Feb
09
2010
| February 17, 2010 |
| 3:00 pm | to | 5:00 pm |
Wednesday February 17th we will have the first seminar session of this year, and our topic will be Beliefs Dynamics and Probabilities. You can find the program below.
The meeting will start at 15:00 hrs, and will take place in the OMHP F2.01c room on the Oude Manhuispoort 4-6, 1012CN Amsterdam.
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| 15:00 – 15:35 |
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Bryan Renne |
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(University of Groningen) |
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Evidence Elimination in Multi-Agent Justification Logic |
This talk is a presentation of my paper of the same title. In the talk, I will present a logic combining Dynamic Epistemic Logic, a framework for reasoning about multi-agent communication, with a new multi-agent version of Justification Logic, a framework for reasoning about evidence and justification. This novel combination incorporates a new kind of multi-agent evidence elimination that cleanly meshes with the multi-agent communications from Dynamic Epistemic Logic, resulting in a system for reasoning about multi-agent communication and evidence elimination for groups of interacting rational agents.
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| 15:35 – 15:50 |
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Discussion |
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| 15:50 – 16:00 |
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Coffee break |
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| 16:00 – 16:35 |
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Joshua Sack |
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(Reykjavík University) |
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Probability and dynamics – an overview |
Dynamic logic describes change, how processes, states, or situations change given certain actions or events. One way probability may play a role is if the results of the actions or events are not entirely certain, and this uncertainty can be quantified using probability. Another way probability and dynamics are combined is when it is the probabilities themselves that are subject to change as new information is provided. Bayesian updating is the most accepted mechanism for change in probability that results when such information received is fully understood and taken to be true. But less trusted or understood information may require different types of updating. One way to justify probabilistic updating mechanisms is to adapt to the new circumstances a betting game argument, called a Dutch book argument, that has been used to justify Bayesian updating through the possibility of a winning strategy in certain subgames. This talk provides an overview of ways dynamic logic and probability are combined.
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| 16:35 – 16:50 |
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Discussion |
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| 17:00 - |
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Drinks |
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Dec
15
2009
| January 18, 2010 | to | January 19, 2010 |
On 18th-19th January the ILLC will host the second workshop on Formal Models of Norm Change (location Doelenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek)
The workshop addresses dynamic aspects involved in normative systems change, by pursuing an interdisciplinary approach at the interface of (deontic) logic, artificial intelligence, and socio-economical disciplines. More specifically, topics of interest will be: norms and games, norms for the dynamics of interaction (procedures), the dynamics of normative systems, norm change and the dynamics of different cognitive attitudes (e.g. knowledge and preference).
Participation is free but registration (possibly by 4th January) is required. To do so please contact Davide.
Nov
30
2009
| December 7, 2009 |
| 2:00 pm | to | 5:00 pm |
This Monday December 7th we will have the last seminar session of this year, and our topic will be Epistemic Protocols. You can find the program below.
The meeting will start at 14:00 hrs, and will take place in the Nina van Leer room of the Allard Pierson Museum.
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| 14:00 – 14:35 |
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Yanjing Wang |
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(CWI) |
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Making Things Happen |
In this talk, we report the ongoing work on dynamic epistemic logics with so-called ”future-shaping modalities” which constrain the possible actions in the future. The introduction of the new modalities is motivated by the analysis of epistemic protocols, where the meta knowledge of the protocol itself is crucial. We will demonstrate the use of such dynamic modalities with various of potential applications in, e.g., semantics of (pseudo) imperatives, dynamics of games, and information flow analysis.
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|
| 14:35 – 14:50 |
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Discussion |
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| 14:50 – 15:00 |
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Coffee break |
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| 15:00 – 15:35 |
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Floor Sietsma |
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(CWI) |
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Logic of Information Flow on Communication Channels |
We present a logic to describe communication channels and secret messages. Additionally, our logic can reason about communication protocols. We combine a Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) perspective with ideas from Interpreted Systems (IS). Our framework models the communication channels underlying the information flow as well as the information flow itself. Our DEL-style actions allow us to model various communication actions such as message passing and group announcements. In particular we define an external informing action, which essentially announces the protocol the agents are supposed to follow, thus making it common knowledge that the future behaviour of the agents is constrained. Our framework is very flexible in modeling a variety of scenarios with different assumptions about the observational power of the agents. We propose a generic method of epistemic modeling where the initial model is simply the real world, and other worlds are generated on-the-fly. We show how our framework applies to some nice examples.
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| 15:35 – 15:50 |
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Discussion |
| 15:50 – 16:00 |
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Coffee break |
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| 16:00 – 16:35 |
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Sonja Smets |
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(University of Groningen) |
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Dynamic and Epistemic Perspectives on Quantum Behavior |
In my recent and on-going joint work with A. Baltag, we use the formalism of Dynamic-Epistemic logic to model and reason about the non-local informational dynamics in compound quantum systems. I will show how this combined logical formalism can express important features of quantum measurements and unitary evolutions of multi-partite quantum states, and I will give logical characterizations of various forms of entanglement (e.g. the Bell states, the GHZ states etc). As applications, I will use our logic to give a formal correctness proof for at least one of the following quantum protocols (Teleportation, Quantum Secret Sharing protocol, Superdense Coding, Quantum Key Distribution etc.). In the remainder of the talk I will sketch how this formalism can be extended to model how classical agents record the results of their quantum observations and perform actions. The final goal is to model all aspects of the classical-quantum interaction present in the mentioned quantum protocols.
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| 16:35 – 16:50 |
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Discussion |
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| 17:00 – |
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Drinks |
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Nov
12
2009
| November 23, 2009 |
| 2:00 pm | to | 4:00 pm |
This Monday 23 of November at 14:00 hrs we will have our next seminar’s sessions. This time, Kurt Ranalter, from the Universita’ degli Studi di Verona, will talk about Towards a dynamic account for an expressive conception of norms (abstract below). After the talk, further discussions about the topic and other dynamic business can take place with some drinks!
The meeting will take place in room C0.110 at Science Park 904.
Abstract
We report on work in progress concerning possible interpretations of deontic expressions such as “everyone must pay taxes”. If we look at them from a speech act theory perspective, such expressions may stand for assertions or prescriptions, depending on the specific context of their utterance or, alternatively, on whether the modal verb “must” is regarded as a force indicating device or not. Both of these readings can be naturally expressed in Carlo Dalla Pozza’s pragmatic framework for an expressive conception of norms. One of the aims of this talk is to give a concise introduction to the basic concepts of the framework. Its key feature is that it extends classical logic with a pragmatic logic of speach act types. Interestingly, there are two observations about the framework that look promising from the dynamic point of view. First, the semantics of the logic of speech act types is given in terms of justification values and the justification conditions may be seen as providing a sort of precondition for the speech act under consideration. Second, the two levels of the framework are tied together with the so called reflection principle, thus providing a sort of postcondition for the speech act under consideration. We shall briefly sketch how these aspects could possibly be accomodated in a proof-theoretic framework.
