

# Introducing the MARA Survey

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# Foreword

- output of a collaborative process initiated during TFG-MARA I (Ljubljana, 2005)
- different persons took the responsibility of different sections, plus crossed reviewing process
- to appear in *Informatica*, 2006

# Introduction

## Tentative definition...

MultiAgent Resource Allocation is the process of distributing a number of items amongst a number of agents

- *What* kind of items (resources)?
- *How* are they being distributed?
- *Why* are they being distributed?

# Outline

- Type of resources
- Preference Representation
- Social Welfare
- Allocation Procedures
- Complexity Results
- Application Areas
- Simulation Platforms

# Resources

- **continuous** vs. **discrete**  
physical property of the resources
- **divisible** or not  
continuous resources are usually (infinitely) divisible
- **shareable** or not  
same resource can be allocated to different agents at the same time
- **static** or not  
resources may be consumable (fuel) or perishable (food)...
- **single** vs. **multi-unit**
- **resources** vs. **tasks**  
very similar, but task allocation involves specificities (time constraints)



# Preference Representation

Agents may have preferences:

- over the bundle they hold,
- over the bundles received by other agents (**externalities**)

The number of alternatives to consider (bundles of resources) is exponential, so we cannot simply rely on “naive” enumeration...

## Main Issues

What are suitable representation languages for agents' preferences (expressiveness, succinctness, elicitation...)



# Preference Representation

The survey discusses a number of representations, falling into two broad categories:

- **quantitative** preferences  
mapping bundles of resources to numerical values
  - *k*-additive form (*algebraic-based, synergies between items*)
  - weighted prop. formulas (*logic-based, bundles as models*)
  - straight-line programs (*program-based, computes value*)
  - bidding languages (OR, XOR, etc.)
- **ordinal** preferences  
binary relation over the bundles of resources
  - prioritised goals (*ordinal counterpart to weighted goals*),
  - ceteris paribus preferences (*"all other things being equal"*)

# Social Welfare

We need to assess the quality of an allocation from the viewpoint of the society as a whole. This typically depends on the preferences of individual agents, as studied in depth in **welfare economics** and **social choice theory**

So far, multiagent research has (almost) exclusively favored a **utilitarian** approach...

## Main Issues

What notions of social welfare are relevant in the general context of MARA? In which specific application should we favour a given measure? Can we think of other measures?



# Social Welfare

The survey discusses a number of notions of social welfare for both ordinal and cardinal agents' preferences

- Pareto efficiency
- Collective utility functions (utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash...)
- Leximin Ordering
- Envy-freeness
- Normalized utility

# Allocation Procedures

Allocation procedures range from **centralised** (a single agent computes the final allocation) to truly **distributed** (sequences of local negotiation steps)

## Main Issues

When should we prefer a centralised/distributed approach?

What kind of protocol shall we devise in a given circumstance?

Having fixed a protocol, what kind of properties can we prove?

# Protocols

## Auction protocols

- way of reporting preferences (*open-cry/sealed bids*)?
- number of rounds? descending or ascending bids?
- type of bids allowed (*bidding language*)?

## Negotiation protocols

- basic *Contract-Net*  
(announcement / bidding / assignment / confirmation)
- extensions for bundle of resources, deals without money...
- concurrent *Contract-Net*  
(pre-bidding phase, levelled commitments)

# Properties of Procedures

Examples of desirable properties of allocation procedures includes:

- **Termination** —is the procedure dead-lock free?
- **Truthfulness** —is there an incentive for agents to manipulate the procedure (e.g. by reporting false preferences)?
- **Convergence** —is it guaranteed to converge to an optimal allocation? Of course strongly related to strategies agents would implement...

# Complexity Results

The allocation process involves, at different stages, **computational or communication resources** —and these resources are limited.

Complexity results indicate whether or not efficient algorithms can ever be found for different decision/optimisation problems

## Main Issues

**Global properties** (Does there exist allocations with a given property?) **Negotiation properties** (Is there sequence of  $\mathcal{X}$ -deals leading from  $A$  to  $A'$ ?) **Communication complexity** (Upper bounds on the length of these paths?)

## Example of Results

Depends of the representation used to encode utility functions, but for most (expressive enough) languages, we know *e.g.* that:

- finding an allocation that maximises utilitarian sw is NP-hard
- finding an allocation that is both Pareto optimal and envy-free can be up to  $\Sigma_2^P$ -complete
- deciding wether there is a sequence of 1-deals leading from  $A$  to  $A'$  is NP-hard
- upper bound on the length of shortest path of 1-deals is  $\leq n^m - m(n - 1)$  and  $\geq \frac{77}{256}2^m - 1$

# Application Areas

The survey introduces and discusses four problem domains:

- **Industrial Procurement (IP)**
- **Earth Observation Satellites (EOS)**
- **Manufacturing Systems (MS)**
- **Grid Computing (GC)**

# Constraints of Applications (Examples)

- allocation of resources have to be efficient, but also to **fair** (EOS), **safe** (IP), or **robust** (MS)
- allocation problems may involve hundreds (IP) or even thousands (GC) of resources to be allocated
- users have to report **preferences**, **constraints** (IP, EOS, MS, GC), and even **negotiation strategies** (IP)



# Simulation Platforms

In many cases, some assumptions do not hold, or theoretical results simply cannot be proven: it is then useful to do experimental work using simulation

## Main Issues

Simulation vs. implementation, simulating time, agent modelling, extensibility and integration

The survey introduces a number of simulation frameworks:

- Swarm
- RePast
- Desmo-J
- AScape
- DEx

# Conclusion

- Type of resources
- Preference Representation
- Social Welfare
- Allocation Procedures
- Complexity Results
- Application Areas
- Simulation Platforms

We didn't investigate (enough/at all): game-theoretical aspects (strategies, mechanism design), algorithmic aspects...