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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2006/newsitem/1534/13-
 October-2006-Special-Lecture-Jay-D-Atlas
DTSTAMP:20061005T000000
SUMMARY:Special Lecture, Jay D. Atlas
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Jay D. Atlas (Pomona College
 )
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20061013T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20061013T153000
LOCATION:Room 001 (MFR), Philosophy Department, Ve
 ndelstraat 8, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:.   In his recent [2005] book
  Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a scienc
 e of Consciousness, Dennett renews his attack on a
  philosophical notion of qualia, the success of wh
 ich attack is required if his brand of Functionali
 sm is to survive. He also articulates once again w
 hat he takes to be essential to his notion of cons
 ciousness. I shall argue that his new, central arg
 ument against the philosophical concept of qualia 
 fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that Da
 vid Rosenthal's "higher-order thought" theory of c
 onsciousness also faces in accounting for qualia. 
 I then contrast Dennett's newest account of consci
 ousness with interestingly different conceptions b
 y contemporary neuro-scientists, and I suggest tha
 t philosophers should take the recent suggestions 
 by neuro-scientists more seriously as a subject fo
 r philosophical investigation.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <h4>Abstract:
 </h4>\n      <p>\n       In his recent [2005] book
  Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles\n       to 
 a science of Consciousness, Dennett renews his att
 ack on a\n       philosophical notion of qualia, t
 he success of which attack is\n       required if 
 his brand of Functionalism is to survive.  He also
 \n       articulates once again what he takes to b
 e essential to his\n       notion of consciousness
 . I shall argue that his new, central\n       argu
 ment against the philosophical concept of qualia f
 ails.  In\n       passing I point out a difficulty
  that David Rosenthal's\n       "higher-order thou
 ght" theory of consciousness also faces in\n      
  accounting for qualia.  I then contrast Dennett's
  newest\n       account of consciousness with inte
 restingly different\n       conceptions by contemp
 orary neuro-scientists, and I suggest\n       that
  philosophers should take the recent suggestions b
 y\n       neuro-scientists more seriously as a sub
 ject for philosophical\n       investigation.\n   
    </p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2006/newsitem/1534/13-
 October-2006-Special-Lecture-Jay-D-Atlas
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