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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/12781/27
 -May-2021-DIEP-Seminar-Olivier-Roy
DTSTAMP:20210526T170906
SUMMARY:DIEP Seminar, Olivier Roy
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Olivier Roy (Bayreuth Univer
 sity)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20210527T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20210527T130000
LOCATION:Zoom
DESCRIPTION:In this talk we will present a number 
 of results stemming from a computational model of 
 collective attitude formation through a combinatio
 n of group deliberation and aggregation. In this m
 odel the participants repeatedly exchange and upda
 te their preferences over small sets of alternativ
 es, until they reach a stable preference profile. 
 When they do so the collective attitude is compute
 d by pairwise majority voting. The model shows, on
  the one hand, that rational preference change can
  fill an existing gap in known mechanisms purporte
 d to explain how deliberation can help avoiding in
 coherent group preferences. On the other hand, the
  model also reveals that when the participants are
  sufficiently biased towards their own opinion, de
 liberation can actually create incoherent group ra
 nkings, against the received view. The model sugge
 sts furthermore that rational deliberation can exh
 ibit high levels of path dependencies or "anchorin
 g", where the group opinion is strongly dependent 
 on the order in which the participants contribute 
 to the discussion. We will finish by discussing po
 ssible trade-offs between such positive and negati
 ve features of group deliberation.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>In this talk w
 e will present a number of results stemming from a
  computational model of collective attitude format
 ion through a combination of group deliberation an
 d aggregation. In this model the participants repe
 atedly exchange and update their preferences over 
 small sets of alternatives, until they reach a sta
 ble preference profile. When they do so the collec
 tive attitude is computed by pairwise majority vot
 ing. The model shows, on the one hand, that ration
 al preference change can fill an existing gap in k
 nown mechanisms purported to explain how deliberat
 ion can help avoiding incoherent group preferences
 . On the other hand, the model also reveals that w
 hen the participants are sufficiently biased towar
 ds their own opinion, deliberation can actually cr
 eate incoherent group rankings, against the receiv
 ed view. The model suggests furthermore that ratio
 nal deliberation can exhibit high levels of path d
 ependencies or &quot;anchoring&quot;, where the gr
 oup opinion is strongly dependent on the order in 
 which the participants contribute to the discussio
 n. We will finish by discussing possible trade-off
 s between such positive and negative features of g
 roup deliberation.</p>\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/12781/27
 -May-2021-DIEP-Seminar-Olivier-Roy
CONTACT:Soroush Rafiee Rad at soroush.r.rad at gma
 il.com
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