BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/12781/27 -May-2021-DIEP-Seminar-Olivier-Roy DTSTAMP:20210526T170906 SUMMARY:DIEP Seminar, Olivier Roy ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Olivier Roy (Bayreuth Univer sity) DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20210527T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20210527T130000 LOCATION:Zoom DESCRIPTION:In this talk we will present a number of results stemming from a computational model of collective attitude formation through a combinatio n of group deliberation and aggregation. In this m odel the participants repeatedly exchange and upda te their preferences over small sets of alternativ es, until they reach a stable preference profile. When they do so the collective attitude is compute d by pairwise majority voting. The model shows, on the one hand, that rational preference change can fill an existing gap in known mechanisms purporte d to explain how deliberation can help avoiding in coherent group preferences. On the other hand, the model also reveals that when the participants are sufficiently biased towards their own opinion, de liberation can actually create incoherent group ra nkings, against the received view. The model sugge sts furthermore that rational deliberation can exh ibit high levels of path dependencies or "anchorin g", where the group opinion is strongly dependent on the order in which the participants contribute to the discussion. We will finish by discussing po ssible trade-offs between such positive and negati ve features of group deliberation. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
In this talk w e will present a number of results stemming from a computational model of collective attitude format ion through a combination of group deliberation an d aggregation. In this model the participants repe atedly exchange and update their preferences over small sets of alternatives, until they reach a sta ble preference profile. When they do so the collec tive attitude is computed by pairwise majority vot ing. The model shows, on the one hand, that ration al preference change can fill an existing gap in k nown mechanisms purported to explain how deliberat ion can help avoiding incoherent group preferences . On the other hand, the model also reveals that w hen the participants are sufficiently biased towar ds their own opinion, deliberation can actually cr eate incoherent group rankings, against the receiv ed view. The model suggests furthermore that ratio nal deliberation can exhibit high levels of path d ependencies or "anchoring", where the gr oup opinion is strongly dependent on the order in which the participants contribute to the discussio n. We will finish by discussing possible trade-off s between such positive and negative features of g roup deliberation.
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/12781/27 -May-2021-DIEP-Seminar-Olivier-Roy CONTACT:Soroush Rafiee Rad at soroush.r.rad at gma il.com END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR