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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/13094/2-
 November-2021-EXPRESS-PhilMath-Seminar-Corine-Bess
 on
DTSTAMP:20211101T030340
SUMMARY:EXPRESS / PhilMath Seminar, Corine Besson
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Corine Besson
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211102T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211102T180000
LOCATION:Online via Zoom
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s 
 justification to use a logical principle such as M
 odus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amon
 gst epistemologists of logic that such justificati
 on cannot be internalist. One key reason offered f
 or this view is that internalist accounts of justi
 fication are susceptible to Carroll-style regresse
 s. In this talk, I examine this claim and argue th
 at internalist accounts of justification are not o
 pen to such regresses. I further argue that the so
 rts of externalist accounts of the justification o
 f logical principles typically put forward as alte
 rnatives are inadequate.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p><em>Abstract</
 em>: What is the nature of one’s justification to 
 use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in re
 asoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologis
 ts of logic that such justification cannot be inte
 rnalist. One key reason offered for this view is t
 hat internalist accounts of justification are susc
 eptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, 
 I examine this claim and argue that internalist ac
 counts of justification are not open to such regre
 sses. I further argue that the sorts of externalis
 t accounts of the justification of logical princip
 les typically put forward as alternatives are inad
 equate.</p>\n
URL:https://inferentialexpressivism.com/seminar/
CONTACT:Leïla Bussière at bussiere at sequitur.eu
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