BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2020/newsitem/12077/13
 -November-2020-Meaning-Logic-and-Cognition-MLC-Sem
 inar-Julian-Schlöder
DTSTAMP:20201109T141516
SUMMARY:Meaning, Logic, and Cognition (MLC) Semina
 r, Julian Schlöder
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Julian Schlöder
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20201113T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20201113T173000
LOCATION:Online, via Zoom
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. *All truths are knowable* ap
 pears to entail that *all truths are known*; this 
 is Fitch's paradox. Recent work has generalised th
 e paradox; e.g. *all truths are believable* entail
 s that *all beliefs are true* and *all knowledge i
 s correctly assertible* entails that *all assertio
 ns are correct*. I suggest a general strategy to r
 esolve such paradoxes. The suggestion is that "-ab
 le" should be understood dynamically with a backwa
 rd-looking component. In case of the Fitch paradox
 , my suggestion is that *p is know-able* means tha
 t there is some act that, if executed, imparts the
  knowledge that *before the act was executed, p*. 
 The modal flavour of such *-able* varies with what
  the relevant acts are (alethic = possible acts; d
 eontic = permitted acts; etc). In the talk, I lay 
 out the different "Fitch-like" problems, conceptua
 lly defend the dynamic/backward strategy (which I 
 trace to the work of Dorothy Edgington on the Fitc
 h paradox) and sketch the general a logical framew
 ork to implement this strategy.  Zoom link: https:
 //uva-live.zoom.us/j/82405276346
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p><strong>Abstra
 ct</strong>. *All truths are knowable* appears to 
 entail that *all truths are known*; this is Fitch'
 s paradox. Recent work has generalised the paradox
 ; e.g. *all truths are believable* entails that *a
 ll beliefs are true* and *all knowledge is correct
 ly assertible* entails that *all assertions are co
 rrect*. I suggest a general strategy to resolve su
 ch paradoxes. The suggestion is that &quot;-able&q
 uot; should be understood dynamically with a backw
 ard-looking component. In case of the Fitch parado
 x, my suggestion is that *p is know-able* means th
 at there is some act that, if executed, imparts th
 e knowledge that *before the act was executed, p*.
  The modal flavour of such *-able* varies with wha
 t the relevant acts are (alethic = possible acts; 
 deontic = permitted acts; etc). In the talk, I lay
  out the different &quot;Fitch-like&quot; problems
 , conceptually defend the dynamic/backward strateg
 y (which I trace to the work of Dorothy Edgington 
 on the Fitch paradox) and sketch the general a log
 ical framework to implement this strategy.</p>\n\n
   <p>Zoom link: <a href="https://uva-live.zoom.us/
 j/82405276346" target="_blank">https://uva-live.zo
 om.us/j/82405276346</a></p>\n
URL:http://projects.illc.uva.nl/LoLa/MLC-Seminar/e
 vent/35164/
CONTACT:Dean McHugh at d.m.mchugh at uva.nl
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR