BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2023/newsitem/14153/12
 -May-2023-Formalisation-Optimisation-Algorithms-Me
 chanisms-FOAM-Guido-Schäfer
DTSTAMP:20230424T141727
SUMMARY:Formalisation, Optimisation, Algorithms, M
 echanisms (FOAM), Guido Schäfer
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Guido Schäfer
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20230512T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20230512T162500
LOCATION:Room L2.06, ILLC Lab42, Science Park 900,
  Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:  Corruption in auctions, whe
 re an auctioneer engages in bid rigging with one (
 or several) of the bidders, occurs rather frequent
 ly in practice, especially in the public sector (e
 .g., in construction and procurement auctions). We
  study the social welfare loss caused by corrupt a
 uctioneers, both in single-item and multi-unit auc
 tions.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>Abstract:<br>\
 n  Corruption in auctions, where an auctioneer eng
 ages in bid rigging with one (or several) of the b
 idders, occurs rather frequently in practice, espe
 cially in the public sector (e.g., in construction
  and procurement auctions). We study the social we
 lfare loss caused by corrupt auctioneers, both in 
 single-item and multi-unit auctions.</p>\n
URL:https://events.illc.uva.nl/FOAM/posts/talk4/
CONTACT:Gregor Behnke at g.behnke at uva.nl
CONTACT:Ronald de Haan at r.dehaan at uva.nl
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR