

Polarity particle responses as a window onto the interpretation of questions and assertions*

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“I don’t think I know what you mean,” she said; “you use too many metaphors; I could never understand allegories. The two words in the language I most respect are *yes* and *no*.”

—Mrs. Touchett in Henry James’ *The Portrait of a Lady*

Abstract

This paper provides an account of the distribution and interpretation of *polarity particles* in responses, starting with *yes* and *no* in English, and then extending the coverage to their cross-linguistic kin. Polarity particles are used in responses to both declarative and interrogative sentences, and thus provide a window onto the semantics and discourse effects of such sentences. We argue that understanding the distribution and interpretation of polarity particles requires a characterization of declaratives and interrogatives that captures a series of challenging similarities and differences across these two sentence types. To meet this challenge we combine and extend insights from inquisitive semantics, dynamic semantics, and commitment based models of discourse. We then provide a full account of the English data that leads to a typology of polarity particles and a series of cross-linguistic predictions. These predictions are checked against data from Romanian, Hungarian, French and German, languages that contrast with English in that they have ternary polarity particle systems, and contrast with one another in further subtle ways.

1	Introduction	2
2	Overview of the empirical landscape	2
3	Semantics and contextual effects of discourse initiatives	7
4	Polarity particle responses in English	26
5	Polarity particles cross-linguistically: a preliminary exploration	38
6	Repercussions of markedness beyond polarity particle responses	45
7	Comparison with previous approaches	47
8	Conclusion	54

*Acknowledgments to be added after the reviewing process.

1 Introduction

Across languages responses to questions and assertions often involve so-called *polarity particles*. We illustrate below with *yes* and *no*, the two polarity particles of English:

- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|-----|----------------------|
| (1) | Amy left. | (2) | Did Amy leave? |
| | a. Yes, (she did). | | a. Yes, (she did). |
| | b. No, (she didn't). | | b. No, (she didn't). |

This paper addresses a number of issues concerning the distribution and interpretation of such particles, in English and beyond. Our point of departure is the basic observation that polarity particles are *anaphoric*, in the sense that they require a suitable antecedent and their interpretation is dependent on this antecedent. As with anaphoric expressions in general, a full account of polarity particles thus requires a proper understanding of the expressions that provide their antecedents. Or, put more optimistically, investigating the distribution and interpretation of polarity particles may tell us something about the interpretation of the expressions that they are used to respond to as well. In this sense, polarity particles offer a window onto the interpretation of questions and assertions. As such, their investigation is not only interesting in its own right, but potentially has broader repercussions as well.

The roadmap for the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, we provide an overview of the empirical landscape, presenting a number of puzzling observations concerning polarity particles, and identifying, based on these observations, the broader issues that need to be addressed. Then, driven by these empirical considerations, in Section 3 we formulate a list of desiderata for a semantic theory of declaratives and interrogatives, which need to be met in order to establish a suitable basis for an account of polarity particles. Subsequently, we develop a theory that satisfies these desiderata, bringing together and extending insights from inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli *et al.*, 2013a, a.o.), dynamic semantics (Karttunen, 1969; Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991, a.o.), and commitment-based discourse models (Gunlogson, 2001; Farkas and Bruce, 2010, a.o.). Next, in Section 4, we present our account of polarity particles, first considering the details of English and then deriving a series of predictions concerning the typology of polarity particle systems cross-linguistically. In Section 5, these predictions are tested against data from Romanian, Hungarian, French, and German, and in Section 6 some further repercussions of our theory, beyond the proper realm of polarity particle responses, are discussed. Section 7 compares our analysis with previous approaches, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Overview of the empirical landscape

Licensing conditions. Perhaps the most basic challenge concerning polarity particles is to characterize the precise range of discourse initiatives that license polarity particle responses, and to understand how these initiatives differ from those that do not license such responses. We have seen in (1) and (2) above that both assertions and polar questions do license polarity particle responses. On the other hand, as illustrated in (3) below, *wh*-questions do not:

- | | |
|-----|---------------------|
| (3) | Who left? |
| | a. *Yes, Amy did. |
| | b. *No, Amy didn't. |

One specific task, then, is to characterize what it is that assertions and polar questions have in common in this regard, and what sets them apart from *wh*-questions. Moreover, if we look beyond these three basic types of initiatives, further issues arise. In particular, in the domain of disjunctive questions we find some intriguing contrasts. For instance, it needs to be explained why (4) and (5) below, which at first sight seem perfectly equivalent, differ in their potential to license polarity particle responses (upward and downward arrows are used in these examples to indicate rising and falling pitch, respectively).

- (4) Is the door open \uparrow or is it closed \downarrow ?
 a. *Yes, it is.
 b. *No, it isn't.
- (5) Is the door open \uparrow or is it not open \downarrow ?
 a. Yes, it is.
 b. No, it isn't.

Sensitivity to polarity of the antecedent. A second general phenomenon that stands in need of explanation, in fact already foreshadowed by the contrast between (4) and (5), is the sensitivity of polarity particle responses to the polarity of their antecedent. Consider, for instance, the use of polarity particles in agreeing and disagreeing responses to the plain positive assertion in (6) and to its negative counterpart in (7) (capitalization is used here to indicate obligatory contrastive stress).

- (6) Peter passed the test.
 a. Agreement: Yes, he did / *No, he did.
 b. Disagreement: *Yes, he didn't / No, he didn't.
- (7) Peter didn't pass the test.
 a. Agreement: Yes, he didn't / No, he didn't.
 b. Disagreement: Yes, he DID / No, he DID.

We see that in responses to positive assertions, the division of labor between *yes* and *no* is clear: *yes* is used to express agreement and *no* is used to express disagreement. However, in responses to negative assertions, this division of labor is no longer in force; indeed both particles can be used in either type of response. And a similar pattern is found when we consider responses to positive and negative polar questions rather than assertions.¹

In languages other than English, we also find polarity particles that are clearly sensitive to the polarity of their antecedent. For instance, the French particle *oui* can be used in response to positive initiatives, but not in response to negative ones, while the particle *si* exhibits exactly the opposite pattern. A third particle, *non*, can be used in response to both types of initiatives, but in one case it signals agreement with the antecedent, while in the other case it signals disagreement.

- (8) Claude est à la maison. 'Claude is home.'
 a. Agreement: Oui / *Non / *Si, elle y est. 'Yes, she is.'
 b. Disagreement: Non / *Si / *Oui, elle n'y est pas. 'No, she isn't.'
- (9) Claude n'est pas à la maison. 'Claude is not home.'
 a. Agreement: Non / *Oui / *Si, elle n'y est pas. 'No, she isn't.'

¹See Brasoveanu *et al.* (2013) for experimental work corroborating the acceptability of both *yes* and *no* in agreeing responses to negative assertions; this work also shows that in simple cases like (7) there is a significant preference for *no* over *yes*.

- b. Disagreement: Si / *Non / *Oui, elle y est. ‘Yes, she IS.’

Bare particle responses. A third general issue concerns the status of *bare* polarity particle responses, in comparison with responses in which the particle is accompanied by an explicit preja-cent. In some cases bare particle responses are considerably less felicitous than ones with an explicit preja-cent. Responses to negative assertions and polar questions are a notorious case in point:

- (10) Did Peter not pass the test? / Peter didn’t pass the test.
 a. ?Yes. / ✓ Yes, he didn’t pass. / ✓ Yes, he DID pass.
 b. ?No. / ✓ No, he didn’t pass. / ✓ No, he DID pass.

The exact status of bare particle responses to such negative initiatives has been investigated exper-imentally by Kramer and Rawlins (2012). We briefly review their experimental setup and results, as well as the main generalizations that emerge from these results.

In (11) and (12) below are two examples of the experimental items that Kramer and Rawlins used in their experiment. Each item consisted of a context, a question, and a bare particle response to that question. The question was either *positive*, as in (11), or *negative*, as in (12); the answer was either *yes*, as in (12), or *no*, as in (11); and the context was either *positive* in the sense that it verified the sentence radical of the question, as in (11), or *negative* in the sense that it falsified the sentence radical of the question, as in (12) (the sentence radical of the question in (12) is taken to be ‘John took his vacation’).

- (11) CONTEXT: John was supposed to send an email to a customer. Bill helped John write it and finally send it. Sue wasn’t involved at all and doesn’t know this. [pos]
 SUE: Did John send the email? [pos]
 BILL: No. [neg]
- (12) CONTEXT: John was planning to take a vacation soon. Bill is John’s boss and knows that he didn’t go on vacation. Sue just noticed John’s car in the parking lot. [neg]
 SUE: Did John not take his vacation? [neg]
 BILL: Yes. [pos]

Participants were asked to assess (i) the felicity of the answer on a 1-7 scale, and (ii) the truth of the answer in the given context, picking one of three available options: *true*, *false*, and *unsure*.




Figure 1: Felicity judgments, where conditions are coded as question : answer : context.




Figure 2: Truth value judgments for answers to negative questions.

The obtained felicity judgments for all $2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8$ conditions are given in Figure 1, which is taken directly from Kramer and Rawlins (2012). The main generalizations that can be drawn from these results are the following (Kramer and Rawlins themselves focus on the second):

(13) *Generalizations from felicity judgments:*

- F1: Bare particle responses to negative polar questions are less felicitous than truthful bare particle responses to positive polar questions (each of the last four bars in Figure 1 is lower than the 1st and the 4th bar).
- F2: In response to negative polar questions, bare *yes* and bare *no* are both less felicitous when the context is positive than when the context is negative (the 5th bar is lower than the 6th, and the 7th bar is lower than the 8th). Kramer and Rawlins explicitly report that this difference is significant, both for *yes* and for *no*.

The results also suggest that in response to negative polar questions, bare *no* is less infelicitous than bare *yes*, both when the context is positive and when the context is negative (the 5th bar is lower than the 7th, and the 6th is lower than the 8th). However, Kramer and Rawlins report that these differences are statistically not significant.

Turning now to truth value judgments, the results for negative questions are plotted in Figure 2, again taken from Kramer and Rawlins (2012); the results for positive questions did not involve any surprises—i.e., *yes* was judged true in positive contexts and false in negative contexts, and *no* the other way around—and are therefore not explicitly displayed here. Again, two main generalizations can be drawn from these results:

(14) *Generalizations from truth value judgments:*

- T1: Bare particle responses to negative polar questions are ambiguous. They are interpreted much more equivocally than bare particle responses to positive polar questions.
- T2: In response to a negative polar question, schematically of the form $? \neg p$, both *yes* and *no* are more often interpreted as confirming $\neg p$ than as rejecting $\neg p$.

The two pairs of generalizations in (13) and (14) provide a nuanced characterization of the status of bare particle responses to negative polar questions, and we will assume that they extend to

bare particle responses to negative assertions as well. Accounting for these generalizations is an important empirical challenge for theories of polarity particle responses, and has indeed been the main focus of a number of recent proposals.²

Now let us take a step back from the specific case of negative polar questions (and assertions), and return to the general phenomenon that bare particle responses are sometimes much less felicitous than ones with an explicit prejacent. This phenomenon also manifests itself in responses to open disjunctive questions, i.e., disjunctive questions with rising intonation on each of the disjuncts (unlike *closed* disjunctive questions, also referred to as *alternative questions*, which have falling intonation on the final disjunct, cf. Pruitt and Roelofsen, 2013). An additional feature of open disjunctive questions is that they exhibit a puzzling asymmetry between *yes* and *no* responses, i.e., while bare *yes* is infelicitous, bare *no* is perfectly acceptable (Roelofsen and van Gool, 2010).

- (15) *Context: Amalia wants to write a letter to Igor, who is Russian. She doesn't speak Russian, so she would like to know whether Igor speaks any other languages that she could write in.*
- Does he speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ?
- a. #Yes. / \checkmark Yes, he speaks English. / \checkmark Yes, he speaks French.
 b. \checkmark No. / \checkmark No, he only speaks Russian.

Intuitively, a bare *yes* response confirms that Igor speaks either English or French, but this is not sufficient to resolve the given issue. This can be overcome by adding an explicit prejacent that confirms one of the disjuncts. In the case of a bare *no* response, the given issue is immediately resolved, even without an explicit prejacent, albeit not in one of the ways that the questioner had hoped for.

There are also cases in which the infelicity of a bare particle response cannot be overcome by adding an explicit prejacent. One case in point is that of constituent questions, exemplified in (3) above. Another case is that of closed disjunctive questions. Interestingly, while in form such questions only differ from open disjunctive questions in that they involve falling intonation on the final disjunct, the two question types differ radically in their potential to license polarity particle responses.

- (16) *Context: Amalia wants to write a letter to Igor. She knows that he speaks either English or French, but she doesn't remember which.*
- Does he speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ?
- a. #Yes. / #Yes, he speaks English. / #Yes, he speaks French.
 b. #No. / #No, he doesn't speak either. / #No, he speaks both.

These contrasts show that while in some cases bare particle responses may be infelicitous because of underspecification or ambiguity, e.g., in (10) and (15), in other cases there appears to be a stronger reason for their unacceptability, which is not overcome even if the putative ambiguity is resolved by an explicit prejacent, as in (3) and (16).

Commitments and conversational crises. A fourth aspect of polarity particle responses that needs to be captured concerns the discourse commitments that they give rise to, and how these relate to the commitments resulting from the initiatives that they target. The main contrast is between responses to assertions and responses to questions. While the former may give rise to

²See in particular the work of Kramer and Rawlins (2009, 2010, 2012) and Holmberg (2013), which we will discuss in some detail in Section 7.

a ‘conversational crisis,’ a situation in which two discourse participants have made incompatible commitments, the latter never do.

- (17) Amy left.
 a. Yes, she did. ↗ no crisis
 b. No, she didn’t. ↗ crisis
- (18) Did Amy leave?
 a. Yes, she did. ↗ no crisis
 b. No, she didn’t. ↗ no crisis

While in English the distribution of polarity particles does not seem to be sensitive to the distinction between responses that lead to a conversational crisis and those that don’t, in other languages we do find that this distinction constrains the distribution of polarity particles in systematic ways. In Romanian, for instance, the particle combination *ba nu* can be used in a negative response to a positive assertion, as in (19b), but not in a negative response to a positive question, as in (20b).

- | | | |
|------|-------------------|------------------|
| (19) | Paul a telefonat. | ‘Paul called.’ |
| | a. Da. | ‘Yes, he did.’ |
| | b. Nu. / Ba nu. | ‘No, he didn’t.’ |
| (20) | A telefonat Paul? | ‘Did Paul call?’ |
| | a. Da. | ‘Yes, he did.’ |
| | b. Nu. / *Ba nu. | ‘No, he didn’t.’ |

Polarity particles cross-linguistically: common core and constraints on variation. This brings us to the final fundamental issue, which concerns the cross-linguistic typology of polarity particle systems. What, if anything, is the common core of all these systems, and what are the main constraints on the variation that exists between them? As mentioned in the introduction, our initial focus will be on English. However, taking inspiration from Pope (1976), our aim will not just be to account for the details of the English polarity particle system as such, but also to distinguish aspects of the system that are likely to be language specific from those that may be universal. Furthermore, we will identify principled constraints on how polarity particle systems may differ from language to language. The typological predictions that these considerations give rise to will be tested against data from Romanian, Hungarian, French and German, a group of languages that contrast with English in that they have three polarity particles, as already illustrated above for Romanian and French, and further contrast with one another in ways that allow us to test our typological predictions in quite some detail.

3 Semantics and contextual effects of discourse initiatives

The above empirical considerations underline the fact that an account of polarity particle responses can only be given in tandem with an account of the initiatives that they target, and which provide their antecedents. Moreover, the phenomena that we have surveyed place a number of concrete requirements on the general architecture of such an account. We will formulate and discuss these requirements in Section 3.1. In order to meet these requirements, it will be necessary to combine and extend insights from inquisitive semantics, dynamic semantics, and commitment-based discourse models. We will do so in Sections 3.2-3.4, first concentrating on the semantic framework and then

on the representation of discourse contexts and the way in which these contexts are updated when an utterance is made.

A brief terminological note: henceforth we will use the terms *declarative* and *interrogative* to designate the different sentence types that we will be concerned with, and the terms *assertion* and *question* to talk about the discourse moves that are typically performed using these types of sentences.

3.1 Requirements

Below we formulate four general requirements on the architecture of a suitable account of discourse initiatives, arising from the empirical considerations concerning polarity particles discussed above.

Informative and inquisitive content. Since polarity particle responses can target both questions and assertions, our account of discourse initiatives needs to be cast within a semantic framework that allows for a uniform analysis of declarative and interrogative sentences, capturing not only the differences, but also the relevant similarities between the two. The framework of *inquisitive semantics* (Ciardelli *et al.*, 2013a, a.o.) is eminently suitable for this purpose. The main features of this framework will be reviewed below.³

Anaphoric potential. Since polarity particle responses require a suitable antecedent, and since their interpretation depends on the nature of this antecedent, our account of discourse initiatives should capture the range of suitable antecedents that is made available by the different kinds of initiatives. To achieve this, we will have to give the basic inquisitive semantics framework a dynamic twist. In dynamic semantics, anaphoric dependencies are standardly captured in terms of *discourse referents*. For instance, in a sentence like *One of the girls lost her raincoat* the determiner phrase *one of the girls* is taken to introduce a discourse referent, which then serves as the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun *her*. Similarly, discourse initiatives can be taken to introduce certain propositional discourse referents, which may then serve as the antecedents of subsequent polarity particle responses.

Polarity sensitivity. We have seen that polarity particle responses do not only require a suitable antecedent, but are also sensitive to the *polarity* of their antecedent. Thus, our account of initiatives should not only characterize the discourse referents that each type of initiative introduces, but it should also characterize these discourse referents as being either positive or negative, depending on the nature of the initiative that introduces them. Notice that, again, this is parallel to what we find with other kinds of anaphoric dependencies. For instance, in many languages anaphoric pronouns are sensitive to the grammatical gender of their antecedents, which means that the relevant discourse referents need to be characterized as being, e.g., either masculine or feminine.

Discourse commitments. We have seen that the distribution of polarity particles is, in some languages, sensitive to the distinction between responses that lead to a conversational crisis, i.e., incompatible discourse commitments, and those that don't. Thus, a suitable account of discourse initiatives should explicitly characterize the discourse commitments that each kind of initiative

³Inquisitive semantics builds on much previous work on the semantics of questions (Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Groenendijk, 1999, a.o.) and on disjunction and indefinites in the framework of *alternative semantics* (von Stechow, 1991; Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002; Simons, 2005; Alonso-Ovalle, 2006; Aloni, 2007, a.o.). For a detailed discussion of the historical context of inquisitive semantics and its advantages with respect to previous approaches, see Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2011); Ciardelli *et al.* (2013a,b); Roelofsen (2013a).

gives rise to. Moreover, this characterization should be as general and uniform as possible. For instance, a theory that characterizes the discourse commitments that arise from assertions and polar questions separately is to be dispreferred over a theory that provides one general characterization of the commitments that arise from these two types of discourse moves. In the latter case, differences in commitments are fully predictable from differences in semantics of the uttered sentences. We will see that in order to provide such a general characterization, it is crucial that our semantic framework allows us to assign semantic values to sentences that capture both their informative and their inquisitive content in an integrated way.

Our aim in the remainder of this section will be to develop an account of the semantics and contextual effects of questions and assertions that satisfies the requirements listed above in a minimal way, i.e., without adding any unnecessary complexity. In Section 3.2 we lay out the basic inquisitive semantics framework that we take as our point of departure, in Section 3.3 we enrich this framework with discourse referents, and in Section 3.4 we specify how discourse contexts are represented and updated.

3.2 Inquisitive semantics

Inquisitive semantics starts from the observation that one of the primary functions of language is to enable the *exchange* of information. That is, language is used both to provide and to request information. This means that sentences in natural language can have both *informative* and *inquisitive* potential.

In classical logic, and in most work on natural language semantics, the meaning of a sentence is identified with its informative content. A classical proposition is a set of possible worlds, embodying a piece of information. When asserting a sentence, a speaker is taken to provide the information that the actual world is located in the proposition expressed by the sentence.

In inquisitive semantics, the proposition that a sentence expresses is intended to capture both its informative and its inquisitive content. This means that propositions cannot simply be construed as sets of possible worlds in this framework. However, there is a very natural generalization of the classical notion of propositions. To arrive at this notion, we first introduce two auxiliary notions, that of an *information state* and that of an *issue*.

Information states. An information state is, as usual, construed as a set of possible worlds: the set of all worlds that are compatible with the information available in the information state. For brevity, we will often simply refer to information states as *states*. If α and β are states and $\alpha \subseteq \beta$, we say that α is an *enhancement* of β . Furthermore, we say that an information state is *trivial* if it consists of all possible worlds; in this case, it does not contain any non-trivial information.

Issues. An issue is meant to represent the semantic content of a request for information, i.e., a request to locate the actual world more precisely within the current information state. If our current state is α , then a request for information can be characterized by the set of enhancements of α that locate the actual world with sufficient precision to satisfy the request. Thus, an issue over a state α can be modeled as a non-empty set of enhancements of α .

However, a non-empty set of enhancements of α can only be taken to embody a proper issue over α if it satisfies the following two conditions. First of all, I has to be *downward closed*. That is, for any $\beta \in I$, and any $\gamma \subseteq \beta$, it must be the case that $\gamma \in I$ as well. After all, if β locates the actual world with sufficient precision to satisfy the request at hand, then γ , which locates the actual world even more precisely, cannot fail to satisfy the given request as well.

Second, the elements of I must together form a *cover* of α , i.e., $\bigcup I = \alpha$. This is to guarantee that the request represented by I can be truthfully satisfied in the first place. After all, if $\bigcup I \neq \alpha$, then there is a world $w \in \alpha$ which is not in any $\beta \in I$. The information available in α does not preclude w from being the actual world. But if it *is* the actual world, then it is impossible to truthfully satisfy the request represented by I , i.e., it is impossible to truthfully locate the actual world within some $\beta \in I$, because no such state contains the actual world.

These considerations lead to the following notion of issues:

- (21) An issue I over a state α is a non-empty, downward closed set of enhancements of α which together form a cover of α .

Notice that an issue I over a state α may contain α itself. In this case, by downward closure, I also contains all substates of α , that is, I amounts to the powerset of α , $\wp(\alpha)$. This issue embodies a vacuous request for information, one that is already satisfied by the information available in α . Therefore, $\wp(\alpha)$ is called the *trivial* issue over α .

Propositions. The proposition expressed by a sentence should determine the basic effect that a speaker brings about when uttering the sentence (to the extent that this effect is determined by the conventions of the language, rather than, e.g., by principles of rational communication). Now, returning to the initial observation, we take it that in making an utterance a speaker may *provide* information, i.e., locate the actual world within a certain set of worlds α , but she may also *request* information, i.e., raise an issue I over α . In order to capture these two potential effects, a proposition may be modeled as a pair $\langle \alpha, I \rangle$, where α is a state, capturing the informative content of the sentence, and I an issue over α , capturing the inquisitive content of the sentence.

In many cases, speakers actually seem to achieve only one of the two potential effects. For instance, in uttering a simple declarative, *We invited Bill*, a speaker only provides information, while in uttering a simple polar interrogative, *Did he accept?*, she only requests information. In view of this, one might want to stick to the classical idea that a declarative sentence does not have any inquisitive content, which means that its meaning can be identified with its informative content and formally modeled by means of a classical proposition, while interrogative sentences do not have any informative content. Such an approach is taken in Karttunen (1977) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), among many others.

Inquisitive semantics takes a different approach. Both the declarative *We invited Bill* and the polar interrogative *Did he accept?* are taken to have informative and inquisitive content; only, in the case of the declarative, the inquisitive content is trivial, and in the case of the interrogative, the informative content is trivial. This allows for a uniform treatment of declarative and interrogative sentences, as well as sentences that are both informative and inquisitive at the same time, such as the conjunction *We invited Bill, but did he accept?*^{4,5}

Now, let us have a closer look at semantic objects of the form $\langle \alpha, I \rangle$, where α is a state and I

⁴One may argue that such conjunctions could be treated as two separate utterances, one involving only informative content and the other involving only inquisitive content. Note, however, that declarative and interrogative clauses can also be conjoined in embedded contexts, e.g., *Sue only remembers that we invited Bill and whether he accepted*; for such cases, a hybrid notion of meaning capturing both informative and inquisitive content at the same time really seems inevitable.

⁵There are other arguments for adopting a hybrid notion of meaning as well, involving for instance the treatment of disjunction (Groenendijk, 2009; Roelofsen, 2013a,b), the division of labor between semantics and discourse pragmatics (Farkas and Roelofsen, 2014), and the fact that it allows for a generalized notion of entailment that applies both to declaratives and to interrogatives (Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011; Ciardelli *et al.*, 2013b). However, going through such arguments would take us too far afield from our main storyline.




Figure 3: Some simple propositions visualized, depicting only maximal elements.

an issue over α . Note that, since I is an issue over α , we always have that $\alpha = \bigcup I$. But this means that α can always be *retrieved* from I , and it need not appear explicitly in the representation of a proposition. Thus, a proposition is defined in inquisitive semantics simply as a set of states that is non-empty and downward closed, and the informative content of the proposition is then identified with the union of the states that it consists of.

(22) A proposition in inquisitive semantics is a non-empty, downward closed set of states.

The proposition expressed by a sentence φ is denoted as $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. The union of the elements of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, $\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, is referred to as the informative content of φ , and is denoted as $\text{info}(\varphi)$. For any set of states S , S^\downarrow denotes the downward closure of S :

$$(23) \quad S^\downarrow := \{\beta \mid \beta \subseteq \alpha \text{ for some } \alpha \in S\}$$

Our initial example sentences, (1) and (2), may be taken to express the following propositions in inquisitive semantics (we will say more about how to derive this compositionally in just a moment):

$$(24) \quad \llbracket \text{Amy left} \rrbracket = \{\{w : \text{Amy left in } w\}\}^\downarrow$$

$$(25) \quad \llbracket \text{Did Amy leave?} \rrbracket = \{\{w : \text{Amy left in } w\}, \{w : \text{Amy didn't leave in } w\}\}^\downarrow$$

These propositions are depicted in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), respectively, where w_1 and w_2 are worlds where Amy left, w_3 and w_4 are worlds where Amy didn't leave, and the shaded rectangles are the *maximal* elements of the given propositions (by downward closure, all substates of these maximal states are also contained in the given propositions, but to make the pictures easier to read these substates are not explicitly depicted). The maximal elements of a proposition $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ are referred to as the *possibilities* for φ , or sometimes as the *alternatives* for φ .

It follows from this semantic treatment that in uttering the declarative *Amy left*, a speaker (i) provides the information that the actual world must be either w_1 or w_2 , i.e., one where Amy left, and (ii) raises a trivial issue, i.e., does not request any further information; on the other hand, in uttering the polar interrogative *Did Amy leave?*, a speaker (i) provides the trivial information that the actual world must be w_1 , w_2 , w_3 , or w_4 (all options are open) and (ii) requests information from other participants in order to locate the actual world more precisely, either within $\{w_1, w_2\}$, establishing that Amy left, or within $\{w_3, w_4\}$, establishing that Amy didn't leave.

Informative and inquisitive sentences. A sentence φ is said to be informative just in case its informative content is non-trivial: $\text{info}(\varphi) \neq W$, where W is the set of all possible worlds. Similarly, φ is said to be inquisitive just in case its inquisitive content is non-trivial: $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \neq \wp(\text{info}(\varphi))$, or equivalently, $\text{info}(\varphi) \notin \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. For instance, the declarative *Amy left* is informative, but not inquisitive,

while the polar interrogative *Did Amy leave?* is inquisitive, but not informative.

If one has a picture of the proposition expressed by a sentence φ it is straightforward to determine whether φ is inquisitive or not. This is because, under the assumption that there are only finitely many possible worlds—and this is a safe assumption to make for all the examples to be considered in this paper—a sentence φ is inquisitive just in case $\llbracket\varphi\rrbracket$ contains at least two possibilities (maximal elements). For instance, the proposition in Figure 3(a) contains a single possibility, while the one in Figure 3(b) contains two possibilities. From this we can immediately conclude that the polar interrogative *Did Amy leave?* is inquisitive, unlike the declarative *Amy left*.

The system $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$. We now specify an inquisitive semantics for a simple logical language \mathcal{L} , whose formulas are built up from a set of atomic formulas \mathcal{P} using negation, \neg , disjunction, \vee , and two additional operators, $!$ and $?$, which, for reasons to become clear shortly, are referred to as the non-inquisitive and the non-informative projection operator, respectively. The semantics that we will specify for this simple logical language is considered to be the most basic concrete inquisitive semantics, and is referred to as $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$.⁶ After having laid out this formal system, we will indicate how the different types of sentences in natural language that we considered in Section 2 are to be translated into our logical language.

We assume that every possible world w determines a truth value for every atomic formula $p \in \mathcal{P}$, so that we always have either $w(p) = 1$ or $w(p) = 0$. The proposition expressed by a formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$ is determined by the following recursive definition:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket p \rrbracket &= \wp \{w \mid w(p) = 1\} \\ \llbracket \neg\varphi \rrbracket &= \wp (\overline{\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket}) \\ \llbracket !\varphi \rrbracket &= \wp (\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket) \\ \llbracket \varphi \vee \psi \rrbracket &= \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket \\ \llbracket ?\varphi \rrbracket &= \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \wp (\overline{\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket}) \end{aligned}$$

Let us briefly go through the clauses of the definition and illustrate it with a number of examples. In doing so, it will be convenient to have a compact notation to refer to the possibilities in a proposition. To this end, for any formula φ in the language of classical propositional logic, we will write $|\varphi|$ to denote the classical proposition expressed by φ , i.e., the set of worlds in which φ is classically true.

Atomic formulas. The proposition expressed by an atomic formula p contains all states that consist exclusively of worlds where p is true. This proposition is depicted in Figure 4(a). Note that $\llbracket p \rrbracket$ contains a single possibility, namely $|p|$, and is therefore not inquisitive.

Negation. The proposition expressed by a negated formula, $\neg\varphi$, again always contains a single possibility, $\overline{\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket}$, and can therefore not be inquisitive either. A state is contained in $\llbracket \neg\varphi \rrbracket$ if and only if it is inconsistent with any state in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. For instance, $\llbracket \neg p \rrbracket$ is the set of states that are

⁶ $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$ is normally specified for a slightly richer language, which also includes conjunction and implication. We leave these connectives out of consideration because they are not relevant for the types of initiatives considered here. However, we should note that conjunctive and conditional initiatives raise a number of interesting and challenging issues for any account of polarity particle responses, including ours. We hope to address these issues in future work. For in-depth discussion of $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$, we refer to Ciardelli (2009); Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009); Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2011); AnderBois (2011); Roelofsen (2013a); Ciardelli *et al.* (2013a). For variants and extensions of this basic system, see, e.g., Ciardelli *et al.* (2013b,c); Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2014); Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2014).




Figure 4: Propositions expressed by some simple formulas in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$; in each picture, 11 is a world where p and q are both true, 10 a world where p is true but q is false, 01 a world where q is true but p is false, and 00 a world where both p and q are false.

inconsistent with any state in $\llbracket p \rrbracket$. These are states that consist exclusively of worlds where p is false. Thus, as depicted in Figure 4(b), $\llbracket \neg p \rrbracket$ contains a single possibility, namely $\neg p$.

Disjunction. The proposition expressed by a disjunction $\varphi \vee \psi$ is obtained by taking the union of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket$. As a concrete example, consider $\llbracket p \vee q \rrbracket$. A state α is contained in $\llbracket p \vee q \rrbracket$ if and only if $\alpha \in \llbracket p \rrbracket$ or $\alpha \in \llbracket q \rrbracket$, i.e., if and only if all worlds in α make p true, or alternatively all worlds in α make q true. Thus, as depicted in Figure 4(c), $\llbracket p \vee q \rrbracket$ contains two possibilities, $|p|$ and $|q|$, which means that it is inquisitive. If we apply negation to this sentence, we get a single possibility again, the complement of $|p| \cup |q|$, which is $\neg p \wedge \neg q$. This is depicted in Figure 4(d).⁷

The projection operators. As depicted in Figure 5, propositions in inquisitive semantics can be thought of as inhabiting a two-dimensional space. On the horizontal axis, there are propositions that are purely informative, i.e., whose inquisitive content is trivial. On the vertical axis, there are propositions that are purely inquisitive, i.e., whose informative content is trivial. All other propositions, whose informative and inquisitive content are both non-trivial, are located somewhere in the plain, off the axes.

Given this picture, it is natural to consider general operations that *project* any proposition onto one of the axes, trivializing either its informative or its inquisitive content. $!$ and $?$ express such operations, which is why they are called *projection operators*. $!$ is the non-inquisitive projection operator: it trivializes the inquisitive content of a proposition, while leaving its informative content untouched. $?$ is a non-informative projection operator: it trivializes the informative content of a proposition, while minimally weakening its inquisitive content (inquisitive content cannot be left

⁷There is a very precise sense in which negation and disjunction are treated here just as they are in classical logic. Namely, both in classical logic and in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$, $\neg\varphi$ expresses a proposition that can be characterized algebraically as the *pseudo-complement* of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, and $\varphi \vee \psi$ expresses a proposition that can be characterized algebraically as the *join* of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket$. Thus, from an algebraic perspective the treatment of negation and disjunction in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$ is entirely classical, only now the notion of meaning has an inquisitive dimension. See Roelofsen (2013a) for detailed discussion.




Figure 5: ! and ? as projection operators.

completely untouched in this case, because then the informative content would also remain intact, see Roelofsen, 2013a, for discussion).

Let us go through some concrete examples. The proposition expressed by $!\varphi$ always contains a single possibility, namely $\bigcup[\![\varphi]\!]$, the union of all the elements of $[\![\varphi]\!]$. For instance, as depicted in Figure 4(e), the unique possibility for $!(p \vee q)$ is $|p \vee q|$, the union of $|p|$ and $|q|$. This means that $!(p \vee q)$ has the same informative content as $p \vee q$, but that, unlike the latter, it is not inquisitive.

Now consider $?\varphi$. The proposition expressed by $?\varphi$ always contains all the elements of $[\![\varphi]\!]$ itself, plus the complement of $\bigcup[\![\varphi]\!]$ and all subsets thereof. For instance, as depicted in Figure 4(h), the proposition expressed by $?(p \vee q)$ contains three possibilities: $|p|$ and $|q|$, which are the possibilities for $p \vee q$, as well as $|\neg p \wedge \neg q|$, which is the complement of $|p| \cup |q|$. Notice that this indeed ensures that $?\varphi$ is never informative. Two other examples are given in Figures 4(f) and 4(g). These projection operators will play an important role in our analysis of declarative and interrogative sentences in natural language.

From natural language to $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$. Now that the basic inquisitive semantics framework is in place, we are ready to specify how the relevant types of sentences in natural language are to be translated into our logical language. Note that the framework as such does not provide any particular analysis of expressions in natural language, it only provides the formal tools to articulate and compare such analyses.

The types of sentences that we are primarily interested in are declaratives and sentential interrogatives (i.e., polar and other non-*wh*-interrogatives), possibly containing negation and/or disjunction. Following Zimmermann (2000), Pruitt (2007), Biezma (2009), Biezma and Rawlins (2012), and Roelofsen (2013b), we will think of these types of sentences as *lists*. Lists can be either declarative or interrogative, they can be either open or closed, and they contain either a single item or multiple items:⁸

- (26) *Closed declarative lists*
- a. *with a single item:* Igor speaks English \downarrow .
 - b. *with multiple items:* Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \downarrow .
- (27) *Open declarative lists*
- a. *with a single item:* Igor speaks English \uparrow .
 - b. *with multiple items:* Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \uparrow .

⁸Zimmermann (2000) is primarily concerned with non-singleton declarative lists like (26b) and (27b), while Pruitt (2007), Biezma (2009), and Biezma and Rawlins (2012) are primarily concerned with non-singleton closed interrogative lists like (28b) and singleton open interrogative lists like (29a). Roelofsen (2013b) outlines a uniform analysis of the full range of declarative and interrogative lists exemplified in (26)-(29).

- (28) *Closed interrogative lists*
- a. *with a single item:* Does Igor speak English \downarrow ?
 - b. *with multiple items:* Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ?
- (29) *Open interrogative lists*
- a. *with a single item:* Does Igor speak English \uparrow ?
 - b. *with multiple items:* Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ?

Open lists characteristically have rising intonation on the final disjunct, indicated by \uparrow , while closed lists characteristically have falling intonation on the final disjunct, indicated by \downarrow . Semantically, the characteristic property of open lists is that they leave open the possibility that none of the given list items holds. Closed lists on the other hand signal, roughly speaking, that exactly one of the given items holds.


List items are separated by disjunction, in combination with a prosodic phrase break—indicated by means of a comma—and rising intonation on the left disjunct, indicated by \uparrow . When both disjuncts are non-final, the disjunction word *or* may optionally be omitted, as long as the prosodic phrase break and the rising intonation on the left disjunct are present.

Disjunction may also occur *within* list items, but then it does not come with a prosodic phrase break and rising intonation on the left disjunct. Rather, both disjuncts are pronounced within one prosodic phrase in this case, which we indicate with hyphenation. Thus, the lists in (30) below all have a single item, containing disjunction, rather than two items separated by disjunction:

- (30) *Closed declarative:* Igor speaks English-or-French \downarrow .
- (31) *Open declarative:* Igor speaks English-or-French \uparrow .
- (32) *Closed interrogative:* Does Igor speak English-or-French \downarrow ?
- (33) *Open interrogative:* Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow ?


We adopt the semantic analysis of lists outlined in Roelofsen (2013b). Some aspects of the analysis are spelled out here in more detail than in the original proposal, while others are left out of consideration here because they are not directly relevant for the licensing of polarity particle responses.

Schematically, we assume that a list with n items has the following syntactic structure:⁹




We will refer to DECL/INT and OPEN/CLOSED as *list classifiers* and to the rest of the structure as the *body* of the list. To give a concrete example, the open interrogative in (29b), which involves two list items, is taken to have the following structure:

⁹We are abstracting away here from a number of syntactic issues which are crucial for a general account of declarative and interrogative disjunctive lists, but do not seem directly relevant for the analysis of polarity particle responses to such sentences (see, e.g., Han and Romero, 2004, and references therein, for relevant discussion).



On the other hand, the open interrogative in (33), which has a single list item containing disjunction, is taken to have the following structure:



Now let us turn to the translation of these structures into our logical language. As far as the body of a list is concerned, the translation procedure is almost entirely standard. In particular, negation is translated as \neg , and disjunction is translated as \vee , no matter whether it separates two list items or occurs within one of the list items. The only non-standard provision is that the non-inquisitive projection operator, $!$, is applied to every list item. The rationale for this is that every list item is to be seen, intuitively speaking, as one block, i.e., as contributing a single possibility to the proposition expressed by the list as a whole. This is ensured by applying $!$, which, roughly speaking, takes a set of possibilities and returns its union.

Thus, the body of a list is translated according to the rule in (34), where $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ are standard translations of $\text{item}_1, \dots, \text{item}_n$ into propositional logic:

$$(34) \quad \text{Rule for translating the body of a list:}$$

$$[\text{item}_1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or item}_n] \rightsquigarrow !\varphi_1 \vee \dots \vee !\varphi_n$$

Returning to our concrete examples above, if we translate *Igor speaks English* as p and *Igor speaks French* as q , then we get the following translations for the list bodies of (29b) and (33), respectively.

$$(35) \quad [\text{Igor speaks English}]_{\text{item}_1} \text{ or } [\text{Igor speaks French}]_{\text{item}_2} \rightsquigarrow !p \vee !q \quad (\equiv p \vee q)$$

$$(36) \quad [\text{Igor speaks English or French}]_{\text{item}_1} \rightsquigarrow !(p \vee q)$$

Now let us turn to the list classifiers. First, DECL and INT are treated semantically as *propositional modifiers*, i.e., as functions that take a proposition as their input, and deliver another proposition as their output. In type-theoretic terms, they are treated as functions of type $\langle T, T \rangle$, where T is the type of propositions. OPEN and CLOSED on the other hand, are treated as functions that take two inputs, first a proposition and then a propositional modifier, and deliver another proposition as their output. That is, they are treated as functions of type $\langle T, \langle \langle T, T \rangle, T \rangle \rangle$. It will become clear in a moment why OPEN and CLOSED are treated as having this somewhat more complex type,

rather than simply $\langle T, T \rangle$, like DECL and INT. First, we need to look at each of the classifiers in somewhat more detail.¹⁰

First consider DECL. Intuitively, the role of declarativeness is to make a list purely informative, i.e., to *eliminate inquisitiveness*. This effect can be captured straightforwardly in $\text{Inq}_{\mathcal{B}}$ by treating DECL as a function that applies the non-inquisitive projection operator ! to its input proposition \mathfrak{p} , returning $!\mathfrak{p}$. Using type-theoretic notation, this can be formulated concisely as follows:

$$(37) \quad \text{DECL} \rightsquigarrow \lambda \mathfrak{p}.!\mathfrak{p}$$

Next, consider INT. The proposal in Roelofsen (2013b) is to treat interrogativity as having two effects. First, whenever possible, it *ensures inquisitiveness*. This is done by applying a conditional variant of the ? operator, which we will denote here as $\langle ? \rangle$. If the proposition that $\langle ? \rangle$ takes as its input is not yet inquisitive, then ? is applied to it. On the other hand, if the input proposition is already inquisitive, then it is left untouched. The only case in which this procedure does *not* yield an inquisitive proposition is when the input proposition is a *tautology*, i.e., if it contains a single possibility consisting of all possible worlds. In this case $\langle ? \rangle$ has no effect. In all other cases, it delivers an inquisitive proposition.

The second effect of interrogativity proposed in Roelofsen (2013b) is that it *ensures non-informativity*, by introducing a presupposition that the actual world must be contained in at least one of the possibilities in the proposition expressed. This second effect is especially important to account for the presuppositional component of closed interrogatives (see, e.g., Karttunen and Peters, 1976; Biezma and Rawlins, 2012). However, since this presuppositional component will not be relevant for our account of polarity particle responses, we will simplify the analysis here and restrict ourselves to the first effect of interrogativity described above. Thus, we assume the following treatment of INT:

$$(38) \quad \text{INT} \rightsquigarrow \lambda \mathfrak{p}.\langle ? \rangle \mathfrak{p}$$

Now consider OPEN. As mentioned above, we take the characteristic semantic property of open lists to be that they leave open the possibility that neither of the given list items hold. For instance, both the open declarative in (27a) and the open interrogative in (29a) leave open the possibility that Igor does not speak English. This property of open lists can be captured by treating OPEN as applying the ? operator to the proposition that is generated by the body of the list.

Now, consider the effects of DECL and INT after we have applied ? to the proposition that is generated by the body of the list. On the one hand, applying ! will always yield a tautology in this case, which is clearly not a desirable result, while on the other hand, applying $\langle ? \rangle$ will never have any effect. For this reason, we will treat OPEN as *disabling* the further effects that DECL and INT may have. This is achieved by treating OPEN as a function that takes two inputs, a proposition \mathfrak{p} and a propositional modifier f , and returns the proposition $? \mathfrak{p}$, ignoring the modifier f (notice that this effect could not be achieved if OPEN were simply treated as a propositional modifier of type $\langle T, T \rangle$; this is why we assigned it a somewhat more complex type):

$$(39) \quad \text{OPEN} \rightsquigarrow \lambda \mathfrak{p}.\lambda f.? \mathfrak{p}$$

Finally consider CLOSED. The proposal in Roelofsen (2013b) is that closed lists characteristically imply that *exactly one* of the given list items holds, where in the case of a declarative this im-

¹⁰We will only use some type-theoretic terminology and notation informally here, in the meta-language. A more rigorous approach would be to extend the logical framework to an appropriate type theoretic framework. We leave this step implicit here because, on the one hand, for readers familiar with type theory it will be clear how to execute it, while on the other hand, for readers unfamiliar with type theory, it may obscure the essence of the analysis.

plication is part of the at-issue content, while in the case of an interrogative it is part of the non-at-issue/presupposed content. In order to capture this, CLOSED is treated as an *exclusive strengthening* operator, i.e., an operator that takes a proposition and, roughly speaking, removes the overlap between the possibilities that it consists of.¹¹ However, since the effects of this exclusive strengthening operator are, as far as we can see, not directly relevant for the licensing of polarity particle responses, we will again simplify the analysis here and treat CLOSED as a vacuous operator, taking as input a proposition p and a propositional modifier f , and delivering as output the proposition obtained by applying f to p .¹²

$$(40) \quad \text{CLOSED} \rightsquigarrow \lambda p.\lambda f.f(p)$$

In total there are four types of lists, each featuring a combination of two classifiers. From the treatment of the individual classifiers given above, it follows that the four types of lists are translated into our logical language as specified in (41) below, where in each case φ stands for the translation of the body of the list, obtained according to the rule in (34) above.

$$(41) \quad \text{Rules for translating lists:}$$

a.	[DECL [CLOSED [list-body]]]	\rightsquigarrow	$!\varphi$
b.	[DECL [OPEN [list-body]]]	\rightsquigarrow	$?\varphi$
c.	[INT [CLOSED [list-body]]]	\rightsquigarrow	$\langle ? \rangle \varphi$
d.	[INT [OPEN [list-body]]]	\rightsquigarrow	$?\varphi$

The rules in (34) and (41) together give a complete specification of how to translate declarative and interrogative lists in natural language into our logical language, and thereby indirectly provide a semantic analysis of such lists.

Below we provide a number of examples that are representative for the types of sentences that we are concerned with. In the translations of these examples, p stands for *Igor speaks English* and q for *Igor speaks French*. In each case we provide the direct translation and also a simpler formula that is semantically equivalent in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbf{B}}$ to the direct translation. The propositions expressed by all these simplified translations are depicted in Figure 4 on page 13.

<i>—Closed declaratives—</i>	<i>Translation:</i>	<i>Simplified:</i>
Igor speaks English \downarrow .	$!!p$	p
Igor does not speak English \downarrow .	$!!\neg p$	$\neg p$
Igor speaks English-or-French \downarrow .	$!!(p \vee q)$	$!(p \vee q)$
Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \downarrow .	$!(!p \vee !q)$	$!(p \vee q)$
<i>—Open declaratives—</i>		
Igor speaks English \uparrow .	$?!p$	$?p$
Igor does not speak English \uparrow .	$?!\neg p$	$?p$
Igor speaks English-or-French \uparrow .	$?!(p \vee q)$	$?!(p \vee q)$
Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \uparrow .	$?(!p \vee !q)$	$?(p \vee q)$

¹¹Operators of this kind have been assumed in earlier work on disjunctive questions as well (e.g., Roelofsen and van Gool, 2010; Pruitt and Roelofsen, 2011; Biezma and Rawlins, 2012), and also in work on free choice indefinites (Menéndez-Benito, 2005; Aloni, 2007), imperatives (Aloni and Ciardelli, 2013), and implicatures (e.g., Fox, 2007; Alonso-Ovalle, 2008; Balogh, 2009).

¹²Exactly the same effects would be obtained if we treated CLOSED simply as the identity function on propositions, $\lambda p.p$. However, for uniformity, we take it to have the same type as OPEN, which means that it should not just take a proposition as its input, but also a propositional modifier.

—Open interrogatives—

Does Igor speak English \uparrow ?	?!p	?p
Does Igor not speak English \uparrow ?	?!¬p	?p
Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow ?	?!(p ∨ q)	?!(p ∨ q)
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ?	?(!p ∨ !q)	?(p ∨ q)

—Closed interrogatives—

Does Igor speak English \downarrow ?	?!p	?p
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ?	!p ∨ !q	p ∨ q
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or doesn't he \downarrow ?	!p ∨ !¬p	?p
Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow , or doesn't he \downarrow ?	!(p ∨ q) ∨ !¬(p ∨ q)	?!(p ∨ q)

This concludes our overview of inquisitive semantics and the basic analysis of declarative and interrogative lists in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$ that we assume. Notice that this analysis captures the informative and inquisitive content of the various types of sentences that we are interested in, but it does not yet capture their potential to introduce *discourse referents*, which could serve as the antecedents for subsequent anaphoric expressions. We have seen in Section 2 that this aspect of meaning is crucial for an account of polarity particle responses. Thus, our next task is to enrich the basic $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$ framework, as well as the basic analysis of declarative and interrogative lists laid out above, in order to capture the anaphoric potential of the various types of initiatives.

3.3 Discourse referents

We saw in Section 2 that an account of polarity particle responses requires a semantic analysis of declaratives and interrogatives that does not only capture their informative and inquisitive content, but also their potential to introduce discourse referents, which may serve as antecedents for subsequent anaphoric expressions. It is important to note that such an analysis of declaratives and interrogatives is not only required for an account of polarity particle responses, but also for a broad class of other anaphoric expressions. To illustrate this, consider the contrast between (42), (43), and (44) below, involving the anaphoric expression *so*:

- (42) A: Is the number of planets even?
 B: I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think it's even
- (43) A: Is the number of planets odd?
 B: I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think it's odd
- (44) A: Is the number of planets even \uparrow , or odd \downarrow ?
 B: *I don't think so.

In the framework we have laid out so far, the interrogatives in (42), (43), and (44) are semantically equivalent. This is as it should be, because these interrogatives have precisely the same inquisitive (and informative) content, and this is all that propositions in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$ are intended to capture. However, the fact that the answer *I don't think so* is interpreted differently in response to (42) and (43), and is even infelicitous in response to (44), shows that there is more to the meaning of these interrogatives than their inquisitive content.¹³

¹³Note that the argument here is analogous to the classical argument for dynamic semantics based on Partee's *marble examples* (see Heim, 1982, p.21). Those examples show that there is more to the meaning of declarative sentences than their truth conditions, i.e., their informative content. Analogously, the examples given here show that there is more to the meaning of interrogative sentences than their inquisitive content.

The contrast between examples like (42)-(44) has sometimes been presented as a general argument against so-called *proposition set approaches* to the semantics of questions, which include the classical theories of Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977), and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), as well as the inquisitive semantics framework adopted here, which builds on this classical work. The argument has inspired several alternative approaches to the semantics of questions such as the categorial approach of von Stechow (1991) and Krifka (2001), among others, and the orthoalgebraic approach of Blutner (2012). We choose not to pursue a full-fledged alternative to the proposition set approach here, but rather to extend the framework laid out so far in a suitable way, taking inspiration from dynamic semantics.¹⁴

Once our analysis of declaratives and interrogatives is sufficiently fine-grained to account for the contrast between (42)-(44), we may expect that it will also allow us to account for parallel contrasts involving polarity particle responses, such as those illustrated in (45)-(47) below.

- (45) A: Is the number of planets even?
 B: Yes, it is. \rightsquigarrow it's even
 No, it isn't. \rightsquigarrow it's odd
- (46) A: Is the number of planets odd?
 B: Yes, it is. \rightsquigarrow it's odd
 No, it isn't. \rightsquigarrow it's even
- (47) A: Is the number of planets even \uparrow , or odd \downarrow ?
 B: *Yes, it is. / *No, it isn't.

However, we saw in Section 2 that polarity particle responses give rise to additional empirical challenges as well, because, unlike many other anaphoric expressions, they have the special property of being sensitive to the *polarity* of their antecedent. This is witnessed, for instance, by the contrast between (48) and (49) below.

- (48) A: Is the number of planets odd \uparrow ?
 B: No, it isn't. \rightsquigarrow it's not odd
- (49) A: Is the number of planets not even \uparrow ?
 B: No, it isn't. \rightsquigarrow it's not even

Thus, our account of declaratives and interrogatives should not only characterize which discourse referents are introduced by a given sentence, but it should also characterize these discourse referents as having either positive or negative polarity, depending on the nature of the sentence that introduces them.

To meet this requirement we will define an extension of $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$, which we call $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}^{\pm}$, where each formula φ is not only assigned the proposition $\llbracket\varphi\rrbracket$ that it is standardly assigned in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$, but also receives an additional semantic value, $\llbracket\varphi\rrbracket^{\pm}$, which determines the discourse referents that are introduced when φ is uttered.¹⁵ Since positive and negative discourse referents have to be kept

¹⁴It should be noted that the analysis of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) actually does provide a way to distinguish the interrogatives in (42)-(44), which already shows that proposition set approaches to questions are not inherently incapable of dealing with the observed contrast, as has sometimes been claimed (see, e.g., Blutner, 2012, p.240). Our approach will be especially close in spirit, though quite different in implementation and empirical coverage, to that of Aloni and van Rooij (2002), which integrates elements of the categorial approach with Groenendijk and Stokhof's partition theory in a dynamic setting. For comparison of our approach to this line of work, see Section 7.

¹⁵For simplicity, we focus on 'propositional' discourse referents here; other types of discourse referents, such as those introduced by nominal expressions, are left out of consideration.

apart, $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm$ is construed as a pair $\langle \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+, \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^- \rangle$, where both $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+$ and $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^-$ are sets of possibilities, corresponding to the positive and negative discourse referents that are introduced when φ is uttered. We say that the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+$ have positive polarity and those in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^-$ have negative polarity. Moreover, adopting a piece of terminology from Roelofsen and van Gool (2010), we say that φ *highlights* the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+$ and $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^-$.¹⁶

In order to arrive at a principled recursive definition of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm$, we have to address two questions. First, we have to specify, in pre-theoretic terms, when exactly a sentence should be taken to highlight a given possibility. And second, given an answer to this first question, we have to say, again in pre-theoretic terms, when a highlighted possibility should be taken to have positive polarity, and when it should be taken to have negative polarity.

Let us start with the first question. The general idea is that the possibilities highlighted by φ are those possibilities that are made particularly salient when φ is uttered, and thereby come to serve as highly accessible potential antecedents for subsequent anaphoric expressions. To sharpen this intuition, let us consider a number of examples, using the anaphoric expression *so* as a probe.

First, consider the simplest possible example, the basic declarative in (50a), which is represented in our logical language by the atomic formula p . The latter expresses a proposition containing a single possibility $|p|$, the set of all worlds where p is true. It is natural to assume that this possibility is made particularly salient when the sentence is uttered, and thereby becomes available as a possible antecedent for subsequent anaphoric expressions. Indeed, the anaphoric expression *so* in (50b) is naturally interpreted as making reference to this possibility. Thus, we assume that an atomic sentence p highlights the possibility $|p|$.

- (50) a. Igor speaks English.
 b. I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think he speaks English

Next, consider the polar interrogative in (51a), which is translated into our logical language as $?p$. The latter expresses a proposition containing two possibilities, $|p|$ and $|\neg p|$. It is natural to assume, however, that only $|p|$ is made particularly salient when the sentence is uttered. In an intuitive sense, this possibility is explicitly mentioned, while its complement is only implicitly introduced. This intuition is supported by the fact that *so* in (51b) can only be interpreted as making reference to $|p|$, and not to $|\neg p|$. So we assume that $?p$, just like p , highlights only the possibility $|p|$.

- (51) a. Does Igor speak English?
 b. I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think he speaks English

Now let us turn to disjunctive lists containing multiple items. There are four cases to consider, closed declaratives, open declaratives, open interrogatives, and closed interrogatives. We consider all four cases at once, because it is in comparing them that we are best able to probe their highlighting potential.

- (52) a. Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \downarrow .
 b. I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think he speaks English or French

¹⁶For transparency, we provide a two-dimensional semantics here, keeping the 'highlighting' dimension apart from the ordinary, 'propositional' dimension. In a full-fledged dynamic semantics, these dimensions of the meaning of a sentence would both be determined in an integrated way by the sentence's context change potential. However, properly spelling out such a dynamic semantics in this setting would involve certain complications (having to do in particular with the fact that we do not only need to keep track of the *common ground* of the discourse, but also of the commitments of each individual discourse participant, see Section 3.4), which would be likely to obscure the essence of our proposal. Therefore, we present a static, two-dimensional system here.

- (53) a. Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \uparrow .
 b. I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think he speaks English or French
- (54) a. Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ?
 b. I don't think so. \rightsquigarrow I don't think he speaks English or French
- (55) a. Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ?
 b. *I don't think so.

The main question is whether these lists should be taken to separately highlight the two possibilities $|p|$ and $|q|$, corresponding to the two explicitly given list items, or whether they should be taken to highlight just the union of these two possibilities, $|p \vee q|$. To choose between these two options, we have to check which of these possibilities, if any, are made available for subsequent anaphoric reference, using our probe *so*.

Notice that there is a stark contrast between (52)-(54) on the one hand, and (55) on the other. In the first three cases, the anaphoric expression is interpreted effortlessly, while in the fourth case it is infelicitous. Moreover, notice that in the first three cases, *so* is interpreted as making reference to $|p \vee q|$, rather than to $|p|$ or to $|q|$. These observations are naturally accounted for under the following two assumptions: (i) in order for the anaphoric expression *so* to be interpreted felicitously, there needs to be a *unique* most salient suitable antecedent (just like for other anaphoric expressions), and (ii) closed interrogatives with multiple items behave differently in terms of highlighting from other types of lists; in particular, while (52)-(54) highlight a single possibility, $|p \vee q|$, and thereby license anaphora, (55) highlights both $|p|$ and $|q|$ separately, and therefore does not license anaphora. The next question, then, is why closed interrogatives would behave so markedly different from the other types of lists in this respect.

Recall that (52) is represented in our logical language as $!(p \vee q)$, (53) and (54) both as $?(p \vee q)$, and (55) as $p \vee q$. That is, the first three involve a projection operator, while the fourth does not. We take it, then, that the projection operators are responsible for collapsing the two highlighted possibilities generated by the disjunction, $|p|$ and $|q|$, into a single possibility, $|p| \cup |q| = |p \vee q|$. Under this assumption, the observed contrast between closed interrogatives and the other types of lists is exactly as expected.

Now let us turn to the second question that we started out with: when should a highlighted possibility be taken to have positive polarity, and when should it be taken to have negative polarity? Here the general idea is that by default highlighted possibilities have positive polarity, unless they are introduced by a negative sentence, i.e., a sentence that has negation as its highest scoping sentential operator. Again, let us consider some examples to sharpen this intuition. In the case of atomic sentences, and negations thereof, things are straightforward: p highlights the possibility $|p|$ and since there is no negation involved, this possibility should be taken to have positive polarity; on the other hand, $\neg p$ highlights the possibility $|\neg p|$, and since in this case the sentence is clearly negative, the possibility that it highlights should be taken to have negative polarity.

Next, consider $!p$, $!\neg p$, $?p$, and $? \neg p$. In the case of $!p$ and $?p$, the highlighted possibility is $|p|$ which clearly should be marked as positive since the given sentences do not involve negation at all. In the case of $!\neg p$ and $? \neg p$, the highlighted possibility is $|\neg p|$, and this time it should be marked as negative because it is introduced by a negative sentence, $\neg p$. Notice that negation is not the highest scoping operator in $!\neg p$ and $? \neg p$. In both cases, however, the highlighted possibility $|\neg p|$ is *introduced* by $\neg p$ and subsequently left untouched by the projection operators. Therefore, it needs to be marked as negative.

Things are different when a projection operator applies to a sentence that highlights more than just one possibility, for instance in the case of $!(p \vee \neg q)$. In that case, the projection operator

collapses the two possibilities highlighted by the disjunction, $|p|$ and $|\neg q|$, into a single possibility, $|p| \cup |\neg q| = |p \vee \neg q|$. Of this possibility we can no longer say that it was introduced by a negative sentence, which means that it should be marked as positive. This is even the case if both disjuncts are negative, as for instance in $!(\neg p \vee \neg q)$.

These considerations lead to the following recursive definition of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm$:¹⁷

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket p \rrbracket^\pm &= \langle \{|p|\}, \emptyset \rangle \\ \llbracket \neg \varphi \rrbracket^\pm &= \langle \emptyset, \{\overline{\cup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm}\} \rangle \\ \llbracket \varphi \vee \psi \rrbracket^\pm &= \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^\pm \\ \llbracket !\varphi \rrbracket^\pm = \llbracket ?\varphi \rrbracket^\pm &= \begin{cases} \langle \emptyset, \{\alpha\} \rangle & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \emptyset, \{\alpha\} \rangle \\ \langle \{\cup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm\}, \emptyset \rangle & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Below we list the same range of examples that we provided above to illustrate our basic analysis of declarative and interrogative lists in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}$. Now, with the added highlighting dimension, some of the simplified translations that were given above no longer preserve the meaning of the direct translations. Below we provide the simplest translations that do preserve the meaning of the direct translation, also in the highlighting dimension. We list the set of positive and negative highlights for each sentence as well. The relevant semantic values are depicted in Figure 6, where areas with dashed borders correspond to highlighted possibilities, and \oplus and \ominus are used to mark the polarity of these possibilities.

	<i>Simplified translation:</i>	<i>Positive highlights:</i>	<i>Negative highlights:</i>
<i>—Closed declaratives—</i>			
Igor speaks English \downarrow .	p	$ p $	
Igor does not speak English \downarrow .	$\neg p$		$ \neg p $
Igor speaks English-or-French \downarrow .	$!(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \downarrow .	$!(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
<i>—Open declaratives—</i>			
Igor speaks English \uparrow .	$?p$	$ p $	
Igor does not speak English \uparrow .	$? \neg p$		$ \neg p $
Igor speaks English-or-French \uparrow .	$?!(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
Igor speaks English \uparrow , or French \uparrow .	$?(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
<i>—Open interrogatives—</i>			
Does Igor speak English \uparrow ?	$?p$	$ p $	
Does Igor not speak English \uparrow ?	$? \neg p$		$ \neg p $
Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow ?	$?!(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ?	$?(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	
<i>—Closed interrogatives—</i>			
Does Igor speak English \downarrow ?	$?p$	$ p $	
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ?	$p \vee q$	$ p , q $	
Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or doesn't he \downarrow ?	$p \vee \neg p$	$ p $	$ \neg p $
Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow , or doesn't he \downarrow ?	$!(p \vee q) \vee \neg(p \vee q)$	$ p \vee q $	$ \neg(p \vee q) $

¹⁷With slight abuse of notation, we use $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^\pm$ as shorthand for $\langle \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+ \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^+, \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^- \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^- \rangle$ and $\cup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm$ as shorthand for $\cup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^+ \cup \cup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^-$.




Figure 6: The semantic values of some simple formulas in $\text{Inq}_{\mathbb{B}}^{\pm}$.

This concludes our semantic account of declaratives and sentential interrogatives. Before moving on, let us briefly indicate how the account could be extended to *wh*-interrogatives. In the case of *wh*-interrogatives, it would be natural to assume that what is made particularly salient is, instead of one or more possibilities, an n -place *property*, where $n \geq 1$ is the number of *wh*-elements in the interrogative.¹⁸ Anticipating our account of polarity particle responses, this means that the type of objects that are made available by *wh*-interrogatives as potential antecedents for subsequent anaphoric expressions are not the right type of objects to license polarity particle responses. This, then, will account for the basic contrast between (1)-(3) noted at the outset of the paper.¹⁹

¹⁸This idea is indeed quite commonplace in the literature on the semantics of questions; see in particular the categorial approach of von Stechow (1991) and Krifka (2001), among others, the partition theory of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), and the dynamic approach of Aloni and van Rooij (2002). For comparison of our proposal to this line of work, see Section 7.

¹⁹In the domain of non-*wh*-interrogatives, there are a number of cases that we have purposely left out of consideration here. First, there are several ‘non-canonical’ types of interrogatives, like tag interrogatives and high negation polar interrogatives, exemplified in (i) and (ii):

- (i) John likes Mary, doesn’t he?
- (ii) Isn’t there a great vegetarian restaurant around here?

Our account can easily be extended to such cases in a way that yields correct predictions about polarity particle responses. To do this, both types of interrogatives need to be treated, in terms of highlighting, just like regular polar interrogatives. For instance, (i) should be taken to highlight the possibility that John likes Mary, with positive polarity, and (ii) should be taken to highlight the possibility that there is a great vegetarian restaurant around here, again with positive polarity. It remains to be explained, however, *why* these cases should be treated in this particular way. Why, for instance, should (ii) not be taken to highlight the possibility that there is *not* a great vegetarian restaurant around here, with negative polarity? A satisfactory answer to this question most likely has to involve a detailed account of the syntactic status of negation in interrogatives like (ii) (see, e.g., Holmberg, 2013, for relevant discussion). We leave this for future work.

Finally, there are sentential interrogatives that involve logical connectives other than disjunction and negation. In particular, sentential interrogatives can be conjoined and conditionalized:

- (iii) Is Bill home, and is Susan at work?

3.4 Discourse contexts and how they are updated

Having spelled out a semantic account for the relevant range of sentence types, our next task is to characterize precisely how utterances affect the discourse context. First, we specify what we take to be the relevant components of a discourse context, drawing primarily on Farkas and Bruce (2010), who in turn build on a rich tradition of previous work on discourse (Hamblin, 1971; Stalnaker, 1978; Carlson, 1983; Clark, 1992; Ginzburg, 1996; Roberts, 1996; Gunlogson, 2001; Asher and Lascares, 2003; Büring, 2003, among others).

- (56) A *discourse context* is a tuple $\langle \text{participants}, \text{table}, \text{drefs}, \text{commitments} \rangle$, where:
- a. **participants** is the set of discourse participants;
 - b. **table** is a stack of propositions, expressed in the discourse so far;
 - c. **drefs** is a stack of discourse referents; more precisely, each element of **drefs** is a set of possibilities, with positive or negative polarity, that were highlighted by one of the utterances made so far; the first element of the stack contains the most salient discourse referents, i.e., the ones introduced by the most recent utterance;
 - d. **commitments** is a function that maps every participant $x \in \text{participants}$ to a set of possibilities, those possibilities that x has publicly committed to during the discourse so far.

In terms of these basic discourse context components, several other notions may be defined. For instance, we may define the *commitment set* of a participant x , $cs(x)$, as the set of worlds that are compatible with all the possibilities that x has publicly committed to so far: $cs(x) = \bigcap \text{commitments}(x)$.

In terms of the commitment sets of all the individual participants, the *context set* of the discourse may be defined as the smallest set of possible worlds α such that all discourse participants are publicly committed to the actual world w_0 being contained in α . In other words: $cs = \bigcup_{x \in P} cs(x)$. Thus, the standard Stalnakerian notion of a context set can be derived here, but is not taken as a basic component, let alone the defining characteristic, of a discourse context. This is because, as we have seen in Section 2, in order to account for certain aspects of polarity particle responses it is important to keep track of the commitments of all the individual discourse participants.²⁰

The *initial* context of every discourse is one in which the **table** is empty, $\text{table} = \emptyset$, no discourse referents have been introduced yet, $\text{drefs} = \emptyset$, and for every discourse participant x , $\text{commitments}(x) = \{W\}$, where W denotes the set of all possible worlds. This reflects the fact that the discourse participants do not have any public discourse commitments yet, apart from the trivial commitment that w_0 is contained in W .²¹

Now that we have laid out what we take to be the relevant components of a discourse context, and what the initial context of every discourse is, the next task is to specify how utterances *affect* the discourse context.

- (57) An utterance of φ by a participant x has a three-fold effect on the discourse context:
- a. $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ is added to the **table**;
 - b. $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\pm$ is added to **drefs**;

(iv) If Vincent asks Jane out, will she accept?

Again, a detailed account of polarity particle responses to such sentences must be left for another occasion.

²⁰Independently of polarity particle responses, there are other reasons to keep track of the commitments of all the individual discourse participants as well, see Farkas and Bruce (2010).

²¹Note that discourse commitments, in our technical sense, do not include general background assumptions. Of course, such assumptions also play a crucial role in discourse but they can be disregarded for our purposes.

- c. $\text{info}(\varphi)$ is added to $\text{commitments}(x)$.

Recall that $\text{info}(\varphi)$ is defined as $\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. Also recall that if φ is a polar interrogative, then $\text{info}(\varphi)$ is always *trivial*, in the sense that it amounts to the set of all possible worlds, W . In this case, adding $\text{info}(\varphi)$ to $\text{commitments}(x)$ does not incur any real commitment on x , since clearly the actual world w_0 must be among the set of all possible worlds. By contrast, if φ is a declarative, then $\text{info}(\varphi)$ is typically non-trivial, and as a result adding $\text{info}(\varphi)$ to $\text{commitments}(x)$ does incur a real commitment on x . Thus, while the discourse effects of an utterance are characterized in a uniform way, without making reference to the syntactic properties of the uttered sentence (e.g., whether its declarative or interrogative), differences in discourse effect between sentence types result from differences in their semantics.

In putting a proposition $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ on the **table**, a discourse participant invites a response from other participants that *decides* on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, i.e., a response that determines the location of the actual world w_0 relative to the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. We distinguish between responses that decide *favorably* on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, and ones that decide *unfavorably* on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. A response that decides favorably on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ locates w_0 inside at least one of the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, while a response that decides unfavorably on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ locates w_0 outside all of the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. Put more formally:

- (58) a. A response ψ decides *favorably* on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ if and only $\text{info}(\psi) \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$;
 b. A response decides *unfavorably* on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ if and only if $\text{info}(\psi) \cap \alpha = \emptyset$ for all $\alpha \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$;
 c. A response decides on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ if and only if it decides favorably or unfavorably on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$.

If there is a possibility $\alpha \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ such that all discourse participants have publicly committed to α (which means that $cs \subseteq \alpha$), or if all discourse participants have committed to the complement of all the possibilities in $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ (which means that $cs \subseteq \bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$), then we say that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ has been *commonly decided*. If the discourse reaches a state where all the propositions on the **table** have been commonly decided, we say that the discourse is in a *stable state*.

A response that decides unfavorably on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ places the discourse in a state from which a stable state can only be reached if one of the participants retracts one of her commitments or if the participants ‘agree to disagree’ on $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, in which case the proposal is removed from the **table** without a common decision on it having been reached.

This concludes our discussion of the discourse model that we assume, a slight refinement of the model proposed by Farkas and Bruce (2010) which interfaces naturally with inquisitive semantics. With this framework in place, we are now ready to turn to polarity particle responses.

4 Polarity particle responses in English

The basic insight behind the account of polarity particles that we will develop, rooted in the work of Pope (1976), is that polarity particles may fulfill two distinct, though closely related purposes. Namely, on the one hand, they can be used to mark a response as being either *positive* or *negative*, and on the other hand, they can be used to signal how the response is related to its antecedent, in particular to signal whether the response *agrees* with or *reverses* the content and the polarity of the antecedent.

For the specific case of English, our main hypothesis will be that the particles *yes* and *no* do double duty, in the sense that they may fulfill either of the above two purposes: *yes* may be used to signal that the response is positive, or that it agrees with the antecedent possibility in terms of content and polarity, while *no* may be used to signal that the response is negative, or that it reverses the antecedent possibility in terms of content and polarity.

This double duty hypothesis provides a ready explanation for the basic pattern that we find in the distribution of polarity particles in English:

- (59) a. Positive initiative: Amy left.
 b. Agreement: Yes, she did. / *No, she did.
 c. Reversal: *Yes, she didn't. / No, she didn't.
- (60) a. Negative initiative: Amy didn't leave.
 b. Agreement: Yes, she didn't. / No, she didn't.
 c. Reversal: Yes, she DID. / No, she DID.

In an agreeing response to a positive initiative, as in (59b), *yes* can be used to mark the response either as being positive or as agreeing with the antecedent, while *no* cannot be used, since the response is neither negative nor does it reverse the antecedent. In a reversing response to a positive initiative, as in (59c), the tables are turned: now *no* can be used to mark the response either as being negative or as reversing the antecedent, while *yes* cannot be used, since the response is neither positive nor does it agree with the antecedent.

Turning now to agreeing responses to a negative initiative, as in (60a), we see that both *yes* and *no* can be used. This is expected on the account sketched above, because *yes* can be used to mark the response as agreeing with the antecedent, while *no* can be used to mark it as being negative. Similarly, in a reversing response to a negative initiative, as in (60b), *no* can be used to mark the response as reversing the antecedent, while *yes* can be used to mark it as being positive.

In the remainder of this section, this informal sketch of our account will be worked out in detail, and its predictions w.r.t. the empirical issues surveyed in Section 2 will be discussed systematically. We will also argue that the particular division of labor between the polarity particles that we find in English, i.e., having one particle to mark positive and agreeing responses, and another particle to mark negative and reversing responses, is not arbitrary.

In Section 5, we will consider a number of languages other than English. In all these languages there are three particles rather than two, which means that each particle can fulfill a more restricted purpose—in particular, unlike *yes* and *no*, most particles in these languages don't do double duty, but are specialized for marking the response either as being positive/negative or as being agreeing/reversing.

4.1 Polarity features

Following Farkas and Bruce (2010) and Farkas (2010), who in turn build on Pope (1976), we assume that polarity particles across languages function as the morphological realization of two types of polarity features, called *absolute* and *relative* features:²²


- (61) Absolute polarity features: [+], [−]
 Relative polarity features: [AGREE], [REVERSE]

An absolute polarity feature marks a response as being positive or negative. A relative polarity feature on the other hand marks a response as either agreeing with or reversing the antecedent possibility, both in terms of content and in terms of polarity. There are four possible combinations of polarity features, given in the following table:

²²In Farkas and Bruce (2010) and Farkas (2010), the first absolute polarity feature is labeled [SAME] rather than [AGREE]. We changed the label here because [AGREE] is more in line with the formal semantic treatment that we will provide for this feature. It also stays closer to the original terminology of Pope (1976).

	relation with antecedent	polarity of response
[AGREE,+]	agree	+
[AGREE,-]	agree	-
[REVERSE,+]	reverse	+
[REVERSE,-]	reverse	-

Syntactically, we assume that these polarity features are hosted by a left periphery head called Pol, which takes a clausal argument, called its *prejacent*, as in the tree below:



We assume that the prejacent may be partially or fully elided, as long as its semantic contribution can be fully recovered (how this can be done will become clear below). In particular, in the case of a bare polarity particle response, the prejacent is fully elided.²³

Semantically, we take polarity features to be purely presuppositional, in line with the standard treatment of, e.g., gender features on pronouns (Cooper, 1983; Heim and Kratzer, 1998; Sudo, 2012, among others). That is, these features perform a test on the semantic value of their prejacent. If the test is successful, they pass the semantic value of the prejacent on to the PolP node. If the test fails, the compositional process gets stuck and unacceptability results.

The absolute polarity features [+] and [-] presuppose that their prejacent expresses a proposition containing a single possibility, which is highlighted and has positive or negative polarity, respectively:

- (62) [+] presupposes that its prejacent expresses a proposition containing a single possibility α , which is highlighted and has positive polarity:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\alpha\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \{\alpha\}, \emptyset \rangle$$

- (63) [-] presupposes that its prejacent expresses a proposition containing a single possibility α , which is highlighted and has negative polarity:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\alpha\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \emptyset, \{\alpha\} \rangle$$

These features are called *absolute* precisely because they are sensitive purely to the properties of their prejacent. Their presupposition is therefore checked internally to the response.

Relative polarity features on the other hand connect the response to the foregoing discourse move. They presuppose that their prejacent highlights a unique possibility α , and that the discourse context contains a unique most salient antecedent possibility β such that α agrees with / reverses β , both in terms of content and in terms of polarity.

²³The assumption that polarity particle responses always involve a prejacent, even in the case of a bare particle response, is not really crucial for our account of English. Indeed, as far as English is concerned, our account could easily be reformulated in a way that polarity particles are treated as pure sentential anaphors (cf. Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Krifka, 2013). However, the assumption that polarity particle responses always involve a prejacent does play an important role in the analysis of the Romanian data in Section 5. Thus, to facilitate a uniform cross-linguistic account, we adopt the assumption in general, even if for English it does not seem to be strictly necessary.

- (64) [AGREE] presupposes that its prejacent highlights a unique possibility α , and that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility β such that α and β contain precisely the same possible worlds and have the same polarity.
- (65) [REVERSE] presupposes that its prejacent highlights a unique possibility α , and that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility β such that α is the complement of β and has the opposite polarity.

From this semantic treatment of the individual polarity features, it follows that the four possible feature *combinations* are interpreted as follows:²⁴

- (66) [AGREE,+] presupposes that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility α with positive polarity such that:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\alpha\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \{\alpha\}, \emptyset \rangle$$

- (67) [AGREE,-] presupposes that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility α with negative polarity such that:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\alpha\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \emptyset, \{\alpha\} \rangle$$

- (68) [REVERSE,-] presupposes that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility α with positive polarity such that:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\bar{\alpha}\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \emptyset, \{\bar{\alpha}\} \rangle$$

- (69) [REVERSE,+] presupposes that the context provides a unique most salient antecedent possibility α with negative polarity such that:

$$\llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket = \{\bar{\alpha}\}^\downarrow \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \text{prejacent} \rrbracket^\pm = \langle \{\bar{\alpha}\}, \emptyset \rangle$$

This concludes our semantic account of the polarity features.²⁵ Next, we need to specify (a) which particles can be used to realize which features, and (b) given a certain feature combination, which features are most likely to be realized. The answer to the first question is bound to be language specific. The answer to the second, however, ideally rests on universal principles. In the next subsection we approach these two questions from the perspective of English.

4.2 Realization rules

We conceive of polarity particles as lexical items that morphologically realize polarity features, in line with *Distributed Morphology* (Halle and Marantz, 1993).²⁶ Thus, we assume that syntax generates a certain combination of polarity features in the head of a Polarity Phrase, and morphological Vocabulary Insertion rules insert lexical items, namely polarity particles, that realize these features. We give two *realization rules* below, specifying which features can be realized by which particles. Further, we assume that different features and feature combinations need to be overtly realized

²⁴It does not matter in which order any given feature combination is taken to apply, i.e., whether we first apply the absolute feature and then the relative feature or the other way around. The result is always the same.

²⁵Note that, even though our account of the polarity features is made formally precise in a specific semantic framework here, its conceptual core could be imported into other frameworks as well.

²⁶Nothing crucial hinges on our specific assumptions concerning the morphology-syntax interface. A lexicalist account of polarity particles is also possible, which means that we should not be taken here as aiming to provide an argument for using Distributed Morphology against any competitors.

to various degrees, depending on the nature of the features involved. We refer to the pressure for overt realization of a feature or feature combination as its *realization needs*.

The polarity particle inventory is language specific and so are the rules connecting particular particles to particular features or feature combinations, though we will propose general principles that delimit this variation. In English, there are two polarity particles, *yes* and *no*. The realization potential of these two particles is as follows:

- (70) *Realization potential of English particles*
- a. [AGREE] and [+] can be realized by *yes*
 - b. [REVERSE] and [-] can be realized by *no*

These rules capture the sense in which polarity particles in English do double duty: each particle is used to realize both an absolute feature and a relative feature.

As a consequence of (70), the connection between the four possible feature combinations and the two polarity particles in English is as follows:

- (71) *Feature combinations and particles in English*
- a. [AGREE,+] can only be realized by *yes*
 - b. [REVERSE,-] can only be realized by *no*
 - c. [AGREE,-] can be realized by *yes* or *no*
 - d. [REVERSE,+] can be realized by *yes* or *no*

An interesting question that these realization rules for English give rise to is whether the particular clustering that they embody, i.e., having one particle for [AGREE] and [+], and another for [REVERSE] and [-], is arbitrary or has a deeper explanation. Put differently, the question is whether there would be any reason for surprise were we to encounter a language with two double duty particles where one particle realizes [AGREE] and [-] while the other realizes [REVERSE] and [+]. In a lexicalist approach the rules in (70) essentially amount to positing that *yes* is ambiguous between an [AGREE] interpretation and a [+] interpretation, while *no* is ambiguous between a [REVERSE] interpretation and a [-] interpretation. In lexicalist terms, then, the question is whether this is a case of arbitrary ambiguity or of motivated polysemy. Our answer to this question rests on general considerations concerning the various realization needs of particular features and feature combinations, to which we turn now.

4.3 Realization needs and markedness scales

Given a certain feature combination, what factors determine which features are to be realized? We base our answer to this question on two traditional observations, namely that features are distinguished with respect to markedness, and that the more marked a feature is the stronger the pressure is for it to be overtly realized. The overall system we have in mind could be expressed in optimality theoretic terms making use of an interplay between economy constraints, militating for leaving features implicit, and faithfulness constraints sensitive to markedness considerations, militating for overt expression of features. We stay here at an informal level for the sake of simplicity, and talk about markedness affecting the ‘realization needs’ of features.

The markedness distinctions within and across polarity features we propose below are rooted in insightful observations in Pope (1976). We start with markedness contrasts between polarity features that are of the same type, i.e., either absolute or relative, and propose the scales in (72), where < separates a less marked feature from a more marked one:

(72) *Absolute and relative markedness scales*

- a. $[+] < [-]$
- b. $[\text{AGREE}] < [\text{REVERSE}]$

The feature $[-]$ is more marked than $[+]$ because it marks the prejacent as being negative, and negative expressions are more marked than positive ones (see Horn, 2001, among others, for discussion). The feature $[\text{REVERSE}]$ is more marked than $[\text{AGREE}]$ because complementation is a more complex relation than identity.

Given the assumption we made above concerning the connection between markedness and overt realization of features, the scales in (72) give rise to the following typological predictions:

- (73)
- a. Languages may have a specialized $[-]$ particle in the absence of a specialized $[+]$ particle. The opposite situation is less likely to occur.
 - b. Languages may have a specialized $[\text{REVERSE}]$ particle in the absence of a specialized $[\text{AGREE}]$ particle. The opposite situation is less likely to occur.

Latin and Irish are examples of languages that lack a dedicated particle expressing either $[\text{AGREE}]$ or $[+]$ but have a particle expressing $[\text{REVERSE}]$ or $[-]$. We will see in the next section that Romanian and Hungarian have a dedicated $[\text{REVERSE}]$ particle but no dedicated $[\text{AGREE}]$ particle.

Another immediate consequence of the markedness scales in (72) is that the features $[\text{AGREE}]$ and $[+]$ form a natural class, as do the features $[\text{REVERSE}]$ and $[-]$. This is so because $[\text{AGREE}]$ and $[+]$ are the two unmarked features on their respective scales, while $[\text{REVERSE}]$ and $[-]$ are the two marked features. We thus have the two natural classes in (74):

- (74)
- a. Unmarked polarity features: $[\text{AGREE}]$, $[+]$
 - b. Marked polarity features: $[\text{REVERSE}]$, $[-]$

Another reason that $[\text{AGREE}]$ and $[+]$ form one natural class, and $[\text{REVERSE}]$ and $[-]$ another, has to do with the unmarked nature of positive initiatives. An $[\text{AGREE}]$ response to such an initiative is $[+]$, while a $[\text{REVERSE}]$ response is $[-]$.

Returning now to the issue of the two features that can be realized by each hard working polarity particle in English, we see that the fact that *yes* realizes $[\text{AGREE}]$ and $[+]$ while *no* realizes $[\text{REVERSE}]$ and $[-]$ is not an arbitrary fact. This is precisely what we expect in case a language decided to make do with two polarity particles to encode a four way contrast: one particle realizes the two unmarked features, the other the two marked ones. This provides a rationale for the realization rules we proposed for English, and leads us to expect that other languages with double duty polarity particle systems would exhibit the same pattern.²⁷ In lexicalist terms, *yes* and *no* are polysemous in our view rather than arbitrarily ambiguous.

Now let us return to the factors that determine the relative markedness of particular features or feature combinations. Besides the scales in (72), there are various other such factors. First, we consider the relative markedness of $[\text{REVERSE}]$ responses depending on whether they target an assertion or a question. A $[\text{REVERSE}]$ response to an assertion is more marked than a $[\text{REVERSE}]$ response to a question because, as discussed in Section 2, the former, unlike the latter, is bound to lead to a conversational crisis.

(75) *Reversal scale*
assertion reversal $>$ question reversal

²⁷Of course we do not rule out a language like Japanese, for instance, which has two polarity particles realizing the two relative polarity features, and no particles realizing the absolute polarity features.

As foreshadowed by the empirical discussion in Section 2, this scale will be crucial in accounting for the details of polarity particle distribution in Romanian, and also in Hungarian.

Next, we note that absolute polarity features in [REVERSE] responses have a special status in that they always *contrast* with the polarity of their antecedent possibility. We therefore posit (76):

(76) *Contrastive markedness*

Absolute polarity features in [REVERSE] responses are marked because they contrast with the polarity of their antecedent.

One important consequence of these observations is that [REVERSE,+] responses involve two sources of markedness: [REVERSE] is marked relative to [AGREE], and [+] is marked because it is contrastive in the presence of [REVERSE]. Thus, both features have high realization needs. In addition, because the combination of these two features does not form a natural class, languages like English cannot use one of their double duty particles to realize both features at once. The most natural way to express a [REVERSE,+] response in English is as in (77), with an explicit preajacent that carries verum focus on the verb, encoding the contrastive absolute polarity of the response, combined with either *yes*, realizing the contrastive [+] feature, or *no*, realizing [REVERSE]:

(77) A: Peter didn't call.

B: Yes, he DID. / No, he DID.

The three markedness factors specified in (72), (75), and (76) together result in the following overall markedness scale for the four possible polarity feature combinations:

(78) *Overall markedness scale*

[AGREE,+] < [REVERSE,-] < [AGREE,-] < [REVERSE,+]

[AGREE,+] and [REVERSE,-] are less marked than [AGREE,-] and [REVERSE,+] because the former involve feature combinations that form a natural class. [AGREE,+] is less marked than [REVERSE,-] because [AGREE] and [+] are both relatively unmarked and [+] is not contrastive in the presence of [AGREE], while [REVERSE] and [-] are both relatively marked and [-] is contrastive in the presence of [REVERSE]. Finally, [AGREE,-] is less marked than [REVERSE,+] because [AGREE] is relatively unmarked and [-] is non-contrastive in the presence of [AGREE], while [REVERSE] is relatively marked and [+] is contrastive in the presence of [REVERSE]. We therefore expect [REVERSE,+] responses to have a special status. We've already seen that they do in English, where such responses require an overt preajacent bearing contrastive focus on the verb, marking the contrastive absolute polarity of the response. In Section 5 we will see that other languages employ different strategies to satisfy the high realization needs of the [REVERSE,+] feature combination and present further support for the typological predictions made here.

4.4 Back to the data

We now show that our semantic treatment of polarity features, the realization rules in (70), and the markedness scales discussed above, account for the distribution and interpretation of polarity particle responses in English, addressing in particular the issues that were raised in Section 2.

Basic cases. We start with responses to simple assertions and polar questions. In [AGREE,+] responses to such initiatives, exemplified in (79), *yes* is licensed while *no* is unacceptable:

- (79) A: Peter called. / Did Peter call?
 B: Yes, he did. / *No, he did. [AGREE,+]

This is predicted because *yes* can realize either [AGREE] or [+], while *no* cannot realize any of these two features. The opposite pattern is found, and predicted, in [REVERSE,-] responses, where *no* can realize both features while *yes* cannot realize either:

- (80) A: Peter called. / Did Peter call?
 B: *Yes, he didn't. / No, he didn't. [REVERSE,-]

In [AGREE,-] responses, both *yes* and *no* are licensed:²⁸

- (81) A: Peter didn't call. / Did Peter not call?
 B: Yes, he didn't. / No, he didn't. [AGREE,-]

This is predicted because *yes* can realize [AGREE] and *no* can realize [-]. Moreover, given our markedness considerations we expect that, other things being equal, there will be a preference for *no* in such responses given that [-] is a marked feature and [AGREE] is not. This prediction has been confirmed experimentally, at least for simple cases like (81), in Brasoveanu *et al.* (2013).

In [REVERSE,+] responses, again both *yes* and *no* are licensed:

- (82) A: Peter didn't call. / Did Peter not call?
 B: Yes, he DID. / No, he DID. [REVERSE,+]

This is predicted, because *no* can realize [REVERSE] and *yes* can realize [+]. Moreover, the obligatory contrastive stress on the auxiliary verb in the prejacent is explained by the special contrastive nature of the absolute polarity feature in this type of response.

Now consider a case in which *yes* and *no* come with an explicit continuation that agrees with the antecedent possibility in content but not in polarity. In this case, only *yes* is licensed.

- (83) A: Susan failed the exam. / Did Susan fail the exam?
 B: Yes, she did not pass. / *No, she did not pass.

Note that the given continuation *cannot* be construed as the prejacent of the polarity particles in this case. This is because it would be impossible to satisfy the presuppositions of any feature combination taking the given continuation as its prejacent, since the continuation agrees with the antecedent possibility in *content* but not in *polarity*. So, for the responses in (83) to be felicitous at all, the particles must be construed as having a fully elided prejacent, and the explicitly given continuation must be taken to form a separate clause.

Now, since the antecedent possibility has positive polarity, the only possible feature combinations for the response are [AGREE,+] and [REVERSE,-]. The former would confirm that Susan failed the exam and would therefore be compatible with the explicitly given continuation. The latter, however, would convey that Susan passed the exam and would therefore not be compatible with the given continuation. Thus, assuming that the responder does not intend to contradict herself, the only possible feature combination for the response is [AGREE,+], and therefore it is predicted that the only possible particle is *yes*.

On the other hand, if the antecedent possibility has negative polarity, it is correctly predicted that both *yes* and *no* are licensed.

²⁸It seems that, at least for some speakers, *yeah* is more natural than *yes* in this type of response, and the particle combination *yeah no* is also acceptable. Further empirical work is needed, however, to corroborate this.

- (84) A: Susan did not pass the exam. / Did Susan not pass the exam?
 B: Yes, she failed. / No, she failed.

Finally, we note that polarity particle responses to *wh*-questions are correctly predicted to be unacceptable, given that such questions do not highlight one or more possibilities, but rather an *n*-place property, where $n \geq 1$ is the number of *wh*-elements. As such, *wh*-questions do not provide the type of antecedent that is needed to license polarity particle responses.

Bare particle responses to negative initiatives. Now let us consider bare particle responses to negative initiatives:

- (85) A: Peter didn't call. / Did Peter not call?
 B: ?Yes. / ?No.

Recall the experimental results from Kramer and Rawlins (2012) that we discussed in Section 2. For convenience, we repeat the main generalizations that these results give rise to:

- (86) *Generalizations from felicity judgments:*

- F1: Bare particle responses to negative polar questions are less felicitous than truthful bare particle responses to positive polar questions.
 F2: In response to negative polar questions, bare *yes* and bare *no* are both less felicitous when the context is positive than when the context is negative.

- (87) *Generalizations from truth value judgments:*

- T1: Bare particle responses to negative polar questions are ambiguous. They are interpreted much more equivocally than bare particle responses to positive polar questions.
 T2: In response to a negative polar question of the form $? \neg p$, both *yes* and *no* are more often interpreted as confirming $\neg p$ than as rejecting $\neg p$.

Our theory accounts for these generalizations as follows. First, notice that a positive polar question, $?p$, licenses [AGREE,+] and [REVERSE,-] responses, while a negative polar question, $? \neg p$, licenses [AGREE,-] and [REVERSE,+] responses. Our realization rules say that *yes* can realize [AGREE] and [+], while *no* can realize [REVERSE] and [-]. This means that bare particle responses to positive polar questions are predicted to be unambiguous: *yes* can only be interpreted as an [AGREE,+] response, confirming p , while *no* can only be interpreted as a [REVERSE,-] response, rejecting p . However, bare particle responses to negative polar questions are predicted to be ambiguous: *yes* may be interpreted as an [AGREE,-] response, confirming $\neg p$, but it may also be interpreted as a [REVERSE,+] response, rejecting $\neg p$. And the same is true for *no*. This explains the fact that bare particle responses to negative polar questions are less felicitous than bare particle responses to positive polar questions, as well as the mixed truth value judgments in the case of negative polar questions (generalizations F1 and T1).

Second, in a positive context the *correct* response to a negative polar question is a [REVERSE,+] response. In this case an explicit preajcent is needed in order to signal the contrastive absolute polarity of the response. So there is additional pressure for an explicit preajcent, independent from the need to disambiguate. On the other hand, in a negative context the correct response to a negative polar question is an [AGREE,-] response. In this case there is no pressure for an explicit preajcent, apart from the need to disambiguate. This explains why, in response to negative polar questions, both bare *yes* and bare *no* are less felicitous when the context is positive than when the context is negative (generalization F2).

Finally, the fact that [REVERSE,+] responses come with additional pressure for an explicit prejacent, unlike [AGREE,-] responses, also implies that if the responder does *not* provide an explicit prejacent, then, other things being equal, it is more likely that her response is to be interpreted as an [AGREE,-] response than as a [REVERSE,+] response. This explains why bare *yes* and bare *no* responses to a negative polar question $? \neg p$ are more often interpreted as an [AGREE,-] response, i.e., as confirming $\neg p$, than as a [REVERSE,+] response, i.e., as rejecting $\neg p$ (generalization T2).

Disjunctive lists. Now let us consider polarity particle responses to declarative and interrogative disjunctive lists. There are four types of lists to consider: closed declaratives, open declaratives, open interrogatives, and closed interrogatives. As far as polarity particle responses are concerned, closed declarative lists with multiple list items behave exactly the same as ones with a single list item, which amount to simple declarative sentences like the ones in (79)-(82) above. Moreover, open declarative lists behave exactly the same as open interrogative lists in this respect. For this reason we will not exemplify the predictions of our account for these two types of lists explicitly, and focus on the remaining two types: open and closed interrogatives.

Let us first consider cases where both disjuncts are positive; after that we will look at the case where one of the disjuncts is negative (cases where both disjuncts are negative behave just like ones where both disjuncts are positive). We start with the following well-known contrast:²⁹

- (88) A: Does Igor speak English-or-French \uparrow ? ?!($p \vee q$)
 B: Yes. / Yes, he speaks English. / No. / No, he doesn't.
- (89) A: Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \downarrow ? $p \vee q$
 B: *Yes. / *Yes, he speaks English. / *No. / *No, he doesn't.

The propositions that these interrogatives are taken to express on our account and the possibilities that they are taken to highlight are depicted in Figure 6 on page 24. The contrast is explained as follows. The interrogative in (88) highlights a single possibility, $|p \vee q|$, with positive polarity. Therefore, it licenses an [AGREE,+] response and a [REVERSE,-] response. In the former type of response, *yes* can be used to realize either of the two features, while in the latter type of response, *no* can be used to do so. This explains the fact that both *yes* and *no* are licensed, and also that they are interpreted as confirming or disconfirming, respectively, that Igor speaks English or French.

On the other hand, the interrogative in (89) highlights two possibilities, $|p|$ and $|q|$, both with positive polarity. This means that it does not provide a unique positive antecedent possibility, nor a unique negative antecedent possibility, which would be needed to satisfy the presuppositions of any of the four possible feature combinations in responses. This explains why neither *yes* nor *no* are licensed in this case.

Next, consider an open interrogative list with two list items, still both positive:

- (90) *Context: Amalia wants to write a letter to Igor, who is Russian. She doesn't speak Russian, so she would like to know whether Igor speaks any other languages that she could write in.*
- A: Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or French \uparrow ? ?($p \vee q$)
 B: #Yes. / Yes, he speaks English. / No. / No, he doesn't.

Roelofsen and van Gool (2010) observe that, while a bare *yes* response is not satisfactory in reaction

²⁹This contrast has been accounted for in several ways in previous work (see, e.g., Krifka, 2001; Aloni and van Rooij, 2002; Roelofsen and van Gool, 2010; Pruitt and Roelofsen, 2011). However, these proposals do not satisfactorily account for the other disjunctive cases to be discussed below, nor do they account for the basic contrasts between positive and negative initiatives exemplified in (79)-(82) above.

to this type of interrogative, a bare *no* response is fine. We added the observation that, even though *yes* is not acceptable as a bare particle response, it is fine when accompanied by a sentence that explicitly confirms one of the given disjuncts.³⁰ Notice that there is a two-way contrast between the open interrogative in (90) and the closed interrogative in (89). First, while the former licenses a *no* response, the latter doesn't. And second, while the former licenses a *yes* response provided that the particle is accompanied by a sentence that explicitly confirms one of the given disjuncts, the latter does not license *yes* responses at all, even if the particle is accompanied by a sentence explicitly confirming one of the disjuncts.

How can all this be explained? First of all, the interrogative in (90), translated into our logical language as $?(p \vee q)$, highlights a single possibility, $|p \vee q|$, with positive polarity. This means that it licenses an [AGREE,+] response and a [REVERSE,-] response. In the first case, *yes* can be used to realize either of the polarity features, and in the second case, *no* can be used to do so. However, there is an asymmetry between these two responses. To see this, we need to consider the proposition expressed by $?(p \vee q)$, which is $\{|p|, |q|, |\neg(p \vee q)|\}^\downarrow$. This proposition embodies an issue which can be resolved by locating the actual world in either one of the three given possibilities, $|p|$, $|q|$, and $|\neg(p \vee q)|$. Now, a bare *no* response conveys, by virtue of the semantics of the [REVERSE,-] feature combination, that the actual world is located in the third possibility, $|\neg(p \vee q)|$. On the other hand, a bare *yes* response conveys, by virtue of the semantics of the [AGREE,+] feature combination, that the actual world is located in $|p \vee q|$. However, it does not determine whether the actual world is located in $|p|$ or in $|q|$, and therefore it does not resolve the issue that is raised by the interrogative. This is why a bare *yes* response, in contrast with a bare *no* response, is not satisfactory.

However, if *yes* is accompanied by a sentence that explicitly locates the actual world either in $|p|$ or in $|q|$, then the response does become satisfactory. Crucially, while a plain *yes* response is ruled out both in (90) and in (89), it is ruled out in these two cases for *different reasons*. In the case of (90), it is unsatisfactory because it does not resolve the issue expressed by the interrogative, a shortcoming that can be overcome by appending a sentence providing suitable additional information. In the case of (89), however, it is ruled out because its presuppositions are not met, and this cannot be overcome by appending a sentence providing additional information.

Now let us turn to closed interrogatives with one positive and one negative disjunct:

- (91) A: Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or doesn't he \downarrow ? $p \vee \neg p$
 B: *Yes. / Yes, he does. / ?Yes, he doesn't.
 *No. / No, he doesn't. / ?No, he DOES.

Krifka (2001) observes that such interrogatives do not license bare polarity particle responses, but that they do license particle responses with a suitable explicit prejacent, like *Yes, he does* and *No, he doesn't*.³¹ We add the observation that responses like *No, he DOES* and *Yes, he doesn't* also seem to be marginally acceptable, though less natural than the ones considered by Krifka.³²

This is accounted for as follows. The interrogative highlights two possibilities, $|p|$ and $|\neg p|$, the first with positive polarity and the second with negative polarity. Now, first consider a bare *no* response. Such a response could involve either of the following feature combinations:

³⁰This additional observation is not accounted for by the proposal of Roelofsen and van Gool (2010), nor, to the best of our knowledge, by any other previous proposal.

³¹This contrast is observed but not accounted for in Krifka (2001), nor, to the best of our knowledge, by any other previous proposal. Krifka's (2001) approach predicts that polarity particle responses to questions like (91) are unacceptable across the board.

³²It seems that *Yeah, he doesn't* is somewhat more natural than *Yes, he doesn't* in this context, just like in response to a simple negative declarative or interrogative, see footnote 28. More in-depth empirical work on the apparent subtle differences between *yeah* and *yes* must be left for future work.

[AGREE,-]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor doesn’t speak English’
[REVERSE,-]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor doesn’t speak English’
[REVERSE,+]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor does speak English’

Thus, depending on the feature combination involved, the response may either be intended to signal that Igor does speak English or that he doesn’t. This pernicious ambiguity accounts for the infelicity of a bare *no* response. On the other hand, if the particle is accompanied by an explicit prejacent that resolves the ambiguity, then the response is predicted to be felicitous. Notice that our account also predicts that in the case of a [REVERSE,+]
response, i.e., if the prejacent of *no* signals that Igor does speak English, then it has to come with verum focus: *No, he DOES (*does)*.

Now consider a bare *yes* response. Such a response could involve either of the following feature combinations:

[AGREE,+]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor does speak English’
[AGREE,-]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor doesn’t speak English’
[REVERSE,+]	↔ interpretation: ‘Igor does speak English’

Again, the different possible feature combinations result in different interpretations, and this pernicious ambiguity accounts for the infelicity of a bare *yes* response. If the particle is accompanied by an explicit prejacent that resolves the ambiguity, then the response is again predicted to be felicitous. In this case, if the prejacent signals that Igor does speak English, it does not necessarily have to come with verum focus. This is because, given that the particle is *yes* rather than *no* in this case, such a response can be taken to involve the feature combination [AGREE,+], whose absolute feature does not contrast with the polarity of the antecedent possibility.

Finally, let us consider the fact that the responses *No, he DOES* and *Yes, he doesn’t* seem less natural than the ones considered by Krifka. This does not follow from anything we have said explicitly so far, but we do think that our framework provides a natural explanation. Namely, given our markedness considerations, it is reasonable to make the following assumption:

(92) *Markedness and choice of feature combination*

If a response is in principle compatible with several polarity feature combinations, then the default preference is to assume the least marked feature combination.

A response to (91) to the effect that Igor does speak English could in principle be characterized either as an [AGREE,+]
response, confirming the positive disjunct, or as a [REVERSE,+]
response, reversing the negative disjunct. [AGREE,+]
is less marked than [REVERSE,+]; in fact, these two feature combinations are on opposite sides of the overall markedness scale in (78). Thus, the default preference is to characterize the response as an [AGREE,+]
response, which means that *yes* is the preferred particle in this case. This explains the marginal status of *No, he DOES*.

Similarly, a response to (91) to the effect that Igor does *not* speak English could in principle be characterized either as a [REVERSE,-]
response, reversing the positive disjunct, or as an [AGREE,-]
response, confirming the negative disjunct. Since [REVERSE,-]
is less marked than [AGREE,-], the default preference is to characterize the response as a [REVERSE,-]
response, which means that *no* is the preferred particle in this case. This explains the marginal status of *Yes, he doesn’t*.³³

³³We would like to mention an interesting empirical contrast here, between interrogatives like the one in (91) and ones where the second disjunct is simply *or not*. It seems to us that the latter, unlike the former, generally do license

Summary and outlook. This concludes our account of polarity particle responses in English. We have argued that, at the morpho-syntactic level, the role of polarity particles is to realize two types of polarity features, absolute and relative features, which are hosted by the head of a polarity phrase. Crucial to our account is the semantics of these features, which we take to be universal. The absolute features, [+] and [−], presuppose that their prejacent is either positive or negative. The relative features, [AGREE] and [REVERSE], presuppose that their prejacent either agrees with or reverses its antecedent, both in terms of content and in terms of polarity. What we take to be language specific is the polarity particle repertoire and the rules that govern which particles can be used to realize which features. Finally, we argued that certain polarity features or feature combinations are semantically/pragmatically more marked than others. These markedness considerations, together with the assumption that morphological markedness tends to parallel semantic/pragmatic markedness, yield certain predictions, not only concerning the distribution and interpretation of polarity particles within a particular language, but also more generally concerning the kind of polarity particle systems that we expect to find cross-linguistically.

Thus, besides providing a concrete account of polarity particle responses in English, our analysis also brings out (i) what we take to be the common core of polarity particle systems across languages, namely the two types of polarity features and their semantics, (ii) what we take to be the source of variation across languages, namely the particle inventory and the realization rules, and (iii) how we expect this variation to be constrained across languages, namely by the general principle that more marked features or feature combinations are more likely than less marked features or feature combinations to be overtly realized and to be associated with a specialized particle, i.e., a particle that can realize *that* feature or feature combination and no others.

In Section 5, we turn to a preliminary exploration of these typological predictions, by considering a number of languages that differ from English in interesting ways. After that, in Section 6, we will briefly return to English to show that our markedness considerations do not only shed light on polarity particle responses as such, but also help to explain certain contextual restrictions on the felicitous usage of discourse initiatives that elicit such responses.

5 Polarity particles cross-linguistically: a preliminary exploration

We have argued that in English, the two polarity particles *yes* and *no* do double duty, in that each is called upon to realize both an absolute and a relative polarity feature. On our account,

bare polarity particle responses:

- A: Does Igor speak English \uparrow , or not \downarrow ?
 B: Yes. / No.

One way to account for this contrast would be to assume that interrogatives of the form ‘ φ or not’ are like tag interrogatives in that they only highlight the possibility highlighted by φ itself. At first sight, it indeed seems quite plausible to treat *or not* as a kind of tag. However, two immediate challenges would arise under this assumption, namely to explain why *or not* interrogatives, unlike run-of-the-mill tag interrogatives, (i) exhibit auxiliary inversion and (ii) can be embedded:

- (i)
 - a. Does Igor speak English, or not?
 - b. *Does Igor speak English, doesn’t he?
- (ii)
 - a. Mary knows whether Igor speaks English or not.
 - b. *Mary knows that/whether Igor speaks English, doesn’t he.

We must leave a detailed analysis of tag interrogatives, *or not* interrogatives, and the polarity particle responses that they license, for future work.

then, English uses the strategy of economizing on the inventory of polarity particles by endowing them with strong expressive power. An alternative strategy is to utilize a larger particle inventory allowing more specialization for each particle. Such a strategy would reduce polysemy at the expense of particle inventory. A minimally different system from this point of view would be one with three polarity particles rather than two, and in this section we will consider a number of languages that exhibit precisely such a system, namely Romanian, Hungarian, French, and German.

Given our general markedness principle, we expect that such languages divide the labor among their richer particle inventory in such a way that polarity features or feature combinations that are relatively marked are most likely to be realized by a specialized particle. In line with this expectation, three of the four languages that we will consider, Romanian, Hungarian, and French, have a designated particle for one of the marked features, [-]. Moreover, two of the four languages, Romanian and Hungarian, also have a designated particle for the other marked feature, [REVERSE]. The other two languages, French and German, have a designated particle for the most marked feature *combination*, [REVERSE,+].

Given our ‘compositional’ characterization of [REVERSE,+] responses as involving the two basic polarity features [REVERSE] and [+], we expect that in languages with a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle, this particle could either be based on an adversative morpheme connected to expressing a [REVERSE] move, or on an emphatic [+] particle expressing contrastive [+]. We indeed find these two possibilities instantiated in French and German. The former has a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle that is based on an emphatic [+] marker, while the latter has a [REVERSE,+] particle that is based on an adversative discourse particle.³⁴

Besides these general characteristics, the polarity particle systems found in Romanian, Hungarian, French and German also have a number of more specific properties that are of interest in light of our markedness considerations. In Section 5.1 we provide a more in-depth discussion of the two languages that have a dedicated [REVERSE] particle, Romanian and Hungarian; in Section 5.2 we turn to the language that have a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle, French and German.

5.1 A dedicated [reverse] particle: Romanian and Hungarian

We first present the Romanian data in some detail, and then summarize the relevant Hungarian facts, focusing on the areas where the two languages contrast. The discussion here is based on Farkas (2009, 2010, 2011).

Romanian. The polarity particle inventory of Romanian contains a positive particle *da*, a morpheme of Slavic origin, a negative particle *nu*, from the older Latin vocabulary, which is identical to verbal negation, and a third particle, of South Slavic origin, *ba*, which, we claim, realizes [REVERSE].

As a first step toward determining which features each of these particles is called upon to realize, note that in [AGREE,+] responses *da* is possible, and *nu* is not:

- (93) [AGREE,+]
 A: Paul a telefonat./A telefonat Paul? ‘Paul called./Did Paul call?’
 B: Da/*Nu, (a telefonat). ‘Yes/*No (he called).’

In [REVERSE,+] responses we see the third particle in action, followed by *da*; *nu* cannot occur in such responses:

³⁴Swedish and Danish are like French in that they have a [REVERSE,+] particle based on a positive polarity particle.

- (94) [REVERSE,+]
 A: Paul nu a telefonat./Nu a telefonat Paul? ‘P did not call./Did P not call?’
 B: Ba da/*Nu, (a telefonat). ‘Yes, he DID.’

In (95) and (96) we give the relevant data for [−] responses, where we see *nu* used:

- (95) [AGREE,−]
 A: Paul nu a telefonat./Nu a telefonat Paul? ‘P did not call./Did P not call?’
 B: Nu/*Da, (nu a telefonat). ‘No, (he didn’t call).’
- (96) [REVERSE,−]
 A: Paul a telefonat./A telefonat Paul? ‘Paul called./Did Paul call?’
 B: Nu, (nu a telefonat)./*Da, nu a telefonat. ‘No, (he didn’t call).’

Based on what we have seen so far we conclude that the realization potential of the polarity particles in Romanian is as follows:

- (97) *Realization potential of Romanian particles*
- a. [+] is realized by *da*
 - b. [−] is realized by *nu*
 - c. [REVERSE] is realized by *ba*

The rules above capture the observed distribution of the particles: *da* occurs only in [+] responses, *nu* occurs only in [−] responses, and *ba* occurs only in [REVERSE] responses. The similarity between Romanian *da* and English *yes* on the one hand, and Romanian *nu* and English *no* on the other, is that the first pair is used to realize [+] and the second, to realize [−]. The contrast between the two pairs in each language is that the Romanian particles are specialized for realizing absolute polarity features, while their English counterparts are used to realize relative features as well. Thus, in Romanian [AGREE,−] responses only *nu* is possible, while we have seen that in English both *yes* and *no* are allowed in such responses, realizing [AGREE] and [−], respectively.

Borrowing terminology from morphology, Romanian uses an ‘analytic’ strategy when it comes to the expression of polarity features, while English uses a ‘synthetic’ one. Thus, the polarity particle inventory in Romanian is richer than in English and this richness allows each particle to be more narrowly specialized for the polarity feature it realizes, thereby avoiding polysemy. This is the type of give and take between lexicon size and semantic specialization within a narrow semantic field that we see elsewhere in languages as well. To exemplify from the realm of kinship terms, English has two lexical items to encode sibling relations, differentiating them by gender but not by relative age: *brother* and *sister*. In Hungarian, on the other hand, there is a further lexical differentiation depending on relative age: *nővér*, for ‘older sister’, *húg* for ‘younger sister’, *báty* for ‘older brother’, and *öccs* for ‘younger brother’. English thus sacrifices semantic precision, and allows *brother* and *sister* to be polysemous with regard to relative age for the sake of lexical economy, while Hungarian opts for the opposite choice. This is parallel to what we found in the realm of polarity particles, where English is lexically parsimonious while Romanian favors specialization at the expense of parsimony.

Let us now turn to the more complex question of which features need to be realized in Romanian. In (98) we see that the [REVERSE] particle *ba* is not acceptable as a bare particle response, unlike *da* and *nu*. This particle must be accompanied either by the appropriate polarity particle or by a preadjacent whose verb phrase expresses whether the response is positive or negative:

- (98) A: Paul nu a telefonat. ‘Paul did not call.’
 B: *Ba. / Ba da, (a telefonat). / Ba, a telefonat. ‘Yes, he DID.’

- (99) A: Paul a telefonat. ‘Paul called.’
 B: *Ba. / Ba nu, (nu a telefonat). / Ba, nu a telefonat. ‘No, he didn’t.’

We can capture these facts by adopting the following realization rule:

- (100) *Realization needs of absolute polarity features in Romanian*
 Absolute polarity features have to be overtly realized in Romanian, either by an appropriate polarity particle or by an explicit prejacent.

Note that this rule can only be stated in this way under the assumption, which we adopted here, that polarity phrases always involve a prejacent, which may or may not be elided.³⁵

We now turn to the details of the realization of [REVERSE] in different types of responses. We will see that our markedness considerations are crucial in accounting for the contrasts that we find. First, we note that in [REVERSE,+] responses, [REVERSE] is obligatorily realized, whether the initiative is an assertion or a question:

- (101) [REVERSE,+]
 A: Paul nu a telefonat./Nu a telefonat Paul? ‘P did not call./Did P not call?’
 B: Ba (da)/*Da/*Nu, (a telefonat). ‘Yes, he DID.’

On the other hand, in [REVERSE,-] responses, [REVERSE] is optionally realized if the response targets an assertion, and never realized if the response targets a question:

- (102) [REVERSE,-] in reactions to assertions
 A: Paul a telefonat. ‘Paul called.’
 B: (Ba) nu, (nu a telefonat). ‘No, he didn’t.’
- (103) [REVERSE,-] in reactions to questions
 A: A telefonat Paul? ‘Did Paul call?’
 B: *Ba nu/Nu, (nu a telefonat). ‘No, he didn’t.’

These observations reveal that [REVERSE] has the following realization needs in Romanian:

- (104) *Realization needs of [REVERSE] in Romanian*
- a. [REVERSE] is always realized in [REVERSE,+] responses
 - b. [REVERSE] is optionally realized in [REVERSE,-] responses to assertions
 - c. [REVERSE] is never realized in [REVERSE,-] responses to questions

Note that these realization needs are in line with our markedness principle, since [REVERSE,+] responses are more marked than [REVERSE,-] responses, and assertion reversal is more marked than question reversal. It would be unexpected, for instance, to find a language where the [REVERSE] feature is obligatorily realized in [REVERSE,-] responses but not in [REVERSE,+] responses, or one where the [REVERSE] feature is optionally realized in [REVERSE,-] question reversals but not in [REVERSE,-] assertion reversals.

In (105) we put together the rules that characterize the realization needs of absolute and relative polarity features in Romanian:

³⁵It is not strictly impossible to capture this connection without the assumption that polarity phrases always involve a prejacent. But it is, in our view, most naturally captured under the assumption that they do.

(105) *Realization needs of absolute and relative polarity features in Romanian*

- a. Absolute features are always realized.
- b. [AGREE] is never realized.
- c. [REVERSE] is always realized in [REVERSE,+] responses.
- d. [REVERSE] is optionally realized in [REVERSE,-] responses to assertions.
- e. [REVERSE] is never realized in [REVERSE,-] responses to questions.

Summarizing the contrasts between Romanian and English, what we found is that Romanian has a dedicated [REVERSE] particle, *ba*, which allows the other two particles, *da* and *nu*, to perform the single duty of realizing the absolute polarity feature of the response, something that has high priority in Romanian. Whether [REVERSE] is realized or not in a response depends on what the absolute feature is, as well as on whether the response targets an assertion or a question, in line with our markedness principle. Note that both English and Romanian have a special strategy for marking [REVERSE,+] responses: in English we have *verum focus* on the prejacent, while in Romanian we have the obligatory use of *ba* even in case of question reversals.

We conclude our discussion of Romanian by pointing out what we may expect to find in a minimally different polarity particle system. Given the relative markedness of [-] vs. [+], it would not be surprising to find a language just like Romanian except that the rule in (105a) is relaxed to the effect that it only requires obligatory realization of [-], allowing optional realization of [+]. Below we summarize the Hungarian polarity particle system and show that it differs from Romanian in precisely this way. It would be unexpected to find a language where the reverse situation holds, i.e., where [+] is obligatorily realized while [-] is only optionally realized.

Hungarian. We provide a brief overview of the Hungarian polarity particle data, concentrating on the narrow area where it contrasts with Romanian. For further details on Hungarian, see Farkas (2009). Just like in Romanian, Hungarian has three polarity particles: *igen*, *nem* and *de*, where *de* is connected to an adversative morpheme. The realization potential of the Hungarian particles parallels what we proposed for Romanian:

(106) *Realization potential of Hungarian particles*

- a. [+] is realized by *igen*
- b. [-] is realized by *nem*
- c. [REVERSE] is realized by *de*

The pattern supporting these rules for Hungarian is analogous to what we found in Romanian, as shown in Farkas (2009). The realization needs of [REVERSE] in Hungarian are also the same as in Romanian. The only area of contrast concerns the realization needs of absolute polarity features.

(107) *Realization needs of absolute polarity features in Hungarian*

- a. [-] is always realized by a polarity particle, an explicit prejacent, or both.
- b. [+] is optionally realized.

These two rules predict that in [REVERSE,-] responses *de* must be followed by *nem*, while in [REVERSE,+] responses, *igen* is optional, as exemplified in (108) and (109):

- (108) [REVERSE,-]
A: Pali telefonált. 'Paul called.'
B: De nem./De nem telefonált./*De. 'No, he didn't.'

- (109) [REVERSE,+]
 A: Pali nem telefonált. ‘Paul did not call.’
 B: De igen./De (igen), telefonált./De. ‘Yes, he DID.’

Recall that in Romanian the bare [REVERSE] particle is not acceptable in either [REVERSE,+] or [REVERSE,-] responses, because the absolute polarity feature must always be realized. The fact that in Hungarian the absolute feature [-] is realized obligatorily, while the other absolute feature [+] is only realized optionally is in line with our assumption that [-] is more marked than [+].

5.2 A dedicated [reverse,+] particle: French and German

We now briefly show that French and German have a ternary polarity particle system where one of the particles is specialized to realize the most marked feature combination, [REVERSE,+]. In French, this particle is a special [+] particle, while in German it is an adversative particle.

The French polarity particle inventory consists of *oui*, *non*, and *si*. Elsewhere in Western Romance languages, such as Italian and Spanish, *si* is a positive polarity particle, used where French uses *oui*. The basic rules specifying the realization potential of each particle are as follows:

- (110) *Realization potential for French particles*
 a. [+] is realized by *oui*
 b. [-] is realized by *non*
 c. [REVERSE,+] is realized by *si*

Thus, in an [AGREE,+] response the only possible particle is *oui*:

- (111) [AGREE,+]
 A: Claude est à la maison. ‘Claude is at home.’
 B: Oui/*Non/*Si, elle y est. ‘Yes, she is.’

In an [AGREE,-] response on the other hand, the only possible particle is *non*:

- (112) [AGREE,-]
 A: Claude n’est pas à la maison. ‘Claude is not at home.’
 B: Non/*Oui/*Si, elle n’y est pas. ‘No, she isn’t.’

In a [REVERSE,+] response, the only possible particle is *si*:

- (113) [REVERSE,+]
 A: Claude n’est pas à la maison. ‘Claude is not at home.’
 B: Si/*Non/*Oui, elle y est. ‘Yes, she IS.’

That *si* is a [REVERSE,+] particle rather than simply a [REVERSE] particle is shown by the fact that it cannot be used in [REVERSE,-] responses. In such responses, the only possible particle is *non*:

- (114) [REVERSE,-]
 A: Claude est à la maison. ‘Claude is at home.’
 B: Non/*Si/*Oui, elle n’y est pas. ‘No, she isn’t.’

Thus, the crucial difference between French on the one hand and Romanian and Hungarian on the other is that French *si* is a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle, while Romanian *ba* and Hungarian *de* are dedicated [REVERSE] particles. Otherwise the three languages are very similar: French *non*

behaves just like Romanian *nu* and Hungarian *nem*, while French *oui* behaves much like Romanian *da* and Hungarian *igen*, although *oui*, unlike *da* and *igen*, cannot be used in [REVERSE,+] responses, because it is blocked in this case by the dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle *si*.

Finally, the German polarity particle inventory consists of *ja*, *nein*, and *doch*. The third particle, *doch*, is also used as an adversative discourse particle (see Rojas-Esponda, 2014, and references therein). The realization potential of the three particles is as follows:

- (115) *Realization potential for German particles*
- a. [AGREE] and [+] are realized by *ja*
 - b. [REVERSE] and [−] are realized by *nein*
 - c. [REVERSE,+] are realized by *doch*

Thus, in an [AGREE,+] response, the only possible particle is *ja*:

- (116) [AGREE,+]
 A: Katharina ist zu Hause. ‘Katharina is at home.’
 B: Ja/*Nein/*Doch, sie ist zu Hause. ‘Yes, she is at home.’

In an [AGREE,−] response, both *ja* and *nein* are possible:

- (117) [AGREE,−]
 A: Katharina ist nicht zu Hause. ‘Katharina is not at home.’
 B: Ja/Nein/*Doch, sie ist nicht zu Hause. ‘Yes, she is not at home.’

In a [REVERSE,+] response, only *doch* can be used:

- (118) [REVERSE,+]
 A: Katharina ist nicht zu Hause. ‘Katharina is not at home.’
 B: Doch/*Nein/*Ja, sie ist zu Hause. ‘Yes, she IS.’

And finally, in a [REVERSE,−] response, the only possible particle is *nein*:

- (119) [REVERSE,−]
 A: Katharina ist zu Hause. ‘Katharina is at home.’
 B: Nein/*Ja/*Doch, sie ist nicht zu Hause. ‘No, she is not at home.’

This shows that *doch* is a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle, like French *si*, rather than a dedicated [REVERSE] particle like Romanian *ba* and Hungarian *de*.³⁶ The other two German particles, *ja*

³⁶Tania Rojas-Esponda pointed out to us that, although the most typical use of *doch* is indeed in responses that reverse an explicitly introduced negative antecedent, there are also cases where *doch* is used in responses that go against a negative *expectation*. A good example of this use of *doch* is given by Karagjosova (2006):

- (i) A: Das war sehr freundlich von ihm. ‘That was very friendly of him.’
 B: Doch, das muss man schon sagen. ‘Yes, that needs to be admitted.’

What we take this example to show is that, given sufficient contextual support, a suitable antecedent for polarity particle responses can in principle be accommodated. This is not surprising, given that such a mechanism needs to be assumed for other kinds of anaphora as well, as illustrated by the following examples (in each case, the anaphoric pronoun whose antecedent needs to be accommodated is displayed in boldface):

- (ii) There was not a man, a woman or child within sight; only a small fishing boat, standing out to sea some distance away. Harriet waved wildly in its direction, but **they** either didn’t see her or supposed that she was merely doing some kind of reducing exercises. (Gundel *et al.*, 1993, quoted from a novel by Dorothy Sayers)

and *nein*, are assumed to have the same realization potential as English *yes* and *no*. However, both of them are blocked in [REVERSE,+] responses by the dedicated particle *doch*. In English such a dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle does not exist. Therefore, both *yes* and *no* are licensed in [REVERSE,+] responses, unlike their German counterparts *ja* and *nein*.³⁷

To sum up, in this subsection we have seen data from languages with three polarity particles, which differ from one another in a number of interesting ways. The cross linguistic variation that we found, however, is within the limits of what our markedness principle leads us to expect. Obviously, more cross linguistic investigation is needed; for now we conclude that our approach seems to provide a useful framework for such investigation and that thus far its predictions are borne out.

6 Repercussions of markedness beyond polarity particle responses

We now briefly return to English to show that our markedness considerations do not only shed light on polarity particle responses as such, but also help to explain certain contextual restrictions on the felicitous usage of polar interrogatives, which have received considerable attention in the recent literature (see Büring and Gunlogson, 2000; van Rooij and Šafářová, 2003; Romero and Han, 2004; AnderBois, 2011; Roelofsen *et al.*, 2012, among others).

Let us first consider the empirical generalizations to be captured. In fact, several mutually inconsistent generalizations capturing the connection between interrogative form and contextual factors have been proposed. While we believe that further experimental work is needed to firm the empirical ground, we suggest that there is a core generalization that is quite robust. In formulating this generalization we use α_φ to denote the unique possibility that is highlighted by a polar interrogative φ .

- (120) *Felicity condition for polar interrogatives*
 A polar interrogative φ is only felicitous if there is no compelling contextual evidence against α_φ .

This generalization encompasses a number of generalizations that have been proposed in previous work. For instance, Büring and Gunlogson (2000) suggest the following generalization concerning *positive* polar interrogatives (rephrased here using our own terminology).

- (121) *Felicity condition for positive polar interrogatives* (Büring and Gunlogson, 2000)
 A positive polar interrogative φ is only felicitous if
 there is no compelling contextual evidence against α_φ .

Clearly, this generalization is a special case of (120), specifically concerned with *positive* polar interrogatives. Büring and Gunlogson motivate (121) with the following two examples.

- (iii) Maxine was kidnapped but **they** didn't hurt her. (Bolinger, 1977)
 (iv) If I get pregnant, I'll definitely keep **it**. (Roelofsen, 2008)

An explicit account of the nature of this accommodation mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper.

³⁷For some speakers of German, the particle combination *ja doch* is (marginally) acceptable in [REVERSE,+] responses. We may assume that for these speakers, the use of *ja* to realize the [+] feature in a [REVERSE,+] response is not (fully) blocked by the dedicated [REVERSE,+] particle *doch*. We should emphasize, however, that judgments concerning *ja doch* seem to vary considerably across speakers, and also across responses to different types of initiatives, e.g. questions versus assertions, or initiatives involving sentential negation versus initiatives involving negative quantifiers or adverbs. Further empirical investigation is needed before drawing any definite conclusions.

- (122) Scenario: *A enters S's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet raincoat.*
- a. S: What's the weather like out there? Is it raining?
 - b. S: #What's the weather like out there? Is it sunny?
- (123) Scenario: *A and S have conducted a psycholinguistic experiment in which the subjects have all certified that they are right-handed. They encounter Carl, who they recognize as one of their subjects, cutting bread with his left hand.*
- a. S: Is Carl left-handed?
 - b. S: #Is Carl right-handed?

The example in (123) shows that immediate contextual evidence overrules previous beliefs of the speaker and the addressee in determining whether a polar interrogative is felicitous or not.

As for negative polar interrogatives, Büring and Gunlogson (2000) propose the following generalization.

- (124) *Felicity condition for negative polar interrogatives* (Büring and Gunlogson, 2000)
 A negative polar interrogative φ is only felicitous if
 there is compelling contextual evidence for α_φ .

This generalization is not a special instance of our generalization in (120). Our generalization implies that a negative polar interrogative φ is only felicitous if there is *no* compelling contextual evidence *against* α_φ . But that does not mean that there has to be contextual evidence *for* α_φ , as required by (124). Büring and Gunlogson motivate their generalization with the following examples.³⁸

- (125) Scenario: *S is visiting A in his home town. S and A want to have dinner.*
- a. A: Since you are vegetarian, we can't go out in this town, where it's all meat and potatoes.
 S: Is there no vegetarian restaurant around here?
 - b. A: I bet we can find any type of restaurant that you can think of in this city. Make your choice!
 S: # Is there no vegetarian restaurant around here?
 - c. A: Where would you like to go for dinner?
 S: # Is there no vegetarian restaurant around here?

Notice that in (125a) there is evidence *for* α_φ , in (125b) there is evidence *against* α_φ , and (125c) involves a *neutral* context, without any evidence for or against α_φ . Thus, these examples indeed point in the direction of Büring and Gunlogson's generalization.

However, van Rooij and Šafářová (2003) argue that this generalization is too strong, based on the following examples:

- (126) Have you not been able to receive credit from your financial institution to back up your business activities? Then click this button.

³⁸In these examples it is assumed that *no* is an indefinite determiner that occurs in the scope of a covert sentential negation operator (see, e.g., Zeijlstra, 2004; Penka, 2011; Brasoveanu *et al.*, 2013, for theoretical and experimental work supporting this assumption). Thus, the polar interrogative featuring in these examples is taken to be a negative polar interrogative.

- (127) Scenario: *A visits her doctor with her son.*
 Doctor: Has he not been eating properly?

In both cases, the context is presumably neutral, not providing any evidence for or against α_φ . Thus, negative polar interrogatives are not always infelicitous in a neutral context, which means that Buring and Gunlogson's generalization is too strong. Notice, however, that the generalization in (120) is *not* contradicted by van Rooij and Šafařová's examples. This, then, is the generalization that we aim to account for.³⁹

Our account of the generalization in (120) relies on the assumption that a speaker's choice between the various interrogative forms is partly determined by the type of responses that the context leads her to anticipate. The crucial contrast here, we suggest, is the marked nature of [REVERSE] responses relative to the unmarked nature of [AGREE] responses. So far, we discussed some expectations that this markedness contrast gives rise to concerning the realization of polarity features and combinations thereof. These expectations concern the form of *responses*. However, the same markedness contrast also gives rise to certain expectations concerning the preferred form of initiatives. In particular, it may be expected that in formulating her initiative, a cooperative speaker always tries to maximize her interlocutor's chances to give a relatively unmarked response. In other words, whenever possible, a speaker will avoid a situation where her interlocutor has to give a [REVERSE] response. We formulate this as a maxim constraining the form of the initiative that a speaker chooses to utter.

- (128) *Avoid* [REVERSE]
 Other things being equal, formulate your initiative in such a way as to minimize the chance of eliciting a [REVERSE] response.

This maxim directly accounts for the generalization in (120). To see this, consider a polar interrogative φ and a context in which there is compelling evidence against α_φ . In this case, if a speaker would ask φ , she would, in view of the available evidence, force her interlocutor to give a [REVERSE] response. Thus, a speaker who adheres to the maxim in (128) will not choose to ask φ , but rather, a polar interrogative that highlights the complement of α_φ . For instance, if a speaker wants to raise the issue whether Carl is left- or right-handed, and if there is compelling contextual evidence that he is left-handed, then asking whether Carl is left-handed is less likely to elicit a [REVERSE] response than asking whether Carl is right-handed. The former is therefore preferred in this context, and the latter perceived as infelicitous, as we saw in example (123).

7 Comparison with previous approaches

Before concluding, we briefly compare our proposal to previous work on polarity particle responses. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three relevant lines of work, each focusing on a different set of empirical and conceptual issues. The first line of work is part of the more general enterprise

³⁹We will not pursue a detailed account of the variable felicity of negative polar interrogatives in neutral contexts, since this is an area where more empirical data is needed before developing a sophisticated theory. But one factor that plausibly plays a role here is the *competition* between positive and negative polar interrogatives. If both types of interrogatives are in principle licensed, then we expect a general preference for positive polar interrogatives, simply because they are less marked in form than negative polar interrogatives (see also AnderBois, 2011). This general preference may be overruled by several more specific considerations. For instance, the reason why a negative rather than a positive polar interrogative is used in (126) may be that it highlights the negative alternative and thereby makes this alternative available for subsequent anaphoric reference by *then*. The reason why a negative polar interrogative is used in (127) may be that this interrogative highlights the alternative that has the highest *utility* w.r.t. the speaker's goals in the given context, as suggested by van Rooij and Šafařová (2003).

of characterizing the interpretation of answers to questions, in particular so-called *term answers*, i.e. ones that do not form complete sentences on their own and whose interpretation therefore eminently depends on the given question (e.g., *Who called? John*). Polarity particle responses can be seen as a specific instance of term answers. One central issue in this line of work, then, is to give a uniform treatment of polarity particle responses and other kinds of term answers (see, e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Krifka, 2001; Aloni and van Rooij, 2002).

A second line of work focuses on issues arising from the contrast between polarity particle responses to positive and negative initiatives, and the cross-linguistic variation that is found in this respect (see, e.g., Pope, 1976; Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Holmberg, 2001, 2007, 2013; Farkas, 2009, 2010, 2011; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Kramer and Rawlins, 2009, 2010, 2012).⁴⁰

Finally, a third line of work focuses on issues arising from contrasts between polarity particle responses to various types of disjunctive initiatives (Roelofsen and van Gool, 2010; Pruitt and Roelofsen, 2011, see also Krifka, 2001, and Aloni and van Rooij, 2002, for relevant discussion).

The present paper combines and refines insights from these three lines of work, and also connects the treatment of polarity particles to previous work on other kinds of anaphora; recall in particular our discussion on page 28 of polarity features as compared to, e.g., gender features on pronouns.

In Section 7.1 we discuss, in rather general terms, how our proposal refines earlier work in the first tradition distinguished above, and in Section 7.2 we do the same w.r.t. the second tradition.

7.1 Polarity particle responses as term answers

An idea that is common to a large body of work on the semantics of questions (see, e.g., Hull, 1975; Tichy, 1978; Hausser and Zaefferer, 1978; von Stechow and Zimmermann, 1984; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; von Stechow, 1991; Krifka, 2001; Aloni and van Rooij, 2002) is that one of the main discourse effects of a *wh*-question is to make salient an *n*-place property, where *n* is the number of *wh*-elements in the question, and that this property plays an important role in the interpretation of answers to the given question, in particular term answers.

For concreteness, we will say a bit more about how this idea is implemented in the partition semantics of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), although our remarks apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other works cited above just as well. In partition semantics, the *n*-place property that is made salient by a question is called the *abstract* of the question. In (129) below, we illustrate how these abstracts are used in the interpretation of term answers:

- | | | |
|-------|--------------------|---|
| (129) | a. Who likes Mary? | abstract: $\lambda x[\textit{likes}(x, m)]$ |
| | b. John. | interpretation: $\lambda P[P(j)](\lambda x[\textit{likes}(x, m)]) = \textit{likes}(j, m)$ |
| | c. Everyone. | interpretation: $\lambda P[\forall y.P(y)](\lambda x[\textit{likes}(x, m)]) = \forall y.\textit{likes}(y, m)$ |

Notice that the interpretation of the term answers is obtained by applying the interpretation of the terms themselves—in both cases a generalized quantifier—to the abstract of the question.⁴¹

Now, in the case of a *polar* interrogative, Groenendijk and Stokhof assume that the abstract is a 0-place property, which, in our terms, amounts to a possibility. Polarity particle responses are then treated as special instances of term answers. As exemplified in (130) below, *yes* is taken to express

⁴⁰After the present paper had been submitted for publication, another interesting account of polarity particle responses that would fall into this category has been proposed by Krifka (2013). We must leave a detailed comparison with this account for future work.

⁴¹We leave out of consideration here the *exhaustivity* operator of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), which is taken to apply to the interpretation of the term before the latter is applied to the abstract of the question, resulting in an exhaustive interpretation—e.g., *only* John likes Mary in the case of (129b).

the identity function mapping every possibility to itself, while *no* maps every possibility to its complement. This gives correct results for polarity particle responses to simple polar interrogatives.

- (130) a. Does John like Mary? abstract: $likes(j, m)$
 b. Yes. interpretation: $\lambda p[p](likes(j, m)) = likes(j, m)$
 c. No. interpretation: $\lambda p[\neg p](likes(j, m)) = \neg likes(j, m)$

Thus, the possibility that we take to be highlighted by a polar interrogative corresponds precisely to the 0-place abstract that is associated with such an interrogative on Groenendijk and Stokhof's approach. However, our account refines Groenendijk and Stokhof's approach in at least three ways. First, it is not restricted to simple polar interrogatives, but also applies satisfactorily to various types of disjunctive interrogatives. Related to this, sentential interrogatives are not always taken to highlight a single possibility, but may also highlight several possibilities. Second, our account uniformly applies to declaratives and sentential interrogatives, both of which license polarity particle responses. And finally, highlighted possibilities are taken to have positive or negative polarity, which we have seen is crucial for an adequate theory of polarity particle responses to positive and negative initiatives.

Importantly, these refinements are compatible with the overall perspective of Groenendijk and Stokhof and other work in this area. That is, we can still think of interrogatives as introducing n -place abstracts in general, where $n = 0$ in the limit case of a polar interrogative, and we can still think of these abstracts as generally playing a crucial role in the interpretation of responses to the given interrogative, in particular polarity particle responses. The picture has just become a bit more general. On the one hand, it is not only interrogatives that introduce abstracts; declaratives do so as well, in exactly the same way. And on the other hand, sentences do not necessarily introduce just one abstract, but may introduce multiple abstracts as well.

7.2 Contrasting polarity particle responses to positive and negative initiatives

Next, we discuss a number of proposals that fall within the second tradition distinguished above, namely those of Pope (1976), Ginzburg and Sag (2000), Kramer and Rawlins (2009), and Holmberg (2013). Within the scope of this paper we can clearly not do full justice to the details of all these analyses, but we will give an overview of the main commonalities and differences. Since these accounts all focus on the contrast between positive and negative initiatives and do not deal with the additional puzzles that arise when disjunctive initiatives are taken into consideration, our discussion in this section will also be restricted to non-disjunctive cases.

Pope (1976). Our analysis of polarity particles builds on and refines several fundamental insights from Pope (1976). In particular, Pope distinguishes four basic types of responses to polar questions: positive agreement, negative agreement, positive disagreement, and negative disagreement, which in our terms correspond to [AGREE,+], [AGREE,-], [REVERSE,+], and [REVERSE,-], respectively.⁴² She also argues that these response types differ in markedness and, in particular, recognizes [REVERSE,+] (positive disagreement) as being the most marked response type. She points out that this leads to the expectation that, across languages, [REVERSE,+] responses are typically realized in special ways, and she shows that this expectation is borne out in English, German, French, Swedish, Hebrew, Japanese, and Tigrinya (for the latter, she uses data from Leslau, 1962). We have seen that Romanian and Hungarian provide further support for the special status of [REVERSE,+] responses.

⁴²Another early discussion of the distinction between positive/negative and agreeing/disagreeing responses, although much more concise than that of Pope, can be found in Sadock and Zwicky (1985).

Our account of polarity particles differs in at least three important ways from that of Pope. First, whereas we take it that polarity particles may realize individual features, Pope associates polarity particles, in our terms, with feature *combinations*. That is, she assumes that a particular particle in a particular language is connected to [AGREE,+], [AGREE,-], [REVERSE,+], or [REVERSE,-] responses (with possible overlap). Languages like Romanian and Hungarian show that this assumption is too restrictive, and that particles must be associated, at least in some cases, with individual features. Another phenomenon that is more naturally accounted for on our approach is that certain response types may be marked by more than one polarity particle. For instance, [AGREE,-] responses in English may be marked either with *yes* or with *no*. On our account, this follows straightforwardly from the assumption that *yes* can be used to realize [AGREE] while *no* can be used to realize [-]. Pope’s analysis predicts that [AGREE,-] responses in English can only be marked with *no*.

A second important difference is that our semantic treatment of relative polarity features requires (dis)agreement between the prejacent and the antecedent, *both in terms of polarity and in terms of content*. Pope only requires (dis)agreement in terms of polarity. This is problematic for cases like (131):

- (131) A: Is the door open?
 B: *Yes, it is closed.

Pope’s analysis wrongly predicts that the response in (131) is felicitous, since the prejacent agrees in polarity with the antecedent. Our account correctly predicts that the response is infelicitous.

Finally, our markedness considerations are more fine-grained than those of Pope, in that they concern both individual features and feature combinations, whereas Pope only compares feature combinations. This means, for instance, that our markedness considerations lead us to expect that languages are more likely to have a special [REVERSE] particle than a special [AGREE] particle (as in Romanian and Hungarian), and that they are more likely to have a special [-] particle than a special [+] particle (as in Latin and Irish). Furthermore, the connection between [+] and [AGREE] on the one hand, and [-] and [REVERSE] on the other can be explained on our account as a case of harmonic alignment: [+] and [AGREE] are the two unmarked features, while [-] and [REVERSE] are both marked. Pope notes the existence of the connection, but has no explanation for it.

Ginzburg and Sag (2000). The account of Ginzburg and Sag focusses on polarity particle responses to positive and negative polar questions, but could be extended to cover responses to positive and negative assertions as well. The account is formulated within the framework of situation semantics, which allows for a very fine-grained semantic treatment of polar interrogatives.⁴³ In particular, the polar interrogatives in (132) can all be assigned a different semantic value.

- (132) a. Is the number of planets even?
 b. Is the number of planets odd?
 c. Is the number of planets not even?

We concur with the view that the semantic ontology needs to be fine-grained enough to semantically distinguish these types of interrogatives. However, we did not formulate our account within the framework of situation semantics. Instead, we started out with the most basic implementation of inquisitive semantics and refined this system so as to be able to make precisely those distinctions that are needed to account for the phenomena at hand. The advantage of our approach, then, is

⁴³Cooper and Ginzburg (2012) recently recast the account of Ginzburg and Sag (2000) within the framework of *type theory with records* (Cooper, 2005), which is even richer than situation semantics.

that the semantic framework does not become more fine-grained than necessary, and clearly brings out which features are essential to deal with the phenomena under consideration.

Now let us turn to Ginzburg and Sag’s concrete analysis of polarity particles. Syntactically, polarity particles are treated as ‘propositional lexemes’, words that form a complete clause on their own. Semantically, they are treated as anaphoric expressions, which retrieve their propositional content from the most salient question under discussion. In our view, any account with these two basic characteristics has three important shortcomings. First, since it analyzes polarity particles as stand-alone syntactic objects, and not as elements of larger syntactic constructions, it cannot, or at least not straightforwardly, account for phenomena that exhibit interaction between polarity particles and their prejacent. Recall, for instance, that in Romanian absolute polarity features have to be realized either by a particle or by an explicit prejacent (see example (98)). Such phenomena are unproblematic for approaches like ours, in which polarity particles are seen as elements of larger syntactic constructions.

A second disadvantage of this type of account relative to ours is that in this setup no connection can be made between the different polarity particle systems that we find across languages. On Ginzburg and Sag’s account, each individual particle in each individual language must be treated separately. On our account, on the other hand, the polarity features and their semantics are universal; moreover, while the realization of these features varies cross-linguistically, this variation is constrained in a principled way. In this approach, then, it is clear how the different linguistic systems are connected and what their common core is.

Third, Ginzburg and Sag’s account cannot derive general markedness-related expectations concerning the type of polarity particle systems found across languages. Moreover, within the confines of any particular language, the phenomena that we accounted for in terms of markedness remain unexplained.

These problems relate to Ginzburg and Sag’s treatment of polarity particles as atomic propositional lexemes. The specific account proposed by Ginzburg and Sag encounters some additional problems. In particular, *yes* is analyzed as confirming the propositional content of the question under discussion (in our terms, the possibility that the question highlights). Thus, in response to *Did Sue pass the exam?* it conveys that Sue did pass the exam, and in response to *Did Sue not pass the exam?* it conveys that Sue did not pass the exam. This, however, is incompatible with the use of *yes* in [REVERSE,+] responses to negative questions or assertions, as illustrated in (133).

- (133) A: Did Sue not pass the exam? / Sue did not pass the exam.
B: Yes, she DID.

Kramer and Rawlins (2009) and Holmberg (2013). There are several recent accounts of polarity particles whose main theoretical point is to argue for an ellipsis based account of bare polarity particle responses, and therefore against the type of propositional lexeme approach in Ginzburg and Sag (2000). Kramer and Rawlins (2009) and Holmberg (2013) develop two such accounts, focusing on bare particle responses to negative polar questions. Recall that the experimental data from Kramer and Rawlins (2012) discussed in Section 2 show that such responses are ambiguous and not fully felicitous. However, the experimental results also show that in response to a negative polar question $?¬p$, both bare *yes* and bare *no* are predominantly interpreted as confirming $¬p$, as exemplified in (134).

- (134) Is Mary not going to the party?
a. Yes. \rightsquigarrow preferred interpretation: she is not going
b. No. \rightsquigarrow preferred interpretation: she is not going

The phenomenon that bare *yes* and bare *no* have the same preferred interpretation in response to negative polar questions has been dubbed *negative neutralization* by Kramer and Rawlins (2009). Their account, which focuses on negative neutralization but is meant as a general theory of polarity particle responses, relies on the following three assumptions. First, syntactically, polarity particles are adverbials that adjoin to ΣP . This means that bare polarity responses like those in (134) are taken to have an elided prejacent. Following Merchant (2001) and many others, Kramer and Rawlins assume that ellipsis is only licensed if the elided constituent is semantically equivalent with some constituent in the immediately preceding discourse. This accounts for the preferred interpretation of *yes* and *no* in (134).⁴⁴

Second, following Farkas and Bruce (2010), Kramer and Rawlins take polarity particles to mark utterances as *responding assertions*, which are only felicitous if, in our terms, (i) there is a unique most salient antecedent possibility, and (ii) the assertion commits its speaker either to this antecedent possibility, or to the complement thereof. This accounts for the fact that polarity particles cannot be used in response to constituent questions.

Third, Kramer and Rawlins assume that *no* carries an uninterpretable [NEG] feature, which must form a negative concord chain with the Σ head of the prejacent ΣP and possibly other elements deeper inside the prejacent that also carry [NEG] features. Furthermore, exactly one of the [NEG] features in the concord chain must be interpretable. This rules out the option of marking a positive response with *no*, as in (135a). It also ensures that a solitary *no* response to a positive polar question, as in (135b), is interpreted as rejecting the possibility highlighted by the question. The assumed syntax of such a response is given in (135c). Note that the interpretable [NEG] feature is assumed to be located in Σ , which makes it possible for the complement TP to elide under semantic identity with the TP of the question.

- (135) Is Mary going to the party?
 a. *No, she is.
 b. No.
 c. No_[uNeg] [ΣP Σ _[iNeg] [TP ~~Mary is_[uNeg] going to the party~~]]

Thus, the analysis of Kramer and Rawlins (2009) accounts for negative neutralization, as well as additional facts concerning polarity particles in English. There are, however, several empirical challenges that remain problematic for this account. We briefly discuss two of them.

First, as illustrated in (136), the distribution of *yes* and *no* in response to plain positive polar questions is not sufficiently restricted.

- (136) Is the number of planets odd?
 a. *Yes, it is even. (wrongly predicted to be ok)
 b. *Yes, it is not odd. (wrongly predicted to be ok)
 c. *No, it is not even. (wrongly predicted to be ok)

The only constraint on the distribution of *yes* in Kramer and Rawlins' account is that it has to occur in a responding assertion. This constraint is not sufficient, as witnessed by (136a-b). The particle *no* is subject to a further requirement, namely it has to be part of a negative concord chain. This effectively means that its prejacent has to have sentential negation. However, this additional

⁴⁴Note that an ellipsis account of polarity particles is not *necessary* to account for negative neutralization. After all, Ginzburg and Sag (2000) provide a non-ellipsis account of polarity particles which straightforwardly deals with the phenomenon. Also note that, while Kramer and Rawlins' account straightforwardly derives the preferred interpretation of bare particle responses to negative polar questions, it does not directly account for the (arguably more basic) fact that such responses are ambiguous and not fully felicitous.

constraint is still not sufficient, as witnessed by (136c).

The source of this last problem is that in constraining the distribution of *no*, Kramer and Rawlins only take the relation between the particle and its prejacent into account. In our terms, their theory only makes reference to *absolute* polarity. The example in (136c) shows that in order to capture the distribution of *no*, it does not suffice to look at the relation between the particle and its prejacent. The relation between the prejacent and the antecedent also plays a crucial role. In other words, an account of polarity particles cannot be formulated just in terms of *absolute* polarity; it also needs to make reference to *relative* polarity.

A second problem is that *no* is wrongly ruled out in positive responses to negative questions:

- (137) A: Is Mary not going to the party?
B: No, she IS. (wrongly predicted not to be ok)

Kramer and Rawlins (2009) recognize this second problem. They do not address it in depth, but suggest that “the *no* here is not really a negative *no*”. Rather, they conjecture, it is a reverse particle, much like German *doch* and French *si*. However, an analysis of such reverse particles is not provided and extending this account to the cross linguistic data involving what we call [REVERSE] particles is problematic. The problem is addressed in more depth in Kramer and Rawlins (2010) where [REVERSE] responses, in our terms, are treated as ‘bias corrections’. The solution sketched there does not cover all the complications needed for a full account of the Romanian, Hungarian, French or German data. Note also that treating [REVERSE] particles as ‘bias corrections’ does not account for the occurrence of such particles in negative rhetorical questions in Romanian where the bias of the question is positive and the response agrees with the bias but reverses the possibility that the question highlights, as discussed in Farkas (2009, 2011) and exemplified in (138):

- (138) A: Nu e cel mai frumos copil din lume? ‘Isn’t he the most beautiful child in the world?’
B: Ba da, este. ‘Yes, he is.’

We conclude that a cross-linguistic perspective strongly suggests that a suitable account of polarity particles must make reference to both absolute and relative polarity.

We now turn to the account of Holmberg (2013). One way in which this account differs from that of Kramer and Rawlins (2009) is that it requires the prejacent of *yes* to be positive. On this account, then, bare *yes* is only felicitous in response to a polar question that involves negation, like (134), to the extent that the question can be construed as a *positive* polar question involving constituent negation rather than sentential negation. If this is possible, then the elided prejacent of *yes* can also be construed as a positive sentence involving constituent negation.

Holmberg differentiates his account from that of Kramer and Rawlins by considering examples like (139).

- (139) Does John sometimes not show up for work?
a. Yes. \rightsquigarrow John sometimes does not show up for work
b. *No. intended meaning: John sometimes does not show up for work

Holmberg points out that bare *yes* is fully acceptable in (139), whereas, as we saw, it is only marginally acceptable in (134). This contrast is explained on Holmberg (2013)’s account, under the assumption that the adverb in (139) forces the negation to be construed as constituent negation.⁴⁵

However, note that examples like (140) below are problematic for Holmberg’s account:

⁴⁵Under this assumption, the contrast is also explained on our account.

- (140) A: You cannot not go to church and call yourself a good Christian.
B: Yes, you cannot do that.

The initiative in (140) is given by Holmberg himself as an example of a sentence in which sentential and constituent negation co-occur. Thus, the account wrongly predicts that a *yes* response is not possible here. Moreover, taking a step back from the particular case of negative neutralization, we note that Holmberg’s account, just like that of Kramer and Rawlins, relies on absolute polarity only. This means that the problems listed above in our discussion of Kramer and Rawlins’ account, apply here as well.⁴⁶

We conclude that in order to capture the details of polarity particle distribution and interpretation, both in English and cross-linguistically, the distinction between absolute and relative polarity features is essential.

8 Conclusion

We have provided a detailed account of polarity particle responses, as well as the initiatives that they target. We started out by laying out the main empirical issues that need to be addressed in this area, and extracted from these issues a number of general requirements that need to be satisfied by a theory of the semantics and discourse effects of declarative and interrogative sentences, in order to serve as a suitable basis for an account of polarity particle responses.

In developing a theory that meets these requirements, we combined insights and techniques from inquisitive semantics, dynamic semantics, and commitment based discourse models. The main novelty of the resulting framework is that it captures, in a uniform and compositional way, the potential of various types of declarative and interrogative sentences, possibly involving negation and/or disjunction, to introduce the type of antecedents that are necessary to license polarity particle responses. Crucially, such antecedents must be characterized as having either positive or negative polarity, just like in many languages the potential antecedents of pronominal anaphora must be characterized as having grammatical gender, e.g., masculine or feminine.

As for polarity particle responses proper, our point of departure was the idea, rooted in the work of Pope (1976), that there are two types of polarity features, absolute and relative, and that the role of polarity particles is to realize these features, or combinations thereof. We provided a presuppositional semantics for polarity features, in line with, e.g., the semantics of gender features on anaphoric pronouns. The absolute features, [+] and [–], presuppose that their prejacent is either positive or negative. The relative features, [AGREE] and [REVERSE], presuppose that their prejacent either agrees with or reverses its antecedent, both in terms of content and in terms of polarity. We take the two types of polarity features and their semantics to be the common core of polarity particle systems cross linguistically. What we take to be language specific is the polarity particle repertoire and the rules that determine which particles can be used to realize which features or feature combinations. Furthermore, we propose that this cross linguistic variation is constrained by the general principle that more marked features or feature combinations are more likely than less marked features or feature combinations to be overtly realized and to be associated with a specialized particle. We showed that the variation found across the polarity particle systems of English, Romanian, Hungarian, French, and German is compatible with this hypothesis, though evidently more wide-range cross linguistic investigation is needed to further test and refine our account.

⁴⁶Recall that we restricted our discussion here to non-disjunctive initiatives. If disjunctive initiatives are taken into consideration as well, several additional issues arise for the accounts discussed here.

There is a host of remaining open issues, the most acute of which, in our opinion, is that of extending the account to embedded contexts (see, e.g., Kramer and Rawlins, 2009; Authier, 2013; Krifka, 2013, for discussion). There are similarities but also important differences between polarity particles in responses and their close relatives in embedded contexts, which await further empirical and theoretical investigation. We hope that this paper will prove a useful stage on the road toward a comprehensive account of polarity particle responses and their embedded relatives across languages.

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