Inés Crespo, Dimitris Gakis, Galit Weidman-Sassoon (editors)

Abstract:
Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference
--- Truth, Meaning, and Normativity ---
María Inés Crespo, Dimitris Gakis, and Galit Weidman-Sassoon (eds.)

Abstract:

  The 3rd Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference on "Truth, Meaning,
and Normativity" was organised by the Department of Philosophy and the
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation of the Universiteit van
Amsterdam. The conference invited submissions from graduate
researchers conducting novel philosophical research into any of the
three conference topics. Some of the papers in this volume inform the
discussion about truth, meaning, and/or normativity by offering a
philosophical interpretation of results from other fields such as
logic, cognitive psychology and formal semantics.  A typical example
for this is Cova and Égré's paper, including experimental results
about the semantics of 'many' as a gradable adjective and their
variety of philosophical implications.

  Another area of interest is semantic normativity with respect to
meaning, use, content, and context. This topic was taken up by
Belleri's work on predicates of personal taste. Other dominant topics
included formal theories of truth and deflationism, dealt with in the
majority of papers in this volume including those by Gruber, McKinnon
and Speck.

  Since the topics of truth, meaning, and normativity naturally feed
into each other, some contributions explore several of the intricate
ways in which these notions relate to one another. We include here
Wieland and Turbanti as representative authors.


                           Contents

Florian Cova and Paul Égré (Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-ENS-EHESS))
  Moral asymmetries and the semantics of many

Delia Belleri (University of Bologna)
  Relative Truth, Lost Disagreement and Invariantism on Predicates of
  Personal Taste

Monika Gruber (Universität Salzburg)
  Does Tarski's critique of the Redundancy Theory apply to all
  Deflationary Theories of Truth?

Rhys McKinnon (University of Waterloo)
  Giving Warrant Credit in Warranted Assertibility: Against Wright's
  Inflationary Argument

Jönne Speck (University of St Andrews and Birkbeck, University of London)
  Note on Horsten's Inferentialist Deflationism

Giacomo Turbanti (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa)
  Modality in Brandom's Incompatibility Semantics

Jan Willem Wieland (Ghent University)
  Rules Regresses