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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2024/newsitem/14777/27
 ---28-September-2024-Workshop-on-Truth-Definabilit
 y-and-Quantification-into-Sentence-Position-Vienna
 -Austria-
DTSTAMP:20240201T143755
SUMMARY:Workshop on Truth, Definability and Quanti
 fication into Sentence Position, Vienna (Austria)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240927
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240928
LOCATION:Vienna (Austria)
DESCRIPTION:Can truth be defined? Frege argued tha
 t it couldn't. Ramsey argued that defining it woul
 d be easy if only we had an analysis of judgement.
  Today Horwich claims that truth cannot be defined
  explicitly because doing so would require quantif
 ication into sentence position and such quantifica
 tion is not coherent. Instead he proposes a “minim
 al theory” of truth, which comprises all the unpro
 blematic instances of the equivalence schema. Künn
 e, by contrast, argues that quantification into se
 ntence position is coherent and may actually be pa
 rt of some natural languages. Künne uses such quan
 tification to define truth explicitly: ∀x (x is tr
 ue iff ∃p ((x is the proposition that p) & p)). Or
  in English: a representation (belief, assertion e
 tc) is true just if things are as it represents th
 em as being.  Is truth definable? Is propositional
  quantification coherent? Do natural languages inv
 olve propositional quantification, and in what sen
 se? What do the answers to these questions mean fo
 r philosophical attempts to define or explain trut
 h? Is truth redundant if explicitly definable? Not
  redundant if not explicitly definable? We are int
 erested in these and related questions (broadly co
 nceived).  Confirmed speakers are: Peter Fritz (Au
 stralian Catholic University), Paul Horwich (New Y
 ork University), Wolfgang Künne (University of Ham
 burg), Poppy Mankowitz (University of Bristol)  an
 d Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto).  We invite
  submissions of extended abstracts (1000 words max
 .) for up to 3 further talks. Please send your ano
 nymized abstracts by 22 March 2024 to truthwien at
  gmail.com. Selected speakers will be notified by 
 mid April. We will cover accommodation of selected
  speakers (and on application offer them a travel 
 subsidy of up to 400 Euros).
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<div>\n  <p>Can truth
  be defined? Frege argued that it couldn't. Ramsey
  argued that defining it would be easy if only we 
 had an analysis of judgement. Today Horwich claims
  that truth cannot be defined explicitly because d
 oing so would require quantification into sentence
  position and such quantification is not coherent.
  Instead he proposes a “minimal theory” of truth, 
 which comprises all the unproblematic instances of
  the equivalence schema. Künne, by contrast, argue
 s that quantification into sentence position is co
 herent and may actually be part of some natural la
 nguages. Künne uses such quantification to define 
 truth explicitly: ∀x (x is true iff ∃p ((x is the 
 proposition that p) & p)). Or in English: a repres
 entation (belief, assertion etc) is true just if t
 hings are as it represents them as being.</p>\n  <
 p>Is truth definable? Is propositional quantificat
 ion coherent? Do natural languages involve proposi
 tional quantification, and in what sense? What do 
 the answers to these questions mean for philosophi
 cal attempts to define or explain truth? Is truth 
 redundant if explicitly definable? Not redundant i
 f not explicitly definable? We are interested in t
 hese and related questions (broadly conceived).</p
 >\n  <p>Confirmed speakers are: Peter Fritz (Austr
 alian Catholic University), Paul Horwich (New York
  University), Wolfgang Künne (University of Hambur
 g), Poppy Mankowitz (University of Bristol)&nbsp; 
 and Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto).</p>\n</d
 iv><div>\n  <p>We invite submissions of extended a
 bstracts (1000 words max.) for up to 3 further tal
 ks. Please send your anonymized abstracts by 22 Ma
 rch 2024 to&nbsp;<a class="email" href="#">truthwi
 en<span class="at">&nbsp;at&nbsp;</span>gmail.com<
 /a>. Selected speakers will be notified by mid Apr
 il. We will cover accommodation of selected speake
 rs (and on application offer them a travel subsidy
  of up to 400 Euros).</p>\n</div>
URL:https://philevents.org/event/show/119270
CONTACT:truthwien at gmail.com
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