BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2021/newsitem/13180/26
-November-2021-Cool-Logic-Vasily-Romanovskiy
DTSTAMP:20211128T233834
SUMMARY:Cool Logic, Vasily Romanovskiy
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Vasily Romanovskiy
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211126T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20211126T183000
LOCATION:Room D1.116, Science Park 904, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:In his pioneering ‘Truth and Probabili
ty’ (1931), Frank Ramsey sets out an influential a
ccount of the nature, measurement, and norms of pa
rtial belief. The centrepiece of this work is a re
presentation theorem that allows Ramsey to constru
ct a unique probability function representing an a
gent’s subjective degrees of confidence. In many w
ays, this marks the birth of decision theory as a
field and the birth of the subjective interpretati
on of probability. In this expository talk we will
examine the philosophical background underlying R
amsey’s goals in this work, we will re-construct t
he main formal moves Ramsey makes in proving his r
epresentation theorem and finally, we will critici
se some of the philosophically contentious assumpt
ions that permeate throughout ‘Truth and Probabili
ty’ (1931). Taking a broader perspective, represen
tation theorems are the underbelly of much work in
theoretical economics, the underbelly behind clai
ms like ‘humans are rational’. This talk will give
a first-hand look at (just) one such representati
on theorem, but the illustrative purposes this wil
l serve will hopefully be felt by anyone who is a
slave of some defunct economist. Which, if some ar
e to believed, includes all of us.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n In his pioneer
ing ‘Truth and Probability’ (1931), Frank Ramsey s
ets out an influential account of the nature, meas
urement, and norms of partial belief. The centrepi
ece of this work is a representation theorem that
allows Ramsey to construct a unique probability fu
nction representing an agent’s subjective degrees
of confidence. In many ways, this marks the birth
of decision theory as a field and the birth of the
subjective interpretation of probability. In this
expository talk we will examine the philosophical
background underlying Ramsey’s goals in this work
, we will re-construct the main formal moves Ramse
y makes in proving his representation theorem and
finally, we will criticise some of the philosophic
ally contentious assumptions that permeate through
out ‘Truth and Probability’ (1931). Taking a broad
er perspective, representation theorems are the un
derbelly of much work in theoretical economics, th
e underbelly behind claims like ‘humans are ration
al’. This talk will give a first-hand look at (jus
t) one such representation theorem, but the illust
rative purposes this will serve will hopefully be
felt by anyone who is a slave of some defunct econ
omist. Which, if some are to believed, includes al
l of us.

\n
URL:http://events.illc.uva.nl/coollogic/
CONTACT:Vasily Romanovskiy, Tibo Rushbrooke at coo
llogic.uva at gmail.com
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR