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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2023/newsitem/14091/7-
 February-2023-EXPRESS-Philmath-Seminar-Sarah-Moss
DTSTAMP:20230206T135311
SUMMARY:EXPRESS-Philmath Seminar, Sarah Moss
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Sarah Moss (University of Mi
 chigan)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20230207T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20230207T180000
LOCATION:Online via Zoom
DESCRIPTION:There are two prominent accounts of co
 unterfactuals in the literature---variably strict 
 conditional accounts first developed by Stalnaker 
 and Lewis, and strict conditional accounts defende
 d by von Fintel, Hájek, and others. Unfortunately,
  both accounts face serious challenges. In the fir
 st half of this paper, I argue that existing stric
 t conditional accounts fail to accommodate our pro
 babilistic judgments about counterfactuals. The sa
 me goes for several other semantic theories of cou
 nterfactuals.  Having presented these challenges, 
 I introduce and defend my own positive account of 
 counterfactuals. The account incorporates a key in
 sight of variably strict accounts--namely, that th
 e antecedent of a counterfactual often influences 
 what worlds are relevant to its truth conditions a
 t a context. But unlike variably strict accounts, 
 my view preserves a strict conditional semantics a
 ccording to which Antecedent Strengthening is vali
 d, thereby capturing the data that have motivated 
 other strict conditional theorists. By adopting th
 e right account of the pragmatics of counterfactua
 ls, we can endorse a strict conditional semantics 
 and still straightforwardly capture the full range
  of our intuitive judgments, including probabilist
 ic judgments about counterfactuals.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>There are two 
 prominent accounts of counterfactuals in the liter
 ature---variably strict conditional accounts first
  developed by Stalnaker and Lewis, and strict cond
 itional accounts defended by von Fintel, Hájek, an
 d others. Unfortunately, both accounts face seriou
 s challenges. In the first half of this paper, I a
 rgue that existing strict conditional accounts fai
 l to accommodate our probabilistic judgments about
  counterfactuals. The same goes for several other 
 semantic theories of counterfactuals.</p>\n  <p>Ha
 ving presented these challenges, I introduce and d
 efend my own positive account of counterfactuals. 
 The account incorporates a key insight of variably
  strict accounts--namely, that the antecedent of a
  counterfactual often influences what worlds are r
 elevant to its truth conditions at a context. But 
 unlike variably strict accounts, my view preserves
  a strict conditional semantics according to which
  Antecedent Strengthening is valid, thereby captur
 ing the data that have motivated other strict cond
 itional theorists. By adopting the right account o
 f the pragmatics of counterfactuals, we can endors
 e a strict conditional semantics and still straigh
 tforwardly capture the full range of our intuitive
  judgments, including probabilistic judgments abou
 t counterfactuals.</p>\n
URL:https://inferentialexpressivism.com/seminar/
CONTACT:Luca Incurvati at L.Incurvati at uva.nl
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