BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2020/newsitem/11524/4-
 February-2020-joint-EXPRESS-DiP-Colloquium-Daniel-
 Rotschild
DTSTAMP:20200127T143125
SUMMARY:joint EXPRESS-DiP Colloquium, Daniel Rotsc
 hild
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Daniel Rotschild (UCL)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20200204T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20200204T173000
LOCATION:ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107
 , Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:On the Lockean thesis one ought to bel
 ieve a proposition if and only if one assigns it a
  credence at or above a threshold (Foley 1992). Th
 e Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of linking 
 sets of all-or-nothing beliefs with credences. Rec
 ent work on the lexical semantics of attitude verb
 s such a 'think’ and ‘believe’ suggest that Lockea
 nism is more plausible than the view that believin
 g a proposition requires having full confidence in
  it (Hawthorne, Rothschild and Spectre, 2016). In 
 this talk, I will give two independent characteriz
 ations of sets of full beliefs satisfying the Lock
 ean thesis. One is in terms of betting disposition
 s associated with full beliefs and one is in terms
  of an accuracy scoring system for full beliefs. T
 hese characterizations are parallel to, but not me
 rely derivative from, the more familiar Dutch book
  (de Finetti 1974) and accuracy arguments (Joyce 1
 998) for probabilism.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>On the Lockean
  thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and 
 only if one assigns it a credence at or above a th
 reshold (Foley 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, pr
 ovides a way of linking sets of all-or-nothing bel
 iefs with credences. Recent work on the lexical se
 mantics of attitude verbs such a 'think’ and ‘beli
 eve’ suggest that Lockeanism is more plausible tha
 n the view that believing a proposition requires h
 aving full confidence in it (Hawthorne, Rothschild
  and Spectre, 2016). In this talk, I will give two
  independent characterizations of sets of full bel
 iefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in term
 s of betting dispositions associated with full bel
 iefs and one is in terms of an accuracy scoring sy
 stem for full beliefs. These characterizations are
  parallel to, but not merely derivative from, the 
 more familiar Dutch book (de Finetti 1974) and acc
 uracy arguments (Joyce 1998) for probabilism.</p>\
 n
URL:https://inferentialexpressivism.com/seminar/4-
 february-2020-daniel-rotschild/
CONTACT:Leïla Bussière at bussiere at sequitur.eu
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR