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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2009/newsitem/3058/29-
 October-2009-Logic-and-Cognition-Seminar-Alistair-
 Isaac
DTSTAMP:20091028T000000
SUMMARY:Logic and Cognition Seminar, Alistair Isaa
 c
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Alistair Isaac
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20091029T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20091029T180000
LOCATION:Room A.106, Science Park 904, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:Peirce first identified abduction as a
  type of inference distinct from induction and ded
 uction. He claimed that abduction permeates every 
 aspect of human thought, from low-level perception
  to scientific theory choice. In contemporary phil
 osophy, abduction is frequently considered only in
  the latter capacity, as a form of high-level scie
 ntific reasoning. In A.I., abduction is closely as
 sociated with the frame problem, the problem of ho
 w to determine relevance. Again, however, philosop
 hers tend to identify this as a problem only for h
 igh-level reasoning. Fodor, for example, argues th
 at low-level perceptual processes are encapsulated
 , and thus immune to the challenges of holistic re
 asoning, like abduction. In this talk I provide an
  overview of several different perspectives on abd
 uction. I argue that the fundamental stumbling blo
 ck for formal models of abduction is its inherentl
 y creative character. I conclude with a defence of
  Peirce’s original insight, arguing that empirical
  research on perception is a field from which mode
 ls of abduction in other domains (such as scientif
 ic reasoning) can and should draw inspiration.  Fo
 r more information contact Nina Gierasimczuk at N.
 Gierasimczuk at uva.nl.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <p>\n        
 Peirce first identified abduction as a type of inf
 erence\n        distinct from induction and deduct
 ion.  He claimed that\n        abduction permeates
  every aspect of human thought, from\n        low-
 level perception to scientific theory choice.  In\
 n        contemporary philosophy, abduction is fre
 quently considered\n        only in the latter cap
 acity, as a form of high-level\n        scientific
  reasoning.  In A.I., abduction is closely\n      
   associated with the frame problem, the problem o
 f how to\n        determine relevance.  Again, how
 ever, philosophers tend to\n        identify this 
 as a problem only for high-level\n        reasonin
 g. Fodor, for example, argues that low-level\n    
     perceptual processes are encapsulated, and thu
 s immune to the\n        challenges of holistic re
 asoning, like abduction. In this talk\n        I p
 rovide an overview of several different perspectiv
 es on\n        abduction.  I argue that the fundam
 ental stumbling block for\n        formal models o
 f abduction is its inherently creative\n        ch
 aracter.  I conclude with a defence of Peirce&rsqu
 o;s\n        original insight, arguing that empiri
 cal research on\n        perception is a field fro
 m which models of abduction in other\n        doma
 ins (such as scientific reasoning) can and should 
 draw\n        inspiration.</p>\n    \n        <p>F
 or more information contact Nina Gierasimczuk\nat 
 <a class="email">N.Gierasimczuk <span class="at">a
 t</span> uva.nl</a>.</p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2009/newsitem/3058/29-
 October-2009-Logic-and-Cognition-Seminar-Alistair-
 Isaac
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