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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2025/newsitem/15817/2-
 October-2025-Philosophy-of-Mathematics-Φ-Math-Read
 ing-Group
DTSTAMP:20250930T141748
SUMMARY:Philosophy of Mathematics (Φ-Math) Reading
  Group
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20251002T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20251002T173000
LOCATION:ILLC seminar room F1.15, Science Park 107
 , Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:We kick off the academic year with Wil
 liam Tait’s compelling exposition of the tension b
 etween Truth and Proof in Mathematics. Are mathema
 tical proofs constructed or discovered by means of
  a proof? In the decade-long debate between constr
 uctivist and platonists, Tait defends Platonism by
  attacking some of Dummett’s main claims in favour
  of intuitionism. By adopting a similar approach t
 owards the relaionship between language and realit
 y as Dummet’s, he aims to downsize the accusations
  intuitionists wage against mathematical realists,
  arguing that proofs are merely representations of
  mathematical truth. The issues Tait brings up in 
 this paper are extremely engaging for Intuitionist
 s and Platonists alike, so come plenty and take pa
 rt in the discussion.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>We kick off th
 e academic year with William Tait’s compelling exp
 osition of the tension between Truth and Proof in 
 Mathematics. Are mathematical proofs <em>construct
 ed</em> or <em>discovered</em> by means of a proof
 ? In the decade-long debate between constructivist
  and platonists, Tait defends Platonism by attacki
 ng some of Dummett’s main claims in favour of intu
 itionism. By adopting a similar approach towards t
 he relaionship between language and reality as Dum
 met’s, he aims to downsize the accusations intuiti
 onists wage against mathematical realists, arguing
  that proofs are merely <em>representations</em> o
 f mathematical truth. The issues Tait brings up in
  this paper are extremely engaging for Intuitionis
 ts and Platonists alike, so come plenty and take p
 art in the discussion.</p>\n
URL:https://events.illc.uva.nl/Phi-Math/events/202
 5-10-02-truth-and-proof/
CONTACT:Matteo Celli at matteo.celli at student.uv
 a.nl
CONTACT:Marco De Mayda at marco.de.mayda at studen
 t.uva.nl
CONTACT:Josje van der Laan  at josje.va.der.laan a
 t student.uva.nl
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