The relat ionship between mathematics and science continues to be of considerable philosophical interest. With in contemporary philosophy of science, for example , pinpointing the exact role of mathematics in the sciences remains a hotly debated issue. Does math ematics play a mere inferential role in that it al lows for the derivations of one substantial truth from another or is mathematics more than a 'theore tical juice-extractor'? Are there distinctive math ematical explanations of physical phenomena? Simil ar questions can be asked about the role of logic in science.
\n\nThese issues connect with discussions within the philosophy of mathematics ( and the philosophy of logic) concerning the nature of mathematics (or logic). Within the philosophy of mathematics, Platonists, nominalists and struct uralists consider mathematics to be fundamentally different in kind from empirical science, while em piricists have argued that mathematics is, just li ke other sciences, fundamentally about aspects of the empirical world. Different positions within th e debate about the nature of mathematics will, arg uably, lead to different answers to the question a s to how mathematics and science are related.
\ n\nIn this workshop we want to focus on how t hese different philosophies of mathematics fare in giving an account of mathematical practice and th e role of mathematics in scientific practice.
\ nWe welcome contributions that a pproach these (and related) topics either from a s ystematic or a historic angle. In other words, we welcome contributions that elaborate and defend yo ur own position, but also contributions that discu ss the views that philosophers and scientists had on these topics in the past.
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