BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2017/newsitem/8317/2-- -3-March-2017-Consequence-and-Paradox-between-Trut h-and-Proof-Tuebingen-Germany DTSTAMP:20161031T141140 SUMMARY:Consequence and Paradox between Truth and Proof, Tuebingen, Germany DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20170302 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20170303 LOCATION:Tuebingen, Germany DESCRIPTION:The notion of logical consequence has been traditionally analysed as necessary truth-pre servation, and such an analysis is at the core of contemporary model-theoretic approaches to semanti cs. An alternative approach to semantics is infere ntialism, according to which the notions of infere nce and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of reference, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory. Inferenti alism has mostly been developed in opposition to t he more traditional semantic approach. However, th e tight relationships between the basic concepts i nvolved in the two approaches suggest a more compl ex interplay than mere opposition. Many of the cen tral notions (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g . interpolation) in logic usually have both a mode l-theoretic and a proof-theoretic dimension. Moreo ver, the notions of truth and proof, when conceive d as the central notions of a theory of meaning, s hare many of their core features. This complex in terplay between truth and proof can be found in cu rrent debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to p aradoxes are motivated sometimes by traditional se mantic considerations, sometimes by considerations about the structural features of our inferential practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires resources coming from both mode l-theoretic and inferential conceptions of languag e and meaning. The aim of the workshop is to brin g together researchers working on different aspect s of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange ideas and methods and discuss recent results. If you would like to contribute a talk (30-45 minute s), then please send a one-page abstract to Luca T ranchini at cptp-cfp at informatik.uni-tuebingen.d e. The deadline for submission is 15 December 2016 . X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
The notio n of logical consequence has been traditionally an alysed as necessary truth-preservation, and such a n analysis is at the core of contemporary model-th eoretic approaches to semantics. An alternative ap proach to semantics is inferentialism, according t o which the notions of inference and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of referen ce, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory.
\n\nInferentialism has mostly been developed in opposition to the more tr aditional semantic approach. However, the tight re lationships between the basic concepts involved in the two approaches suggest a more complex interpl ay than mere opposition. Many of the central notio ns (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g. interpol ation) in logic usually have both a model-theoreti c and a proof-theoretic dimension. Moreover, the n otions of truth and proof, when conceived as the c entral notions of a theory of meaning, share many of their core features.
\n\nThis complex i nterplay between truth and proof can be found in c urrent debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to paradoxes are motivated sometimes by traditional s emantic considerations, sometimes by consideration s about the structural features of our inferential practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires resources coming from both mod el-theoretic and inferential conceptions of langua ge and meaning.
\n\nThe aim of the worksho p is to bring together researchers working on diff erent aspects of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange ideas and methods and discuss recent results.
If you would like to contribute a talk (30-45 minutes), then please se nd a one-page abstract to Luca Tranchini at cptp-cfp  ;at informatik.uni-tuebingen.de. T he deadline for submission is 15 December 2016.