BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/13124/12 -November-2021-Cool-Logic-Tibo-Rushbrooke DTSTAMP:20211108T000349 SUMMARY:Cool Logic, Tibo Rushbrooke ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Tibo Rushbrooke DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211112T180000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211112T200000 LOCATION:Room D1.111, Science Park 904, Amsterdam DESCRIPTION:In his seminal 1936 paper "On the Conc ept of Logical Consequence", Tarski provides a not ion of logical consequence which has become standa rd in analytic philosophy today. Tarski argues tha t logical consequence is independent of the meanin gs of non-logical terms, on the grounds that a log ical inference cannot rely on any empirical knowle dge of the objects referred to. Accordingly, he de fines a logical consequence relation which is inse nsitive to the meanings of the non-logical vocabul ary. In this talk, I will closely scrutinise Tarsk i’s original reasoning. I will then give an altern ative notion of logical consequence in natural lan guage, which is entirely sensitive to the meanings of the terms involved. I argue that the alternati ve notion is both interesting and fruitful, in tha t it captures certain inferences not reckoned as ‘ logical’ by the traditional notion, thus broadenin g the scope of logic. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n

In his seminal 1936 paper "On the Concept of Logical Conseq uence", Tarski provides a notion of logical c onsequence which has become standard in analytic p hilosophy today. Tarski argues that logical conseq uence is independent of the meanings of non-logica l terms, on the grounds that a logical inference c annot rely on any empirical knowledge of the objec ts referred to. Accordingly, he defines a logical consequence relation which is insensitive to the m eanings of the non-logical vocabulary. In this tal k, I will closely scrutinise Tarski’s original rea soning. I will then give an alternative notion of logical consequence in natural language, which is entirely sensitive to the meanings of the terms in volved. I argue that the alternative notion is bot h interesting and fruitful, in that it captures ce rtain inferences not reckoned as ‘logical’ by the traditional notion, thus broadening the scope of l ogic.

\n URL:http://events.illc.uva.nl/coollogic CONTACT:Tibo Rushbrooke, Vasily Romanovsky at cool logic.uva at gmail.com END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR