Why logical pluralists should be anti-exceptionalists
Evelina Lissoni

Abstract:
Beall and Restall’s (2006) proposal sparked renewed interest in logical pluralism, but it hasn’t gone uncriticized. The most widely-discussed objection to this view is the so-called collapse problem, which highlights some unpalatable consequences arising from the combination of an intra-theoretic pluralist framework with a traditional take on the properties that are essential for the notion of logicality. In this thesis I argue that, in order to avoid the collapse problem, pluralists of the same mold as Beall and Restall should depart from an orthodox perspective on logic. Instead, I propose that they should embrace some form of logical anti-exceptionalism, a position about logic whose core claim is that at least one of the properties that made up the ‘exceptional’ status of this discipline through its history should be rejected. In particular, I contend that their choice is between dropping either normativity or generality, and I do not fall short of assessing the implications of such metaphysical alterations.