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ERRATA: Paper [EndrissEtAlMFI2003]
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U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. 
Resource Allocation in Egalitarian Agent Societies.
Secondes Journees Francophones sur les Modeles Formels d'Interaction 
(MFI-2003), pages 101-110, Cepadues-Editions, May 2003.
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Theorem 2 does /not/ apply to deals that are independently decomposable. 
These are deals that can be decomposed into two subdeals concerning 
disjoint sets of agents.

This omission has been corrected in the journal version of the paper:

o U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. 
  Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources. 
  Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25:315-348, 2006. 

Note that the main implication of the theorem, namely that deals 
involving any number of agents and resources can be necessary to reach a 
socially optimal allocation by means of equitable deals, is not affected 
by this issue.

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