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ERRATA: Paper [EndrissEtAlAAMAS2003-optimal]
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U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. 
On Optimal Outcomes of Negotiations over Resources. 
Proc. 2nd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and 
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2003), pages 177-184, ACM Press, July 2003.
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Theorems 2 and 4 do /not/ apply to deals that are independently 
decomposable. These are deals that can be decomposed into two subdeals
concerning disjoint sets of agents.

This omission has been corrected in the journal version of the paper:

o U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. 
  Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources. 
  Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25:315-348, 2006. 

Note that the main implication of the two theorems, namely that deals 
involving any number of agents and resources can be necessary to reach a 
socially optimal allocation by means of rational deals, is not affected 
by this issue.

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