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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/1104/12-
 December-2005-Logic-and-Game-Reading-Group-Special
 -Event-Martin-van-Hees-University-of-Groningen-Dep
 artment-of-Philosophy-
DTSTAMP:20051201T000000
SUMMARY:Logic and Game Reading Group, Special Even
 t, Martin van Hees (University of Groningen, Depar
 tment of Philosophy)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Martin van Hees (University 
 of Groningen, Department of Philosophy)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20051212T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20051212T163000
LOCATION:P3.27, Euclides Building, Plantage Muider
 gracht, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:My object here is twofold. In the firs
 t part I will try to explain why it is important f
 or rational choice theory to incorporate intention
 s in its framework. In doing so I shall not yet go
  into the question whether intentions can be defin
 ed in terms of strategies, preferences, or beliefs
  or in any other ingredient of the existing models
 ; I simply introduce intentions as an extra variab
 le and then introduce some conditions that one mig
 ht impose on them. I argue that the conditions tha
 t I use reveal new information about the behaviour
  of rational individuals and that intentions thus 
 do indeed add something to rational choice theory.
    Whereas the first part is somewhat formal, the 
 second part is of a more informal nature. Here I w
 ill address the question of how certain intentions
  are to be defined in terms of specific rational c
 hoice models. It is argued that a particular class
  of intentions, viz. intentions that have autonomo
 us effects, cannot be modelled by standard rationa
 l choice theory in a satisfactory way.    For more
  information: oroy at science.uva.nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <p>\n        
 My object here is twofold. In the first part I wil
 l try to explain why it is important for rational 
 choice theory to incorporate intentions in its fra
 mework. In doing so I shall not yet go into the qu
 estion whether intentions can be defined in terms 
 of strategies, preferences, or beliefs or in any o
 ther ingredient of the existing models; I simply i
 ntroduce intentions as an extra variable and then 
 introduce some conditions that one might impose on
  them. I argue that the conditions that I use reve
 al new information about\n        the behaviour of
  rational individuals and that intentions thus do 
 indeed add something to rational choice theory.\n 
      </p>\n      <p>Whereas the first part is some
 what formal, the second part is of a more informal
  nature. Here I will address the question of how c
 ertain intentions are to be defined in terms of sp
 ecific rational choice models. It is argued that a
  particular class of intentions, viz. intentions t
 hat have autonomous effects, cannot be modelled by
  standard rational choice theory in a satisfactory
  way.\n      </p>\n    \n      <p>\n        For mo
 re information: <a class="email">oroy <span class=
 "at">at</span> science.uva.nl</a>\n      </p>\n   
  
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/1104/12-
 December-2005-Logic-and-Game-Reading-Group-Special
 -Event-Martin-van-Hees-University-of-Groningen-Dep
 artment-of-Philosophy-
END:VEVENT
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