Scientist s are regularly called upon to serve as experts ad visors for various institutions, be it on the auth orization of a new drug, the effects of climate ch ange, or a monetary policy. Typically, expert advi sers are constituted in panels, who are to utter t heir advice collectively. This raises a variety of questions about the decision-making process: How should the group best take advantage of the indivi dual strengths and expertise? How to wager individ ual opinions and how to ideally deal with peer dis agreement? One may want to devise special delibera tion procedures to avoid groupthink, and to instal l voting rules tailored to the situation at hand.< /p>\n\n
This workshop aims at gathering resear chers who tackle these normative questions, from a variety of perspectives. We aim to bring together approaches from fields such as philosophy of scie nce, social epistemology, political philosophy, po litical science, judgment aggregation, social choi ce theory, or agent-based modeling that provide in side on these problems. We are particularly lookin g for papers who are concerned with the specificit y of both group decision-making and scientific exp ertise (compared to, say, an individual scientist giving advice, or a group of friends choosing a re staurant). Submissions may cover abstract work as well as case studies, and may involve formal tools .
\nPlease submit an extended abstract of maximum 1000 words suitable for blind review, together with a short abstract of maximum 100 words. Submissions may cover abstract work as well as case studies, and may involve formal tool s.
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