BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:ILLC Website
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:19700329T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:19701025T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2008/newsitem/2375/3-J
 une-2008-Truth-values-neither-true-nor-false-and-s
 upervaluations-Nuel-Belnap
DTSTAMP:20080529T000000
SUMMARY:Truth values, neither-true-nor-false, and 
 supervaluations, Nuel Belnap
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Nuel Belnap
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20080603T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20080603T000000
LOCATION:Room 032, Ruppertgebouw, Leuvenlaan, entr
 ance 'educatorium', Utrecht (Bus 11 or 12 from Utr
 echt Central Station).
DESCRIPTION:The first part of this essay defends r
 eliance on truth values against those who, on nomi
 nalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a tru
 th predicate. I rehearse some practical advantages
  of working with truth values in logic. In the sec
 ond part I look at several cases in which logics i
 nvolve, as part of their semantics, quantification
  over a silent parameter, such as modal logic's qu
 antification over worlds. In many cases, this faci
 lity produces truth values for sentences which see
 m neither true nor false by ``supervaluation,'' th
 at is, by ``quantifying out'' the extra, silent ar
 gument. Logics that generate truth values for the 
 neither-true-nor-false in this way exhibit strikin
 g differences. I consider the following: open sent
 ences in first order logic, vague sentences, ambig
 uous sentences, paradoxical sentences, and future-
 tensed sentences in indeterministic tense logic.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>The first part
  of this essay defends reliance on truth values ag
 ainst those who, on nominalistic grounds, would un
 iformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse s
 ome practical advantages of working with truth val
 ues in logic. In the second part I look at several
  cases in which logics involve, as part of their s
 emantics, quantification over a silent parameter, 
 such as modal logic's quantification over worlds. 
 In many cases, this facility produces truth values
  for sentences which seem neither true nor false b
 y ``supervaluation,'' that is, by ``quantifying ou
 t'' the extra, silent argument. Logics that genera
 te truth values for the neither-true-nor-false in 
 this way exhibit striking differences. I consider 
 the following: open sentences in first order logic
 , vague sentences, ambiguous sentences, paradoxica
 l sentences, and future-tensed sentences in indete
 rministic tense logic.</p>\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2008/newsitem/2375/3-J
 une-2008-Truth-values-neither-true-nor-false-and-s
 upervaluations-Nuel-Belnap
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR