Giving Warrant Credit
in Warranted Assertibility:
Against Wright’s Inflationary Argument

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Abstract

Crispin Wright has famously argued that a deflationary theory of truth
cannot account for truth’s role in norms of warranted assertibility. Truth
and warranted assertibility are normatively coincident but extensionally
divergent and the only explanation of this is some property of truth. Thus,
since truth has a property above what can be accounted for by the dis-
quotation schema, truth amounts to something more substantial than
the deflationist can allow. Thus, deflationism fails. Or, so goes the arg-
ument. In this paper I will argue that Wright mistakenly attempts to
explain the normative coincidence but extensional divergence of truth and
warranted assertibility as a property of truth. Instead, I will argue that it
is a fundamental property of warrant that explains this difference. Con-
sequently, the deflationist position can adequately account for truth’s role
in warranted assertibility and Wright’s inflationary argument fails.