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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2006/newsitem/1143/2-F
 ebruary-2006-Computational-Social-Choice-Seminar-K
 rzysztof-Apt
DTSTAMP:20060116T000000
SUMMARY:Computational Social Choice Seminar, Krzys
 ztof Apt
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Krzysztof Apt
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20060202T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20060202T000000
LOCATION:P-3.27, Euclides Building, Plantage Muide
 rgracht 24, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:The rationalizability concept was intr
 oduced in (Bernheim 84) and (Pearson 84) to assess
  what can be inferred by rational players in a non
 -cooperative game in presence of common knowledge.
  However, this notion can be defined in a number w
 ays that differ in seemingly unimportant minor det
 ails. We shed light on these differences, explain 
 their impact, and clarify for which games these no
 tions coincide. Also we apply the same analysis to
  clarify the differences and similarities between 
 various ways iterated elimination of strictly domi
 nated strategies was defined in the literature.   
 The paper is available at http://homepages.cwi.nl/
 ~apt/ps/stronger05.ps. For more information, pleas
 e contact Ulle Endriss (ulle at illc.uva.nl).
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <p>\n        
 The rationalizability concept was introduced in (B
 ernheim 84) and (Pearson 84) to assess what can be
  inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative
  game in presence of common knowledge. However, th
 is notion can be defined in a number ways that dif
 fer in seemingly unimportant minor details. We she
 d light on these differences, explain their impact
 , and clarify for which games these notions coinci
 de. Also we apply the same analysis to clarify the
  differences and similarities between various ways
  iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate
 gies was defined in the literature.\n      </p>\n 
    \n      <p>The paper is available at <a target=
 "_blank" href="http://homepages.cwi.nl/~apt/ps/str
 onger05.ps">http://homepages.cwi.nl/~apt/ps/strong
 er05.ps</a>.\n        For more information, please
  contact Ulle Endriss (<a class="email">ulle <span
  class="at">at</span> illc.uva.nl</a>).\n      </p
 >\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2006/newsitem/1143/2-F
 ebruary-2006-Computational-Social-Choice-Seminar-K
 rzysztof-Apt
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