BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2002/newsitem/227/6-Ju
 ne-2002-Logic-Tea-Paul-Égré
DTSTAMP:20020528T000000
SUMMARY:Logic Tea, Paul Égré
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Paul Égré
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20020606T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20020606T170000
LOCATION:Room P.018, Euclides Building, Plantage M
 uidergracht 24,\n      Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:In this talk I offer to discuss more c
 losely the links between the Knower Paradox and pr
 ovability interpretations of modal logic. First, I
  bring together and compare the respective strengt
 h of several inconsistency results respectively in
 volving truth predicates, provability predicates, 
 up to knowledge and belief predicates. In a second
  part, I examine how provability interpretations o
 f modal logic enable to bypass the limitations imp
 osed by the Knower and related results. The discus
 sion rests more specifically on an examination of 
 the distinct treatments elaborated by B. Skyrms (1
 978), C.A. Anderson (1983), and R. Solovay (1976).
  imposed by the Knower and related results.    The
  Logic Tea homepage can be found at http://staff.s
 cience.uva.nl/~debruin/logic_tea.html
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <p>\n        
 In this talk I offer to discuss more closely the l
 inks between\n        the Knower Paradox and prova
 bility interpretations of modal\n        logic. Fi
 rst, I bring together and compare the respective\n
         strength of several inconsistency results 
 respectively\n        involving truth predicates, 
 provability predicates, up to\n        knowledge a
 nd belief predicates. In a second part, I examine\
 n        how provability interpretations of modal 
 logic enable to\n        bypass the limitations im
 posed by the Knower and related\n        results. 
 The discussion rests more specifically on an\n    
     examination of the distinct treatments elabora
 ted by B.\n        Skyrms (1978), C.A. Anderson (1
 983), and R. Solovay (1976).\n        imposed by t
 he Knower and related results.\n      </p>\n    \n
       <p>\n        The Logic Tea homepage can be f
 ound at\n          <a target="_blank" href="http:/
 /staff.science.uva.nl/~debruin/logic_tea.html">htt
 p://staff.science.uva.nl/~debruin/logic_tea.html</
 a>\n      </p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2002/newsitem/227/6-Ju
 ne-2002-Logic-Tea-Paul-Égré
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
