Abstract

Relativism as Assessment-Sensitivity is designed to capture the idea that there can be genuine disagreement on matters of e.g. taste, as opposed to the loss of disagreement engendered by Contextualism. I argue that disagreement is lost on the Relativist approach too, and the reason is exactly that ‘tasty’ is conceived of as a relativised or assessment-sensitive predicate. I argue for a view in which ‘tasty’ is an un-relativised predicate and in which utterances containing ‘tasty’ are absolutely true or false. I show that theories that see ‘tasty’ as relative are mistaken, in that they conflate the reasons a subject S has to assert that X is tasty with the truth-conditions of a subject’s assertion to the effect that X is tasty. Once the misunderstanding is clear, speakers can be seen as genuinely disagreeing on whether X is tasty while relying on different but perfectly compatible reasons.