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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2019/newsitem/10906/28
 ---29-November-2019-Mental-Representations-in-a-Me
 chanical-World-Bochum-Germany
DTSTAMP:20190523T183329
SUMMARY:Mental Representations in a Mechanical Wor
 ld, Bochum, Germany
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20191128
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20191129
LOCATION:Bochum, Germany
DESCRIPTION:The concept of representation is ubiqu
 itous in cognitive science and in the philosophy o
 f mind. Neural representations are postulated by n
 euroscientists to explain sub-personal phenomena s
 uch as the processing of visual information in the
  brain, while mental representations are taken to 
 explain person-level phenomena, such as imaginatio
 n, or consciousness. But non-representationalists 
 contend that postulating representations of any so
 rt is unnecessary or problematic. This workshop in
 vestigates the status of representations in a mech
 anical account of the mind and cognition. One core
  question will be whether the status of neural and
  mental representation is equally problematic. A s
 econd core question concerns the relationship betw
 een neural and mental representations.  Speakers: 
 Joe Dewhurst (LMU), Carrie Figdor (Iowa), Jolien F
 rancken (Amsterdam), Matej Kohar (RUB), Beate Kric
 kel (RUB), Marcin Milkowski (Polish Academy of Sci
 ences) and Karina Vold (Cambridge).  A number of f
 urther presentation slots have been reserved for i
 nterested scholars selected by double-blind peer r
 eview process. The contributions should be suitabl
 e for a 30 minute presentation.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<div>\n  <p>The conce
 pt of representation is ubiquitous in cognitive sc
 ience and in the philosophy of mind. Neural repres
 entations are postulated by neuroscientists to exp
 lain sub-personal phenomena such as the processing
  of visual information in the brain, while mental 
 representations are taken to explain person-level 
 phenomena, such as imagination, or consciousness. 
 But non-representationalists contend that postulat
 ing representations of any sort is unnecessary or 
 problematic. This workshop investigates the status
  of representations in a mechanical account of the
  mind and cognition.&nbsp;One core question&nbsp;w
 ill be whether the status of neural and mental rep
 resentation is equally problematic. A second core 
 question concerns the relationship between neural 
 and mental representations.</p>\n\n  <p>Speakers: 
 Joe Dewhurst (LMU), Carrie Figdor (Iowa), Jolien F
 rancken (Amsterdam), Matej Kohar (RUB), Beate Kric
 kel (RUB), Marcin Milkowski (Polish Academy of Sci
 ences) and Karina Vold (Cambridge).</p>\n</div><di
 v>\n  <p>A number of further presentation slots ha
 ve been reserved for interested scholars selected 
 by double-blind peer review process. The contribut
 ions should be suitable for a 30 minute presentati
 on.</p>\n</div>
URL:http://meta4e.com/workshop/
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