The notio n of logical consequence has been traditionally an alysed as necessary truth-preservation, and such a n analysis is at the core of contemporary model-th eoretic approaches to semantics. An alternative ap proach to semantics is inferentialism, according t o which the notions of inference and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of referen ce, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory.
\n\nInferentialism has mostly been developed in opposition to the more tr aditional semantic approach. However, the tight re lationships between the basic concepts involved in the two approaches suggest a more complex interpl ay than mere opposition. Many of the central notio ns (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g. interpol ation) in logic usually have both a model-theoreti c and a proof-theoretic dimension. Moreover, the n otions of truth and proof, when conceived as the c entral notions of a theory of meaning, share many of their core features.
\n\nThis complex i nterplay between truth and proof can be found in c urrent debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to paradoxes are motivated sometimes by traditional s emantic considerations, sometimes by consideration s about the structural features of our inferential practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires resources coming from both mod el-theoretic and inferential conceptions of langua ge and meaning.
\n\nThe aim of the worksho p is to bring together researchers working on diff erent aspects of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange ideas and methods and discuss recent results.
\nIf you would like to contribute a talk (30-45 minutes), then please send a one-page abstract to Luca Tranchini at cptp-cfp&nb sp;at informatik.uni-tuebingen.de. The deadline for submission is 15 December 2016.< /p>\n