\n Group decision-making problems occur every ti me a collective\n choice has to be made fro m several individuals that have\n conflicti ng interests or preferences. There has been recent ly\n a growing interest on the use of logic as the basic tool for\n formalizing and co mputing those problems. This is in\n partic ular true in two close fields of research. The fir st one\n lies at the intersection of game t heory and logics, especially\n by exploring how modal logics may be used to model and reason\ n about games. A second one, which focuses on the logical\n insights into rational col lective choice, has recently emerged\n arou nd problems of judgment aggregation and beliefs/go als\n merging, on the one hand, and logical formalization of welfare\n distribution pr ocesses (social software), on the other. These\n two domains propose further formal refinemen ts, using logical\n tools, of the classical theories of collective\n decision-making, by offering new evaluation criteria of and\n new ways of building social choice procedures. T he workshop\n aims at sparking off interact ion between social choice\n theorists, comp uter scientists, logicians and philosophers.\n
\n \n \nFor more informatio n, see\n https://www.illc.uva.nl/LCD 07/\n\n or contact us via lcd07 at hotmail.fr.\n
\n\n The aim of this workshop is to promote interacti on between\n researchers in the areas of lo gics and collective\n decision-making theor ies. We invite submissions of abstracts\n i n the interface of the above or related areas that \n investigate common problems. Authors sh ould send an abstract\n by January, 31st.\n
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